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PREFACE 
The Japan Economic Research Center held an inter-
national conference from January 9 through 13, 1968 on the 
subject of "Pacific Trade and Development" . Cont ained 
in this book are the papers and proceedings of the conference . 
Trade policies in the Post- Kennedy Round world are 
fluid and searching for new di rection . The devaluation of 
the pound sterling and its effect on gold and the dollar were 
a severe shock for the Pacific countries . A restructuring 
of European trade can be anticipated . The North-South 
problem is soon to be debated again in New Delhi. 
At this time, there seems an urgent need to promote 
Pacific economic cooperation, to develop measures for expand-
ing trade among Pacific countries , and to promote trade and 
aid for developing countri es in Asi a and Latin America . 
The fluidity in world trade polici es and the uncertainty in world 
trade and monetary arrangements serve to emphasise the urgen-
cy of this task . 
The conference was ori ginally planned with a very humble 
desire to promote keener inter est in economi c development and 
trade expansion among countri es in the extended Pacific area, 
including Asian and Lati n American developing countri es . 
These countri es have huge potenti al for future development . 
The importance of this potential has tended to be neglected in 
the past . 
At the end of very intensi ve and fruitful di scussions which 
ranged over a wide area of trade and ai d problems i n the extend-
ed Pacific area , we are full of enthusi asm and confidence that 
it is r eally worthwhile to study further and deeply the feasi-
bility , as well as difficulties , of the establishment of a Paci-
fic Free Trade Area . Our studies should certainly sti mu-
late, within 3 or 5 years, moves by nations around Pacific 
Basin towards closer economi c cooperation . This would 
benefit not only trade expansi on among advanced countries but 
also for the economic development of Asian and Lati n American 
developing count ries due to the joint aid efforts which could be 
more effectively realized through the closer partnership of 
advanced Pacific basin countries . 
As indicated in the final communique issued by the confe -
rence , our study should be continued, and our study should be 
academi c and free from various pressures except truth. 
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Our study is, however, policy oriented, and, it is hoped, 
the results of our study will contribute to policy-making for 
the benefit of nations in the extended Pacific area. 
Finally, we would like to express our sincere thanks to 
the members of the secretariat and others who made the meet-
ing so successful. 
January, 1968 
Kiyoshi Kojima 
Chairman of the Organizing Committee 
for "Pacific Trade and Development" 
Saburo Okita 
President of the Japan Economic 
Research Center 
COMM UNIQUE 
A conference on Pacific Trade and Development was 
held under the sponsorship of the Japan Economic Research 
Center from l 1-13th January 1968 to discuss the trade needs 
and policies of advanced Pacific countries and the aid and 
trade needs of less developed countries, especially in Asia 
and Latin America . Economists from Australia, Canada, 
Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States participated in the Conference, 
Discussion ranged over a wide area of trade and aid 
problems. These included consideration of a proposal for 
the formation of a Pacific Free Trade Area as a means for 
promoting freer trade and higher income levels generally. 
The potential gains from such a free trade area were 
fully recognized, No less clearly recognized was the fact 
that not all the economies concerned are ready for any im-
mediate move to free trade , Economic gains, while definite, 
may well be unevenly distributed between countries and, in 
all, there are difficulties which prevent the adoption of any 
such proposal in the near future, 
Moreover, a Pacific Free Trade Area is not the only 
possibility . Alternative international economic strategies 
are open for consideration. The best course for Pacific 
area countries, developed and less developed alike, would, 
for example, be affected by the outcome of Britain's applica-
tion to join the EEC , Again, the best combination of aid 
and trade policies for all countries concerned with develop-
ment in the Asian/Pacific Area will be affected by the outcome 
of the important official discussions to take place at the forth-
coming meeting of the U. N. Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment in New Delhi. Any consideration of regional trade 
groupings must include careful assessment of the effects of 
such proposals on trade access for developing countries to the 
markets of the advanced countries. 
While recognizing all these problems, however, the 
Conference agreed 1) that there was a strong case for step-
by- step moves towards close co- operation in trade policies 
among Pacific economies and 2) that there was also a strong 
case for more co-ordination in their aid policies. This co-
ordination is needed not only to increase the effectiveness of 
aid as an instrument of economic development but also to relate 
aid to the expansion of export earnings by developing economies. 
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COMMUNIQUE 
Participants in the Conference stressed the need in mem-
\ ber countries both for continued public discussion of these im-
1 portant problems and for their regular consideration by govern-
l. men ts . The Conference welcomed an offer by the hbsts and 
H .P. Jones, Chancellor of the East-West Center in Hawaii, 
to confer on arrangements for a further conference in about a 
year's time. 
January 13, 1968 
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Chapter 1 CANADA AND PACIFIC TRADE POLICY 
by H. Edward English 
Director, School of Commerce, Carleton University 
The purpose of this paper is to indicate the nature of 
Canadian views on the economic and political significance of 
international trade policy for Canada and, in particular, to 
assess the probable implications for Canada of trade liberali -
zation among the countries of the Pacific area. 
I The Historical Development of Canada's Trade Relation-
ships 
In assessing Canada's interest in international trade 
policies, it is important to examine both the historical record 
and present circumstances . While many of the historical 
factors which have governed Canadian policies are still opera-
tive, the postwar peri od has generated both new trading rela-
tionships and new considerations affecting our tradi tional 
relationships . 
Historically, Canada' s interests have r elated primarily 
to its unique rel ati on to the United States, to the B r iti sh 
preferential sys tem , and to the domestic pur poses which trade 
and trade policies serve . Ever since the interior of the 
North Ameri can continent became an economi cally- accessible 
locus of agricultural and industrial activi ty, about the middle 
of the last century, Canadi an and U . S . economic destinies 
became interlocked . Many of those who developed one of 
the first manufactur ing industri es of the Ottawa valley were 
U, S. lumbering men from New England who saw their oppor-
tunity in a vaster supply of Canadian resources and the wait -
ing demand in the markets for construction materials in the 
United States as well as in Britain . It should be added that 
the development of that industry was assisted by the recipro-
city agreement of 1854, under which squared timber and other 
commodities important to the trade potentials of the time could 
pass freely across the border. 
The first experiment in Canada- U . S . reciprocity broke 
down in 1866, partly as a result of the nationalistic aftermath 
of the American Civil War and partly as a reaction to imposi-
tion of new Canadian duties on products not covered by the 
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treaty, which nevertheless undermined U.S. enthusiasm for 
reciprocity. Interest in a renewal and extension of recipro-
cal free trade was subsequently expressed repeatedly. At 
first the United States resisted the idea, partly on grounds 
of fear of competition from British manufacturers, but later 
efforts were resisted mainly by Canada, which by 1880 had 
adopted a protective tariff to support manufacturing industries, 
In 1911, a reciprocity agreement became one of the principal 
issues (but not by any means the only issue) on which a bitter 
election was fought and the government defeated. From then 
until after the Second World War, the issue was not seriously 
debated. 
The British connection was the other main feature of 
Canada's historic trade relationships. From 1846 until com-
paratively recent times, trade between Canada and Britain 
was governed by a rather asymmetrical trade policy. For 
its part, Britain, while in the vanguard of modern industriali-
zation, rejected protection, and Canada, being an increasing· 
ly competitive supplier of the foodstuffs and raw materials 
which comprised Britain's main imports, found in Britain its 
principal market in the years before the First World War . 
Canada, as a colony with a young economy, was permitted 
tariffs both for revenue and a measure of protection for manu-
facturing . Throughout the period before 1914, this relation-
ship thrived, the more so as Canada opened up the west, shipp· 
ing grain primarily across the Atlantic, and buying back the 
capital goods which established transportation links with the 
west, and consumer goods for a growing population . The in-
flow of British capital helped to avoid the financial embarrass-
ments of rapid development, and made Canada a classic case 
for the study of the transfer mechanism. 
Per haps the most important practical aspect of Canada's 
trade policy toward Britain is that the importance of the 
British connection and of the British market helped to ensure 
that Canada did not discriminate against British goods even 
when they were the most important source of import competition. 
It is also significant that we began to discriminate in favour of 
British imports only in the interwar years, by which time the 
United States and other countries were becoming the most com· 
petitive suppliers of many manufactured goods demanded in 
Canada. The essence of the famous (or infamous) Ottawa 
agreements of 1932 was to achieve preferences in trade betweeTI 
members of the Commonwealth and Empire by raising tariffs 
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governing imports from non-members. Thus the sources of 
imports were shifted to a degree, in Canada's instance favour-
ing British exports at the expense of the United States and, 
to a lesser degree, Europe and Japan. But the principal 
purpose of the exercise in the 1930s was to ensure that imports 
should not comprise an increasing share of the depressed 
domestic market. 
The legacy of the British preferential system has not been 
nearly as great as its critics or most enthusiastic supporters 
have claimed. In the Canadian case, even before the outbreak 
of war, Canada and the United States had begun to reduce their 
most restrictive barriers, and for the postwar years the supply 
problems of recovery dominated trade barriers as a factor limit-
ing the growth of Canadian imports from all but the United 
States, Even now that these have been largely overcome, 
Britain has had to share the Canadian market with other Europe-
an exporters, 
Though a number of manufacturing plants were established 
in Canada in the interwar years to take advantage of the Common-
wealth preferences, these have remained to exploit primarily 
the Canadian market now that other Commonwealth countries 
have increased the protection accorded to their own manufactur-
ers. Perhaps the only really important continuing opportunity 
which dates from the Ottawa agreements has arisen from the 
free access to the British market itself enjoyed by Canadian 
manufactured exports. Of course, this was meaningful for 
Canada only after the pound had been made convertible again in 
the late 1950s, and once Britain had applied for entry to the 
EEC, Canadian producers could be excused for not regarding 
the marketing opportunities in the United Kingdom as of lasting 
importance. 
Canada's trade with countries other than the United States 
and Britain has grown substantially in importance in recent 
years. In assessing this development, we should not confuse 
short-run with more fundamental shifts . For example, the 
rise since 1950 in Canadian imports from the countries which 
are now members of the EEC has been marked (from 2.1 percent 
to 5. 6 percent of Canadian imports), but the percentage of 
total imports which come from those countries has in fact re-
turned to the relative position which prevailed in 1929. On 
the import side, the really striking long-term changes have 
been the decline in the importance of Britain (from 15. 3 percent 
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of Canadian imports in 1929 to 7 .6 percent in 1963-65) and the 
growth from 9 .1 percent to 15 .1 percent tn the role of countri-
es outside North America and Europe .l! Japan (supplying 
2. 4 percent) is clearly the most important single source, be-
ing Canada's third trading partner, though on the import side 
far behind the United States (69 percent) and only one third 
of the United Kingdom (with 7 .6 percent). Other regions 
showing marked growth are: Central and South America, no\i 
7. 3 percent (compared with 4.1 percent in 1929); middle east 
and Africa, now 2.5 percent (compared with .4 percent in 
1929); other Asian areas, now 1. 9 percent (compared with 
1.6 percent in 1929). Only Oceania, dominated by Australia 
and New Zealand, has declined in importance. The growth 
reflected in imports from developing countries is partly the 
result of expanded imports of petroleum and tropical products, 
and in part a growth of imports of light manufactured articles. 
Canada's exports have also shifted in direction, and here 
the changes have been even more marked. Britain took 14.4 
percent of Canadian exports in 1963-65, but this compares 
with 34 percent in the late 1920s. The EEC countries have 
also declined in relative importance, from 10. 5 percent in 
1928 to 7. 1 percent in 1963-65. The 50 percent relative 
decline in the role of western Europe as a customer for 
Canadian imports has been balanced by a rise from 39 , 6 per-
cent to 55 percent in U.S. share of Canadian exports, and 
growth in Canadian markets in east Europe, Japan and the 
developing countries, East Europe now takes 4. 3 percent 
(were negligible in the late 1920s), Japan now takes 4 percent 
(2. 7 percent in 1928), and the developing countries now take 
9. 9 percent (6 . 8 percent in 1928). 
Two principal trends are reflected in these figures --
the growth of east European, Chinese, and Japanese markets 
for Canadian wheat; and the rise of Canadian exports of a 
wide variety of manufactures, especially to the United States. 
The principal conclusions which emerge from the forego-
ing discussion of Canadian trade history are two: 1) That 
although Canadian trade is still primarily with the United 
States, it is very much more diversified than in the past, with 
manufactured goods playing a large role especially in Canada's 
exports. 2) That Japan, East Europe, and the developing 
countries are of growing importance both in imports and exports 
and together comprise a share of Canadian trade which is ap-
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proaching equivalent importance to Canada's trade with Europe . 
With the growth of the Canadian economy, the importance 
of international trade for Canada has declined slightly, though 
dependence upon trade in a few staple commodities has decreas -
ed more markedly, thanks to the diversification of processing 
and manufacturing activity . While the U . S . marfket has be -
come more important than ever for Canada , the degree to which 
Canadi an vulnerability (whatever that is defined to mean) has 
been increased is questionable . Insofar as trade with other 
countries provides a counterweight (economic and political) to 
the relationship with the United States , the non- European 
world offers as much (if not more) promise as the European . 
II Canada's National Policy 
If Canada- U . S . trade and Canada- Commonwealth trade 
were two of the pillars on which Canadian trade policy has 
rested, the third pillar on which Canadian trade policy was 
founded was the protection of domestic industry . What began 
largely as revenue tariffs were converted into a program of 
support for processing and manufacturing with the introduction 
of the national policy in 1879. This policy has remained in 
effect ever since, with modification according to the needs of 
Canadian export industries . Insofar as these needs required 
reduction or elimination of trade restrictions on partly- process-
ed natural resources , it was not difficult for Canada to make 
deals with her p rincipal tradi ng partners whi ch enabled- each to 
export the raw materials in which it enjoyed an absolute or com-
parative advantage . This was particul arly so fo r Canada-
U. S . trade , since these countries were and are major pro-
ducers of a wide (and in part compl ementary) range of such 
products . So long as the Canadian economy was small and 
undeveloped , there was al so little difficulty in permitting im-
ports of many i ron and steel products , capital goods, and 
textiles from B ritain , while l e av ing some scope for local 
industr y . As the economy matured , however , the comprise 
became more an d more difficult , and the s tructure of the 
Canadi an tariff now reflects an awkward attempt to serve con-
flicting interests . 
This is nowhere more apparent than i n machinery and 
industri al chemicals industri es .']) Because of the require -
ments of the export- oriented resource industr ies for materi al 
and equipment inputs at p r ices comparabl e to those paid by com-
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parable to those µaid by competitors in other countries, low 
tariffs have been established on the categories of commodities 
these industries purchase . In some cases such tariffs apply 
generally (i.e ., to all imports of such commodities), while in 
other cases only if the commodity is being imported for the 
particular industry (in which case it is labelled an " end- use" 
item) . This presents little problem if the item is sufficiently 
specialized to have only a small market in Canada and could 
not be produced economically in Canada for sale in the conti-
nental or world market . But for i tems in whi ch the Canadi an 
market is sufficient to support production at an economi c scal e, 
or in which it could exploit a comparative advantage if it were . 
not for trade restri ctions , the compromise arrangement is un-
sati sfactory because it serves the interest of tradi tional export 
industries at the expense of potenti ally str ong domestic indus t -
ries or newer export industri es . The situati on i s well il -
l us t rated in contrasting the experience of chemical fertilizers 
and petr ochemi cals or of agricultural machinery with othe r 
wi dely used lines of i ndustr ial and mini ng machines . Bec au s e 
of the strength of the agricultural s ector i n the politic al pro-
cess in North America , tariffs on chemical fe r tili zers were 
eliminated . Since important chemicals for fertilizers have 
been produced in Canada as a byproduct of non- ferrous metal s 
production and represent an economic source for the inter-
national market , Canada has become an important exporter of 
chemical fertilizers . In the petrochemi cal area, increased 
opportuni ties have opened up with the development of Canadi an 
petroleum resources . But the international market is not 
available, because of trade restrictions, and the available 
domestic market for petrochemical derivatives is reduced by 
the end- use items permitting imports . Thus the compromi se 
between protection of manufacturing industries and measures 
to ensure the competitive position of Canada's traditional ex-
port industries has become less and less satisfactory as the 
opportunities for production of processed intermediates has 
improved , 
In the case of agricultural machinery, as with chemical 
fertilizers, the political strength of agricultural interests 
brought about the elimination of most relevant trade barriers . 
The consequence has been a rationalization of North American 
production, with Canadian plants of each of the principal firms 
specializing in some products and American plants in others . 
Because the North American market for these products lies 
near the centre of the continent, the loc ation of production has 
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favoured the south end of Lake Michigan. Nevertheless, 
the ratio of Canadian exports to imports of these products has 
continued at approximately the same level as it was before the 
achievement of free trade, though exporters are now more 
specialized and a higher proportion of Canadian exports go to 
the United States rather than overseas markets . In other 
words, specialization within the manufacturing industry has 
taken the sort of course economic theory would lead one to 
expect. It should be added that this happened in spite of 
several aspects of the situation which worked against the 
industry and obstructed its ability to exploit fully the oppor-
tunities for production in Canada. While most tariffs on 
agricultural machinery have been eliminated , tariffs affecting 
some of the industry's inputs remain and also tariffs on some 
other lines of equipment produced by agricultural machinery 
firms (for example , construction equipment) . Since the 
market for most other lines of equipment is concentrated more 
in east of North America, the lack of free trade in such pro-
ducts favours the location in the United States of related pro-
duction lines by agricultural machinery firms. Many kinds 
of industrial machinery which are widely used in Canadian 
resource industries or in a variety of manufacturing industries 
are now produced in Canada, and if export opportunities were 
opened up, producers of such machinery would no longer re-
quire protection to compete with imported machinery, though a 
transition period would be required to develop specialized pro-
duction and the related export market. 
These illustrations indicate the contrasts which may be 
found in Canadian manufacturing activity today. They are 
part of the changing pattern of the Canadian economy, the 
evidence of a degree of maturity which has been achieved in 
part because of the national policy, but perhaps mainly in 
spite of it. Until the First World War, Canada was mainly 
a producer of products of the farm, the fishery, the forest, 
and the mine, with agriculture being by far the dominant. 
All manufacturing activity, including much that was processing 
of primary ;products, totalled much less than the primary in-
dustries.~/ By the late 1920s, the contribution of manufac-
turing to the gross domestic product about equalled that of 
primary producers. By the mid 1950s, manufacturing was 
more than twice as important -- this in spite of marked abso-
lute growth in the primary sector, particularly in mining, in 
which during the period in question (1929-56) both iron mining 
and crude petroleum production became for the first time sig-
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nificant contributors to Canada's primary product output. 
Furthermore, the aggregate for manufacturing now comprises 
a much more diversified range of production, with complex 
manufacturing categories such as electrical apparatus, trans-
portation equipment, and chemical products contributing a very 
much higher percentage of the value added in manufacturing. 
An important feature of the change in the past forty years 
has been growth in the Clome stic market . The population of 
Canada has doubled, and well over half of the current population 
of Canada lies in a narrow band within fifty n,iles north of the 
U . S. border and extending from Windsor to Quebec City . 
Furthermore , the per capita GNP in constant dollars has also 
doubled in the forty years. This means that there is now in 
eastern Canada a market base on which a wide range of manu-
facturing can be -- and is being -- based. The market for 
particular consumer durables products, and for the principal 
types of intermediate goods and industrial machinery, has 
grown from inconsequential levels in the interwar years to a 
size that would support one or more production units of effici-
ent scale (by which I mean plants that could achieve cost levels 
comparable to those in the United States) . 
Now I was to make clear exactly what I do and do not 
mean by this. I do not mean that many Canadian industries 
are at present so organized as to achieve internationally com-
petitive cost levels . Nor do I mean that such levels would 
characterize the production of a wide range of products even 
if industrial organization were fully rationalized. In the 
kind of industries which serve the wide range of specialized 
intermediate functions characteristic of a capital-intensive 
economy, the variety of products is enormous , and the volume 
requirements differ widely. Except where scale economies 
are unimportant, the Canadian market for most of these is not 
l ar ge enough to warrant production in Canada on the basis of 
domestic sales alone, and , for those more specialized pro-
ducts, only if international markets are accessible will pro-
duction in Canada be likely to develop. Canada is now an 
importer of specialized machinery and equipment and particular-
purpose rolling mill products and chemicals . But the one -
tenth or less of machinery or equipment types which are most 
in demand in Canada comprise a very l arge fraction of the total 
demand for equipment , and it i s these larger volume items 
which Canadian producers now find themselves able to supply in 
competiti on with imports . 
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Of course, the selection of products cannot be based on 
market size alone. The technology of production and distri-
bution requires that much larger markets be available for some 
roducts than for others. This may be because of the elabo-
~ ate and expensive capital needed in production processes (as 
in steel, automobiles, and other consumer durables) : it may 
be because of the expensive research and· development f acili -
ties needed to keep a company abreast of others in the field 
(chemicals, electronics , and aero- space industries) : or it 
may be because selling and distribution outlays have become an 
important feature of the oligopolistic rivalry in certain indus -
tries. Of course, the last two of these factors need not af-
fect production location . They bear more particularly on 
the need for a firm size which exceeds plant size . That 
Canadian industry has not played a major role in integr ated 
production of typewri ters and certain types of electrical appli -
ances seems to be explained by the scale required for such 
activities and the limi ted scope for separating the assembly 
function . However , minimum efficient scale of plant is not 
so large as to i mpose on Canadian manufacturing a serious 
constraint i n itself . 
What has happene d in the Canadian automobile industry 
in connection wi th the 1965 Canadian- U . S . agreement i s il -
lustrative . Although scale of production i s ve r y i mportant 
in this industry , Canadian asse mbly plants have become spe-
cialized in producti on of fewer models . Many parts requir-
ing relatively small vol ume in or der to achieve competitive 
cost levels are produced in Canada . For the components 
produced efficiently only in very large volume (in or der to 
spread costs of expensive dies , etc . ), imports from the 
United States are more impor tant , Although integrati on in 
this North American industry has assisted specialization at 
all levels of production , it i s important to recognize explicit-
ly that the integration has helped main ly to overcome the dis -
advantages arisi ng out of having three or four producers with 
a wide variety of product lines . Had the industry been more 
concentrated in either or both of two ways -- fewer manufac -
turers or fewer models -- the Canadian market alone would 
have been able to support efficient integrated production units 
requiring (at the most) to import only certain standard compo-
nents such as automatic transmi ssions . 
The automobile industry is atypi cal in most respects, 
since the size of operations and extent of product differentia-
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tion exceeds that in most industries. However, in two other 
respects it has been representative of the situation in quite a 
few Canadian industries. It i s one of several industries in 
which the combined effect of tariff protection and foreign owne1 
ship has contributed in the past to an inefficient industry. 
Tariff protection has permitted the maintenance of diversified 
production units characterized by small volume production of 
particular products or models, and an oligopoly situation in 
which pricing has been based on the tariff, and the high degree 
of interdependence of the oligopolists has created potentialiy 
very unstable pricing and market behaviour . Foreign owner-
ship has increased the number of firms established in Canada, 
since leading U.S . firms have endeavoured to achieve in 
Canada a relative market share at least as large as they have 
in the United States. This has made it more difficult to 
achieve the economies of scale in Canadian industry and height. 
erred the fear of price competition. This inefficiency, which 
the tariff has done much to generate, has made individual firms 
advocates of continued protection, and since foreign subsidia-
ries have been established in Canada behind the tariff, some 
Canadian government officials and apparently also the manage-
ment of some of the subsidiary firms are afraid that foreign 
head offices would not be prepared, without special incentives , 
to integrate their Canadian production facilities into continent-
al or worldwide marketing arrangements . This is one of the 
reasons for the direct agreements between the Canadian govern 
ment and the automobile companies. 
The foregoing observations on the problems of· Canadian 
manufacturing industries consisted of illustrations taken from 
particular industries. There have recently been a number of 
more general analyses of Canada's productivity problem. One of 
these, by Professor N . H. Lithwick, has focused on the fact 
that there has been a poorer productivity record in manuf actur· 
ing than in other sector of the Canadian economy.!±/ He 
cites the ratios between U . S. and Canadian capital, labour , 
and output and finds that they are, respectively, about 9 : 1, 
12: 1, and 15: 1 . He notes that U . S . manufacturing output 
per worker thus exceeds that in Canada by 22 percent, and 
when the difference in capital is taken into account, U.S. pro-
ductivity advantage is estimated at 30 percent. Among the 
various factors which may explain this difference, he concludes 
that the foremost is, no doubt, the inefficiency introduced into 
the Canadian economy and perpetuated by our tariff policy. 
This carries greater conviction when it is noted that the effi-
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ciency effects of commercial policy bear almost entirely on 
manufacturing . (Other sources of productivity differences 
between the two economies, such as educational attainments, 
do not bear particularly on manufacturing . ) A recent esti-
mate of the cost of the tariff, by the Professors Ronald and 
Paul Wonnacott , suggests that the Canadian tariff and the U . S . 
tariff together may reduce real per capi ta income in Canada by 
at least 10 percent . 5/ Many of the effects are indirect. 
For example , t he higher cost of capital equipment whi ch reduc -
ed the U . S . / Canada capital rates i s p artly attributable to the 
tariffs on machinery and equipment and components . Again , 
insofar as lower Canadian R & D expendi tures restrain 
Canadi an manufacturing productivity , they ar e in fact held 
back by the smaller market avail able to Canadi an firms , and 
the reduced opportunity to spr ead the cost s of developing dis -
tinctive Canadi an products . 
One is dr awn to the c onclusi on that Canada n eeds a sub-
stantial change in commerci al policy as the cornerstone for a 
growth policy designed to take advantage of the enlarged do-
mestic market base and to i mprove productivi ty by specialized 
production and export . This is a need which mo s t of the 
smaller industr ialized states have l ong since realized , the 
Netherlands and Sweden being good examples . P erhaps 
because these countri es are substantially smaller than Canada , 
they have recognized that their manufacturing activity would 
have to depend on external as well as domestic markets , while 
Canadians have flirted with the idea that with a growing popu-
lation they could afford to wait for thei r industri es to become 
cost competitive on the base of the domestic market alone . 
For reasons already cited , this has proven a costly approach , 
and one which i t is neither necessary nor wise to continue . 
III Political Considerati ons Affecting Canadian Trade Policy 
Whether Canada is likely to be a willing participant in any 
trading arrangement which would help to achieve improved pro-
ductivity will depend on both domesti c and international politics . 
The domestic political scene in Canada is not promising . 
During the past five years, successive Canadian governments 
have shown little active concern for intermediate or long-term 
economic problems, and particularly not with international 
economic policies. Part of the preoccupation has been the 
consequence of minority federal governments and the urgent 
domestic problem of national uni ty and federal-provincial 
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relations . Among economic policies, there was more concern 
for restoration of full employment until 1965, and subsequently, 
recurring worry over inflationary pressures. Meanwhile, 
the growing demands for resources for such social purposes as 
improvement of transportation, education, and health services 
has put pressure on public revenues, and in view of the divi-
sion of responsibility for such services, sharpened the contro-
versy over distribution of revenue sources between federal and 
provincial governments. Only very recently has there been 
much stress upon the possible relevance of trade policies to 
these issues, There is now a growing realization that 
Canada's capacity to sustain full employment without sevel'.'e 
inflation, and to finance public services, both federal and 
provincial, are likely to be promoted by the more competitive 
and productive economy which freer international trade and 
related policies can make possible . 
One of the important aspects of any assessment of the 
domestic political implications of elimination of trade barriers 
is the regional impact. It has always been argued that the 
outlying regions of Canada have borne disproportionately the 
burden of the tariff, because it has served to protect higher 
cost manufacturing activity located largely in the central pro-
vinces, Recent reassessment of the regional implications of 
removal of trade barriers in the light of the improved potential 
and reduced locational disadvantag-es already mentioned has 
indicated that the greatest beneficiaries of the elimination of 
trade barriers in Canada would be the central provinces, 
Ontario and Quebec, because it is these provinces which have 
the greatest unrealized productive potential. Thus, the 
Atlantic and western provinces would gain from the lower re -
lative costs of manufactured products and the advantages of 
better access to external markets and suppliers, while the 
central provinces would now experience, in addition to the 
above gains, the gains in productive efficiency and competitive-
ness. They face, of course, more of an adjustment problem, 
but as in the automotive case, the nature of the adjustment 
should be largely within firms, in the internal organization of 
production or the pattern of specialization. 
These economic considerations should make it more attrac-
tive for Canadian political parties to adopt bold trade policies, 
The major economic deterrent, apart from failure to study and 
appreciate the changing character of the Canadian economy and 
its policy needs, may well be excessive preoccupation with the 
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transitional costs and their immediate effect on electoral suc-
cess. A departure from minority government and new leader-
ship for the governing party (whichever it is) can play an im-
portant role in placing such problems in perspective. 
One of the problems facing Canada's political leaders is 
that the albatrosses of traditional doctrinaire positions still 
hang around the necks of the two largest Canadian parties. 
The Liberal Party appears particularly sensitive to its his-
toric identification with a "free trade" position. 
Thus, it is characteristic of older leaders of that party 
to favour "freer" rather than "free" trade, while many younger 
leaders of the party, especially from Toronto, identify sub-
stantial moves toward free trade with what is labelled "conti-
nentalism." The attitudes of this group seem about identical 
with those of the "Canada First" movement of the 1870s, of 
which Professor Frank Underhill said the following: 
" • • , it was easy for them to identify the special 
interests of Toronto with the general interests of the 
nation as a whole. Their movement, after all, re-
presented only the rhetoric of nationalism; they had 
not thought their way through the conditions which 
limit and determine any definition of the national 
interest, In the final analysis the Canada First 
movement was only a sectional movement clothing 
itself in the impressive garments of nationalism. 11 6/ 
What is striking is any young Canadians today should still have 
so little confidence in the ability of their country (and especial-
ly of Ontario) to participate and compete on equal terms in the 
continental or world economy . Part of the problem is their 
preoccupation with the extent of foreign, especially American, 
ownership of Canadian industry. As already suggested, they 
fail to appreciate the degree to which trade barriers have both 
promoted foreign ownership and hindered the ability of subsi-
diary firms to use their Canadian facilities effectively. 
What these people should be doing instead of floundering in un-
comfortable confusion over the problems posed by foreign owner-
ship is to build upon a free trade foundation a set of domestic 
policies to ensure that both foreign- controlled and domestic 
enterprises exploit their full potential for specialized produc-
tive activity. For the Liberal Party, the development of a 
program of this sort is not merely economically advantageous, 
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but of considerable importance in restoring.political support in 
the western provinces, where they have been unsuccessful in 
recent years and where local political leaders have been most 
harsh in their criticism of economic nationalists. 
Some of the more pragmatic politicians of the other parti-
es may well pre-empt a liberal trade policy . They too are 
coming to appreciate the economic importance of trade to the 
process of ensuring sound economic growth, and they may be 
less constrained by previous positions. Although the Con-
servatives were the avowed protectionists of the nineteenth 
century, their leaders frequently demonstrated a wi llingness 
to explore reciprocity with the United States and only occa-
sionally , as in 1911 , took up a relatively clear position against 
it . In recent years , the leaders of the Conservative Party 
have been from the western and Atlantic provinces , and could 
be expected to take a favourable view of the role of a liberal 
trade policy in achieving national objectives . The present 
Conservative leader, Roberd Stanfield , displ ays both an in-
terest in economic policies and a willingness to employ economic 
advice in a pragmatic way. Whether he would be likely to 
adopt a bold program recognizing the contribution that trade 
policy can make to Canadian productivity and sound and sustain-
able economic growth cannot as yet be ascertained. 
The New Democratic Party has lately played down its 
propensity to economic nationalism, largely as a result of the 
efforts of thoughtful members of the parliamentary group to 
study the structure and performance problems of Canadian in-
dustry. 
On the domestic political scene one may , I think, conclude 
that the economic and political potential for a bold trade policy 
is appearing on the scene . There is arising a common assess· 
ment among those who have done empirical studies on Canada' s 
industrial economy (in the universities and in government ser-
vice) , among the leaders of the business community and a num-
ber of the younger political leaders, and among a few economi-
cally sophisticated newspapermen . The realization lag among 
others arises out of attachment to traditional policies and insti-
tutions, and fear of the consequences of change, etc . An in-
ordinate political influence has been exercised by those busi-
nesses which lack managerial confidence to face the new chal-
lenge, in part because they may be concerned over the ability 
of government to comprehend and provide for the needs of tran-
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sition. In other cases the opposition arises out of a simple 
fear of loss of profit currently derived under circumstances of 
comfortable protection . But these comments only serve to 
underline the breakdown in the foundation of the old alignment 
of political forces respecting trade policies and the opportunity 
for political leadership which now exists . 
IV The Role of Trade Policy in Canada's International 
Political Role 
On the international political scene , trade policies have 
always been a very important aspect of Canada's stance, if 
only because Canada' s role among the trading nations is rel a-
tively greater than her influence in other spheres , such as the 
military . Much can be said, and has been sai d , about 
Canada' s past role in the U . N . and NATO , its direct influ-
ence in Washington and London, and so forth . At the r i sk 
of oversimplification , Canada' s political position could be sum-
marized as follows : Canada i s a North American country 
with many interests in common with the United States , but 
with a dete r minati on , wher ever necessary , to promote differ-
ent (and presumably more effective) means to the achievement 
of these ends . 7/ For exampl e : 
1. Canada, like the United States , opposes the spr ead of 
Communist gover nments by invasion or subversion of popu-
lar governments , but may well differ on what constitutes 
"popular" government and therefore as to what constitutes 
subversion or the appropriate means of dealing with it . 
It is sometimes said that Canada's attitude to the Soviet 
Union and China has been influenced by the importance of 
these countries as markets for Canadian wheat in recent 
years . Such influences may to a degree be present, but 
I think that it should also be said that Canadians have never 
impressed wi th the argument that her exports of foodstuffs 
are likely to contribute to the strengthening of the strategic 
position of nations like the USSR and China . We have 
also held a somewhat less monolithi c conception of the Com-
munist world than that which has from t i me to time been 
held in Washington . Except for Viet Nam , however, 
Washington and Ottawa views of the nature of the Commun-
ist forces and of -policies needed to deal with them do not 
appear at present to differ greatly . 
2 . Canada and the United States have a common interest in 
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maintaining the security system of the North Atlantic count· 
ries, though there are differences of opinion, particularly 
within Canada, as to just what the Canadian role should be 
There is also a good deal more scepticism in Canada about 
Washington's policy of promoting British entry into the 
European Common Market, insofar as this is regarded as 
likely to contribute to the strengthening of the North Atlant. 
ic relationship. Canadians are more prone to question 
the extent to which Britain can be expected to influence 
Europe's role in the world as a member of the EEC, par-
ticularly if the terms are as stiff as is now implied in 
Paris. There is also concern about the economic damage 
which might be done while Britain is left at the door await-
ing entry . 
3. Canada and the United States have an almost identical view 
on the need for cooperation among all industdally advanced 
states, and the particular importance of providing for the 
means by which Japan, as the most important of the non-
Atlantic countries in this category, can be incorporated 
in vari ous institutional arrangements . In the past decade, 
this concern has been reflected in the support by North 
America for full Japanese participation in GATT and the 
OECD. 
4. Canada and the United States have a very similar concern 
for the problems of development in the world. Canada, 
like the United States, has never been a colonial power in 
the traditional sense, but as an ex- member of the British 
Empire, Canada has been somewhat more familiar with 
the colonial record and a little less prone than the United 
States to oversimplified critical views of colonialism. 
More important for the present day, Canada's relationships 
with the developing world are complicated by the legacy of 
the British i mperial relation - - the special concern for the 
West Indies and Columbo Plan countries being the most 
notable instances . (Canadian interests in the developing 
world have been further complicated by the development 
challenges in both ex- British and ex- French countries in 
Africa . ) Among the developing countries , the United 
States has only one t r aditional relationship - - that with 
Latin America . 
The role of trade policy may serve all the foregoing 
political interests . It can be a feature of east- west Rapproche 
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ment, a means of providing Britain an alternative to EEC mem-
i)ership and of similar opportunities for Japan , and a vital as -
pect of development strategy . It is the last which is probably 
of greatest and most urgent importance . Unlike most Europe-
an governments, Canada and the United States today have a 
direct interest in all three of the major continental sectors of 
the developing world, and are faced with the need to bring 
about a measure of joint action if the economic development 
needs of all these areas are to be met . To date, however, 
such action occurs only in the established U . N . institutions , 
and in the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD . 
None of these arrangements has dealt adequately with trade 
matters and aggregate foreign aid has been on the decline in 
relative terms . Commodity agreements have played a sig-
nificant role in a limited range of the trade in raw mate rials, 
but as the UNCT AD documents and other studies since 1964 
have stressed, these have not succeeded in stabilizing income 
from many primary industries . And the structure of trade 
barriers continues to impose high effective obstacles to manu-
factured exports from the developing countries, and thus to 
deter the expansion of such exports . 
Canada and the United States, even more than European 
countries, were unprepared to respond to the UNCT AD de-
mands of 1964. Like other GATT members, they were pre-
occupied with the Kennedy Round (and some say did not even 
make an effective public relations effort in support of the un-
ilateral extension of Kennedy Round concessions offered by 
GATT members to the developing countries) . Unlike the 
Europeans, they could not point to existing preference systems 
and, in the case of Britain, offer to generalize the applica-
tion of existing preferences . 
Since the 1964 UNCT AD meeting, certain trends have 
developed, though none with sufficient clarity as to inspire 
much confidence in their continuity . It is possible that 
African countries, including former British colonies, may 
follow the lead of Nigeria i n working out modified forms of 
association with the EEC as well as to maintain , or perhaps 
even enlarge, regional groupings among themselves . These 
problems of productive potential do not as yet appear to be so 
closely related to market access as to require any more gene -
ral arrangements . Latin American countries have agreed to 
establish a free trade area . If thi s i s carried forward, it 
may be possible for the United States to offer temporary un-
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ilateral concessions (or preferences) to Latin America, 
though this will depend on estimates of the supply elasticities 
of Latin American producers and of the anticipated impact on 
the Uni ted States . As the Latin American market develops, 
Canada may find it increasingly difficult to avoid participating 
in a western hemisphere trading relationship, though the most 
immediate possibility for Canada lies in a much mor e modest 
arrange ment including only the Commonwealth Caribbean . 
Whatever the possibilities i n Latin America and Africa, 
the problems of Asian development remain the most challengi ng 
The massive capital requirements and the foreign trade implica 
tions of speciali zed manufacturing suggest that joint action will 
be essential to a breakthrough to higher per capita incomes in 
this area . One of the reservations that may be expressed 
about British entry into Europe is the possible withdrawal of 
access to the British market for exports from major Asian 
Commonwealth members such as India and P a.kistan . If these 
countries are to be assisted in any substantial way, coopera-
tion among the United States, the other countries of the Paci-
fic area , and the USSR may be required . China may pro-
vide the needed challenge to explore the possibilities of a com-
mon development strategy, though at present the Viet Nam war 
appears virtually to eliminate the prospect for such cooperatior 
As already indicated, Canada has a traditional interest 
in the evolution of more effective development strategy for Asia 
though Canada can itself provide only modest aid, when this i s 
considered in relation to the needs of this area . Thus only 
as a party to larger development schemes is Canada's role 
likely to be significant . 
Canadian interests have been discussed in relation to 
those of the United States. Some of the distinctive features 
of Canada's attitudes and approaches to policy have been men-
tioned . Perhaps the most essential point with which to con-
clude this section of the paper is that Canadian governments 
(and the Canadian people) wish to maintain scope for policies 
which express a distinctive role in world affairs . This is 
not to be different merely for the sake of being different, but 
rather because of a belief that Canada may serve its own inte-
r ests , and pe rhaps even those of the United States , better by 
standing ready on occasion to diverge from Washington's views. 
T his is important for t r ade policy only in one very limited 
sense . It may be better for Canada to belong to a larger 
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trade group rather than one including only the United States 
and Canada . A North American free trade area has been 
suggested as the answer to the essential need for rationaliza-
tion of Canadian manufacturing industries in the years ahead . 
In the context of the earlier part of this paper , it seems to me , 
as it has to other students of Canada' s domestic policy prob-
lems, that a Canada- U.S . arrangement would indeed help sig-
nificantly to solve these problems . But it would certainly do 
little to resolve the problems of other countries unless it were 
a stage in the kind of joint action required to meet those othe r 
greater challenges . Thus, it is i n the interest of Canada' s 
own political identity as well as the mutual politic al concern of 
both North American countries to promote wider development 
and trade strategies. 
V Trade Policy Options 
Any evaluation of the role of trade policy mus t begin 
with a review of the status of trade barriers and of the alter-
native means of removing them . 
Following the establishment of the two European com-
munities and the Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations , the 
level of nominal tariffs between developed countries has been 
greatly reduced from the levels operative ten years ago. 
There will soon be free trade in industrial goods within each 
of the two European groups , the EEC and EFT A, and the ex-
ternal tariffs of these groups and of the United States range 
for the most part between 5 and 10 percent, after the Kennedy 
Round reductions have been ~ffected through staged reductions 
ending in the early 1970s . Countries of the Pacific area, 
particularly Canada, Australia, and New Zealand , will now 
be among those few with relatively higher tariffs . 
A number of conclusions about future trade policy have 
been drawn by GATT authorities and by spokesmen for the 
United States and the EEC : 
1. No further general round of tariff reductions under GATT 
is likely, both because of the time it will take to effect the 
Kennedy Round concessions and because the remaining 
tariffs are in many cases not high enough to generate much 
enthusiasm for the benefits their removal would provide . 
2 . Since tariffs of the larger trading partners are now low , 
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any further negotiations would likely involve movements to 
free trade, and this would be meaningful only if such nego-
tiations were also to include non- tarrif barriers . 
3. Since multilateral across - the - board removal of remaining 
tariffs and non-tarrif barriers is too far reaching to con-
template, a sectoral approach is proposed, with the em-
phasis on the industrial materials sectors suggested as 
the first area for exploring the application of such an ap-
proach. 
It is also generally acknowledged that the EEC will not be 
much interested in pressing ahead with this or any other GATT neg( 
tiation for several years . At this point, the common external tariff 
and common agricultural policy at present represent the main symb( 
of the Community' s economic identity, and much of its substance, 
Now it is quite clear that the above conclusions concern-
ing GATT. are not nearly so relevant for Canada, and perhaps 
not for other Pacific countries, as they are for the EEC and 
the United States (a fact which has not deterred some Canadi-
an spokesmen from echoing them). There can be little doubt 
that Canada could benefit from free trade in industrial raw 
materials, but in fact many of her raw material exports already 
enjoy almost free access to important markets. And for other 
similar products, such as industrial chemicals, sectoral free 
trade could leave Canadian industry with significant negative 
effective protection unless materials and equipment used by the 
industry were also subject to sectoral free trade . If all sec-
tors except consumer goods were incorporated into sectoral 
free trade, the effective protection of such industries would 
be increased, an outcome which, as past Canadian experience 
suggests, could merely accentuate the present inefficient st-
ructuring of industry. Canada would be far better off economi· 
cally with across-the- board free trade, assuming an appropri-
ate transition period and adjustment policies. 
Before discussing the relative merits of any particular 
free trade areas, it should be noted thatthere is at present an 
institutional drag on the so-called "regional" approach to 
trade liberalization . GATT spokesmen and supporters have 
openly opposed most efforts to dismantle trade barriers on 
anything but a multilateral basis, even though the General 
Agreement itself provides for such approaches in Article 24. 
I question whether this opposition is wise in the present cir-
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cumstances, when by the admission of most of those same 
GATT spokesmen the traditional multilateral techniques may 
not be applicable in the near future . Insistence upon the 
tr aditional method may bring a frustration which could leave 
the field to much more specific approaches to solution of the 
trade problems of individual countries, or could even permit 
backsliding into protectionism in the absence of effective ini-
tiatives. No one can assume that free trade arrangements on 
a regional basis can always be as practical as the EEC or 
EFT A, but neither should one close off promising regional 
approaches to multilateral objectives . Both on the basi s of 
geographic proximity (the traditional concept of a region) and 
on grounds of stage of economic development, one can conceive 
of groupings of countries which could move toward a common 
and liberal commercial policy (in accordance with Article 24) 
more quickly than other countries occupying a smaller or less 
economic ally advanced region or group . . If at the same time 
such countries have as their aim a cumulative approach to the 
multilateral abandonment of artificial trade barriers, region-
al groupings may well serve to sustain the momentum of the 
processes initiated under GATT in the past . Regionalism 
has contributed to security in the North Atlantic, to the 
rationalization of aid and development programs, and in 
Europe and elsewhere to trade liberalization and payments 
equilibria. Yet there is danger that in some quarters con-
structive proposals for regional approaches may not get the 
consideration they deserve, and that this neglect will occur 
because of a greater concern with institutional prerogatives 
than with the principles and aims to be served. 
VI Pacific Free Trade -- A Canadian View 
We come then to prospective trade policies of the Paci-
fic area countries, and to the question of what sort of free 
trade arrangement might be adapted to the needs of all these 
countries. Do they really constitute a region? What do 
they have in common other than an interest in use of the 
Pacific ocean as a highway for trade? What of the other in-
terests of these same countries? 
While I can speak with some c onfidence only about the 
attitudes and interests of the North American countrie s , it is, 
I think, very evident that the Pacific are a is not really a 
region; it is a hemi sphere or a little more. Clearly the 
most important common interests of the five Pacific rim count-
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ries arise out of the fact that they are all industrially develop-
ed, that each has an important stake in international trade 
(though for the United States the stake is more political than 
economic), and that none of them is now a member of one or 
other of the regional European groupings which include all 
other industrially advanced countries. . Having established 
this common ground, it must at once be admitted that many 
other interests diverge widely. In the narrower regional 
sense , there are three regions involved, one large - - North 
America , one medium sized -- Japan, and the other small --
Australia and New Zealand . T his obvious distinction is 
brought out only because it is undoubtedly the source of many ' 
of the differences in interest . Certainly Canada' s approach , 
as already argued, relates l argely to the unique nature of the 
Canada- U . S . rel ationship . The only other common interest 
i s the need for joint action on b ehalf of the developing countries 
of this same region . Thus a free trade association must be 
explored for those varied benefits it may offer the advanced 
countri es of this region and for the opportunity it may provide 
for a common and coordinated answer to the challenge of deve -
lopment in southeast Asian and Latin America. 
From the Canadian viewpoint, and for reasons already 
spelled out at some length, a free trade association among 
these countries would serve several useful purposes : 
l. It would enable the kind of move to free trade in industrial 
products which would help Canadian industry to rationalize 
its pattern of production and trade in specialized manuf ac -
tures, as well as to maintain the traditional exports of 
foodstuffs and industrial raw materials. 
2. In parti cular because a free trade arrangement embodies 
a clear aim to achieve free flow of goods among its members , 
it should be easier in the context of such an arrangement to 
work out means for guaranteeing that non- tariff barriers 
will be eliminated or controlled . The association could 
not be established unless this were achieved to the satis -
faction of the member countries, and it is difficult to con-
ceive of a really satisfactory alternative context for an 
attack upon non- tariff barriers . 
3 . Because the f ree trade area approach , in its recent mani-
fe stations , has incor porated arrangements for the transi-
tion period, thi s approach to trade liberalization assists 
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member countries in adapting to exp ected competitive chal-
lenges . Such t r ansition periods are, of course, pos-
sible under the traditional multilateral approach also, as 
evident in the Kennedy Round arrangements. But in a 
smaller regional group it might be possible to take fuller 
account of the differences in extent of adjustment required 
by allowing transitional periods of greater length for the 
smaller members , in this case Canada, Australia , and 
New Zealand . 
4
0 
A free trade area, by its nature, permits each member to 
adopt its own commercial policy towards non member s . 
I believe this feature would also serve the purpose of the 
Pacific area countries . The three subsections of the 
Pacific group have particular relationships which they do 
not share with the others . So far as Canada is c oncern-
ed, the most obvi ous examples are the preferehces exchang-
ed with the West Indi es and Britain, and a possible new 
relation with Latin America in which Canada, as well as 
the United States, could become involved . Of course , 
the relations between developed countries and the less 
developed nations could, as suggested, become a topic for 
common action by the Pacific area countries. The new 
opportunities for trade and economic strength in the Paci-
fic area might make it possible to provide free access to 
all five members for the exports from all or most of the 
developing countries in this region . In any case , the 
flexibility of the external commercial policy of a free trade 
group (as opposed to a customs union) would make it pos -
sible to adopt a different pace of liberalization respecting 
the various developing areas , perhaps in accordance with 
the different stages of economic development . A poor er 
country, such as Indonesia, might be afforded free access 
immediately, while other more advanced regions, such as 
Formosa, must be expected to offer reciprocal concessions 
in exchange for those provided by the full members of the 
Pacific group. 
The free trade area approach to Pacific trade relation• 
ships will thus accommodate many of the n e eds of this area . 
It does , however , present certain problems : I will concen-
trate upon two of these. One concerns its apparent exclusive-
ness. The other arises out of certai n di s tinctive institution-
al features of the member states which pose problems for the 
harmonizati on of commercial practices . 
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It is clear that a Pacific trade grouping, even though it 
would in any case include all developed countries which are 
not already members of one of the European communities, 
should avoid exclusiveness on principle. In the first place, 
it should be possible at some stage to generalize trade liberali-
zation by a reciprocal dismantling of barriers with the EEC 
and with members of EFT A. Indeed, if Britain is to be 
excluded indefinitely from the EEC, this could occur by EFT A 
and the Pacific group joining together, followed eventually by 
EEC membership in a general trading association of developed 
states . These possibilities suggest that it might be best from 
the beginning to establish a general free trade association of 
which the Pacific countries could be charter members, but 
which could be open to membership on a reciprocal basis to all 
developed countries. 
The remaining trade relationships to be worked out would 
include those with the USSR and Eastern Europe, and those 
with the developing countries, especially the large continental 
Asian countries -- India, Pakistan, and eventually China . 
These problems may well be interrelated. The development 
of a basis for trade between advanced countries of the non-
Communist world and the USSR and its Eastern European as -
sociates is gradually being worked out under GATT auspices. 
It seems likely that it will eventually become possible for all 
these countries to associate with GATT by a consistent set of 
rules which will enable an expanded flow of trade with a mini-
mum degree of discrimination. 
But another crucial question must also be resolved -- how 
far and by what means will the USSR and the countries of 
Eastern Europe participate in solving the development problem? 
Clearly, the area of greatest importance is south Asia. 
The size of the development problem there is enormous, and 
the political challenge posed by China affects both Soviet and 
U . S. interests. It seems improbable that adequate aid re-
sources will be forthcoming and that adequate scope will be 
provided for the exports of the large Asian countries unless 
the United States and USSR can cooperate to this end. 
The Pacific area countries will have an opportunity to work 
out development techniques, and through their collective ac -
tion may also be able to promote, through GATT and the OECD, 
a joint development program in south Asia . Unless this can 
be done, there is danger that that region could come increas -
ingly under the influence of Chinese Communism. 
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Thus the Pacific free trade group (better named the 
general free trade association) might become the means both 
of preventing existing regional arrangements from becoming 
restrictive and of achieving effective development strategies . 
The success of a free trade grouping in which both Japan 
and the North American countries are full members would 
also appear to depend on the resolution of a problem of harmo-
nizing what have been called , in the EEC or EFT A, "the 
rules of competiton . " The constitution of a free trade as -
sociation is normally less explicit about such matters than is 
that governing a customs union or common market . In the 
case of the European Free Trade Association, the members 
agree to consult if differences among the domestic practices 
of members are likely to lead to frustration of the aims of the 
Association . There have been committees to consider dif-
ferences in the treatment of restrictive practices and in the 
rules governing the establishment of foreign enterprise in 
EFT A, but the differences have not to date required the adop -
tion of additional conventions . Differences between the 
domestic practices of Japan and the United States or Canada 
would appear to present more serious problems . For exam-
ple, both Canada and the United States are federal countries 
and it is possible for provincial or state governments to sub-
sidize or protect certain activities even when federal commer-
cial policy is liberal. According to North American sources , 
the operation of Japanese trading institutions can have similar 
effects, affecting both the ability of foreign manufacturers to 
compete with domestic Japanese producers and the choice 
among otherwise highly competitive foreign sources for im-
ports. Now it is customary in the context of traditional 
trade negotiations to treat the practices and institutions I have 
just cited as purely domestic matters . I do not believe it 
would be possible to inspire confidence in the favourable 
economic consequences of a free trade association involving 
the Pacific countries unless these countries recognize the 
need to adapt any domestic policies which are likely to inter -
fere in a major way with the benefits of specializati on under 
free trade . 
One of the most important aspects of this question relates 
to the role of foreign-owned enterprises . Canada and Japan 
have adopted different approaches . There is no time to go 
into this complex question, but on the basis of Canadian ex-
perience, I think it can be said that the participation of inter-
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national enterprises can be an important means of achieving 
more equal competitive conditions within a free trade zone. 
I do not mean by this that no form of control or equity is per-
missible in such a grouping. In any such group involving the 
United States, the ownership arrangements are likely to be 
asymmetrical, and other participants might be excused for 
introducing information-disclosure requirements and guidelines 
to ensure that foreign subsidiaries will respond to the legiti-
mate and economically-justifiable interests of the host country . 
But if control of foreign capital goes much further than this, 
it may fortify, or may seem to fortify, trading practices which 
are inimical to the purposes of the free trade area. 
Much is said now about the importance of non-tariff bar-
riers . The i ssue is often overstated , whereas the reality 
r elates to a comparatively few important practices. Insofar 
as there is substance in this issue , however , it seems to me 
likely that it can be handled only in the context of a commitment 
to comprehensive free trade at least on a regional basis . If 
nations reserve the right to maintain tariffs and other conven-
tional barriers, are they likely to be willing to accommodate 
the complaints of foreign exporters against any substantial 
interferences with trade flows which arise out of more purely 
domestic policies? Thus the free trade area probably offers 
one of the most promising vehicles for making progress in re-
ducing really significant non-tariff barriers. But it is never-
theless a difficult task, In contemplating a free trade associa-
tion, the principal internal challenge to the Pacific countries 
may be not in the ability of their various industries to adapt to 
competitive challenges they may pose for one another, but 
rather in the necessity of achieving a sufficiently common set 
of rules governing competition. In this way only can indivi-
dual enterprises be assured of the prospect of equal competi-· 
tive opportunities in the markets of other member countries, 
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Chapter 2 CANADIAN TRADE, THE KENNEDY ROUND 
AND A PACIFIC FREE TRADE AREA 
by B. W. Wilkinson 
Associate Professor, University of Alberta 
I Introduction 
The major purpose of this paper is to examine the eco-
nomic implications for Canadian industry and the Canadian 
balance of international payments of free trade among the deve-
loped nations of the Pacific Region . Both static and dynamic 
effects of free trade on industrial output and the balance of 
payments will be considered . Ignored, however, are the 
welfare implications of trade liberalization. 
Since the problems which Canada may face in the event 
of free trade are largely a function of the present structure 
of Canadian trade, we commence with a brief discussion of 
the main features of current Canadian trade patterns and trends. 
Then the existing trade structure is adjusted for the Kennedy 
Round of tariff negotiations to arrive at a trade matrix for use 
in assessing the economic implications of a Pacific Free Trade 
Agreement. Where somewhat arbitrary decisions are neces-
sary when estimating both the Kennedy Round effects and the 
static effects of a PFT A, they are made so as to provide the 
most unfavorable estimates of the resulting Canadian trade 
patterns. This approach will give us a maximum estimate of 
the extent to which positive, dynamic changes will have to off set 
these static effects if Canada is to avoid a depreciation, sub-
stantial downward yressure on wages, and/ or greatly increas -
ed capital inflows. We shall then examine the economic fea-
sibility of these required dynamic changes in the light of exist-
ing theoretical and empirical knowledge about their attainability. 
The analysis is highly aggregative, but in that the findings are 
1This is not to imply that these types of adjustment might 
still not be economically preferable to existing tariff and non-
tariff barriers to trade. But if there is reason to believe 
that the move to free trade can be made without such conse-
quences, the Canadian political objections to free trade 
becoming a reality will accordingly be greatly reduced. 
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largely consistent with other less aggregative studies, 1 it 
complements these other works. 
II Canadian Trade 
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As with many other small (in terms of population) indus-
trialized nations, foreign trade is of great significance for the 
Canadian economy. In recent years imports and exports have 
equalled about 16 and 17 percent of gross national product res -
pectively. Consequently Canada is the world's fifth largest 
trading nation . 
Whether we speak of a Pacific or an Atlantic Free 
Trade Area, the issues for Canada are much the same. 
This follows because both proposed free trade areas include 
the United States, our major trading partner . In 1966, 
over 70 percent of our total imports were from that country and 
60 percent of our exports were destined for it. If only 
Canadian trade with the developed nations of the Pacific is 
considered, the U.S . accounts for 96 percent of imports and 
92 percent of exports. Although between 1954-56 and 1963-
65 a downward trend occurred in the proportion of our imports 
from and exports to our southern neighbor, this trend was 
brought to a halt abruptly when the Canada- United States Auto-
mobile Pact, which was signed in January of 1965, came into 
full play. For 1966 the shares of our total merchandise 
trade with that country were restored to the levels prevailing 
in 1954- 56. 2 
1 See particularly R. J . and Paul Wonnacott, Free 
Trade Between the United States and Canada: The Potential 
Economic Effects (Cambridge, Mass .: Harvard University · 
Press, 1967 ; also the series of studies on North Atlantic Free 
Trade sponsored by the Private Planning Association of Canada 
forthcoming .) 
2Exports of road motor vehicles and parts to the United 
States rose from $230 millions in 1965 to $840 millions in 1966 , 
that is, from 2. 6 percent of total merchandise exports to all 
countries in 1965 to 8.1 percent in 1966 . Imports of vehicles 
and parts increased from about $950 millions or 11 percent of 
total imports from all nations in 1965 to well over $ 1, 400 mil-
lions or 15 percent of imports in 1966 . These numbers , parti -
cularly for vehicle imports, are understated owing to some de -
lay in reporting by customs officials . But they are sufficient 
to indicate the enormous impact that the automobile agreement 
has had on the total volume of Canada- U . S . trade . 
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TABLE (la) 
ORIGIN OF CANADIAN IMPORTS, 
1954- 56, 1963- 65 and 1966, 
PERCENTAGES 
1954-56 1963- 65 
United States 72 . 9 69.0 
United Kingdom 8 . 8 7.6 
Japan .8 2.4 
Germany 1.3 2 . 3 
Australia- New 
.9 1.0 Zealand 
All Other 15 . 3 17.7 
100.0 100.0 
EFTA 9.8 9 . 5 
EEC 3.4 5.6 
Commonwealth and 
13.0 12.8 Preferential 
PFTA 74.6 72.4 
1966 
72.3 
6.5 
2.6 
2 . 4 
.8 
15 . 4 
100.0 
8.7 
5.6 
10.8 
75.7 I ! 
i 
Source : B . W. Wilkinson . Canada's International 
Trade Anal sis of Recent Trends and Patterns. 
Montreal: Private Planning Association of 
Canada, 1968) Table 11 and 15; and Trade of 
Canada . 
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TABLE (lb) 
DESTINATIONS OF CANADIAN EXPORTS 
1954- 56, 1963- 65 and 1966 
PERCENTAGES 
1954- 56 1963- 65 
United States 59 . 5 55 . 0 
United Kingdom 17 . 3 14. 4 
Japan 2 . 4 4 . 0 
Germany 2 . 5 2 . 4 
Australia- New 
1. 6 2 . 1 Zealand 
U . S . S . R . and China . 3 4 . 3 
All Other 16 . 4 17 . 8 
1966 
59 . 9 
11. 2 
3 . 9 
1.8 
1.6 
5 . 0 
16 . 6 
Total 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 
EFTA 19.5 16 . 4 13.2 
EEC 6 . 7 7 . 1 6 . 3 
Commonwealth and 22.5 20.4 16 . 6 Preferential 
PFTA 63 . 5 61.1 65 . 4 
Source : Same as Table (la) . 
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This and other changes and t rends in the country com-
position of Canadian trade are summarized in Tables la and lb. 
The success of Japan in competing for the Canadian market is 
evident from the fact that in spite of the tremendous boost given 
to Canada- U . S . trade by the automobile agreement, the J apa-
nese share of Canadian imports continued to rise in 1966 . Be-
tween 1964 and 1966 Canadian imports from Japan expanded 45 
percent- compared with only a 20 percent rise in Canadian ex-
ports to that country . The shar e of the United Kingdom in 
Canada' s imports has continued its long run decline, although 
it remains our country's second large st export market and 
source of imports . The impressive increase in Canadian 
exports to Russia and Communist China are the consequence 
of massive wheat sales to these two nations . 
The commodity composition of Canadian trade flows is 
of much relevance in any deliberations on free trade that we 
may undertake. In recent years ·manufacture commodities 
have comprised 82 percent of the nation's imports but only 64 
percent of its exports . (Table 2) The definition of manu-
factures employed in arriving at these p e rcentages is very 
broad however . It includes many commodities that are not 
far removed from their crude states - - lumber, wood pulp, flour, 
frozen fish, new sprint, and semi- processed metals such as 
aluminum, copper and nickel alloys, and primary iron and steel. 
If we confine ourselves to the more sophisticated manufactures 
such as machinery, transportation and communication equipment, 
tools and miscellaneous equipment , scientific apparatus and· 
consumer durables and semi - durables, the comparison of import 
and export composition is much more striking . These products 
total 54 percent of imports but little more than 17 percent of 
exports . 
Canadian exports, then, are largely of those commoditi-
es that are growing relatively slowly in world trade--crude and 
fabricated materials . But imports are largely highly process· 
ed manufactured goods, in which world trade is expanding more 
rapidly than for any other group . 
Given the concentration of Canadian exports in products 
enjoying less than average growth in world trade it is not sur-
prising that from the early 1950' s until 1964- 66 this nation ' s 
exports have been expanding less rapidly (5 . 7 percent annually) 
than world trade (excluding intra- block EEC trade) has expand· 
ed (6 . 6 percent) . Another factor contributing to this slug-
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TABLE 2 
CANADA'S IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 
BY STAGES OF F ABRICATIONl 
1954-56 and 1963-65 
(Percentages based on current dollars) 
35 
Imports Exports 
Stages of Fabrication 
1954- 56 1963- 65 1954- 56 1963-65 
Crude Materials 20 . 9 18.3 31.5 36 . 1 
Manufactured Goods 79 . 1 81.6 67 . 4 64 . 0 
Fabricated Materials2 29 . 2 27 . 3 56 . 8 46.6 
End Products 49 . 9 54 . 3 11.6 17.4 
100.0 100.0 100 . 0 100 . 0 
' 
Source : B. W . Wilkinson, op . cit . 
Notes : 
1. Dominion Bureau of Statistics definitions 
2 . Roughly comparable to what are often referred to 
as industrial materials in many comparisons based 
on S. I . T . C . classifications . 
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gish growth of Canadian shipments abroad has been the reli-
ance upon the United Kingdom and the United States as mar-
kets . Both nations have been growing more slowly than many 
developed nations- - at least until the last few years when 
American expansion has frequently surpassed that of most 
western European countries . 
There has been some relative improvement in the Cana-
dian export performance since the early 1960' s, however , 
The large wheat sales to Russia and Communist China, the 
development of the Labrador iron ore deposits for shipment to 
United States markets , and the expansion of the U . S . market 
for Canadian petroleum and natural gas have all contributed to 
this improvement. (Noti ce though , that they have also in-
creased Canadian dependence upon crude material s exports.) 
The devaluation of 1961-62 preceeded by a period of cost-cutt-
ing necessitated by unemployment and an overvalued currency 
in the late 1950' s gave new life to Canadian secondary (or 
highly sophisticated) manufacturing exports . The more rapid 
American economic growth , the Canada- United States Defense 
Production Sharing Progr am , the auto pact referred to earli-
er, export insurance and other government measures to stimu-
late exports (although modest by comparison with the role of 
governments in promoting exports in some other developed 
nations) have been of some assistance as well . 
In spite of recent improvements, however , future mer-
chandi se shipments abroad are expected to grow more slowly 
than imports . The Economic Council of Canada has fore -
cast the average annual change in the volume of exports to be 
7 . 7 percent for 1966- 1970 whereas the comparable number for 
imports was estimated at 8 . 4 percent .1 The great reliance 
by Canada upon exports of products growing more slowly in 
world trade than most of the products we import is the major 
explanation for these expected trends . But the inflation of 
the last two or three years, which has badly eroded the ad-
vantage gained by the devaluation in 1961- 62 should not be 
overlooked as a contributing factor . In 1970, then, the sur-
plus on merchandise account which Canada has enjoyed since 
1961 is expected to be no more than 200 millions . 
1
F ourth Annual Review: The Canadian Econom from 
the 1960' s to the 1970' s Ottawa: Queen ' s Printer, 19 7 , 
pp .122- 123. 
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This reduced surplus , will be accompanied by a growing 
deficit on non-merchandise account. In 1966, this decifit to-
talled $1. 4 billions of which nearly $900 millions were net in-
terest and dividend payments on foreign investments in Canada, 
and a further $250 millions were for other transactions fre-
quently related to foreign investment such as payments from 
Canadian subsidiaries or branches to foreign parents for pro-
duction and distribution rights, royalties, research, advertis -
ing management, engineering and consulting services . The 
Economic Council place the total non-merchandise deficit in 
1970 at $1. 9 billions , . The net deficit on current account, 
and hence the required capital inflow or reduction in reserves, 
will therefore be about $1. 7 billions. This is probably a 
minimum for it implies that total domestic (personal and govern-
ment) savings in .that year will have to rise to 22. 3 percent of 
GNP compared with 19 . 9 percent in 1966 and 18 . 7 percent in 
1963 . 1 How this increased savings ratio will be brought 
about is not altogether clear . 
It is therefore evident, even from these cursory re -
marks, that any moves to free trade that might greatly enlarge 
the need for capital inflows or necessitate a depreciation of 
the Canadian dollar must be examined carefully . 
III The Kennedy Round 
The tariff reductions agreed to by Canada in the Ken-
nedy Round of negotiations relate to about $2. 5 billions or 
25 percent of Canadian imports in 1966, that is, to about 50 
percent of dutiable imports . 2 An attempt was also made by 
the negotiators to simplify the structure of the Canadian tariff 
so that there would be greater uniformity of rates among diffe-
rent products at each level of processing. Also, some 
smoothing down of higher rates in the tariff took place, so that 
apart from a few sectors such as textiles and footwear, duty 
rates greater than 20 percent ad valorem will now be exception-
al. 
1Based upon computations from ibid ., Table 5.6. p. 115 
and Table 5. 4 p. 111. --
2The average duty on dutiable imports in 1965 was about 
16. 5%, on total imports, 8 . 5%, and on all manufactured im-
ports, about 11%. 
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More than $2 billions or over 20 percent of Canadian 
exports in 1966 will be affected by the tariff reductions of our 
trading partners, primarily the United States . In addition, 
the 21 percent per bushel increase in the minimum and maximum 
price for No . l Northern wheat will mean an increase of about 
10 percent in the average price per bushel of Canadian wheat 
exports (which , at present amount to $1 billion annually) . 
It is di fficult to know what the effects of these tariff de-
creases will be upon Canadian trade flows . On the one hand, 
government officials laud them as offering immense opportuniti-
es for Canadian manufacturers to attain economies of scale 
concomitantly with increased penetration of the gigantic U . S . 
market. Manufacturers, on the other hand are much more 
cautious in their predictions about the eventual i mpact of the 
changes. 
For my purposes it is useful to take a conservative view . 
The traditional , static elasticities approach to estimating the 
adjustments in trade patter ns that may occur will therefore be 
followed . The possibilities of new economies of scale being 
attained by Canadian industry as a consequence of lower U . S . 
tariffs will be ignored at this stage in the discussion . Con-
sequently the r e sults will tend to indicate a less favorable posi-
tion for Canadian trade than might well be true . This will 
in turn tend to increase the size of the estimated deficit result -
ing from the static effects of a Pacific Free Trade Agreement . 
Also ignored in the present approach are the changes in 
the effective protection of products arising from alterations in 
tariffs on inputs. Although effective tariffs are presently 
being calculated for about 135 Canadian manufacturing indust-
ries, 1 these estimates were not available for use in the prepa-
ration of this paper . Therefore, we have had to be content 
with considering only the impact of nominal tariff changes . 
Total Canadian trade flows for 1965 were used as the 
base when computing the static Kennedy Round effects. An 
argument might be made for the exclusion of agri cultural com-
modities and fuels because trade in these products is often sub-
1
See J. R . M elvin and B . W . Wilkinson , Effective 
P r otection in the Canadian Economy, forthcoming . 
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ject to non-tariff restrictions . 1 However, trade in many 
manufactured commodities is also influenced greatly by a wide 
variety of non- tariff barriers ranging from quotas to more sur-
reptitious procedures such as buy-dome stic policies, and sub-
sidies of many types . Consequently, all merchandise has 
been included rather than somewhat arbitrarily excluding par -
ticular groups . Quantitative estimates of these other forces 
will not be attempted , although a few qualitative remarks will 
be made about non-tariff matters later in this paper . 
One additional explanatory remark is necessary regard-
ing the trade flows included in our estimates of the Kennedy 
Round effects . It is assumed that Canadian trade with Au-
stralia and New Zealand will not be altered materially by the 
tariff changes. The supposition is that the stimulus to trade 
between Canada and these nations from the tariff reductions 
will be off set by the reduced margins of British preference 
that each country enjoys in the other's markets . Although 
this presumption undoubtedly does some violence to reality, 
the extent of the error arising therefrom will be tiny compared 
to the overall magnitude of Canadian exports and imports in-
volved in trade with these nations, the United States and 
Japan . 
where: 
The formula employed for the estimates is a common one; 
t 
t' 
dM =Em 
t-t' 
M . l+t 
the change in i mports , 
the importing country' s relative price elas-
ticity of demand for imports, 
the pre- Kennedy ad valorem tariff rate, 
the post- Kennedy ad valorem tariff rate. 
This formula assumes that the importing nation maintains con-
stant prices for its import- competing products and that prices 
of imports are lowered by the full amount of the tariff r educ-
tion . This latter assumption also implies that the exporting 
1Eg. see B. Balassa and M . E . Kreinin, ·"Trade 
Liberalization Under the "Kennedy Round": The Static Ef-
fects," Review of Economics and Statistics, 49 (May, 1967), 
p. 125. 
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nation has perfectly elastic export supplies. This would 
seem to be a reasonable supposition for exports from the United 
States since such commodity flows in general comprise only a 
small percent of total American output. Increased supplies 
therefore should be forthcoming without significant price in-
creases . 1 Even for most Canadian manufacturing industries 
exports are but a small proportion of total output . The ex-
ceptions are few : pulp and paper , primary metal, wood and 
wood products, and some food and beverage industries. 2 
But even for these industries the re is little reason to hypothe -
size significant price increases as exports expand . First, 
foreign tariffs on these goods are already low , so that exports 
will not be stimulated very much by the Kennedy Round tariff 
reductions . Second , labour force growth rates in Canada . 
have been and are anticipated to continue high in relation to 
both recent and anticipated growth rates in other industri alize d 
countries .3 Consequently, there is little reason to expect 
any substanti al wage increases being necessar y in the export 
sectors in order to attract labour from other sectors of the 
economy. New labour force entrants wi ll likely be adequate 
to satisfy increased demands for labour . Finally, to antici -
pate our results, the tariff reductions reduce the present 
Canadian surplus on merchandise account, and would therefore 
tend to displace labour rather than increase the total demand 
for it. Hence, there might be even downward pressure on 
wage rates . In short , then, the assumption that Canadian 
prices of manufactured exports will remain unaltered by the 
1For a more detailed discussion of this type of assump-
tion see Balassa and Kreinin op.cit; also M. Kreinin, Alter-
native Commercial Policies - Their Effect on the American 
Economy . (Michigan: MSU International Business and 
Economic Studies, 1967). 
2As Appendix Table 3 indicates, these are the only 
industries where exports are greater than 10% of total output . 
3see Economic Council of Canada, Fourth Annual Re-
view: The Canadian Econom From the 1960' s to the 1970' s. 
Ottawa: Queen s Printer, 19 7 , ch. 3. 
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Kennedy Round tariff reductions seems a good first approxi-
mation.1 
Although Canadian exports of non-manufactured goods 
often account for a substantial portion of total output, the last 
three reasons cited above may also be introduced to support 
the assumption of no Canadian price increases in these commo-
dities either. 2 
Japanese exports total between 12 and 14 percent of 
gross national product, so that there may be cause to think 
that the expansion of exports made possible by the Kennedy 
Round might lead to some rise in Japanese export prices . 
However, we assume this possibility aside- -an assumption 
which is in line with our goal of providing a maximum estimate 
of the expansion in Canadian imports relative to exports . 
The import price elasticities used are of necessity some-
what arbitrary . Balassa and Kreinin3 relay on Ball and 
Marwah' s 4 estimates for the United States and increase them 
by one standard error. Their estimates for Canada and 
1If the recent record is any indication, Canadian export 
prices may increase, but these must be attributed to domestic 
problems not directly related to the Kennedy Round tariff 
reductions. 
2we can ignore at this point the increased wheat prices 
as tariff reductions in wheat did not occur . 
3 See Review of Econ. and Stat . , 49 (May, 1967, 
pp . 126- 128) for their reasoning. 
4"The U.S. Demand for Imports, 1948-1958", Rev. 
of Econ. and Stat., 44 (November , 1962), pp. 394-401. 
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Japan were set at one-half and three quarters of the American 
elasticities respectively. This example has been followed 
here, 1, 2 
The broad commodity classification employed is similar 
to that in the Ball and Marwah study. Placement of indivi-
dual SITC groups into these classes, however, has been car-
ried out to correspond with Dominion Bureau of Statistics 
industrial classifications and other recent work that has been 
done in Canada on trade and tariffs. 3 The main classes dis-
tinguished and the relevant price elasticities are as follows: 
Commodity Class Canada United State Japan 
Crude Foodstuffs and Feed -.24 - • 48 -.36 
Crude Materials -.20 - . 39 -.29 
Processed Foodstuffs -1.20 -2.39 -1.79 
Primary Manufactures -.82 -1.63 -1.22 
Secondary 11anufactures -2 . 06 -4.12 -3.09 
1However, we have corrected for the error in their 
article, p. 129 which shows the elasticity for semi-finished 
manufactures by Japan as -1. 42 instead of -1. 22 as it should 
if the Ball-Marwah estimate plus one standard error is used 
as the rule for arriving at the Japanese elasticity. 
2
New computations of price. elasticities for Canadian 
imports from Japan and Japanese imports from Canada are 
presently being prepared by Professor Keith Hay, but these 
were not available at the time this paper was prepared. 
3Eg. B. W. Wilkinson, op. cit. ; also J. Melvin 
and B. W. Wilkinson op. cit. 
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The SITC groups included in each of these classes is shown 
in the Appendix of this paper . The term "primary manuf ac-
tures" is roughly similar to the Ball- Marwah caption: semi-
manuf actures . In Canadian statistics it refers to those 
manufactures for which at least 50 percent of the inputs come 
from the primary sector of the Canadian economy; that is, it 
consists of manufactures based on Canadian natural resources . 
Secondary manufactures are essentially sophisticated products 
such as machinery, transportation and communication equip -
ment, chemicals, and consumer durables and semi-durables . 1 
Separate computations were made for each of the 177 
SITC groups in which commodity flows between Canada and 
United States and Japan were recorded for 1965 . In a few 
situations were a subdivision of 3 - digit groups was necessary 
to reflect the DBS classification of production, 4 - digit SITC 
groups were distinguished . 
Adjustments were made in the Canadian and Ame rican 
pre- and post- Kennedy tariff rates to allow for these tariffs 
being levied f.o . b . rather than c .i. f.2 U . S . duties on 
benzenoid chemicals were doubled to reflect the impact of the 
American Selling Price method of valuation on imports of these 
goods. 3 Shipments of motor vehicles and parts between 
Canada and the United States were all assumed to have duty-
free pre- Kennedy Round rates even though replacement parts 
are not included i n the automobile agreement. 
1 The category "processed foodstuffs" could have been 
easily allocated between primary and secondary manufacturing , 
but for purposes of applying a separate elasticity estimate , it 
has been distinguished . 
2See Frances K . Toppi ng , Comparative Tarrif s and 
Trade, Vol. 1 (Committee for Economi c Development, 1963), 
p . XIII. 
3 . S e e Political and Economic Planning, Atlantic Ta-
riffs and Trade (London : George Allen and Unwin, 1962), 
p . xvi; also H . G . Grubel and H . G . Johnson, "Nominal 
Tariff Rates and United States Valuation Practices : Two 
Case Studies", Rev . Econ. and Stat. , 49 (May, 1967) , pp. 
138-142. 
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Pre- and post- Kennedy Round tariffs were obtained from 
the tariff schedules of the countries involved and from the July 
1, 1967 DeRartment of Trade and Commerce publication, For-
eign Trade .1 For commodities within each of the 177 SITC 
groups, unweighted averages of tariffs and tariff changes were 
applied to the commodity movements. 
Table 3 summarizes the effects of the Kennedy Round 
changes upon Canadian trade with United States and Japan . 
Care must be taken in interpreting these results , how-
ever . Only the static consequences of the tariff reductions 
have been considered. Recall that the complications arising 
from tariff changes on inputs, new opportunities for economies 
of scale that might be grasped by Canadian manuf acturir:-g , and 
the continued presence of non- tariff barriers to trade have all 
been pushed aside . Also ignored is the possible improvement 
in the Canadian merchandise trade balance that might arise 
from the agreed 10 percent higher pri ce for wheat . 2 Speci-
fic allowance for these other factors would probably lower the 
net expansion of the Canadian trade deficit with these countries, 
but it is unlikely to reverse the direction of the change . It 
is even less likely when one considers that no allowance has 
been made for the increase in Canadian imports from the 
United States and Japan that may well ensue from lowered pre -
ferences by the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth or 
preferential countries outside the proposed PFT A. 
The results, in general, are a consequence of the large 
proportion of crude and semi-processed products in Canadian 
exports and the low proportion of these same types of products 
in Canadian imports. Foreign tariffs on them were already 
low prior to the Kennedy Round and price elasticities are also 
low, so that the projected increases in exports in most inst-
ances were marginal. In contrast, the duty rates and price 
1 
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967). 
2Assuming that the higher price does not cause an off-
setting reduction in the volume of wheat sold. 
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48 BRUCE WILKINSON 
elasticities for highly manufactured goods, which form the 
majority of Canadian imports, are quite high so that Canadian 
imports will tend to increase substantially owing to tariff de-
creases. 
We now turn to the prime concern of this paper, namely 
the static and dynamic economic implications for Canada of a 
Pacific Free Trade Agreement. 
IV A Pacific Free Trade Area 
The initial part of this section involves an estimate of 
the static effects of a PFT A using the elasticities approach of 
the foregoing discussion. 
Subsequently, the keystone argument for Canadian par-
ticipation in a free trade area-- the possibility of economies of 
scale, and hence lower prices, being realized through access 
to larger foreign markets- -will be considered, and an estimate 
wi ll be made of the P'='rcentage decline in Canadian import- com-
peting and export price that would be necessary to eliminate 
the Canadian deficit on merchandise account resulting from the 
static effects of free trade, 1 This estimate will then be re-
lated to evidence on the extent to which Canadian prices are 
presently above those of our major trading partner, the United 
States. Finally, qualitative consideration will be given to 
other dynamic and not- so-dynamic influences which may affect 
the outcome of a free trade agreement. 
First, a few remarks are necessary regarding the use 
of an elasticities approach when tariff reductions are as large 
as those that would be involved in any free trade agreement. 
Ron Wonnacott has argued2 that for Canadian secondary manu-
1rhe alternate possibility that economies of scale might 
not be realized and that balance of payments adjustment could 
take place through a depreciation of the Canadian dollar is 
being disregarded. Of greater interest at this time is how 
large an average price decrease would have to accrue from a 
tariff reduction and the attainment of economies of scale to 
avoid this alternative. 
211 Canada in an Atlantic Community", Studies in Trade 
Liberalization, B. Balassa (ed.) (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1967). 
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facturing the production cost structure will be changed so 
radically by the elimination of tariffs on inputs and the ration-
alization that will be necessary when domestic and foreign 
tariffs are eliminated that past trade patterns are of little 
relevance in estimating the consequences of free trade . 1 
This is, of course, in part true , 2 but the present approach 
does not seek to determine the precise new pattern of trade 
that will result from free trade . This can only be determined 
by detailed industry studies . 3 Nor is the discussion being 
limited to static effects . Rather the objective is to provide 
something approaching a maximum (highly- aggregative) esti-
mate of the adverse effect upon the Canadian merchandise 
trade balance that might result if a restructuring and ration-
alization of Canadian industry did not occur . Then , it is 
domestrated that the lowering of Canadian costs that would be 
necessary (and largely attainable from the dynamic effects of 
free trade) if this adverse effect is to be prevented, do not 
appear unattainable. In short, then, the conclusion reach-
ed by this approach is similar to Wonnacott ' s in that it sug-
gests that providing the necessary rationalization is carried 
out, Canadian secondary manufacturing can survive and pros -
per under free trade . Our final conclusion differs somewhat 
from his, however, in that we emphasize that the locati on of 
industry and trade in manufactures depend on much more than 
relative labour- capital endowments. 
1H . Grubel in "Intra- Industry Specialization and the 
Pattern of Trade", Canadian Journal of Economics and Poli-
tical Science, 33 (August, 1967) pp . 37 4-388 takes much the 
same position, although his concern. is more with the influence 
of product differentiation on trade flows in the event of tariff 
reductions. 
2Butsee B. W . Wilkinson, op . cit., chap. 8, for 
an alternative line of thought. 
3of a type presently being sponsored by the Private 
Planning Association of Canada . Even these, however, will 
only give some broad guidelines on the eventual structure of 
production and pattern of trade that will develop. 
50 BRUCE WILKINSON 
(1) The static results of a PFT A . The trade flows and 
tariff rates upon which the computati ons are based are those for 
1965 adjuste d for the Kennedy Round tariff reductions as indi -
cated earlier . The same price elasticities of import demand 
are used for Canada, United States, and Japan as were us ed 
b efore . Elasticities for Australia and New Zealand are 
taken to be equal to those for Canada . No allowance is made 
for the modification in trade patterns which might ensue from 
the effe cts of free trade upon the prefe r ential arrangements 
b e tween Canada, Australia, and New Zealand . Although 
such modifications may be substantial fo r particular commodi-
tie s traded, they would not b e large in r e lation to the total 
Canadian trade with the PFT A nations. No allowance is 
made e ithe r for the e ffe ct of the elimination of the United King-
dom prefe r ences in the Canadian market. The s e would un-
doubtedly stimulate some substitution of imports from the Unit-
e d State s and Japan for imports from Britain, thus raising the 
Canadian d eficit with PFT A nations . 
The changes in trade flows between Canada and each of 
the developed nati ons involved are presente d in Table 4. 
Canadian imports would expand n e arly $440 millions more than 
e xports . (This de ficit is due entirely to the growth of s e cond-
ary manufactured imports . Canada would gain , on balance, 
in each of the four othe r commodity groups . ) Such a change 
would bring the total Canadian merchandis e deficit on trade 
with the develope d nations of PFT A to n e a r ly $1, 150 millions , 
and the small surplus on total Canadian merchandis e trade wit h 
all nations of the world in 1965 would b e come a d eficit of h e ar-
ly $ 400 millions . 1 
The s e results are broadly in line with thos e from anothe r 
r e cent e stimate of the i mpact of free trade upon Canadian im-
ports and exports . Kojima, 2 using pre- Kennedy Round tariff 
rate s, highe r e lasticitie s for all the nations involved, a some-
what diffe rent classification of commodities and a 1963 trade 
matrix e stimate d the Canadian import and export increases to 
1 And base d on these computations, if the Economic 
Council's proje ct s of total import and e xp ort growth rates to 
1970 were c orrect , the total Canadian me rchandi s e deficit in 
that y e ar would incre a se to n e arly $1 billi on . 
211 A Pacific Ec onomic Community and As i an Developing 
Countrie s", Hitot sub a shi Journal of Economics, 7 (June , 1966), 
pp . 17- 37. 
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be about $250 millions greater than Table 4 suggests, but the 
net deficit resulting was less than $50 million larger than our 
number) 
(2) Dynamic effects of a PFT A: Economies of Scale . 
The economies of scale idea is a very familiar one. 
For Canada it is confined largely to secondary manufacturing 
because many of the raw material producing and primary manu-
facturing industries have already attained sufficient scale eco-
nomies to be able to expor t competitively. 2 The argument is 
that other nations tariffs on Canadian secondary manufactures 
(particularly the tariffs of the United States) tend to limit the 
opportunities for exporting and hence for achieving economies 
of scale in production, and that the protection afforded by the 
Canadian tariff provides no incentive for firms in Canada to 
rationalize and obtain those scale economies which are attain-
able even within the confines of the Canadian market. The 
removal of foreign tariffs would provide a larger market for 
Canadian producers, and the removal of Canadian protection 
would offer the necessary stimulus to them to modernize and 
rationalize their production. Lower production costs and 
hence lower prices and a more internationally competitive 
secondary manufacturing .industry would be the hoped-for out-
come. 
How much would prices in secondary manufacturing have 
to decline to eradicate the deficit on merchandise account that 
might otherwise occur from trade liberalization? The answer 
1
Also of interest is that Wonnacott used an elasticities 
approach for only non- agricultural resource products (roughly 
comparable with crude materials plus primary manufacturing 
in our classification) and concluded that Canada might gain 
from an Atlantic free trade agreement in these goods to the 
extent of about $50 to $100 millions. This gain is somewhat 
larger than our estimate for the comparable groups, although 
the difference is not surprising considering that he was con-
cerned with a larger trading block in the Atlantic rather than 
with Pacific free trade. 
2In fact exports have often been the means of achieving 
sufficient scale economies to make Canadian production inter-
nationally competitive . 
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may be obtained most easily by reference to Canadian trade 
with the United States alone. This approach will do little 
injustice to the true situation for the total deficit and the de-
ficit on secondary manufactures with the United States are 
each only about $US 15 millions less than the relevant Cana-
dian deficits with all developed PFT A countries. The ques-
tion becomes, then, how much would the prices of Canadian 
secondary manufactures exported to the United States and 
competing domestically with imports from there have to dimi-
nish to remove the estimated deficit on merchandise trade with 
that country resulting from the static effects of free trade? 
Since there is an estimated $US 32 millions surplus on Cana-
dian trade with the United States in the four non- secondary 
commodity groups, it would be sufficient if the price decline 
resulted in all but $US 32 millions of the deficit on secondary 
manufactures being eliminated. 
A very simple and conservative approach is taken in 
answering this question. More sophisticated approaches can 
be developed, but it is doubtful that they would significantly 
alter the conclusion reached- -that the required price decline 
is not more than what is economically feasible, given our pre-
sent knowledge of the extent of present price differences bet-
ween the United States and Canada. 
Let: 
M us 
M c 
1965 United States imports of Canadian secondary 
manufactures adjusted for the Kep.nedy Round. 
1965 Canadian imports from United States of pro-
ducts competing with Canadian secondary manufac-
tures, adjusted for the Kennedy Round. 
tc and t = weighted average, 1 post- Kennedy ad valorem 
us duties on imports of secondary manufactures by 
Canad a and the United States respectively. 
E and c 
E = relative price elasticities of demand for 
11~condary manufactured imports by Canada and the 
United States respectively. 
1The weights are the value of imports in each of the 
three-or four-digit categories used when arriving at the origi-
nal static estimate of the deficit resulting from a PFT A. 
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percent price decline in Canadian exports and im-
po"rt- competing products. 
And assume: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
that U. S. producers do not alter their prices 
that the Canadian price reduction occurs at the same 
time as the tariff removal. 1 
that with respect to exports the effects of the price de-
cline and the tariff elimination both apply to the initial 
value of exports adjusted downward for the price de-
crease, and that these two effects are additive. 
Then, the next expansion in the value of Canadian exports to 
the United States may be formulated as: 
where the decrease in value of initial exports 
owing to the Canadian price reduction, 
and the remainder of the expression is the gross increase in 
the value of exports resulting from the removal of American 
tariffs and the lowering of Canadian export prices. 
-M us 
The enlargement in the value of imports will now be less 
than when no price decreases in Canadian import- competing 
goods occur and it may be expressed as 
[ 1 tc - x J Mc . Ec +tc 
1Implicit in this assumption is the further one that ac-
tually, there will be some transition period in which tariffs are 
removed and industry rationalizes. Many industries may be 
able to rationalize quite quickly because they will not need to 
build new plants but only reduce the number of lines produced 
in their existing plants. 
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Thus the equation for the change in merchandise trade when 
Canadian price declines are allowed for becomes: 
[ 
t 
M 
us 
- + us l+t us 
M .E c c 
- 32 millions 
which, when the known or estimated values of all variables 
except x, are substituted into it reduces to: 
3510 x
2 
- 9387 x + 428 = 0 
The relevant solution is x = • 046
1
; that is, a lowering by 
4.6 percent2 of the prices of Canadian secondary manufactures 
exported to the United States and competing with imports from 
the United States would be sufficient to eradicate the enlarge-
ment of the Canadian deficit on merchandise trade with that 
country that complete tariff elimination by both nations is other-
wise likely to entail . 3 
This result assumes that production costs in other than 
secondary manufacturing remain constant. If one were to 
allow for lowered costs in these other sectors as well, as a 
result of lowered tariffs on imported materials and equipment 
and reduced prices of inputs supplied by Canadian secondary 
1The second solution is x = 2 . 628 
2 several alternate formulations of the model have yielded 
results varying between 4 and 6 percent. 
3Note also that if we assume that no decline in Canadian 
prices occures, then to avoid an increase in the deficit in 
Canadian merchandise trade with the United States, the rela-
tion between Canadian and American elasticities would have 
to be as follows: E us = . 545 + 5. 806 E c 
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manufacturing, 1 then the surplus of merchandise trade in these 
sectors resulting from PFT A would be even greater than that 
computed above. Consequently, the price decline in second-
ary manufacturing necessary to eliminate the deficit on mer-
chandise account would be less than 4 . 6 percent. 
Other considerations would also affect the size of the 
required price reduction, although their net influence on this 
price decrease is not as clear cut. To illustrate, a PFT A 
would have to involve the elimination of all imports quotas (de 
facto or actual) and all domestic production or export subsidi -
es by the participating countries . On the one hand, the eli-
mination of de facto import quotas would place some Canadian 
secondary manufacturing industries in a much more unfavour-
able position than any simple tariff reduction would do . 
Examples are those industries producing clothing, textiles, 
some electronic equipment and plywoods and veneers. On 
the other hand other Canadian industries might in turn benefit 
from the removal of domestic or export subsidies by Canada's 
trading partners in a PFT A. I do not have sufficient infor -
mation available to properly assess the relative strengths of 
these two opposing possibilities, but my guess would be that 
on balance, Canada might stand to gain . If this were so, 
then for this reason too, the price reduction necessary would 
be less than estimated above. 
The discussion of several other factors which might al-
ter the above conclusion is more appropriately left until the 
following section of this paper. What will now be considered 
is how this reckoning of the needed drop in Canadian prices 
compares with evidence on current divergence in prices bet-
ween Canada and the U.S. 
The most recent information available on comparative 
Canadian- United States prices is that by the Economic Coun-
1 As this phrase suggests, and as will be mentioned 
again shortly, economies of scale are not the only reason why 
Canadian costs of production may be lessened. 
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cil of Canada. 1 The relevant numbers are presented in 
Table 5. The groups shown are roughly comparable with 
what have been defined as secondary manufactures. Of 
course, many secondary manufactures are intermediate goods 
whose prices are not reflected directly in the above computa-
tions. They are indirectly, however, so that this does not 
seem to be a major limitation of the data. 
A more important matter is that the Council's compari-
sons were made without adjustment for the exchange rate bet-
ween the Canadian and United States currencies. Since 
the United States dollar is worth $1. 081 Canadian, Canadi-
an prices internationally would actually be lower relative to 
their U.S. counterparts than is indicated in the table. 
When the adjustment is made, the average of Canadian to 
U.S. prices for the three commodity groups becomes 105. 2, 
and for the last two groups--durable consumer goods an:d 
machinery and equipment--it becomes 113.5. 
On average, then, Canadian prices of secondary manu-
factures appear to be between 5 and 14 percent above the com-
parable U.S. numbers, depending upon what one chooses to 
include in this category. Although these computations are 
very crude and highly aggregative, they suggest that the 4. 6 
percent price decrease that would be necessary in Canadian 
secondary manufacturing would certainly not have to be more 
than the amount by which average Canadian prices presently 
exceed those of the United States. (Of course, since much 
intra-industry specialization would likely occur, the price 
decreases in some product groups would have to be much more 
than suggested here while production of other commodities 
would cease entirely). 
1see D. J. Daly and D. Walters, Factors in Canada-
United States Real Income Differences, a paper presented 
at the Maynooth Conference of the International Association 
for Research in Income and Wealth, Ireland, August, 1967 
(mimeographed), espec. pp. 6-7; also see an unpublished 
study by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics entitled, Com-
parative Consumer Price Levels in the United States and 
Canada, on which some of the Economic Council's compu-
tations were based. 
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TABLE 5 
CANADA/UNITED ST ATES PRICES 
FOR SELECTED COMMODITY GROUPS, 1965 
cu. s. = 100) 
Commodity Group 
Nondurables other than food 
Durable consumer goods 
Machinery and equipment 
Source: 
Average of all three items 1 
Average of durables and 
machinery and equipment 
See text. 
Can. prices 
U.S. prices 
104.5 
119.5 
125.6 
113.7 
122.7 
Notes: 1w eighted by value of expenditures on each 
commodity group in 1965 National Accounts. 
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Up to this juncture reference has been made primarily 
to the production cost decreases to be achieved by attaining 
economies of scale, But not all the cost reduction would 
have to come from this source. The removal of tariffs on 
imports of materials and capital equipment will also lower the 
costs of Canadian producers to some extent. For example, 
in the thirteen sectors examined by the Wonnacotts, 1 a simple, 
unweighted average of the saving to Canadian manufacturers 
that could be achieved from elimination of Canadian duties on 
imports of material inputs and capital equipment amounts to 
3. 2 percent of present Canadian costs . 2 The actual average 
saving would probably be less than this, because the drawback 
provisions in the Canadian tariff already provide for tariff re-
mission on material inputs used in exports . However, such 
drawbacks do not apply to capital equipment imports; nor are 
they relevant when thinking in terms of the lowered costs of 
domestic production competing with imports . Hence, there 
is still likely to be some direct cost saving to Canadian manu-
factures from the elimination of import tariffs, even if it 
would not be as large as the above number suggests. Ac-
cordingly the reduction in costs that must originate from a 
rationalization of Canadian industry would be somewhat less 
than the 4 . 6 percent price decrease necessary to preclude the 
expansion of the deficit on merchandise trade with United 
States. 
(3) Other Dynamic Influences. One must now, how-
ever, concentrate solely on the possible reduction in costs 
owing to economies of scale and lowered tariffs on materials 
and capital equipment, to the exclusion a number of dynamic 
considerations relevant to this discussion. The future 
development of world markets for Canadian exports of crude 
materials, new technology, scale economies in marketing, 
foreign (particularly American) ownership of Canadian manu-
facturing, and the degree of aggressiveness or resourceful-
ness shown by Canadian industry are all of some significance 
in trade liberalization. These matters are analyzed at much 
1They considered fourteen sectors, but one of them, 
automobiles, is excluded here, because the Canada- United 
States automobile pact has essentially eliminated all tariffs on 
shipments between the two countries--with the exception of 
tariffs on replacement parts. 
2R. J. and Paul Wonnacott, Table 30, p. 224. 
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greater length in other papers , 1 In the space available here 
only some of the more important issues that are raised by the 
introduction of them can be indicated . Consider them in or-
der . 
Export markets for several Canadian raw materials may 
undergo substantial changes in the coming years . The open-
ing of the Chicago market to Canadian petroleum could mean 
hundreds of millions of dollars of additional exports to this 
area , Also , growing world demand for uranium should im-
prove Canadian export receipts significantly . The export 
of coal to Japan is another new possibility . Concurrently, 
however , increased international competition from new sources 
of raw material supplies such as Australia may cut into Cana-
dian export markets , It is perhaps still too early to say 
what the next effect of these developments will be on the Cana-
dian balance of payments. Nevertheless in discussions of the 
present type they cannot be disregarded . 
Technological advance as a result of research and deve ,.. 
lopment is receiving more and more attention as a determinant 
of international trade in highly sophisticated products . Al -
though the Canadian industrial research effort is minuscule 
compared with that of the · United States and a number of other 
developed nations , recent evidence indicates that Canadian 
secondary manufacturing exports as a proportion of domestic 
production tend to be significantly larger in those industries 
where research and development is relatively more important. 
This finding is of considerable importance because in past 
economic discussions of the determinants of Canadian trade, 
new technology has been virtually ignored . 
The significance of selling costs and economi es of scale 
in marketing have also been downgraded too much in discussions 
of Canadian trade and the implications for Canadian industry 
1For a detailed discussion of the future development of 
world markets for Canadian exports of crude materials see 
the series of studies for the Private Planning Association of 
Canada , particularly those by D . Slater and D . Querin . 
For a review of the other issues see B . W . Wilkinson , op . 
cit., especially chapters V - VIII. · --
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of free trade . There is now evidence that in those industri-
es where there are substantial economies of scale in market-
ing, to be realized- -that is, in the consumer goods industri-
es- -Canadian exports as a pro-portion of domestic output have 
tended to be less . The strongest export performance has 
occurred in the investment goods industries where the number 
of purchasers that must be reached in any country is relative -
ly small and sales are often made directly to the manufacturer 
thus avoiding the commissions of middlemen, the need for large 
selling organizations and expensive advertising. 
Foreign ownership of Canadian industry has had a num-
ber of effects . First, it has facilitated rapid transmission 
of new technology from foreign parents to Canadian subsidia-
ries . Second, it probably also has been a deterrent to 
rationalization of Canadian production . A Canadian- owned 
firm would be reluctant to commence any rationalization if i t 
were to mean that some form of competitive warfare were to 
be initiated between it and a subsidiary with the immense re-
sources of a foreign parent behind it. Where two or more 
subsidiaries are operating in an industry in Canada there 
would again be apprehension on the part of each one of them 
about starting any rationalization maneouvers which would 
have repercussions on their foreign parents. Third, im-
ports tend to be larger the more of an industry that i s under 
foreign ownership . This follows because the foreign sub-
sidiaries, owing to their close association with their foreign 
parents (and in turn with the suppliers of these parents) will 
tend to possess or be able to obtain at lower costs of search, 
more information about foreign products and prices than would 
their domestically- owned competitors . 
Foreign ownership also has important implications for 
the future of Canadian secondary manufacturing in the event 
of free trade. Because the bulk of foreign ownership is 
American, the argument may be framed primarily in terms of 
Canadian- United States trade although , as will be seen, the 
economic implications for Canadian participation in PFT A 
are fairly evident. On the one hand, with the Canadian 
tariff eliminated, there would be less incentive for U . S . firms 
to set up production in Canada as quickly as they have done in 
the past . The Canadian marke t could be supplied from their 
U . S . p 1 an ts • 
On the other hand, with the U . S. tariff gone as well, 
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and with Canadian wage rates lower by 25 or 30 percent, 
there would be a greater incentive for them to locate in Canada. 
To the extent that new technology is an influential determinant 
of trade and some variant of the technological gap or product 
cycle theory of the trade is correct, the shift to Canada would 
occur as soon as production had passed into the stage where 
assembly line methods involving large amounts of unskilled or 
semi- skilled labour were possible. 
But the question which arises is whether the cost ad-
vantage in Canada owing to lower Canadian wages would be 
sufficient to induce U . S, firms to transfer new production to 
Canada or keep existing production in Canada . Certainly 
it would not if the object were to produce in Canada to supply 
the Japanese market under a PFT A, because wage rates 
there are much lower again than in Canada, It would be less 
costly to locate there rather than in Canada. 
If the object were to manufacture in Canada for the U . S. 
market the answer is less clear. A number of factors must 
be considered. First, it would only be important in the long 
run. In the short run, it may be cheaper for them to use 
their existing facilities in the United States- - at least until the 
variable costs of operating them exceeded the total costs of 
operating a new, more efficient plant in Canada . But what 
would happen to wage rates in Canada in the long run is not 
certain. Historical experience regarding regional differences 
in wage rates both wihin Canada and the United States would 
suggest that such differences are very slow to be eliminated, 
so that one is prompted to argue that the wage differences 
are likely to be sustained long enough for it to be worthwhile 
to make the investment in Canada . But those making the in-
vestment decisions may not wish to rely on historical experi -
ence, especially when there is the thread that international 
unions may strike for wage parity across the border--possible 
because the U.S . unions fear that increased U .S. investment 
in Canada would reduce the rate of growth of opportunities for 
new jobs in the United States. Wage parity would eliminate 
the cost advantage of locating in Canada. 
Second, if the decision meant that there might be a loss 
of the goodwill of the consuming public, of the unions, or of 
the government of the United States, or a loss of any privi-
lege or preferences which are a function of this goodwill, 
there could easily be additional hesitation about locating new 
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facilities in Canada. Third, there is always the possibility 
of a free trade arrangement breaking down- - the thought of 
which would also add to the apprehension . This possibility 
might also spur Canadian producers to shift production to an 
Ameri can site because of the much larger U . S . market . 
In short , there is a trade-off between the possible ad-
vantage of lower costs in Canada and the other advantages , 
real or imagined, of remaining in the United States , 1 
A common, although not pervasive, finding of empiri-· 
cal investigations of how American firms would behave in the 
event of free trade is that their facilities in Canada would 
tend to be phased-out and the Canadian market served from 
the United States . 2 
This does not mean, however, that there will be a 
wholesale (but gradual) withdrawal of all U . S . controlled 
production from Canada and that the entire Canadian market 
will be supplied from U . S . plants . Nor does it mean that 
Canadi an secondary manufacturing would entirely disappear. 
The present performance of foreign-owned firms in 
Canada probably speaks louder about their intended response 
to free trade than does economic theory or philosophical rea-
1The suggestion that other factors beside cost reduction 
or profit maximization (as described in most textbooks of micro-
economic theory) may motivate business decisions is far from 
new . For an excellent review of the literature see Y . Aharoni, 
The Foreign Investment Decision Process (Boston: Division 
of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration , 
Harvard University, 1966) especially pp . 261- 272 . Unfortu-
nately , most of this literature has been neglected by a large 
number of economists. 
2 see M . Kreinin , "Freedom of Trade and Capital Move -
ments - Some Empirical Evidence ," Economic Journal, 75 
(December , 1965),pp. 748- 58 ; alsoJ . Polk, L W. Meister , 
and L . A . Veit , U . S . Production Abroad and the Balance of 
Pagrments (New York: Nati onal Industrial Conference Board , 
19 6) espec . p . 120; and more recently , B . A . Keys, Medium-
term Business Investment Outlook- 1967 Survey a study pre -
pared for the Economic Council of Canada (Ottawa: Queen ' s 
Printer, 1967), p . 12. 
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soning as to their political or patriotic motivations. Those 
that are already deeply engrossed in research and development 
and/ or are competing internationally are likely to continue to 
do so--on a bigger scale. They have already taken their 
stand about their operations in Canada. Moreover, since 
"follow the leader" is an important part of the foreign invest-
ment decision process, the example of some U.S. -owned firms 
in an industry thriving in Canada may lead competitors to join 
them. 
As for Canadian-owned manufacturing, however, sub-
stantial aggressiveness and resourcefulness will have to be 
exhibited if the challenge and the opportunities of trade liberal-
ization are to be successfully met. For a Canadian producer 
to obtain a share of the world market or of the PFTA market , 
it will require a product that buyers want (or can be persuaded 
they want) and attention to buyers' wishes . This in turn im-
plies original research and development or competent and rapi d 
imitation. It also implies the need for vision and foresight 
to see the potential of new markets; the willingness to take 
risks; well-qualified salesmen; for some products, large-
scale selling organizations; and for many buyers, liberal 
credit. Moreover, it requires the use of modern technology 
Ce , g. computers) in inventory and other cost, control, produc-
tion scheduling, inspection and so on . 
Those domestic-owned companies that have already ex-
hibited the initiative, imagination , and foresight to undertake 
research and development in Canada, that have searched out 
opportunities for sales abroad, have established foreign sales 
contacts and/ or foreign marketing organizations, and have 
thereby forged their way into the world's markets will perhaps 
be able to cope most successfully with the challenge of free 
trade. But there is no reason why other firms too, if they 
respond appropriately cannot survive and thrive. Govern-
ment assistance will be an important part of the adjustment 
process, but a discussion of this topic is far beyond the scope 
of this paper. 
In conclusion , a Pacific Free Trade Area would create 
many difficulties for Canadian secondary manufacturing, but 
it would also provide immense opportunities . Much intra-
industry specialization would undoubtedly take place as firms 
specialize more fully, lengthen their production runs and 
where necessary, construct larger plants. But the achieve -
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ment of economies of scale is not enough . Constant irn.prove -
ment of products and processes and aggressive selling abroad 
will also be essential if Canadian manufacturing is to develop 
its full potential under trade liberalization. 
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APPENDIX 
Commodity Classification Used in This Paper 
(Based on SITC) 
(1) Crude Foodstuffs and Feed: 001, 025, 041-045, 
051, 054, 061, 071-075, 121. 
(2) Crude Materials: 211, 212, 221, 231.1-231. 4, 
241, 242.2-242.4, 242.9, 243.1, 244, 261-267, 
271-276, 281-286, 291, 292, 321, 331, 341, 
351, 411, 421, 422, 431 . 
(3) Processed Foodstuffs: 011, 012, 013, 022, 023, 
024, 031, 032, 046, 047, 048, 052, 053, 055, 
062, 081, 091, 099, 111, 112, 122 . 
(4) Primary Manufactures: 242.1, 243 . 2, 243.3, 251, 
332, 611, 613, 631, 632, 641.1, 661, 662, 
663, 666, 671, 672, 681-689. 
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CANADA AND PACIFIC TRADE POLICY 
APPENDIX 
TABL E 3 
MANUFACTURED IMPORTS AND EXPORT S BY MAJOR INDUSTRY GROUPS, 
AS PERCENT OF TOTAL MANUF ACTURE D IMPORTS AND EXPORTS AND 
AS PERCENT OF DOME STIC PRODUCTION, AND DUTIES COLLECTED AS 
M a jor Manufacturing 
Industry Grou12s 
Foo.d and Beverage s 
Tobacco Prouducts 
Rubber 
Leather 
Textiles 
Knitting Mills 
Clothing 
Wood 
Furniture and 
Fixtures 
Paper and Allied 
Printing, Publishing 
& Allied 
Primary Metal 
Metal Fabricating 
Machinery 
(except electrical) 
Transportation 
Equipment 
Electrical Products 
Non-Metallic 
Minerals 
Petroleum and Coal 
Chemicals and 
Chemical Products 
Miscellaneous 
Manufacturing 
A PERCENT OF TOTAL IMPORTS , 
1963 
Import s as Exports as Imports as 
Percent of P e rc ent of P e rcent of 
Total Manu- Total Manu- Dome stic 
factured fa:ctured Production 
Imports Expor ts 
(1) (2) (3) 
7 . 3 11. 7 6 .4 
0 . 1 0.6 2. 1 
0.9 0 . 3 11. 5 
0.7 0 . 3 11 . 5 
5.8 0 . 8 26 . 1 
0. 5 0 . 1 10.4 
0.9 0.3 4. 8 
1.4 12.1 5.6 
0 . 4 0.1 4.3 
1.6 26 . 8 3.3 
2.4 0.2 12.3 
4.6 19.3 7.5 
7.6 2.7 20 . 2 
23.0 6.0 130. 1 
15 . 8 5.8 27 . 7 
7.7 3. 1 25.0 
2.5 0.5 16 . 1 
2.0 0.2 7. 4 
8. 4 6 .7 25. 5 
6 . 4 2.3 42.7 
100 . oCl) 100; 0(1) 17.3 
Exports Duties 
a s of Collected 
Domestic as Percent 
Production of Total 
Imports 
(4) (5) 
9 . 3 14.9 
8 . 3 38.1 
4.1 20 . 1 
4 .6 17.3 
3.0 21.3 
2 .0 30. 2 
1.3 26 .0 
43 . 1 7.3 
0.9 25 .9 
50 . 0 15.0 
1.0 4.9 
28.3 4.6 
6.4 15.1 
31. l 7 .0 
9.3 9.22 
9 . 3 17.1 
2.9 10. 3 
0.6 6. 7 
18 . 7 8.5 
14. 0 11.6 
15 . 7 11.3 
Source: J. W . Wilkinson. Can ada's International Trade: Anal ·sis of Recent Trends 
and Patterns. (Montreal: Privat e Planning Association of Canada, 9 
Notes: (1) Percentages may not add to 100.0 due to rounding . 
(2) Would now be much lower owing to Canada- United Stages Automobile 
Pact. 
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COMM.ENT ON H . E . ENGLISH' S PAPER 
by Richard N . Cooper 
I am not an expert on Canadian commercial policy , and 
I found Professor English's discussion of its plitico- histori-
cal origins most illuminating. I will confine my remarks to 
two broad points . 
First , economists have long been baffled as to why the 
productivity of the Canadian economy is so much lower- - by 
about one - third-- than that of the United States . This des -
pite the fact of the same general background of the peoples and 
the greater resource endowment , per capita , in Canada . 
Large di screpancies exist even when regional differences with-
in each country are taken into account . The gap is so large 
that it cannot be attributed to errors in measurement . 
Trade experts like to attribute this "productivity gap" 
to protectionist commercial policies--both in Canada and in 
Canada' s trading partners, notably the United States . 
Canada's tariffs pull Canada' s resour ces into uneconomic manu-
facturing production, and tariffs of Canada's trading partners 
allegedly prevent Canada from exploiting the economies of 
large scale production in some manufacturing lines . 
I am skeptical that Canadian free trade and tariff- free 
access to the U . S . market would eliminate thi s productivity 
gap. It is worth recalling that, insofar such figures can be 
relied on , the productivity gap existed well over a centur y ago, 
before the advent of Canada's policy to stimulate manufacturing 
production through tari ff protection . Nonetheless, the gap 
seems to have widened since the 1870' s , and I am sure that 
trade barri ers contri bute some- though I would guess the small-
er part- - of this gap . Canada's market is by no means a 
small one ; Canada i s the seventh or eighth largest national eco-
nomy in the non- communist world . And it has had preferred 
access to the Briti sh market for many years . Nonetheless , 
I would agree wi th Engli sh's point that t ariffs have resulted 
in excessive product di ffe rentiation , and this fact has prevent-
ed e xp loi ting economies of sc ale that the s ize of the market 
would otherwi se per mit. 
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Moreover, in assessing the effect of tariffs- - or the 
removal of them- - on Canada's standard of living, it is neces -
sary also to take into account the impact on capital movements 
into Canada. This is a complex area, but it would be rea-
sonable to conjecture that Canada's tariff has induced foreign 
direct investment in Canadian manufacturing, and this may 
have increased Canada's total capital stock. Tariff removal 
would, I believe, greatly reduce the net inflow of direct in-
vestment capital into Canada below what it would otherwise be . 
(This has implications for the balance-of- payments consequen-
ces of free trade for Canada as well.) 
My second point concerns the broad area of trade policy 
choices that we face. Professor English rejects, for good 
. reasons, the sectoral approach to free trade . Given the 
complex and strong interrelations among different "sectors" - -
defining a sector is itself difficult- - sectoral free trade would 
involve high risks of distorting the allocation of resources . 
But he endorses a regional free trade area among like -
minded countries, open-minded and outward-looking, appa-
rently in preference to further generalized tariff reductions 
of a type brought about by the Kennedy Round of tariff negoti -
ations . It is not entirely clear whether this preference re -
sults from the judgement that another Kennedy Round, although 
preferable on its merits, is not likely to take place , or from 
the belief that a regional free trade area is likely to offer a 
more significant step toward free trade than would another 
negotiation of the Kennedy Round type. 
In my view , the strength of our interest in a regional 
free trade area must depend heavily and inversely on our as -
sessment of the prospects for a successful second Kennedy 
Round, which would be preferable on its merits . CI have 
indicated briefly why I regard it as preferable in my own 
paper.) I believe , furthermore, that the prospects are not 
so bleak as Professor English seems to feel. It is true 
that the negotiators at the Kennedy Round are now weary, 
and would not relish the prospect of going through another 
round of tariff negotiations in the near future . The Kennedy 
Round tariff reductions will be phased over a five - year period , 
and will not take full effect until 1972 . I would guess that 
by that time the groundwork for further generalized reduction 
in tariffs (and in some non- tariff barriers) could have been 
laid . The time necessary to work out the details of a free 
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trade area and generate the required public support would 
surely be as long. 
This does not mean, however, that discussion of a 
Pacific Free Trade Area is not fruitful. On the contrary, 
such discussion will usefully draw attention to the important 
trading relationships among the countries around the Pacific . 
In addition, in the event a second Kennedy Round should not 
materialize, a Pacific Free Trade Area, particularly one 
open to general membership such as Professor English pro-
poses, would become an attractive alternative; and it is use-
ful to start now laying the necessary groundwork and doing 
the necessary analysis. 
SESSION I 
COMMENT ON B . W. WILKINSON 'S PAPER 
By ShigE>ru Fujii 
75 
Profrssor Wilkinson ' s paper is compos of three main parts : 
1) Main features of current Canadian Trade patterns and 
trends; 
2) Estimation of static effects of Kennedy Round; and 
3) Estimation of static and dynamic effects of P AFT A . 
1) First of all, I am deeply interested in the commodity 
composition of Canadian trade shown in Table 2 (p .35) , which 
indicates a conspicuous contrast to that of Japan . 
Endowed with rich natural resources, actual as well 
as potential, Canada is able to increase the share of crude 
materials in exports and decrease their share in imports, 
along with increasing shares of end products both in exports 
and imports--that is , in the process of furthering industriali -
zation. 
In this respect, it would have been of more help to us 
in attaining a clearer understanding about the features of 
Canadian trade, if Professor Wilkinson had presented the 
percentage shares of respective goods or materials in produc-
tion or output, too . We would have been able to compare, 
for example, the shares of commodities in exports and produc-
tion, 
2) As to the estimation of the static effects of Kennedy 
Round and PAFTA , I have learned much from the paper, for 
which I should like to say "Thank you very much ," 
3) As to the dynamic effects of P AFT A , Professor Wil-
kinson seems to put emphasis on economies of scale . Here 
Professor Wilkinson expects or hopes for beneficial effects 
of trade liberalization on secondary manufacturing industry in 
lowering production costs and hence lowering prices so as to 
be more internationally competitive; for the removal of tariffs 
of other P AFT A countries would extend the opportunities for 
exporting and hence for achieving economies of scale in pro-
duction for Canadian producers, and the removal of Canadian 
protection would offer the necessary stimulus to Can.adian 
producers to modernize and rationalize their production, 
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Professor Wilkinson goes further to estimate the degr ee 
of price decline i n secondary manufacturing necessary to eradi-
cate the deficit on merchandise account that might otherwise oc -
cur from the tariff elimination . For this purpose , he gives 
an elegant formula with three asumptions, and finds that a low-
ering by 4 . 6 percent of the prices of Canadian secondary manu-
factures exported to the United States and competing with im-
ports from the United States would be sufficient to eradicate 
the supposed trade deficit with the United States . 
So far , I can follow Professor Wilkinson's reasoning 
fairly well, an d agree with him in principle . There remai n s, 
however, one question which I should like made clear . The 
point is conce rned with the second assumption on p . 56 . 
Professor Wilkinson assumes that the Canadian price reduc -
tion occurs at the same time as the tariff removal. However, 
price reduction by way of economies of scale or rationaliza-
tion usually takes time . I am afraid that many things, expect-
ed and unexpected , might occur in the time interval between 
the tariff removal and the actual price decline . The final 
effects are difficult to ascertain , especially when the behavior 
of the U . S . - owned firms in Canada is taken into account as one 
of the dynamic influences of P AFT A . 
Thus, unlike the two other assumptions, this second as -
sumptions, I am afraid , would reduce the feasibility of estimat-
ing the dynamic effects in spite of Prof . Wilkinson ' s elegant 
formula . 
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DISCUSSION ON ENGLISH'S AND WILKINSON'S PAPERS 
In reply to comments on his paper, Prof. English 
first made the general point that a restructuring of the Canadi -
an economy would involve not only production rearrangement 
but also adjustments in marketing, research, and development 
activities. With regard to Prof . Cooper's second point , 
Prof. English stressed that recent trends suggest that Canada 
might be ill- advised to accept the cost of waiting for further 
global, Kennedy- Round type negotiations to take place. In 
this connection, he did not see why a regional approach need 
be an alternative to a multilateral approach; the former could 
be a means to a multilateral end . In short, Canada might 
come to favour the idea of P AFT A . 
Concerning the assumption of immediate price reduction 
after the removal of tariffs, Prof. Wilkinson explained that 
tariff removal would actually be staged over a period of time 
and that the scale effects would derive mainly from the length 
of run rather than mere horizontal size . This means that 
the transition would not take so much time as it would, if it 
started from scratch. With respect to the discussant's 
fir st point, the author ref erred to Appendix Table 3 of his 
paper where the data on total manufacturing output are provid-
ed in relation to trade statistics. 
The discussion from the floor centered on the possible 
impact of trade liberalization on (1) industrialists' attitudes, 
(2) the possible dynamic effects of trade liberalization in the 
secondary sector, (3) the position of agriculture, and (4) 
the balance-of-payments issue . 
(1) It was argued that the leading managers in Canadi-
an manufacturing industry would be favourably disposed to-
ward a move to freer trade, despite a traditionally highly pro-
tectionist atmosphere, which might still linger among the 
smaller firms with less managerial confidence. 
(2) Unfortunately it appeared difficult to make any 
satisfactory generalizations on the basis of the recent Cana-
da- United States automobile agreement, for it is a highly 
controlled arrangement. Moreover, American firms have 
tended to cover themselves very well. For example, they 
were supposed to increase the Canadian content of production . 
This they achieved by reinforcing the assembly line system 
rather than increasing the purchase of Canadian parts. 
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It is difficult to predict whether or not Canadian manufacturing 
production would increase where the majority of her industries 
are dominated by American- owned firms. 
(3) The impact on agriculture appeared to be less sig-
nificant for Canada than either for Australia or New Zealand . 
This is partly because she has had little difficulty in finding 
the export markets for wheat (i.e . China, U.S. S. R., and 
developing nations) , although she would, of course, welcome 
the opportunity to widen her markets in agricultural products , 
such as dairy products, in the United States . Canadian 
farmers have generally favoured free trade because it would 
keep down the high cost of imported goods . In any case, 
agriculture can be treated separately from manufactures, pro-
vided sufficient impetus for rationalization is given to the lat-
ter . 
(4) Trade liberalization could call for three kinds of 
adjustments which have an important bearing on the balance of 
payments : 
(i) a general reduction in price levels; 
(ii) the narrowing of wage differentials between the 
United States and Canada ; and 
(iii) exchange rate adjustment . 
The Canadian view was that (ii) would be most vital among the 
three. Put another way, Canada could avoid serious adjust-
ment problems so long as wage differentials did not disappear 
too rapidly. It was felt that institutional factors were import-
ant in judging whe ther there would be too rapid a disappearance 
of North American wage differentials . 
The above view invited the comment that Canadian eco-
nomists generally assume that monetary adjustments will take 
place and put emphasis on the possibilities of lowering price 
levels . But (i) and (ii) are associated more with welfare 
implications and the discussion of monetary adjustments should 
be made explicitly . It was observed that the Canadian balance 
of payments might face di fficulties depending on the direction of 
capital inflows and on the policies of American- owned firms in 
Canada, such as whether or not to purchase intermediate pro-
ducts from the United States. 
Chapter 3 NFW ZEALAND TRADE AND A.ID POLICIES 
IN RELATION TO THE PACIFIC 1\ND f\ SIAN REGION 
by L. V. Castle 
Professor, Victoria University of Wellington 
I Introduction 
A dozen years ago the task of writing a paper on this 
subject would have been simple ; for, i n the mid - fifties New 
Zealand official thinking on for e ign economic policy was fi r m-
ly centred around the country's historic relationship with the 
United Kingdom . There was in addition some concern for 
multilateral traoing relationships as expressed through the 
GP.TT . But this was essentially subsidiary derived more 
from the priociple that small countries had an interest in 
supporting collective security in economic as well as in de -
fPnce matters than from the facts of New Zealand's own pat-
tern of trade rdationships . There was certainly very 
littlP interest in trade with Asia , these countrie s generally 
being rP ,garded as offering no prospect in decades of becori~ing 
markets for the typ0 of foodstuffs exported by New Zealand . 
In the casi:> of Japan, memories of the War and the fear of 
what might eventually be entailed for Zew Zealand industry 
were still much too strong in 1955 to p e rmit any serious at -
tention being given to futuri:> trade con-:.acts with that country . 
In the fields of defence and international politics , 
however, devdopments in Europe as well as .in Asi a were 
already forcing New Zealand to shift the focus of its interest 
and commitment to the ; , sian and Pacific region. Indeed 
although there is significant dissent about the nature of offici-
al policy, there is now fairly broad acceptance in New Zea-
land that its primary political and security interests lie in 
the Pacific and Asian region and not , as in the past, in 
Europe and the Middle East . 
These changes in the orientation of political interests 
have not been matched by a similar degree of change in the 
field of foreign trade policy . Certainly one can detect after 
1956 a much stronger interest in developing trade and economic 
relations with the United States, Canada , Australia, Japan, 
the Philippines, Malaysia and other countries of the Asian 
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and Pacific re.gion. GovernmPnt sponsored trade missions 
to these countries on spveral occasions; trade treaties (with-
in the GATT framework) have bPen concluded and exporters 
actively encouraged by Government to develop these markets in 
particular. Nevertheless, much of this new-found interest 
in Asia anc the Pacific is merely an aspect of the more general 
attempt by New Zealand to reduce the degree of dependence 
on the Uniteo Kingdom market anil to divert as much as pos-
sible of New ZE>aland' s increasing exports of primary produce 
elsewhere - a response to the expectation ("apprehension" 
would be a more appropriate term) that the United Kingdom 
could not, for onE' reason or another, indefinitely. absorb at 
satisfactory prices for New Zealand a 3% per annum increase 
in imports of meat and dairy produce . Thus with an eye on 
increasing exports generally much of the emphasi.s in New 
Zealand's trade policy in recent years has been directed at 
opposing agricultural protectionism in Europe and North 
America and relatively less attention has been given to the 
development of markets in Asian and Pacific countries and to 
the policy measures that such a re-direction of emphasis might 
require. Nevertheless, the change in the pattern of New 
Zealand's trade over the past decade have been quite signific -
ant as the following Table indicates: 
TABLE I 
Direction of New Zealand Trade 
% of total 
Country Exports Imports 1938 1956 1966 1938 1956 1966 
United Kingdom 84.2 64.6 42.2 47.9 53.7 37.2 
Australia 3.8 3.1 4.6 12.9 14.2 19.3 
Canada 1.9 1.5 1.4 8.8 2.7 4.1 
United States 2.5 7.1 15.8 12.4 7.6 11. 2 
Japan 1.0 1.0 8.4 2. 2 1.0 5.7 
E.E . C. 4. 2 16 .:o 14.2 4.2 6.1 6 .7 
Other 2. 4 6.7 12.8 11.6 14.7 15.8 
TOTAL 100 .0 100.0 100.0 100 .0 100.0 100.0 
Source: New Zealand Official Year Book 
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A striking feature is of course the extent to which New 
Zealand's dependence on the United Kingdom market has fallen 
since 1938 . Part of the explanation is that with the relative 
decline of the United Kingdom wool textile industry, the Unit-
ed Kingdom now takes a much lower share of New Zealand 
wool exports; but another important factor is that the United 
States has displaced the United Kingdom as the major outlet 
for New Zealand beef . The European Economic Community 
countries are now of considerably greater importance as a 
market for New Zealand exports than they were in 1938 but this 
is mainly because of their much larger proportion of New Zea-
land wool purchases. Other products are of rather less 
significance, indeed the declining E . E. C . share of recent 
years can be attributed to the decreased i mportance of wool in 
total New Zealand exports . The Table also highlights the 
greatly increased importance to New Zealand of Japan and the 
Uni ted States as trade partners . Sales of beef, wool and 
dairy products (other than butter) to the United States have 
expanded very substantially in the past decade and there is a 
growing number of minor products including some manufactured 
goods in this trade . The increase in exports to Japan has 
been even more striking since much of this has occurred during 
the past five or six years . Wool has always been a major 
component but sales of mutton, milk powder, casein and forest 
products have expanded very rapidly. "Other" countries in 
the Table are a fairly diverse group but the most significant 
markets include Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and India. 
Overall, about 33% of New Zealand exports are now directed 
to the four developed countries of the Pacific basin plus 
Southeast Asia compared with less than 10% in 1938 and 15% 
in 1956 . 
To a country whose trading relationships had remained 
more or less unchanged in the fifty years prior to the Second 
World War, these changes in the direction of trade since 1956 
look very dramatic . For the most part, however, they have 
resulted from influences other than specific policies of the 
New Zealand Government to effect such market diversion. 
Economic growth in Japan, the United States and Europe and 
changing patterns of consumption in these countries and in 
Southeast Asia have been of more fundamental significance. 
Trade treaties with Japan, Philippines and Malaysia have un-
doubtedly been important in providing a general framework for 
building up Government and commercial contacts but the ex-
pansion of trade could never have proceeded as rapidly as it 
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has done unless the underlying basis for profitable exchange 
had not existed. Far from there have been any general change 
in New Zealand's outlook in foreign trade policy from her con-
nections with the United Kingdom to new relationships in the 
Pacific it is clear that the former remains of primary concern 
to New Zealand policy makers and to the major exporting in-
terests represented by the New Zealand Daily Board and the 
New Zealand Meat Board. For it is true that, despite the 
decline in the extent of dependence on the United Kingdom 
market since 1938, there has been very little change with res -
pect to three key products - butter, lamb and cheese. These 
products comprised 40% of total exports by value in 1965, with 
the United Kingdom market taking 92%, 89%, and 86% respec- . 
tively. The protection of New Zealand's rights of unrestrict-
ed duty- free entry to the United Kingdom thus remains a cen-
tral aim of New Zealand policy because no prospects are seen 
for the development of markets elsewhere for ever1 a small part 
of what New Zealand now sells there. However, there are 
or appear to be, two other points which are relevant to this 
attitude. The first is that a major expansion of trade links 
with Japan or even with Australia, if attempted too rapidly, 
may well require New Zealand to introduce substantial changes 
in its present policies of protection for manufacturing indust-
ries . This is a nettle the New Zealand Government would 
prefer not to grasp, although it may be forced to do so in any 
case before very long. Secondly, there is an understandable 
reluctance to move away from trading relationships which in the 
past have expressed also the close cultural, emotional and 
kinship ties that have long existed between the United Kingdom 
and New Zealand. For many in New Zealand - and her 
policy-makers are not immune from such feelings - the comfor-
table, United Kingdom-dependent, quasi-colonial status of 
New Zealand in economic matters, is much to be preferred to 
the rigour of living and trading with partners who do not share 
these other non-economic ties. Why, it is asked, should 
New Zealand turn away from the United Kingdom to its Pacific 
neighbours when that course may turn out to have been unnec-
essary? This emotional element in New Zealand attitudes 
can be put on one side for the moment for it is unlikely to be of 
real significance in blocking policy changes if it should be 
clearly seen that a policy of dependence on the United Kingdom 
it is preventing the attainment of certain material goals which 
are valued more. The strong disposition not to abandon this 
long-standing feature of New Zealand trade policy is not by 
any means irrational; but a principal question which policy-
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makers are now facing is whether it remains relevant in terms 
of the essential policy objectives of economic growth and the 
maintenance of full employment. 
II Trade Policy and Economic Developraent 
The dominance of the United Kingdom as New Zealand's 
principal trading partner merely reflects the way in which eco-
nomic development as an export- led process got under way in 
New Zealand in the latter part of the nineteenth century. 
Prior to the 1880 ' s the main stimulus to development and set-
tlement after the early colonisation efforts came from the dis -
covery of gold and the development of wool production on ex-
tensive natural and artificial grazing lands . There is some 
evidence, however, that by the end of the 1870' s the impetus 
given to economic growth by these forces had begun to peter 
out. The gold deposits having been largely exhausted and 
other mineral resources being scarce there was nothing much 
left to exploit and nothing very substantial on which to base a 
vigorous manufacturing economy . The introduction of re-
frigerated transport, however, opened a completely new 
chapter since it made possible the exploitation of New Zealand's 
main resource - - a favourable climate - by specialisation in 
pastoral farming to produce meat and dairy produce for export. 
The years that followed saw a remarkable growth in such ex-
ports and the development of meat production resulted also in 
a significant expansion in output and exports of its joint pro-
duct - wool - and other less important by-products of the meat 
and dairy industries. This develo~ment process was materi-
ally assisted by a high rate of immigration (which during the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century averaged around 6% per 
annum) and by a sustained programme of public investment in 
roads, railways and ports which contributed much to opening 
up the country for settlement. Furthermore, a large part of 
the manufacturing growth in this period was directly stimulated 
by expansion of agricultural output. Meat preserving and 
freezing, manufactured dairy products, fertiliser plants, 
vehicles and farm machinery industries were quickly established 
especially with the assistance of foreign capital. 
The pointis, however, that all this would have been of 
little avail if England for her own good reasons unconnected 
with New Zealand as such had not followed an open door policy 
as regards agricultural imports. With the open door, the 
decline of English farming and the rise of English living stan-
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dards, the more New Zealand produced the more the English 
were prepared to buy at, on the whole, very profitable prices . 
Furthermore, the more important these exports became the 
more energy, management skill and scientific research were 
devoted to raising the level of productivity and quality of the 
product. This cumulative process meant too that relatively 
speaking New Zealand became very specialised even within 
the agricultural sector (grain production rapidly declined 
from the 1890' s) and became very dependent upon a market 
12,000 miles away which in the late 19th and early 20th cen-
turies had no rival in the vigour with which it pursued a free 
trade policy. The scale and nature of New Zealand's deve -
lopment in the. period 1880- 1930 wa·s determined by that policy 
more perhaps than by any other factor. And of course it 
suited England just as it suited New Zealand . New Zealand 
might, in other circumstances have been able to develop a more 
diversified economy; perhaps also the population would be even 
smaller than it is now; and, with less dependence on a small 
range of primary produce exports New Zealand might have 
been better placed to meet the challenge of a world trading 
regime in which agricultural products are unwelcome. But 
New Zealanders would almost certainly have had a lower stand-
ard of living than they now enjoy .1 
The Ottawa Agreement of 1932 formalised and to some 
degree extended what had in practice been the trading arrange-
ments between the United Kingdom and New Zealand previous -
ly . New Zealand, under the ebullient, imperialistic R. J. 
Seddon had unilaterally established preferences for United 
Kingdom and other Empire goods in i903 by increasing duties 
on "foreign" goods and these preferences were increased and 
extended in several tariff measures in later years . Under 
the Ottawa Agreement New Zealand undertook to preserve 
existing margins of preference where those margins did not 
exceed 20% and not to reduce any margin to below 20% except 
with the consent of the United Kingdom. New Zealand re -
mained free to do what it liked about preferences in excess of 
20% (the "non- contractual" preferences as they became known) 
but there was a limited obligation to consult the United Kingdom 
about proposed changes . In addition, some rates of duty on 
1
Professor K. Kojima refers to this situation as one of 
"forced comparative advantage" See his article "An Impres-
sion of the Oceanian Economy": Economic Record March, 
1964. I do not share this view. 
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British goods were bound; some were reduced; and New Zea-
land also undertook to protect only those industries which seem-
ed likely to be economic eventually . This latter provision 
was weak and very general and the United Kingdom rarely exert-
ed much pressure on New Zealand tariff- making freedom through 
it, largely because import licensing became a£ter 1938 the princi-
pal instrument of protection . 1 
On the United Kingdom side, the Ottawa Agreement with 
New Zealand formalised certain duty preferences established 
for Commonwealth countries under the Import Duties Act of 
1932 . Apart from preferences of 15% on cheese and 15/ - per 
Cwt on butter the most i mportant aspect for New Zealand was 
that , while provi ding for the impositi on of quotas on New Zea-
land produce in certain circumstances, in fact unrestri cted 
duty free entry to the United Kingdom market was guaranteed 
for v i rtually all of New Zeal and's exports . 
The econ omic links with the United Ki ngdom were tight -
ened still further on the outbreak of war in 1939 . The United 
Kingdom became the sole purchaser under bulk purchase agree-
ments of the whole of New Zealands export surplus of meat , 
dairy produce , wool and tallow . Prices were negotiated an-
nually and agreement was also reached on the percentage of 
total output which New Zealand might send to other markets . 
The United Kingdom inter est was of course to ensure a s.teady 
supply of relatively cheap produce and it was often not assy 
for New Zealand negotiator s to secure United Ki ngdom agree -
ment t o an increase in thi s "other- market" percentage . This 
provision tended the r efore to inhibit any vigorous efforts by 
New Zealand to diversify markets while the bulk purchase 
arrangements remained in force . 
The original intention had been that the bulk purchase 
agreements would remain in force for the duration of the war . 
Bulk purchase of wool ceased a£ter the sale of the 1945/ 46 clip , 
the auction system being reverted to . Early in 1944 however 
long term contracts (for a four year period) were entered into 
for meat and dairy products and these were extended in 1948 for 
a further period of seven years , These arrangements reflect-
ed, on the New Zealand side, a desire to achieve stability in 
1 It became more relevant after 1950 when New Zealand 
began to dismantle the import licensing system and to substitute 
higher tariffs . 
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export prices and sales for these products and on the United 
Kingdom side the desire (since food was still being rationed in 
the United Kingdom in the post war years up to the early 50 ' s) 
to have assured supplies at low prices. Government-to-
government trading moreover was in keeping with the general 
political philosophy of the Labour Governments which were in 
power in both countries until the early 1950' s . 
The Conservative Government which came to power in 
the United Kingdom in 1951 quickly moved toward the abolition 
of foodstuffs rationing and in association with this moved also 
to terminate the bulk purchase arrangements with New Zealan d , 
These were due to expire in 1955, but after discussi on with 
New Zealand the contracts for meat and dairy produce wer e 
terminated in mid-1954 . This simply meant that the trade now 
reverted to private enterprise channels. Unrestricted duty 
free entry to the United Kingdom market continued and in the 
case of meat was made firmer by an agreement concluded in 
1952 under which the United Kingdom explicitly guarantee d to 
permit the entry of New Zealand meat without quantitative res -
triction until 1967 . The same provisions were extended to 
dairy produce as part of the revision of the Ottawa Agreement 
in 1959 . In both cases this undertaking was in 1966 extended 
to 1972 subject to certain qualifications essentially related to 
possi.ble British membership of the E . E . C . and to the fact that 
a quota system for butter was being operated by the United 
Kingdom , 1 
1This quota system also applies to New Zealand and was 
in fact introduced by the United Kingdom in 1961 with New Zea-
land I S agreement J especially in order tO prevent excessive 
dumping of butter in the United Kingdom market by European 
and other suppliers about which New Zealand had strongly pro-
tested in the G . A . T . T. and directly to the United Kingdom . 
New Zealand would have preferred the United Kingdom to use 
anti - dumping or countervailing duties, but the quota system is 
certai nly better than a "free-for- all" . J'v:oreover New Zea-
land is well treated in the allocation of the quota and indeed for 
practical purposes they hardly amount to quantitative restric-
tions . 
The tariff preferences granted to the United Kingdom in 
r eturn must be counted as part of the cost of these advantages . 
Under the Agreement as revised in 1959, New Zealand guarant-
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The greater scope achieved by New Zealand in the 1959 
Agreement for the reduction of margins of preference was in-
tended to give New Zealand more bargaining coin in G . A . T . T . 
especially in negotiations with the E . E . C : countries . But 
little use has been made of this, mainly because the increased 
trade with New Zealand that such reductions might permit 
have, reasonably enough , not been considered sufficiently 
worthwhile by other countries in exchange for a reduction of 
restrictions on New Zealand agricultural exports. A great-
er possibility for an exchange of concessions may however b e 
much more relevant in the context of developing trade with Japan 
and with other Pacific countries . I return to this point later. 
The provisions guaranteeing unrestricted duty free entry 
for New Zealand exports (even of manufactured goods) continue 
to be regarded in New Zealand as of the utmost importance . 
They have undoubtedly helped to give greater confidence to 
farmers, especially in the early 1950 ' s , that any increased out-
put from investment in pastures , livestock , processing facili -
ties and fertiliser plants would be able to be sold. But on 
the other hand this may well have been a deceptive security and 
have inhibited any incentive to broaden out into other markets 
on any extensive and permanent scale. Moreover unrestricted 
entry for New Zealand has usually also meant unrestricted 
entry for all other exporters . There has never been any gua-
rantee that the United Kingdom would, other than by tariffs, 
restrict the entry of competing supplies from other sources . 
ees for the most part minimum preferential margins of 5, 7 . 5 
or 10 per cent and some of them were increased in the further 
revision of the Agreement in 1966. But actual margins are 
often well above the minimum. In the case of motor vehicles 
for example the preferential margin is 39% c.k.d. and 35% as-
sembled. Unfortunately no detailed studies have been made 
in New Zealand of the effect of these preferences on import 
costs. Some limited work suggests that British goods tend 
to be priced so that most of the benefit of the margin over 
non-British goods is gained; a practice which has been made 
more possible by the effects of import licensing in restrict-
ing imports and in tying channels of trade . 
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Nor could the United Kingdom do so under the terms of the 
G. A. T. T. Furthermore the United Kingdom has not been 
prepared to accept any serious limitations on its freedom to 
encourage the expansion of its own agricultural output through 
its system of deficiency payments to farmers. In the case of 
lamb for example the deficiency payment has sometimes been as 
high as 50% of the market price. 
Until about 1956 New Zealand confidently expected that 
these trading arrangements would continue to provide the 
principal basis for the maintenanc'e of her export income over 
the long-term. But with rapidly rising United Kingdom out-
put of meat and milk, the slow growth of United Kingdom con-
sumption and the emergence of European and North American 
surpluses of dairy products on world markets New Zealand 
began to realize that she could not rely upon the United Kingdom 
market to absorb indefinitely a steady increase of about 3% per 
annum in New Zealands exports at increased prices. 
New Zealands concern about policies of agricultural 
protection dates from about this time, even though such policies 
had commonly been practised in most countries for decades. 
But because of the special trading agreements with the United 
Kingdom there had never been any need to worry about what 
might be happening in the rest of the world or for that matter 
what might happen in the future. New Zealand farmers (who 
have always had a most powerful influence on New Zealand 
trade policy) were interested only in "facts" not in the prognos-
tications of economic theorists. The "facts" were that New 
Zealand had guaranteed markets in the United Kingdom; prices 
were good; if they should go down, they would always rise 
again and were still better than could be got anywhere else. 
Moreover the products, especially lamb, were highly specialis -
ed for the English taste. To make any change would require 
a change in the structure of the meat and nence of the wool 
industry, change of breeds and char;.ge of production and process-
ing practices. These arguments are still advanced by farmers 
but certainly have much less force now than they had in 1956-58. 
Perhaps the most important factor in diluting the optimistic com-
placency which prevailed in farming and government circles un-
til this time was the attempt by the United Kingdom to reach 
some accommodation with the emerging European Economic 
Community. The first proposals for a Free Trade Area em-
bracing OEEC countries but excluding agricultural products 
were not seriously opposed by New Zealand although reserva-
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tions of principle about the growth of regionalism were made. 
The failure of the negotiations indeed worried some in New 
Zealand especially in official circles because it was realized 
that the next move by the United Kingdom would almost certain-
ly be an application to join the Community without making a 
blanket reservation for agricultural products . 
The move, when it did come, was greeted with a mixture 
of rage and incradulity on the part of many New Zealand farm-
ers .and their attitudes were a se rious handicap over the next 
year or so in developing appropriate policy responses to the 
changed attitude of the United Kingdom. The general ap-
proach of New Zealand during this time was to secure if pos-
sible a firm undertaking from the United Kingdom that she 
would not join the EEC unless New Zealand interests were 
safeguarded. Some such words were indeed uttered by 
Mr. Duncan Sandys but the United Kingdom and the New Zea-
land interpretations differed widely. New Zealand farmers 
and many among the general public simply could not believe, in 
spite of the evidence, that the United Kingdom would ever con-
template imposing tariffs on New Zealand goods while allowing 
imports from EEC countries to enter duty free, or that quanti-
tative restrictions would be imposed on New Zealand butter, 
cheese and meat to favour European suppliers as the common 
agricultural policy would require. 
Thinking in official circles was however much more rea-
listic. Officials had no doubt that the United Kingdom was 
serious and further that in the final analysis the interests of 
New Zealand farmers would go by the board if concern with 
them deemed likely to prejudice the United Kingdoms chances. 
De Gaulle's veto in 1963 came as a great relief to New 
Zealand , although it was generally recognised that the United 
Kingdom would almost certainly make another attempt before 
very long. Nevertheless, although the events of these years 
did more than anything else to shake the confidence of New Zea-
land in the United Kingdom market as a permanent outl et for 
meat and dairy produce exports, agreement had been reached 
between the United Kingdom and five of the EEC countries 
(France entering a reservation) that New Zealand was in a 
"special position" and that arrangements to deal with the prob-
lems presented for her by United Kingdom membership would 
be needed. New Zealand negotiators regarded this as some-
thing of a triumph for their persistent efforts during the course 
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of the negotiations to impress upon the United Kingdom and the 
EEC the "catastrophic" affects on New Zealand which the appli-
cation of the common agricultural policy to the United Kingdom 
would have. Without belittling this achievement - and indeed 
no other policy than that followed would have had any support 
from New Zealand farmers - this result in my view was unfortu-
nate and has seriously inhibited attempts to develop both alter-
native export products and alternative markets for the butter, 
lamb and cheese now being exported to the United Kingdom, 
Butter especially, for this product is the one about which con-
cern has been greatest. 
The way in which the "special position" would be handled 
has never been defined, Some officials and many in the farm-
ing industry seem to assume that the six could agree to New 
Zealands old relationship with the United Kingdom - unrestrict-
ed duty free access to the United Kingdom market - being conti-
nued. Others more realistically consider that at best it would 
involve no more than some form of compensating finance for a 
limited period . Whatever the view taken, the generally agreed 
official line appears to be that the best outcome can be achieved 
if New Zealand does not reduce her degree of dependence on the 
United Kingdom market. This sounds reasonable enough ex-
cept that the probability of gaining anything more than a tempo-
rary respite can hardly be very high. Even if De Gaulle is 
no longer in comm~nd in France, it seems inconceivable that 
the Six would allow the United Kingdom - a major foodstuff 
importer - to join the EEC and not at the same time give pri-
ority to absorbing the expanding EEC meat and butter export 
surpluse s. 
The official line is however hard to combat especially 
now that De GauHe has again vetoed the British application and 
that the United Kingdom entry guarantee to New Zealand still 
has at least five years to run. 
Not all the pressures are in the direction of maintaining 
the status quo. Recent projections of the Food and Agricul-
ture Organization about agricultural commodity production and 
trade in 1975 (and demand in 1985) are of considerable interest 
for policy purposes in New Zealand, The projections suggest 
that, of New Zealand's main exports, prospects are most favour-
able for meat and least favourable for milk and milk products. 
World commercial demand for beef and veal, and for mutton and 
lamb, is predicted to outrun supply. The world market should 
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consequently be able to absorb predicted increases in produc-
tion and indeed offers some prospects of price rises . For 
milk and milk products on the other hand, import demand in the 
main international market, the United Kingdom, is expected 
to fall and substantial export surpluses are predicted in West-
ern Europe. In total, world production is forecast to outrun 
commercial demand by a significant amount . For wool the 
F AO suggests an increase in demand more or less in parallel 
with supply, but unfortunately the projections do not distinguish 
between coarse and fine wools . Furthermore, there are like -
ly to be major increases in demand for meat, including mutton 
and lamb, from a wide range of markets. Significant import 
increases are forecast for North America, Southern Europe, 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Japan and for the deve -
loping economies. 
The really difficult problem is that of dairy products, 
the projections indicating that present trends will lead to in-
creased difficulties in marketing the output of the main exP,ort-
ing countries, with France and Germany, which in 1961/63 
had a small import requirement , having a surplus of 330 ,000 
tons butterfat equivalent in 1965 while the shortfall of British 
production wi ll drop from 400,000 tons (1961/63) to 300,000 
tons in 1975. 
Even if the increase in European surpluses is only half 
as great as the projections indicate, and even if the United 
Kingdom does not join the EEC , the pressure of supplies on 
the United Kingdom market would be heavy and prices inevitably 
driven down to low levels . Furthermore, there is bound to 
be a scramble for whatever markets are available elsewhere -
in some of the developing countries for instance, or in places 
such as the West Indies where New Zealand has been able to 
build up useful markets although with a lot of effort. But such 
competition would not be on the basis of economic prices but on 
the basis of export subsidies . It would be a competiton bet-
ween Treasuries and New Zealand is not in a position to engage 
in that sort of activity . Forecasts of export prospects have 
also been made by A. Maizels and others in a recent articles 
in the National. Institute Economic Review . The main results 
of interest to New Zealand are summarised below. 
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TABLE II 
Projected Annual Rates of Growth of ConsumEtion of Stated 
Products in the Main Industrial Areas, 1960- 61 to 1975 
(% a year, compound) 
Other 
Western 
U . S.A. Canada U . K . EEC Europe Japan Total 
Meat 2.3 3. 2 1.6 3. 2 5. 1 8 . 3 2.9 
Butter -0 . 4 0 .3 1.6 1.8 1.3 8 . 4 1. 2 
Cheese 2. 4 3 ,3 1.1 2. 3 3. 5 6 . 5 2. 4 
Wool 0 .9 1.9 -0 . 4 0 . 5 0 .9 2.9 0 .9 
These results are more optimistic than those of the F AO 
for meat but certainly more depressing for butter and wool. 
For each of New Zealand ' s main exports the growth in total 
demand is less than 3% per annum, for butter and wool only 
about 1%. Of special importance is that the United Kingdom 
market has the slowest growth prospects . The really bright 
spot is Japan with projected demand for each commodity above 
that of other industrial areas . 
For dairy produce this is confirmed by a New Zealand 
study which suggests that by 1975 Japan will have an import 
demand for approximately two million tons of milk in spite of 
major programmes being undertaken to expand dairy output . 1 
The implications of these projections have yet to have 
much influence on New Zealand trade or production policy 
even in terms of direction . The expansion of traditional agri-
cultural output at around 4% per annum remains the target ob-
jective as agreed at the Agricultural Development Conference 
in Wellington in 1964, but that objective was never translated 
into terms of product requirements. What should now be ob-
vious is that even if New Zealand decides to continue its concen~ 
tration on exports of pastoral products , much stronger efforts 
must now be made to cultivate the Japanese market which almost 
alone gives the prospect of becoming the alternative to the 
1 
A . R . Frampton , "A Market Target for the New Zea-
land Dairy Industry" Lincoln College , Christchurch 1965 . 
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United Kingdom. Some of the considerations involved in such 
a policy change are dealt with in a later section of this paper. 
Market diversion, however, will not of itself be suffici-
ent to overcome the problems which New Zealand now faces of 
chronic balance of payments disequilibrium, slow growth, and 
unemployment. A significant expansion of. exports to Japan, 
to Australia or to North America will be possible only if New 
Zealand opens up its own markets to competing imports . More -
over, the dependence of New Zealand on a few primary pro-
ducts can be reduced only if her industrial structure is made 
considerably more competitive than it is now . 
The importance of export income, currently around 25% 
of Gross National Product, is that much of New Zealand's 
manufacturing depends on imported raw materials, components 
and capital equipment for its continued operation. Some 82% 
of all imports in the year ended June 1966 were in these catego-
ries. Moreover, manufacturing accounts for about 27% of 
all employment compared with some 12% in agriculture . In 
terms of contribution to Gross Domestic Product, however, 
agriculture is still more important providing some 25% (includ-
ing primary produce processing) as against 22% for manuf ac -
turing. 1 
Most New Zealand manufacturing is oriented towards 
the local market, less than 4% of output being exported. Apart 
from a few industries processing for export, most units are 
high cost and are fairly small with less than 3% of units having 
100 employees or more although this group contributes nearly 
50% of total added value . 
Prior to 1938, industry was protected by relatively low 
tariffs but since then has had the benefit of import licensing 
imposed originally for balance of payments reasons. In re-
cent years especially, import licensfog has been used delibera-
tely as a means of increasing the pace of industrialisation in 
order to achieve import substituti on and to reduce the degree of 
dependence on foreign trade as well as to "provide employment" . 
1Derived for 1964/65 from C . A . Blyth, "Strategic Fact-
ors in New Zealand's Economic Growth 1965-75" Wellington, 
1965 
94 L. V. CASTLE 
In fact the degree of dependence on imports has not been reduced 
the ratio of imports to GNP having remained fairly constant at 
about 30% over the past 15 years. r The composition however 
has changed in that finished capital and consumer goods are now 
a much smaller proportion and components etc. a much larger 
proportion (70%) of total imports. 
The policy of industrialisation to provide employment and 
to reduce import dependence has been accompanied in the post-
war years by government expenditure policies aimed at improv-
ing welfare benefits and at providing the educational, health , 
transport and other services demanded by an increasing popula-
tion. Until about the mid- fifties, these policies did not lead 
to serious balance of payments troubles because the increased 
volume of New Zealand exports plus rising world prices for 
meat, dairy produce and wool helped to expand export income 
sufficiently to keep the balance of payments d2ficits within limits 
that could be comfortably financed by private , capital inflow and 
by government borrowing. These conditions did not last and 
with sharply falling export prices and rising import demands a 
severe balance of payments crisis was experienced in 1957 /58 
when the deficit rose to $NZ103 million and after some improve-
ment in the next two years rose again to over $NZ 100 million in 
1961 and 1962 . In the last two years the deficits have been 
$186 million and $NZ 205 million respectively and a further 
deficit of about $NZ 140 million is forecast for the year ended 
March 1968. 
The collapse of the wool market has been blamed by the 
Government for this situation which has entailed heavy external 
borrowing from the IMF and a variety of other sources. 
While the fall in wool prices was a precipitating factor, the 
Government must bear a large share of the blame for failing to 
take corrective action at least 18 months beforehand to control 
the rise of internal expenditure and the demand for imports 
when this course became clearly necessary. Indeed, the 
rise of Government expenditure by an average of 9% per annum 
for the three preceeding years must have been a major contri-
butory factor to the increase in imports. Action was, how -
1J. W. ROWE, "Import Reliance 1950- 65"; N. Z . Eco-
nomic Papers Vol . 1, No . l, 1966. 
Also, A.D. Brownlie, "N.Z's Import Function" 
N . Z. Economic Papers Vol. 1. No . 21966 . 
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ever, finally taken in early 1967 by the removal of subsidies on 
foodstuffs, raising prices of certain government services, the 
imposition of increased sales taxation and the sharp curtailment 
of the rate of increase in government expenditure , The objec-
tive of these measures as stated by the Minister of Finance in 
his "Letter of Intent" to the International Monetary Fund is to 
achieve a balance on current account by June 1969. 
Devaluation of the New Zealand dollar on 22 November 
by 19 . 4% could help materially in meeting this objective but the 
Government has yet to announce what additional steps it pro-
poses to take to ensure that devaluation is used to improve the 
longrun position of the economy . The events of the past year 
however, have brought a much wider realisation than ever 
before that primary produce exports , heavily concentrated in 
a market that is not expanding , are not a sound basis for future 
development . At Government level too there i s growing 
opini on that an essential part of the remedy lies in expanding 
industrial exports and in doing more to promote alte r native 
markets for the traditional products, espe cially in Japan , It 
is not at all clear nevertheless that Government is prepared to 
take the main step that is now needed , namely, the removal of 
import licensing that has b e en in force for nearly 30 years . 
Ill Trade Relations with Australia and Japan 
As mentioned earlier , New Zealand policy i s still pri-
marily concerned with New Z e aland ' s position in the United 
Kingdom market . Nevertheless special attention has been 
given in recent years to the expansion of trade with Australia 
and Japan as part of more general efforts to increase exports 
and to reduce reliance on the United Kingdom market. The 
following section briefly reviews New Zealand trade relations 
with these countries. 
(a) Australia 
Despite geographical proximity and similarity of histori-
cal and cultural background, trade relations between Australia 
and New Zealand have never been especially amicable. Vari -
ous attempts had been made from time to t i me to improve trade 
conditions by the elimination of tariffs , granting special licens -
ing treatment or the exchange of tariff preferences . But the 
history of trade relations between the two countries is more a 
record of conflict than of co- operation . This is rather less 
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true of their relations in dealing with other countries in the 
GATT and elsewhere where it has been usual for New Zealand 
and Australia to consult closely together and to reach if pos-
sible a common position. 
Co-operation in other fields, especially defence and 
foreign policy, has usually been much closer and it w_as from 
this side that the first formal attempts to collaborate in econo-
mic matters arose . The Canberra Pact of 1944 which em-
bodied provisions for the development of commerce between the 
countries and for their industrial development "to be pursued 
by consultation and in agreed cases by joint planning" unfortu-
nately turned out to be largely a dead letter, although irregu-
lar consultations on trade matters did take place . 
Events in Europe in the late 1950' s and movements else-
where towards regional political and economic groupings re-
awakened interest intrans-Tasman co-operation and eventual-
ly, in August 1960, an Australia/New Zealand Consultative 
Committee on Trade was set up . Shortly afterwards discus -
sions began on a New Zealand proposal for a free trade area 
arrangement covering forest products (an industry that New 
Zealand had developed in the 1950' s) but this idea was rejected 
by the Australians as too limited and unlikely to be acceptable 
to the GATT . A wider arrangement covering not only fores t 
products but items already traded duty free, as well as certain 
other items agreed by both sides was eventually signed on 31 
August 1965 . This Australia New Zealand Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFT A) as it stands at present, however, has 
only limited relevance to joint industrial development by the 
two countries. Its coverage is very narrow and is really 
confined to products which were already being traded . Only 
a few items of manufactured goods are included where there is 
some New Zealand industrial capacity . This reflects the 
bitter opposition of the New Zealand Manufacturers' F edera-
tion; and the Minister of Industries and Commerce has pub-
licly stated that it is not the intention that any industry in 
New Zealand be damaged by the Agreement. The extensive 
safeguard clauses, many inserted to meet New Zealand fears , 
seem to be designed to ensure that the Agreement will never 
be allowed to promote by the normal processes of competition 
a more economic use of resources in New Zealand . 
New Zealand has probably gained rather more than has 
Australia . The real benefit is that all pulp and paper pro-
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ducts are included as well as most classes of sawn and dressed 
timber. Some agricultural products of interest to New Zea-
land are included, such as frozen vegetables, lamb, pigmeat 
and cheddar cheese. But Australia refused to include butter 
in the interests of protecting its own dairy industry. 
The Agreement provides in general for duties to be re -
duced over a period of eight years and for products to be added 
at each annual review. Apart from this there is no firm time-
table for extending the coverage in a way that would in a few 
years bring effective pressure on industries in both countries. 
One is forced to conclude that the Agreement does not indicate 
any change in the policies of either country as regards indust-
rial protection. 
Devaluation of the New Zealand dollar to parity with 
that of Australia and the consequential policies that must be 
followed for the long run improvement of New Zealand's econo-
mic structure could bring a major change of attitude in New 
Zealand. Devaluation has substantially improved the competi-
tive position of New Zealand manufactured goods and has made 
the prospects of expanding manufactured exports to Australia 
considerably better than they were earlier . But it is still 
too early to say whether the Government will now feel confident 
enough to reject the opposition of the Manufacturers' Federa-
tion and to seek a substantial enlargement of the list of products 
covered by the Agreement . Again, much will depend on 
whether more general measures such as the removal of import 
controls now being strongly advocated by the Monetary and 
Economic Council of New Zealand, are taken within a short 
time, 1 
(b) Japan 
The spectacular increase in New Zealand's trade with 
Japan referred to earlier has occurred mainly over the last six 
or seven years . New Zealand exports consist principally of 
agricultural and forest products - wool, meat, dairy products , 
casein, pulp, paper and timber. Japanese exports to New 
Zealand cover a wide range of manufactured articles and raw 
materials including optical goods, textiles, electric and other 
machinery, vehicles, steel and chemicals . The value of 
1 A more detailed analysis of the Agreement is contained 
in E . W. Holmes, "Freer Trade with Australia?" N. Z . Institute 
of Economic Research , Wellington, March 1966. 
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New Zealand exports has risen from $NZ11 million in 1957 /58 
to $NZ63 million in 1966/67. Imports from Japan were $NZS 
million and $N Z44 million respectively for the corresponding 
years. 
The very high rate of economic growth in Japan over the 
past ten years would be the chief reason for this expansion of 
trade. Rapidly rising incomes and changing patterns of food 
consumption have led to an even faster rate of increase in 
Japan's import requirements of wool and protein foodstuffs which 
New Zealand is particularly well placed to supply. Further-
more, domestic production in Japan has been unable to meet 
these demands. The increase in New Zealand imports from 
Japan reflects the expansion of New Zealand industrial output 
and also the displacement of other suppliers such as the United 
Kingdom from the New Zealand market. The growth of trade 
has in addition been materially assisted by the Trade Agree-
ment between the two countries concluded in 1958 and subsequ-
ently amended in 1962 (the most important amendment being 
New Zealand's withdrawal of her application of Article 35 of 
the GATT to Japan). The Agreement provided in the main 
for the application of most-favoured-nation treatment but in 
addition certain concessions on products of special interest to 
each party were negotiated . The Japanese tariff on mutton 
and lamb, for example, was bound at 10%; but these conces-
sions and others subsequently negotiated in the Kennedy Round 
are in accordance with the GATT extended to all GATT members. 
But apart from Australia this is of little practical significance 
to New Zealand . 
It seems fairly clear that there is considerable room for 
further growth of Japan/New Zealand trade. The increase 
in demand in Japan for meat and dairy produce is rapidly out-
stripping the capacity of the domestic industries to supply . 
For meat, the F AO projections mentioned earlier suggest an 
import requirement in 1975 of 171,000 tons beef and veal and 
76, 000 tons of mutton and lamb compared with net imports of 
5,000 tons and 32,000 tons respectively in 1961/63. New 
Zealand exports to Japan of mutton and lamb alone area, how-
ever, already in excess of 60,000 tons with demand still rising . 
Exports so far have been comprised largely of mutton for manu-
facturing purposes but the prospects of stimulating retail sales 
of both mutton and lamb are considered by the New Zealand 
meat trade most promising. For dairy products, trade is 
restricted at present by import controls in Japan but even so a 
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deficiency of some 80 ,000 tons (butterfat equivalent) in 1975 
(as projected by F AO) compared with net imports of 2, 000 tons 
in 1961 /63 indicates the volume of trade that may be possible. 
The prospects for Japanese exports to New Zealand 
are less clear. Most consumer goods are subject to import 
licensing. No imports are permitted where t!le item concern-
ed would compete with domestic production in New Zealand, 
while for other goods (such as cameras, toys, chinaware, 
etc.) imports are being restricted by licensing as well as by 
the general fall in internal expenditure as a result of recent 
measures to reduce the level of economic activity in New Zea-
land. Moreover, the recent devaluation has put Japan in a 
less competitive position vis - a-vis the United Kingdom. On 
this latter point the question of differential tariffs is of some . 
relevance. For many items, cars for example, the margins 
of preference in favour of the United Kingdom are very sub-
stantial, well above the margins which New Zealand is legal-
ly obliged to accord in terms of the United Kingdom/New Zea-
land Trade Agreement of 1959 . These could be reduced to 
the advantage of Japan (as well as to the advantage of EEC and 
other countries to whom m.f. n . rates of duty apply) but to the 
disadvantage of the United Kingdom. Once again there is 
some reluctance to touch these non-contractual preferences 
mainly for fear that to do so would provoke the United Kingdom 
into retaliatory action either by expanding the present butter 
quotas in favour of New Zealand's competitors in the United 
Kingdom market, or by taking a less firm attitude about New 
Zealand's position if and when negotiations with the EEC are 
resumed. In addition, with New Zealand's eyes still firmly 
fixed on the United Kingdom market, there is a strong disposi -
tion not to take any action on questions such as the non-contrac -
tual preferences because, if the United Kingdom has not become 
a member of the EEC by 1972, New Zealand would wish to 
secure a further extension of the guaranteed rights of access to 
the United Kingdom market which are due to expire in that 
year . Finally, there is the more general point mentioned 
already, that a significant relaxation in Japanese import res-
trictions on dairy products will not be made, it is feared, un-
less New Zealand is prepared to go much further in reducing 
the licensing and tariff barriers to Japanese imports than she 
has so far been prepared to contemplate . For this again 
raises the very difficult issue of New Zealand's policy of indus -
trial protection. 
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IV F orei,gn Policy and Foreign Aid in Asia 
The economic forces which seem to be driving New 
Zealand reluctantly toward much closer trade and economic 
links in Asia and the Pacific are, if anything, assisted by 
the degree of involvement already reached in political and 
security relationships. For most of her history New Zea-
land had relied absolutely upon Britain to provide protection 
against external attack . The anxieties she expressed from 
time to time about expansionist ambitions in the Pacific in the 
19th century of Russia, France and Germany, and after 1919, 
of Japan, were more about the time it might take for the Bri-
tish Navy to arrive than about the ability or willingness of 
Britain to defend her. In many ways the feeling of attach-
ment was stronger on the New Zealand than on the British 
side. Most immigrants were of British stock and retained 
close family and business ties with the "Old Country" or 
"Home" (expressions still used by many among the older gene-
rations in New Zealand) . There was a common language, 
a common sense of destiny and purpose . New Zealand 
regarded itself as an outpost of England and of Empire and 
New Zealanders , with an alacrity that seems incredible 
nowadays, volunteered to assist England in wars of colonial-
ist expansion as in South Afri ca or in more general conflicts 
such as the Great War of 1914- 18 . Even in 1939, the then 
Prime Minister, Mr . M . J . Savage had no doubt that he was 
expressing the sentiments of the country in immediately de-
claring war on Germany at the same time as did the United 
Kingdom and in observing with pride that, "where British 
goes, we go . Where Britain stands, we stand . "Sycophan-
tic sentiment though this might be, it di d charactise, by and 
large, the nature of New Zealand ' s "foreign policy" up to 
that time .1 Independence of thought and action was seldom 
the case and indeed largely irrelevant. 
The Second World War brought a more permanent 
involvement of the United States in the Asian and Pacific 
region and also brought a clearer appreciation by New Zea-
land that she must in future look to the United States rather 
than to Britain for her protection . This realisation was 
given practical expr essi on in the AN ZU S Treaty of 1951 bet-
1
This broad generalisation overlooks some degree of 
independence displayed in the League of Nations in the 1930' s . 
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ween the United States, Australia and New Zealand, but 
neither this nor for that matter New Zealand's involvement 
in the Korean War in 1950 (as a United Nations member) 
indicated any feeling of special involvement in Asian affairs. 
The Australian attitude at this time was very different. 
In the years that followed a number of steps were taken, 
each pragmatic and valid enough in its own right, which col-
lectively resulted in the much stronger sense of involvement 
and responsibility which now marks New Zealand foreign 
policy as regards Asia and the Pacific. In 1954, sharing 
with Australia, the United States and a number of countries 
in Southeast Asia a growing concern with communism follow-
ing the Geneva Accords, New Zealand, in participating in 
SEATO, became for the first time associated in a regional 
defence agreement with Asian countries. New Zealand 
also became associated at this time in Commonwealth defence 
arrangements in Malaya involving the maintenance of New 
Zealand military forces there. It was an entirely natural 
development, therefore, that New Zealand should agree to 
transfer early in 1955 its wartime commitment from the Middle 
East to· Southeast Asia. With this increasing security in-
terest came an expansion of New Zealand's diplomatic repre-
sentation . Prior to 1955, when the New Zealand Commis-
sion was established in Singapore New Zealand had no diplo-
matic post in the Pacific area apart from Tokyo and Canberra. 
Today, New Zealand is represented in most countries in 
Southeast Asia and certainly is more generally represented 
there than it is in Europe. 
The growth of a close security interest in the area has 
been paralleled by increasing involvement in the problems of 
economic development. In 1947 New Zealand became an 
associate member of ECAFE and in 1950 joined with other Com-
monwealth countries in the Colombo Plan. (The Minister of 
External Affairs claimed at the time that New Zealand was 
"too poor" to participate but this pronouncement met with st-
rong public condemnation.) But in both cases, however, it 
cannot be said that at the time the decisions to take part impli-
ed any sense of special concern with Asia. Membership of 
ECAFE was simply an aspect of New Zealand's general sup• 
port for the United Nations Organisation and in any case 
there was no other regional United Nations body to which she 
could logically belong. New Zealand did not become a full 
member of ECAFE until 1962, but significantly enough, it 
was at her own r<>quest. 
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Again, participation in the Colombo Plan was more from 
general Commonwealth solidarity and humanitarian grounds and 
the desire to promote economic and social progress as a means 
of combatting communism. Had the Commonwealth members 
been located~ primarily in South America, New Zealand would 
still have supported any similar plan on the same grounds. 
The lack of special concern is perhaps neatly illustrated by the 
fact that, with sound economic logic but little political touch, 
it was proposed to divide up the initial allocation of $N Z2 
million among India, Pakistan and Ceylon and simply make a 
transfer of sterling funds to these countries without reference 
to projects or programmes. This idea was soon abandoned. 
In the initial phase of the Colombo Plan only independent 
members of the Commonwealth were members so this effective-
ly meant that only India, Pakistan and Ceylon could be candi-
dates for aid. Moreover, these countries had competent ad-
ministrators and usually well-planned projects to which assist-
ance could be quickly granted. Then again there was the com-
mon bond of the English language and familiarity with British 
administrative machinery which made the problems of extending 
capital assistance to and instituting technical assistance pro-
grammes in India, Pakistan and Ceylon relatively easy to deal 
with. These are the principal reasons why, when Colombo 
Plan membership was extended beyond Commonwealth countries 
in South and Southeast Asia, very little New Zealand aid 
went to these new members. But other factors led, after 
1956, to a marked shift in the distribution of New Zealand's 
Colombo Plan aid. First, the total aid allocation of 
$NZ2,200,000 for both capital and technical assistance had 
remained constant at this level since 1950, and it was reduced 
to $NZ2,000,000 at the time of the 1958 balance of payments 
crisis and has not since been increased. Secondly, with 
more members it has been thought desirable for presentational 
reasons to allocate some assistance to every member. Third-
ly, in order to reduce the "burden" of aid on New Zealand's 
foreign exchange resources the emphasis has been shifted away 
from capital assistance grants to technical assistance - largely 
that of training personnel and students in New Zealand. This 
is not a form of assistance which India, Pakistan and Ceylon 
have wanted from New Zealand . Fourthly, and of most im-
portance, the development of security arrangements with 
Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam has led also to a desire to 
give special attention to these countries needs in economic 
problems, thus to derµonstrate that New Zealand's interest 
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goes further than mere military involvement. While one may 
deplore the fact that political considerations enter into the 
allocation of aid, even in the case of a country as insignificant 
on the world scene as New Zealand, it is plausible to suggest 
that in the absence of this security interest, expenditure on 
aid may well have been reduced still further in. recent years 
when New Zealand has been in serious external financial dif-
ficulties, although to a large extent of her own making . 
Unlike many other countries, however, New Zealand 
has not sought overtly to tie its aid to the purchase of New 
Zealand goods . Aid has almost wholly taken the form of 
direct grants of foreign exchange in the case of capital assist-
ance, or the provision of the services of experts or training 
in New Zealand , Capital assistance grants have always 
been in respect of particular d evelopment proje cts . F or 
these it has been a frequent practice to provide also the ser-
vices of t e chnical experts at the planning constructi on or oper a-
tional stage . As a matter of policy New Zealand prefers to 
support proj e cts t o which a New Zealand expert can be assi gn-
ed at s ome stage. Lar ge projects tend to be avoi d e d partly 
bec ause the amount now available for either techni c al or capi-
tal assistance outside New Zealand i s small and bec ause the 
larger the project in relation to the small amount of New Zea-
land ass i stance, the less is the effective control that New 
Zealand can maintain over the expenditure of any grant . New 
Zealand has also tended to concentrate its assistance on cer-
tain types of projects for which it believes i t has special ex-
pe r t i se . Thus agricultural education , trade training and 
technical edu cation , medical and health services have been 
prominent in New Zealand's aid programme . A good deal of 
effort has gone into "institution- building" in the countries be -
ing assisted : not only through the provi sion of finance for build-
ings and equipment but also in the planning of curricula , orga-
nising staff and attempting to ensure that the projects are es -
tablished on a self-perpetuating basis , The development of 
dairying has received special attention . Most of such aid has 
been extended to India and Ceylon where milk is a traditional 
part of diet , Little attention has been given to milk produc-
tion problems, the assistance being generally confined to the 
establishment of processing and distribution facilities . 
For these latter projects, some assistance has been 
given in the form of New Zealand manufactured dairy machinery 
and equipment and in addition New Zealand has been able 
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through this type of aid to secure contracts for the supply of 
milk powders for manufacturing purposes. Naturally enough, 
aid for milk schemes has the strong support of the New Zea-
land Dairy Board which sees trade possibilities emerging in 
the long term from the development of the milk-drinking habit. 
In general, however, New Zealand has refused so far 
to link aid with trade and has refused also to entertain sugges -
tions that in order to lighten thf' aid burd12n aid should be given 
in the form of foodstuffs. New Zealand does not produce food .. 
stuffs of the kind or in the form required in most of the developing 
countries apart from butter which would in any case need conversion 
to butter-oil for cooking purposes, Withdrawal of any quantity of 
butter from the United Kingdom markPt would not result in any rise 
in prices for the New Zealand Product since the gap would be quick-
ly filled by European surpluses. The recipient country is better 
off, in the New Zealand view, by having available the equivalent 
amount of foreign exchange which it can use to best advantage . 
Moreover, food aid is not directly connected with economic 
development and may indeed damage the prospects of increasing 
domestic agricultural production . l 
Most of New Zealand's aid expenditures have been mad e 
on a bilateral basis, but some multilateral or multinational 
schemes, the Indus Waters ProjPct, the Mekong River Com-
mittee and the Asian DevelopmPnt Bank, have been supported . 
In addition New Zealand has over the years consistently sup-
ported multilateral aid programmes of the United Nations. 
Aid has also been extended to African countries under the 
Special Commonwealth Aid to Africa Plan, partly from Com-
monwealth interest and the usual humanitarian reasons and 
partly to be seen to be doing at least something for a reg•.on 
which has become much more important in world political af-
fairs in recent years. But New Zealand's primary aid in-
terests remain in Asia and the Pacific. The fact that aid 
expenditures in the Asian area have failed to expand and have 
not been maintained even at their original level is not from lack 
of enthusiasm on the part of the Department of External Affairs 
which would certainly like to see this aspect of New Zealand' s 
relations with Asia considerably extended. But it is very 
1
M .J. Pop<: has argued convincingly that fo r New Z ea-
land fodd aid is no less burdensome than a grant of foreign ex-
change. "On the Economics of Foreign Aid from the Donor's 
Viewpoint" in G.J. Thompson "New Zealand's International A.id" 
Wellington , 1967 . 
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difficult to persuade Treasury officials and Government Mini-
sters faced with almost perpetual financial crisis and balance 
of payments problems that charity does not necessarily begin at 
home . Perhaps too this simply reflects once again the lack 
of any real sense of involvement in the problems of Asia . In 
this also New Zealand differs from Australia . 
V Summary and Conclusion 
In this final section I shall attempt to draw together the 
main points of this paper and to suggest their implications for 
the future development of closer economic ties with other count-
ries in the Pacific perhaps in the form of a Pacific Economic 
Community as has been suggested by Professor Kojima or in a 
looser arrangement . 
The pervading influence on New Zealand ' s approach to 
foreign policy in the past has been its economic and political 
dependence on the United Kingdom. This developed quite 
naturally from the way in which New Zealand was first colonis -
ed by Britain - the transplantation of British people , British 
political, administrative and educational institutions and Bri-
tish culture generally . Moreover , New Zealand's economic 
development, in particular its specialisation in pastoral pro-
duce for export, depended on the British policy of free trade . 
In matters of defence , dependence on Britain was virtually in-
escapable since New Zealand was incapable of defending itself 
and there was no other country on which New Zealand could or 
was prepared to rely . Being small and remote defence was 
not of any real direct importance; it was more important to as -
sist where possible in preserving "Pax Britannica" even 
though this meant sending troops thousands of miles from her 
shores to fight in Europe on in the Middle East . 
Dependence on Britain was readily accepted as the cor-
rect policy for a country in New Zealand ' s position . There 
were many advantages . The United Kingdom seemed a limit-
less market for New Zealand foodstuffs and certainly enabled 
New Zealanders to achieve a high standard of living . Fur-
ther, dependence meant also (and this was strongly reinforced 
by bulk purchasing arrangements during the war and post- war 
period) escape from uncertainty and escape from the need to 
"waste" resources in continuous market development and the 
need to search for new products , And , finally, under these 
conditions of security in external trade and politics, New Zea-
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land could to a large extent ignore the outside world and push 
ahead with the creation of its own special Polynesian brand 
of the Welfare State. 
It is only in the last decade that New Zealand has begun 
to realise that this type of policy rested essentially on the com-
manding position that Britain once held in world politics and 
in the world economy. But this has long since ceased to be 
true. New Zealand has been obliged to accept that in defence 
and security Britain is no longer relevant to her and that, 
with security in Southern Asia now a primary consideration, 
she must in her new relationships with the United States and 
others in the Pacific play a more positive role than was neces-
sary in the past in relation to Britain. 
In trade and commercial policy too, New Zealand faces 
an entirely new situation. Continued expansion of export in-
come is essential to internal economic development and the 
maintenance of full employment. Tlie United Kingdom, how -
ever, can no longer continue to absorb most of New Zealand's 
increased meat and dairy produce exports. The United King-
dom wishes to reserve any increase in domestic consumption 
for her own agricultural industry to meet, and in any case 
would like to adjust her methods of support more in line with 
the common agricultural policy of the EEC. Outside the 
United Kingdom there are few markets available for lamb and 
dairy produce because of widespread protection to domestic 
agriculture, low incomes or taste barriers, except possibly 
at prices which imply a much lower rate of economic growth 
than New Zealand has achieved in the past. Accordingly, a 
development policy based on continued expansion of output of 
traditional products is highly questionable. Furthermore, 
New Zealand has made things worse for herself not only by 
building up a highly protected, high-cost industrial structure 
oriented primarily towards the domestic market but also by 
internal inflationary policies and has now to deal with serious, 
chronic balance of payments difficulties. 
The latter problem has been approached with any resolu-
tion only in the past year with the introduction of severe fiscal 
and monetary restraints to dampen down the demand for imports. 
Internal deflation is likely to cure the balance of payments 
problem only at the expense of much higher unemployment than 
that to which New Zealand has been accustomed in the past 25 
years. The longer term position of the New Zealand has yet 
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to be approached with similar resolution. Devaluation of the 
New Zealand dollar is seen to offer an excellent opportunity 
for major policy changes but there is a strong inclination at 
Government level to put these off for as long as possible for 
they are bound to meet with much opposition from manufacturers 
and farming interests as well as from trade unions. 
In external economic policy the stated objective of secur-
ing long term growth of export income of 4% p.a. is unlikely to 
be achieved through continued expansion of the traditional ex-
ports of meat wool and dairy produce to the United Kingdom 
market. New Zealand must now move into the rapid develop-
ment of exports of manufactured goods both because it is desir-
able to broaden the export range and be less dependent on fluc-
tuating prices of a few products and because in the longer term 
manufactures are likely to show the faster growth rates in world 
trade. Two main lines of policy are suggested. The first 
is that of securing a much better use of available resources by 
opening up manufacturing industry in New Zealand to inter-
national competition. This means in particular the abandon-
ment of import controls as a means of protection. The second 
and connected point is that of greatly intensifying efforts to ex-
pand markets for lamb and dairy produce in the Pacific Region. 
In effect this relates principally to Japan and to Australia but 
both Canada and the United States need not be left out of ac-
count. 
A Pacific Economic Community or even a looser frame-
work of co-operation could be of special relevance to the basic 
structural changes and indeed changes in mental attitudes which 
New Zealand must now make as part of its adaptation to trading 
conditions quite different from what has been the case in the 
past. Some elements of such a co-operative framework al-
ready exist in the trade agreements between Japan and Aust-
ralia and New Zealand and in the Australia/New Zealand Free 
Trade Area. The latter must be regarded still as - from the 
New Zealand side at least - a first trembling step; but even if, 
following devaluation, New Zealand is able significantly to 
expand the range and volume of its manufactured exports to 
Australia it must be doubted whether for the longer run it will 
be sufficient and desirable to gear the restructuring of the New 
Zealand industrial sector to an economy whose own industries 
need to be made more competitive in world terms . Since 
changes must be made by New Zealand it would be well to cast 
them right from the start in the much broader framework which 
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a Community cou Ld provide. 
Again, so far as Japan is concerned, the expansion of 
New Zealand exports of meat and dairy produce to that country 
will require a change in Japanese attitudes towards the protec-
tion of domestic industry. Within the framework of the Japan/ 
New Zealand Trade Agreement there is undoubtedly scope for 
tariff concessions by New Zealand beneficial to Japanese 
industry. But these are likely to have more force in bringing 
about required changes in protectionist attitudes if they are 
accompanied by concessions from others and are seen to be 
important in terms of general Japanese economic and political 
objectives in relation to Pacific and Asian affairs. 
A similar point is relevant in the New Zealand case . 
The changes that New Zealand must make in its industrial and 
export structure and in its relationships with the United King-
dom will not find ready acceptance by those groups in New 
Zealand whose interests or prejudices are likely to be affected . 
These changes are more likely to become acceptable if made in 
the context of a broader grouping that a Pacific Community 
would provide . New Zealand still retains a strong belief in 
the virtue of multilateral trading relationships not least of the 
protection they can give to small countries with little bargain-
ing power . Hesitation and apprehension in New Zealand 
about closer trade ties with Australia or with Japan could be 
reduced if these closer ties could be developed within a group-
ing that included Canada, the United States and possibly also 
some of the countries of ASP AC. On general grounds too it 
would seem desirable that any such development should proceed 
within the framework of the GATT which has done so much to 
expand world trade over the past twenty years . Disillusion-
ment about GATT in New Zealand is general but she may yet 
find that the progress that has been made in reducing industrial 
tariffs and trade barriers the most relevant to her future pro-
gress . 
More broadly still, New Zealand clearly has the strong-
est interest with others in the security stability and economic 
growth of the developing countries in Asian and the Pacific . 
Despite her present pre- occupations, it would be untypical of 
New Zealand to adopt an attitude of standing aside from these 
problems . New Zealand cannot play the part rightly to be 
expected of her unless her own economy is strong and resilient. 
Co- operation with other developed countries within the Pacific 
can help to bring that about . 
Chapter 4 
THE PROSPECTS OF THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
OF JAPAN, AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND 
by I. A. McDougall 
Professor, Massey University 
I Economic Policy in Australia and New Zealand 
Although Professor Castle has already dealt with econo-
mic policy in New Zealand and although my former colleagues 
at the Australian National University will shortly be assessing 
Australia's economic policy in the Pacific , there are several 
points I should like to make prior to discus sing the prospects 
of establishing a Free Trade Agreement between Australia , 
Japan and New Zealand. I intend to list briefly the major 
policy objectives of the two Australasian economies ; to pose 
some questions suggested by these objectives ; to appraise 
briefly the successofthepolicies used to secure the given ends; 
and, finally , to put forward alternative policies which I believe 
the two countries might better pursue. 
(a) Policy Objectives 
There may be some argument about relative importance, 
but most people would agree that the major objectives of econo-
mic policy in Australia and New Zealand are : the full employ-
ment of a growing workforce, rising per capita incomes, an 
equal distribution of incomes, and stability of incomes brought 
about by each country regulating the market mechanism internal-
ly and endeavouring to become less dependent upon international 
trade. Definitions of full empl oyment vary between countries 
(as they do between Australia and New Zealand) but unemploy-
ment in excess of 1% of the workforce would be considered seri -
ous by both countries and in excess of 2% would be regarded as 
politically disastrous . Economi c growth which has become 
synonymous with manufacturing development , has been fostered 
by a high tariff str ucture in Australia and by the use of tariffs 
and the widespread applic ation of import licensi ng controls in 
New Zealand . An e qual di stribution of the nati onal products 
is sought , especially in New Zealand, by a highly progressive 
income tax structure. Stability of incomes internally has 
been achi eved by a n e twork of licens ing controls and by r estric-
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tions on competitive forces. For instance, in both countries 
one of the criteria used by arbitration system in setting wages 
is the general prosperity of the economy rather than the produc-
tivity of labour in the industry concerned. In both countries 
radio, television, the sale of liquor, transport, the distribu-
tion of motor spirits and many other :productive activities are 
subject to licensing and entry to the industries is controlled . 
Finally, reduced dependence upon overseas trade is sought on 
the export side by diversifying markets and the range commodi-
ties exported and, on the import side, by the development of 
import competing industries which, being mainly of a manuf ac-
turing character, are supposed also to promote 
economic development and make more certain the attainment of 
full employment. 
These policy objectives raise a number of inter esting 
questions, Does the high priority accorded to full employment 
(as defined by Australia and New Zealand) hinder rather than 
assist the economic growth objective? That is to say, making 
use of the compensation principle, could everyone be better 
off, even though more people were unemployed? Why should 
manufacturing development be regarded as the best way of 
achieving economic growth and is an aggressive protectionist 
policy the best means of ensuring industrial development? 
Is it possible that a less equitable distribution of the national 
income may provide sufficient incentives to an important sec-
tion of the workforce, to make everyone better off? To what 
extent does the que st for stable incomes have, harmful second-
ary effects on economic efficiency and to what extent does the 
continued reduction of dependence upon international trade re -
flect social and political immaturity rather than evidence of 
maturing nationhood? 
(b) Some Common Problems 
These questions must await another time and place for 
an answer. The success or otherwise, however, of each 
economy in attaining the above policy objectives does raise 
s everal issues not unrelated to a proposal for regional inte g -
ration, First , the rate of economic growth in Australia and 
New Zealand has not been high when compared with that of 
other more advanced economies. For the period 1954-55 to 
1963- 64, New Zealand recorded an annual average rate of 
increase in productivity of 2 . 1% and for a similar time p e riod 
the comparable figure for Australia was 2, 2% , These pro-
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ductivity growth rates were exceeded, in some cases consider-
ably, by the majority of advanced economies. 
Secondly, neither country has proved markedly success -
ful in reducing its dependence upon international trade. To 
some extent export diversification has succeeded but more in 
the way of developing new markets than in diver5ifying the type 
of products which are exported . Table I compares the ex-
ports of the two economies for the years 1953-54 and 1963-64 
and shows, despite Australia altering the commodity composi-
tion of its output of primary produce and achieving a relatively 
spectacular increas e in exports of manufactures, that both 
countries still remain heavily dependent upon exports obtained 
from the primary sector. In Australia the export of grains, 
meat and wool comprised 59% of total exports in 1964-65; in New 
Zealand in the same time period exports of wool, meat and 
dairy products accounted for 87% of total exports . 
In its elf the high dependence of both economies upon a 
narrow range of primary product exports (which reflects the 
strong comparative advantage of both countries in these lines 
of production) is not disturbing, but it becomes so when taken 
in conjunction with the increased tendency towards agricultural 
protectionism in the industrial nations, the continuing threat 
to wool by synthetics production and the impending threat of the 
United Kingdom's entry to the E.E.C. Relatively speaking, 
all these problems have more serious implications for New 
Zealand than for Australia. 
What of the policy of import substitution? Table II 
shows that imports as a percentage of gross national product 
have in Australia displayed no discernible trend while the ap-
parent reduction of the import ratio in New Zealand is influ-
enced by the widespread use of import licensing controls 
(which were also in force in Australia until 1960). 
The value figures, moreover, understate the real depend-
ence of both economies upon imports because in the time period 
under review import prices have risen much less than have 
domestic price leve :. s in the two economies. 
There are many reasons why the import ratios have fail-
ed to fall significantly but probably the major causes have been 
the spill-over of unsatisfied import demand and the increasing 
dependence of a number of small, import-competing industries 
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on imported raw materials, semi-processed products and capi-
tal equipment. Spill-over effects induced by import licensing 
have either caused the demand for decontrolled imports to rise 
or, by generating inflationary pres sues, they have made ex-
pansion difficult for import-competing industries using a larger 
proportion of doine stic materials. At the same time, consum-
ers have reacted to rising domestic price levels by switching 
their demand back to relatively cheaper imports. 
Table III which classifies imports in the two economies accord-
ing to codi.modity type, shows that in 1964-65 some 75% of the 
imports of each country comprised producers materials for use 
in manufacturing, or capital equipment. Only 12% of the total 
import bill in New Zealand and 15% of the total import bill in 
Australia could be classified with certainty as final consumer 
goods; the remainder are made up of unclassified commodities, 
defence expenditure, fuel and lubricants, etc. 
Thirdly, the failure of the import ratio to fall significant-
ly over time and, indeed, to rise in real terms suggests that 
not only have policies of import replacement proved unsuccess -
ful but that the major policy objective of full employment may 
itself be threatened. Providing export receipts are buoyant 
both economies can maintain the flow of imports required to 
maintain full employment production. In times of crisis, how-
ever, t.h..@-extent t-0-w-~ the extent to which the flow of imports 
can be sustained depends upon access to overseas borrowings 
and upon the extent to which foreign exchange reserves have 
been built up in favourable years. In the event that neither of 
these sources of foreign exchange prove adequate, the real 
limitations of a policy which has encouraged highly import-
dependent manufacturing industries becomes apparent. 
Finally, the generous protection afforded the manuf ac-
turing sector in each country has fostered numerous, small-
scale, high-cost industries which have hindered increases in 
productivity and have given rise to considerable misallocation 
of resources . Unfortunately, few attempts have been made 
to quantify this latter cost, although some valuable work has 
been done recently by the Committee of Economic Enquiry in 
Australia (1, Vol. II, p 74 - 91) . Their analysis suggests 
that the subsidy equivalent of the tariff in Australia on factory 
products was equivalent to about 6 - 7% of the value of the 
gross national product in 1961-62 . Quite apart from any 
statistical bias this estimate is, of course, no more than an 
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approximation of the cost of protection in Australia because 
without the tariff the whole nature of the economy, the distri -
bution of the national income and the level of incomes would 
change . 
(c) Alternative Policies 
An alternative policy which Australia and New Zealand 
might follow would be to allow manufacturing industry to deve -
lop in accordance with each country's comparative advantage . 
Such a policy, which could be implemented by reducing barri -
ers to trade on a most favoured nation basis and by appropriate 
exchange rate adjustments (if required), would have two 
major beneficial effects . By exposing manufacturing develop-
ment in the two countries to competitive conditions it would in-
crease efficiency and, by altering the pattern and nature of 
industrial investment and output, it might lead to the establish-
ment of export industries whose unit costs would be reduced 
because of economies of scale . 
The standard objection to such a policy is that the level 
of manufacturing output could not be sustained and that full em-
ployment and economic growth would be threatened . This ob-
jection, in my opinion, ignores the fact that there must be some 
combination of exchange rates and monetary and fiscal policies 
which would ensure full employment production in the two econo-
mies . It also fails to recognize that both Australia and New 
Zealand have relatively large and established manufacturing 
sectprs which , given an exchange rate appropriate to full em-
ployment, make it far from evi dent that manufacturing output 
would contract . It may even expand . This point is irrele -
vant , however , in that provi ded full employment is ensured, 
and provided production follows each country's comparative 
advantage , the actual pattern of production is unimportant. 
In so far as genuine infant industry opportunities exist these 
could be dealt with by commercial policy . 
The measures outlined have two i mportant defects . 
First, they ignore the strong political position of vested pro-
ducer interests . Secondly , they do not allow for the major 
trading problem which confronts the Australasi an economy : 
the extensive protection accorded primar y production in the 
economically advanced nations . Agri cultural protecti onism , 
which is to be found in its most drastic form in the E . E . C ., 
the U . S . A ., and , to a lesser extent , Japan , virtually excludes 
• 
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primary producing nations from the markets of the protecting 
countries, and, as a result of dumping~ ruins other commerci -
al markets . 
In these circumstances Australia and New Zealand 
should use any most favoured nation reduction in their own pro-
tection of manufacturing industry, to secure free entry for · 
their own primary products into the protected markets of Europe , 
the U . S . A . and Japan. It is improbable, however, that any 
concession which Australia and New Zealand might offer would 
achieve a corresponding relaxation of controls on trade in 
primary products . Most countries as members of G . A . T . T . 
are bound by most favoured nation clauses in their commercial 
t r eatment of othe r countries and what would' therefore' be a 
quantitatively small concession on the part of Australia and 
New Zealand could require a considerable structural change 
in the advanced industrial countries . 
In the se circumstances, Australia and New Zealand 
might do w ell to seek entry to some regional trading area whe r e 
access was guaranteed for their primary products and whe re 
each might pursue a more rational development of manufacturing 
industry. If the Unite d Kingdom were to enter the E . E . C . 
and if no r e duction were achieved in the world level of agricul-
tural protection, such a policy would become virtually manda-
tory . Even if the United Kingdom does not enter the E . E . C . , 
there is still much to be said for seeking access to a larger 
t rading area, provi ding United Kingdom products are not dis -
criminated against in Australia or New Zealand markets . 
In particular, because of the increasing importance of trade 
relations with Japan, it may be that the interests of Australia 
and New Zealand would be best served by seeking some form 
of integration with the Japanese e conomy. 
II Some Characteristics of a J a anese - Australian 
N Pw Z e aland Free Trade Area - JANFT A 
While aware that a me re recitation of facts and figures 
c oncern ing market size and trade relations provides no substi-
tute for a detailed analysi s of the costs and benefits of inte g -
rati on , such information i s required for background material. 
Unfortunately, the most recent statistics were not available, 
bu t e arlie r estimate s given below do give some indication of 
ma r ket size and t he i mp ortance of trade to the three countries . 
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(a) Size of the market 
In 1965 the total population of the three countries was 
·approximately 115 million which is 35 million less than the 
population of the European Economic Community immediately 
prior to its formation. In 1965 Australia's Gross National 
Product was US$21,587 million, Japan's G.N.P. US$84,324 
million and New Zealand's G.N.P. US$3,933 milliongiving a 
G. N. P. for the entire area in 1965 of approximatelyU S $110,000 
million. On a per capita basis the relevant figures are Australia 
US '$1,900, Japan US$861 and New Zealand US$1,490 which gives 
an average per capita income for the area as a whole of US $981 v 
(11). In real terms this figure compares favourable with that of the 
E. E. C. countries in 1955 (measured at current prices). 
Figures relating output of coal and steel and electric 
power in the three economies give some further indication of 
market size (especially when these figures are compared with 
those of the E. E. C . countries in 1955). In 1965 the Area 
produced 83 million metric tons of coal (Australia 32 million, 
Japan 50 million, and New Zealand 0.7 million); 238 billion 
kilowatt hours of electricity (Australia 35. 7 b. kwh; Japan 
192.1 b. kwh, New Zealand 10.6 b. kwh); and 46. 7 million 
metric tons of crude steel (Australia 5. Sm. tons, Japan 41. 2 
m. tons) v (II) . These figures contrast with levels of output 
in the same basic industries in the countries which were to 
comprise the E. E. C.: coal 0954) - 242 million metric tons; 
electricity 0955) 153 billion kwh; crude steel 0955) - 44 
million metric tons (12, 1-2 9). 
(b) Trade Relations 
Trade relations between the three countries who are all 
signatories of GATT are defined also in three international 
agreements: the New Zealand - Australia Free Trade Area 
Agreement, the New Zealand - Japanese Trade Agreement and 
the Australian - Japanese Trade Agreement. The first of 
these agreements is reviewed in some detail elsewhere in this 
paper. The main effect of the others is to establish a full 
GATT relationship which involved Australia and New Zealand 
renouncing the application of Article XXXV of the GATT which 
both countries had previously invoked. 
International trade has always been important for the 
three countries and in 1965 exports as a percentage of gross 
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national product in the area as a whole were 11% (Australia 
14% , Japan 10% , New Zealand 21%) . This compares with a 
figure of 20% for the E . E . C . countries in 1954. 1 Table IV 
which makes use of the notion of trade intensity shows that 
each of the three countries is now exporting more to the other 
two than might be expected from the share of the importing 
countries i n total world imports . There is also a tendency 
for trade b e tween the three countries to increase in relative 
i mport ance . Between 1955 and 1965 Japan's export (f.o . b , ) 
to Australia and New Zealand increased from US $63 mi lli on 
to US $375 mi llion - an increase of approxi mately 600% . In 
the same time period exports (f. o . b . ) from Australia and 
New Zealand to Japan increased from US$ 170 milli on to US$550 
million - an increase of over 300% . 
Despite the fact that Japan has now displaced the United 
Kingdom as Australia' s major export market, that Japan i s 
New Zealand ' s third largest export market and that Australasi a 
was in 1964 Japan ' s third largest export market (ranking behind 
Hong Kong and the U . S . A . ) , Table V shows that in terms of 
the total trade of the three countries , intra- area trade is not 
very important . In 1965 the Area took only 23% of Australia' s 
exports, 4.5% of Japan ' s exports and 9 . 8% of New Zealand ' s 
exports . On the import side the Area counted for 11 . 2% of 
Australia ' s imports , 7 . 6% of Japan ' s imports and 25 . 1% of New 
Zealand's imports . Any argument in favour of the formati on 
of a free trade area , therefore , must rely on the likelihood of 
a very considerable increase in the vol ume and value of trade 
between the three countries . 
1The noti on of trade intensity was first used by Professor 
A , J . Brown in (6) and has more recently been used by Professor 
K . Ko jima (7) . It indicates whether or not the jth country is 
exporting more (or less) to a particular country (the ith country) 
than might be expecte d from that country' s share in total world 
imports . Thus in the table a figure greater (or less) than 100 
indicates that the jth country is exporting more (or less) to a 
particular countr y than might be expected from that countr y ' s 
share in total world trade . 
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Tables VI, VII, VIII, and IX give a broad indication of 
the commodity composition of trade . As might be expected 
trade between Australasia and Japan is characterized by the 
export of raw materials and primary products and by the import 
of a wide range of manufactured products . In 1965 the export 
of wool to Japan accounted for more than 50% of total Australa-
sian exports and other major exports were coal (approximately 
10%), grains and cereals, sugar, meat and dairy products and 
ores and concentrates. It should be noted that the present 
and future role of iron ore exports from Australia to Japan is 
not revealed in these 1965 figures; by 1970 contractual agree -
ments indicate that Australia will be exporting at least A$180 
million per annum of iron ore and that the majority of this ore 
will be destined for Japan (13, 56-57) . 
Imports into Australasia from Japan make up a wide range 
of industrial products, the majority of which are subj e ct to 
high tariff rates or to import licensing control. The most 
important categories of imports in 1965 were metals, metal manu-
factures and machinery (approximately 40% of total imports), 
textiles (26% of total imports), chemicals and drugs, etc . 
As far as trade between Australia and New Zealand is 
concerned this was reviewed in greater detail above . For 
the most part, as Tables V and VI indicate, it is characteriz• .. U 
by the export of sundry primary products and newsprint from 
New Zealand and by the import into New Zealand of a wide 
range of industrial commodities (New Zealand is Australia's 
largest market for manufactured exports . ) The most import-
ant category of import is iron and steel products (approximate-
ly 20% of total imports) and motor vehicles and motor spirit 
(slightly less than 20% of total imports) . 
(c) Levels of Protection 
Finally, what of the h eight of the general tariff levels of 
the member countries. There are a large number of problems 
which confront anyone attempting to me asure the degree of pro-
tection offered by a country's tariff structure, but, generally 
speaking, one can gain some indication of the height of tariff 
structures by taking an average of the ad valorem duties payable 
of the various tariff classifications (which involves weighting 
according to the ingenuity with which imports have been sub-
classified) or by weighting e ach tariff classification by trade 
values (which leads to the paradoxical r e sult of a low weight 
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for a highly protective tariff.) The former method has been 
selected to compare the tariff structures of Australia and Japan, 
No similar exercise is attempted for New Zealand because of 
the severe application of quantitative restrictions in that 
country. 
Only those tariffs in excess of 12-!-% ad valorem have 
been calculated as below this percentage figure is was felt that 
duties were levied for revenue purposes. In the case of 
Australia specific duties have been converted to an ad valorem 
equivalent; no such conversion has been attempted for Japan . 
The results show that in Australia in 1962-63 30% was the 
average nominal rate of protection available to Australian in-
dustry (1, Vol. II, L 127) and that in Japan in 1964 the average 
nominal rate of protection was approximately 20%. One could , 
therefore, classify Japan as a low tariff country and Australia 
and, probably New Zealand, as countries in which the. rate of 
protection was high. 
III JANFT A - The Prospects 
(a) Why Trade Has Increased 
The tendency for trade between Australia, Japan and 
New Zealand to grow at an accelerated rate is of recent origin 
and it is instructive to enquire why this increase has occurred 
and why trade has remained so sluggish previously. As far 
as Australasian exports are concerned, there is the tradition-
al preoccupation of Australia and New Zealand with the United 
Kingdom market, to which both countries were bound by tradi-
tions of race and culture, as well as by substantial United 
Kingdom investments in Australasia and the United Kingdom's 
policy of maintaining cheap prices for basic foodstuffs and raw 
materials·. Other contributing factors were the low level of 
per capita incomes in Japan and, hence, the lack of effective 
demand for high protein goods such as meat and dairy products, 
the preference for rice rather than for other grain cereals, 
the dominant position of cotton-based textile industries and the 
political developments of the mid-twentieth century. 
On the import side the preference accorded United 
Kingdom and Commonwealth countries in the Australasian mar-
ket hindered the development of trade with Japan. In addition, 
Japanese i~ports were representative of the labour-intensive, 
light, consumer- goods type industries which both New Zealand 
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and Australia were attempting to establish with the assistance 
of tariffs and import licensing controls . Finally, there were 
two other factors which restricted a mutual expansion of trade 
between the three countries: the lack of any social or cultural 
contact in depth and the existence of only irregular and slow 
shipping facilities between Japan and Australasia. 
Today a number of these impediments to trade have been 
removed or reduced in magnitude. The political reorienta-
tion which has taken place in Japan and the rapid rise in per 
capita incomes has brought the three economies much closer 
together from a social viewpoint. Rising living standards 
have established Japan as one of the few expanding commercial 
markets for primary products . At the same time, the import. 
ance of Australasian wool to the Japanese textile industry and 
the potential importance of Australia as a supplier of coal and 
minerals has led to a shipping service being established between 
Australasia and Japan which is at least as regular and as cheap 
in terms of economic distance as that between Australasia and 
the United Kingdom. Finally, the realisation of Australia 
and New Zealand that they-must seek alternative markets to 
the United Kingdom and that they must diversify export products 
has seen increased efforts by both to secure markets in Japan. 
Despite the officially stated desire of the New Zealand Govern-
ment and Producer Boards to expand trade with Japan, there 
is a reluctance to do so in practice becau_se it is thought that 
increased trade with Japan might jeopardize New Zealand's 
"special position" in the United Kingdom's E.E.C. negotiations. 
(b) Possible Benefits and Costs of Inte_gration 
Any move towards integration of the three economies must 
be seen to expand the real income of each of the individual mem-
bers. That is to say, the net gains, if any, from a more ef-
ficient allocation of production and consumption between count-
ries, from more general and effective competition between firms 
and industries, from a possible increase in the level of invest-
ment and from increased economies of scale, must be of benefit 
to all members. What is r equired, therefore, is an analysis 
of the net gains which might arise from any of the above causes 
and a careful investigation of the manner in which the se gains 
are likely to be distributed betwe_en countries . 
Generally speaking, the gains to be had from JANFTA as 
far as Australia and New Zealand are concerned would be a 
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more r ational development of their manufacturing sectors and 
greater access for their primary product exports to the Japanese 
mar k e t . For Japan, likely benefits would be a gain in the 
efficiency of those of its primary industries which compete with 
Australasian exports and access to the Australasian market 
for its manufactured exports on terms at least as favourable as 
those accorded to one another by Australia and New Zealand 
and no less favourable than those given the United Kingdom in 
the Australasian market. Adverse effects for both countries 
c ould ari se from changes in the pattern of trade with non-mem-
b e rs. Let us consider these points in greater detail. 
What of the likely terms of trade effects of the establish-
ment of a free trade area? As far as Australasian exports 
are concerned there is no reason why the price of wool, a com-
modity whi ch is traded freely on an international market, should 
alter . Of the remaining exports the prices of wheat and sugar 
are controlled by international commodi ty agreements , dairy 
products are subject to quota rest rictions on the main market 
in the United Kingdom and, even with free trade, the likely 
diversion of meat to the Japanese market would be unlikely to 
affect significantly the ruling inte rnational price . If anything 
meat prices in Japan would fall as attempts were made to ex-
pand per capita consumption of meat. This effect on the 
terms of trade, which would be small, would be off set by a 
probable rise in the prices of dairy products resulting from the 
elimination of a 45% tariff and an elimination of the monopoly 
profits made by Japanese importers. As for Japanese exports 
(Australasian impor ts) these are for the most part commodities 
which are in elastic supply elsewhere in the world so that 
little or no fall in the average price level of these goods could 
be expected . New Zealand, however, could improve her 
t erms of trade slightly to the extent that she substituted lower-
cost Japanese goods for higher cost Australian imports. 
Generally though, one would expect terms of trade effects for 
the area as a whole to be negligible. 
Prospects for trade creation are good in that Australia 
and New Zealand accord high levels of protection to their manu-
facturing industries and Japan likewise gives a relatively hi gh 
level of protection to her primary producing industries. I 
lDairy products are subject to quota controls and carry 
tariffs of 45% . The e xception is cheese which is not subject to 
quot a. Other duti e s (in 1964) are: lamb and mutton 10%(to be 
r educed shortly to 5%), beef and veal 25% (also subject to quotas), 
d ried fruits 20%, wheat 20%. 
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Further, domestic demand in Australasi a for imports from 
Japan (or for the type of commodity which would be imported if 
tariffs were abolished) can be assumed highly elastic and this 
would tend to increase trade creating effects. 
Trade diversion is unlikely to be large. Apart from 
Japan, the United Kingdom is the major trading partner of 
Australia and New Zealand and, since devaluation, the ave-
rage difference in the costs of production i n Japan and the 
United Kingdom of Australasian imports should not be large. 
At the same time, the elasticity of supply of these goods in 
Japan is high and the supply price is, therefore, unlikely to 
be increased significantly. Furthermore, the fact that it 
is a free trade area and not a Customs Union which is contem-
plated means that the average level of Australasian tariffs 
need not be increased and could be reduced . As far as 
Japan is concerned trade diversion should prove negligible in 
that Australasia is internationally competitive as far as primary 
production is concerned. 
To the extent that trade diversion did occur, the United 
Kingdom is the country that is most likely to be affected . If 
the United Kingdom devaluation does make United Kingdom 
goods competitive with those of Japan and if the United Kingdon1 
does not enter the E. E. C. trade diversion could be minimised 
providing United Kingdom goods were placed on approximately 
the same footing as Japanese commodities, i.e., the present 
preferences accorded British goods in the Australasian market 
were eliminated and tariffs upon manufactured imports into 
Australasia were reduced to 10% and below on an m.f.n. basis. 
Such a move would have two effects - one f avourable, 
one adverse to the Australasian economy. First, the terms 
of trade would tend to improve as United Kingdom exporters 
competed for sales in what had been a traditional and semi-
protected market. Secondly, New Zealand and Australia 
could expect preferences which are currently accorded them 
on the United Kingdom market to be withdrawn. The effects 
of an elimination of preferential treatment would be serious 
for certain industries but the major exports such as wool, 
meats, butter, sugar, wheat and dried fruits require unrest-
ricted access to the British market and guarantees about dump-
ing rather than preferential margins, Should the United 
Kingdom enter the E. E . C . the removal of preferential treat-
ment and of freedom of access to the United Kingdom market 
would be automatic. 
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E conomies of Scale and The Effect of Increased 
Competition 
Apart from the traditional argument for free trade, which 
is real enough, the formation of a free trade area between 
Australia , Japan and New Zealand may give rise to increases 
in real income as a result of more competitive conditions and as 
a result of the opportunities for production on a larger scale . 
In so far as prices within national boundaries are not 
consistent with the minimum real costs technically attainable, 
incre ased competition could significantly increase the effici-
ency of production. Gains from an increase in competitive 
conditions are difficult to assess. Obviously, competitive 
conditions vary as between the three countries but it has been 
well-established that the Australian and New Zealand econo-
mies have a large number of sectors characterized by national 
monopolies or by oligopoly (13, 14) . The establishment of a 
free trade area would act as an effective anti-monopoly device 
and, by weakening national monopolies and oligopolistic market 
structures, it would enable non-price competition and price 
competition to become more effective . Furthermore, apart 
from the effect of monopolies and collusive oligopolies on com-
petitive forces, competition in Australia and particularly New 
Zealand is thwarted by such things as traditional business ties 
and practices, the search for a peaceful existence and for 
stable rather than growing incomes. If a larger market were 
established, new firms would prove less tolerant of traditional 
practices anO. would intensify competitive conditions. 
One of the important long-run effects of integration would 
be its influence upon the volume, pattern and value of invest-
ment. The volume of investment could be expected to increase 
if third parties such as the United States or United Kingdom 
were encouraged to increase the rate of foreign. investment in 
the JANFT A area because of greater restrictions on access 
to an expanding market. The volume of investment would also 
be favourably affected if savings were to rise as a result of 
increased incomes and if the confidence of investors in the 
stability of the investment prospects in an enlarged market was 
increased . Given the already high rate of capital formation 
in the three countries it is probable that an increase in the 
flow of foreign direct inve stment would be the major source of 
gain. 
THE PROSPECTS OF THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 123 
The nature and pattern of investment woul d also alter for 
a number of reasons . There would over time be a change in 
the nature of productive equipment as mass production methods 
were adopted in response to the challenge of a wider market, 
and in the pattern of investment as output of high- cost firms was 
reduced and low- cost firms incr eased. Changes in the direc-
tion and channels of investment mi ght also be expected, provid-
ing there were no controls on the free flow of capital within the 
free trade area, The major precondition for these changes in 
the nature and volume of investment is that investors should 
have confidence in the continued free movement of products and 
of capital within the Area . Otherwise, the required changes 
in the structure and volume of production would not be forthcom-
ing . 
Integration would give rise to a number of economie s of 
scale that should be of importance to Australian and New Zea-
land manufacturers who for a number of reasons have not ex-
ploited adequately the gains t o be had from mass produc tion in 
long runs of a standardized product. An example is the New 
Zealand electronics industry. The entire market is not 
quite large enough to cater for one optimum- size plant producing 
radios, yet in 1965 there were some twenty- six firms engaged 
in the production of radio sets or components. D . O . Sewel 
has shown that the cost of production of a radio in a New Zea-
land subsidiary is at least 100% higher than the cost of produc-
tion of a similar radio in the European based parent concern 
(10, 117). This example is typical of many-industries in 
Australia and New Zealand where, even though the marke t may 
be too small for one optimum size industry, several sub- optimal 
firms are to be found in the same industry . In part this is 
due to a deliberate attempt of the authorities to foster competi-
tion by granting import licenses to two or more firms ; in part it 
is due to the general lack of competition in the New Zealand 
market. 
Apart from the effects of trade diversion the othe r main 
objections to the e stablishment of a free trade area betwe en 
Japan, Australia and New Zealand would be that wage levels 
in Australia and New Zealand might be threatened , that c e r -
tain industries would suffer dislocation and str uctural unemploy-
ment and that full employment policies would b e jeopar dized 
because governments would need to resort to deflationary 
policies to control balance of payments problems, 
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The objectons contain more emotive than logical content . 
Wage levels are geared to productivity and, in any case, abso-
lute wage levels are not a determinant of the gains to trade of 
any one country. While it is true that the distribution of 
incomes could be affected by free trade, losses due to redis-
tribution could be off set by appropriate social policies if they 
were not eliminated by rising per capita incomes. Inevitably, 
if there are to be any gains, some industries could be expected 
to contract as a result of free trade. The problem here is 
to modify the transitional effects of these structural changes by 
policies which are designed to retrain and employ displaced 
labour and even to compensate industries which are forced to 
close down. Finally, what of the threat to unemployment 
posed by the need to control the balance of payments with 
deflationary measures. In the present world of fixed exchange 
rates such deflationary measures are already required if the 
balance of payments problem is a structural one. (New Zea-
land has recently discovered the limitations of import licensing 
controls as a long-term balance of payments remedy). If 
anything, because of the greater interdependence of countries 
in a free trade area, member countries should be more prepar-
ed to provide short-term assistance to one another when short-
term balance of payments difficulties arise and more willing to 
encourage the alteration of exchange rates where disequilibrium 
is of a structural nature rather than to suffer the consequences 
of deflation or the imposition of import controls by a member 
country. 
(c) The Need for Quantitative Analysis 
While it is instructive to point out the various possible 
costs and benefits 1 such qualitative analysis provides no ade-
quate substitute for a detailed calculation of the gains or losses 
which are likely to arise from economic integration. Unfortu-
nately, the latter is a for bidding task and I am unaware of any 
instances of its having been attempted satisfactorily. Quite 
apart from the benefits or losses which arise from increased 
competition and from an enlarged market, the more humble 
estimate of net gain from trade creation, trade di version and 
changes in the terms of trade is a difficult one . This latter 
calculation requires a detailed knowledge of effective rates of 
protection and of demand and supply conditions in not only the 
member countries of the area to be integrated but also their 
trading partners . As far as JANFT A is concerned such 
information is not available and could not be obtained without 
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a vast amount of work. Moreover, as far as New Zealand is 
concerned the problem is compounded further by the recent de-
valuation, the effects of which have yet to work themselves out, 
and by the intensified use of import licensing ccntrols which 
makes the estimate of effective rates of protection such a diffi-
cult task. 
For the above reasons I feel that estimates made by Pro-
fessor Kojima are of doubtful value. He has attempted to 
measure the likely extent of the trade creation and trade diver-
sion which would follow the establishment of a free trade area 
between the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand (7). To assist him in this calculation he has made 
use of nominal tariff rates and of import demand elasticities 
calculated with regard to the United States by R. J. Ball and 
K. Mavwah (9). These elasticities are calculated for the 
U.S.A. for five broad categories of commodities. The deg-
ree of commodity rhsaggregation, however, is quite insuffici-
ent to make use of these coefficients of elasticity for all 'ad-
vanced' countries. Moreover, Professor Kojima has as-
sumed that export prices will remain constant despite the very 
considerable trade imbalances indicated by his results (7, 24) 
and despite the implications which a constant export price 
level must have for other elasticity coPfficients. 
An attempt to calculate the net gain or loss arising from 
a full free trade relationship between Japan, Australia and 
New Zealand is made more difficult in that trade in the given 
situation of today is less than it would be because of the histori-
cal attachment of Australia and New Zealand to the United 
Kingdom market. For instance; there is the obvious reluct-
ance noted above of New Zealand to push trade with Japan. 
Once these historical attachments were weakened the increase 
in trade might be far greater than that indicated by the removal 
of existing tariff structures and by the most assiduously calcu-
lated elasticity coefficients. 
Because of the extensive practical difficulties in estimat-
ing the gains and losses which would arise from JANFT A it is 
most unlikely that any one of the proposed members would ac-
cept a proposal for integration on other than a sectoral basis . 
That is to say, quite apart from the opposition of producer-
oriented pressure groups and the inevitable fears of unemploy-
ment and of structural change, no country would proceed with 
integration upon a broad front while it was uncertain about in-
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creasing the average level of its per capita incomes. Bec ause 
of this uncertainty there is much appeal i n proceeding with 
integrat ion on a sectoral or industry basis . Such a develop -
ment is already taking place between Australia and New Z e a-
land as a result of NAFT A (The New Zealand - Australia 
Free T r ade Area Agreement). ln the next section NAFTA i s 
appraised with a view to Japan entering the Agreement . 
IV The New Zealand~ Australia Free Trade Area A.gree -
ment 
The New Zealand- Australia Free Trade Area Agree -
ment (NAFT A) was signed on the 31st of August 1965 and its 
stated objectives are to "Further the development of the Area 
(New Zealand and Australia) and the use of the resources of 
the Area by promoting a sustained and mutually beneficial ex-
pansion of trade" to be conducted "under conditions of fair 
competition" which would contribute to "the harmonious develop-
ment an<l expansion of world trade " . 
To date,the stated objectives of NAFTA have proved to 
be no more than pious hopes because of a number of safeguards 
built into the Agreement . For instance, Article Four pro-
ceeds to weaken the Agreement by stipulating that the general 
reduction and elimination of duties called for need apply only 
to those commodities listed in Schedule A of the Agreement 
although Article Three provides for annual reviews when , 
among other things, there is to be a progressive listing within 
the Schedule of "all goods which enter or might enter into the 
trade of either Member State" . 
There i s nothing automatic, however, about the inclu-
sion of these commodities upon the list and specifically except-
ed are those "goods the inclusion of which would be seri ously 
d e trimental to an industry in ... either Member State, or 
would be contrary to the national interest of either Member 
State, or would be inconsistent with the objectives of any com-
modity arrangement to which both Member States are parties " . 
Once commodities have been included in the Schedule 
to the Agreement the g eneral requirement i s that they will im-
mediately become fre e of duty if subject to a prior tari ff of 
l e ss than 5% , that they will become free of duty inHwo years 
i f subject to prior du tie s of 5 - 10%, that if subject to prior 
duties greater than 10% they will become free of duty over eight 
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years. 
As if the above safeguards were not sufficient others 
were added to ensure that the structure of .New Zealand's 
industrial development could not be affected . Apart from what 
are normal provisions permitting action against dumped and 
subsidised imports and escape clauses permitting tne withdraw-
al of concessions where serious injury is likely to domestic 
producers the Member State is also able for the purposes of .. 
encoul".aging new enterprises to suspend its obligations on items 
listed in the Schedule and to levy duties on such items at a 
reducing rate for a period of up to twelve years . In excep-
tional circumstances it can withdraw items indefinitely from the 
Schedule. Finally, it is stipulated that Import Licensing 
Controls may be maintained or reimposed even on scheduled 
goods providing the imposition of su-ch controls is consistent 
with the member's international obligations and are for balance 
of payments reasons only . 
I The extent to which N AFT A might lead to a substantial 
freeing of trade between thF? member countries depends upon 
\the number and significance of the commodities listed in the 
\Schedule, upon how quickly this list is extended and upon the 
willingness of both countries to refrain from invoking the safe-
Jguard clauses. To date, by all three criteria, the Agree-
ment must be judged a failure . 
It was the proud claim of both Governments that the 
original Schedule to the Agreement listed items which between 
1962-63 and 1963- 64 comprised some 60% of total trade between 
the two countries. Some 53% in value terms of New Zealand 
imports from Australia were i ncluded and some 86% of the goods 
which Australia imported from New Zealand . Thi s method of 
appraising the liberal nature of the Agreement, however, con-
veniently overlooked that most of these items were already 
duty free and that many more commodities would have been trad-
ed in the past had it not been for i mport licensing controls and 
the existence of high tariff barriers . This point is made 
obvious by Table X which shows that despite a slight increase 
in trade between the two countries since the signing of the 
Agreement, trade in Schedule A commodities has suffered a 
proportionate and absolute decline. It is clearly those items 
not listed in the Schedule that offer the major trading benefits . 
The procedure for including new commodities upon the 
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Schedule is fortunately left to the initiative of the two Govern-
ments and not to that of private manufacturers or producers . 
After the two Governments have agreed upon a list of goods 
which might be considered for addition, this list is published 
and all interested individuals and bodies are invited to submit 
their views . Where manufacturers and produc.ers hold that 
their interests are jeopardized an enquiry is held by an appro-
priate authority in each country , 
There can be little doubt, however, that unless each 
Government is inclined to give more substance to the Agree -
ment the above machinery for including extra items on the 
Schedule will not be overtaxed. On one s i de of the Tasman 
the New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister and main architect 
of N AFT A has stated that " although the ai m is the eventual 
establishment of a comprehensive free trade area thi s will not 
be achi eved i n a way that wi ll be s e riously detrimental to an 
indust ry in eithe -r country" (2 , 34) . On the other side of t he 
Tasman, the then Australian Deputy Prime Minister made it 
abundantly evident that any items that Australia might offer to 
include in the Schedule will be such as to avoid reducing the 
level of protection given to Australian manufacturi ng industries 
(3 , 23) . Table X indicates the success both Governments 
have had in achieving these ai ms . 
TABLE X 
NEW ZEALAND ' S TRADE WITH AUSTRALIA 
( $N . Z . Mi llion) 
1. Total Trade : 
1964 
1965 
1966 
Exports to Imports from 
Australia . Australia . 
Cf. o . b .) cc . d . v . ) 
32 . 4 
31.0 
32 . 0 
129 . 8 
130 . 8 
139 . 6 
THE PROSPECTS OF THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 129 
TABLE X Cont'd 
2. Schedule A Trade: 
(a) Value of Schedule A 
between Australia 
and New Zealand 
(b) As percentage of total 
trade betwen Australia 
and New Zealand 
1963-4 1964-5 1965-6 
99.68 85.20 86.08 
58.5% 51.6% 49 . 9% 
Given the serious intentions of its members, N AFT A 
does provide a framework for a more extensive freeing of trade 
between the two countries but it is still debatable whether or 
not the Australasian market is a large enough one to allow for 
a range of economically viable manufacturing industri es . 
There is little which can be said about this problem at a general 
level but the line of argument developed above suggests that the 
Australasian area comprises too small a market for successful 
industrial development. Support for this point of view is 
given by the general impression of Professor Austin Robinson 
who in editing the Symposium on "The Economic Consequences 
of the Size of Nations" concluded that "most of the major in-
dustrial economies of scale could be achieved by a relatively 
high income nation of 50 millions ; but nations of 10-15 millions 
were probably too small to get all the technical economies avail -
able . .. " He continued to say that "There are probably sig-
nificant economies in integrating nations of the size of 10 - 15 
millions" . 
Clearly, while so few commodities of importance to pro-
ducer interests are included in Schedule A, the opportunity 
exists for renegotiating the Agreement with Japan (JANFT A) 
and for proceeding with integration upon a sectoral basis. 
We turn next to consider argument for and against integration 
by sector or industry rather than on a broad front . 
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V Sectoral Integration 
The major argument in favour of proceeding with econo-
mic integration upon a sectoral basis is that politically it is 
more feasible because Governments are more likely to make 
limited decisions, the results of which are more clearly for -
see able and, therefore, acceptable to an elector ate. More -
over, success of integration plans in one industry or group of 
industries may provide the stimulus and encouragement for 
integration to be proceeded with upon a larger scale. There 
is much to be said for this line of argument and one can point 
to the case of the European Iron and Steel Community. When 
the ECSC was first contemplated , an attempt to integrate its 
participating members across a broad front would have been 
doomed to failure. A more limited measure of integration 
gained approval and would seem to have contributed later to 
the formation of the E . E . C. 
As argued above, this last point is relevant to any pro-
jected integration of the Australian, New Zealand and Japa-
nese economies . At this juncture any macro-economic cal-
culation of the possible costs and benefits of the complete re -
moval of trade barriers would need be treated with caution . 
It is not even enough to know that the area as a whole is likely 
to gain unless it can be shown that each of the individual count-
ries stands to benefit. The complete removal of barriers to 
trade would involve substantial changes in the distribution of 
incomes if not in the average level of per capita incomes and 
because no water - tight method exists of guaranteeing any in-
dividual country compensation in the event of real income loss, 
governments would be naturally reluctant to agree to a proposal 
for full integration. Integration on a sectoral basis would 
allow Governments to bargain for such compensation. This 
i s an argument, therefore, for integrating more than one but 
not all sectors at a time. As far as existing industries are 
concerned, a development which was likely to prove harmful to 
a politically important production group in one country could be 
off set by the integratior,i. of another industry in which integra-
tion effects W<?uld be favourable to producers, In the case of 
Australia, New Zealand and Japan this need not only involve 
integrating different industries, such as the automobile industry 
and the me at industry, but could also involve specialisation 
occurring within. an industry as has happened in the E . E. C . 
For instance , in Australia in 1962-63 fourteen firms 
THE PROSPECTS OF THE ECONOMC INTEGRATION 131 
were engaged in the manufacture or assembly of motor vehicles . 
Only six of these firms were engaged in any substantial manu-
facturing themselves although many small firms specialised in 
producing components. A wide range of cars, stati on-wagons 
and other vehicles were produced in a highly protected market. 
Most favoured nation duty rates on complete motor cars were 
35% and on components most favoured nation rates varied bet-
ween 35% and 52-t% . Despite these high rates of protection, 
and despite the number of firms producing a wide variety of 
products in what is a relatively small market (in 1962-63 some 
345 ,000 new vehicles were registered in Australia) the indus -
try has developed some export markets. Competition with 
Japan would inevitably involve mergers and concentration upon 
producing a more limited range of vehicles and components but 
it is difficult to see the motor vehicle industry in Australia 
being eliminated by the removal of protection. It is possible 
that reduced unit costs resulting from competi tion and economie s 
of scale could result eventually in the industry expanding . 
In automobile production, 600,000 is alleged to be the 
optimal output per plant in the U. S , A. Costs are moderately 
higher at 150,000 and considerably higher at 60,000 units 
(above the Australian average output) (16, 245- 247). 
Another advantage of integration by industries is that 
trade diversion and adverse terms of trade effects could be 
minimized. For instance, the competitive status of certain 
United Kingdom industries could be preserved in the Australa-
sian market. 
Finally, apart from a more rational development of exist-
ing industries a sectoral approach to integration would also 
enable a more logical development of industries which have yet 
to be started . 
There are a number of theoretical objections which have 
been made about integration proceeding on a sectoral or indus -
try basis. One of these is that integration in one sector alone , 
e . g . , in the case of Australia , Japan and New Zealand the 
automobile industry, would result in losses as far as some of 
the partners were concerned . This type of argument assumes , 
first, that the country whose industry contracts actually lose s 
real income despite lower cost products being available to con-
sumers; and, secondly, that a general integration of the econo-
mies concerned would benefit all members . Neither of these 
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contentions is necessarily correct and it is this uncertainty 
which attaches to the complete removal of trade barriers which 
is the major practical problem. As noted above, if more than 
one industry at a time were integrated, compensating adjust-
ments could be made to see that all member countries benefitted . 
A more general criticism is that under the sectoral ap -
proach every step in integration results in a new and temporary 
equilibrium of prices, costs and resource allocation . As a 
result, production decisions will be made on the basis of prices 
that are relevant only at a particular point in the integration 
process and the resulting resource shifts may be seen later to 
have been wasteful. Presumably, however , the establishment 
of new temporary positions of equilibrium will occur also where 
integration involves all industries but proceeds in a series of 
discrete steps. In this case, therefore, one cannot argue 
that there will be no wasteful shift of resources- until all adjust -
ments have been made. 
A further and related objection is that the establishment 
of temporary equilibria (as a result of the sectoral approach) 
may require deflationary or exchange rate adjustment measures 
aimed at relieving balance of payments pressures. These, it 
is argued, will tend either to check the growth process in the 
deficit country or, as a result of temporary adjustments in ex-
change rates, lead to unnecessary changes in the international 
division of labour. Once again this objection applies equally 
to the situation in which tariffs on all items are reduced by a 
series of discrete steps. It might be thought that a criteria 
for integrating only a limited number of industries is that the 
balance of payments effects of the integration process could be 
minimi.sed. This is an undesirable criteria, however, be-
cause it is the real income effects of integration which are 
important and maximum real income effects may require exchange 
rate alterations . What is required is machinery to allow a 
deficit country to make the necessary adjustments without the 
need to apply severe deflationary measures. 
Another criticism of integration by sectors is that it is 
less likely to le ad to co- ordination in monetary, fiscal and 
other policies which are required if the industries in the integ-
rated sectors are to be truly competitive . This criticism is 
valid in that countries would be less likely to harmonise policies 
where they did not intend to integrate all sectors . One can 
point, however, to the record of the E. I. S. C . which shows 
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that some co- ordination was successfully achieved in the fielci 
of transport, tax and commercial policy. (8, 288-416). 
What of the objection that integration on a secto·ral basis 
will lead to a conflict of producer and user interests which will 
normally resolve itself in favour of the former? Producers 
with a vested interest in the industry selected for integration 
are bound to be vocal but this emphasizes the need to select 
more than one industry at a time so that the clamour of one 
group can be offset by the favourable lobbying of another. 
Finally, there is the argument that G . A . T . T . regula-
tions prohibit partial economic integration . What is import-
ant is the ultimate aim of the member countries , and to the ex-
tent that they could show that trade diversion would be minimis -
ed and that integration on a sectoral basis would be a continuing 
process, it is unlikely that G. A . T . T . would object. It has 
not, for instance, in the past objected to such p artial integra-
tion on the part of the E . I. S. C. or N . A . F . T. A. 
Finally, there are a few random comments which I should 
like to make . 
· If integration on a sectoral basis is to prove successful, 
it would be important for detailed industry studies to be carried 
out which would provide data on competitive conditions and the 
structure of the industries concerned, on underlying demand and 
supply conditions and upon effective rates of protection. This 
information would be essential if a prior esti mate of the effect 
of integrating certain industries was to be made . It would 
also be required in order to defeat the lobbying of vested in-
terests and to allay the fears of the general population. To 
facilitate these industry investigations some Joint Economic 
Council might be established, the members of which would be 
trained analysts provided by the three countries. 
While JANFT A could be of considerable benefit to the 
Australasian economies, the small increase in the size of the 
market as far as Japan is concerned would make the benefits 
relatively less important. Such a free trade area arrange-
ment, however, could provide the framework for including other 
countries at a later date such as Canada , the United States and 
some of the less developed economies of the Pacific Basin . 
JANFT A should in a number of ways facilitate the render-
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ing of assistance to under- developed countries . A joint for -
eign aid programme could be established; preferential tariff 
treatment with the free trade area could be given to some of 
the underdeveloped areas of the Pacific Basin; and joint i n -
vestment projects could be undertaken by the three advanced 
economies whi ch would establish processing industries in 
underdeveloped countries that would cater for local tastes and 
reduce the supply price of the finished product by employing 
low- cost local labour. 
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TABLE I 
EXPORTS OF AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND 
PRODUCE ACCORDING TO INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN 
(As % of Total Exports) . 
Australia New Zealand 
1953- 54 1964- 65 1953-54 1964- 65 
Industr ial Grou:e 
Agr icultural 19 24 2 
Pastoral 60 45 67 
Dairy 6 5 28 
Mining 7 10 
Forestry and fishe r ies 1 1 1 
Total primary 93 85 98 
Manufacturing 6 13 1 
Unclassified 1 2 1 
Total 100 100 100 
Source : Official Yearbooks of the Commonwealth of 
Austr alia ; New Zeal and Official Year books . 
TABLE II 
IMPORTS AS A % OF G . N . P . IN 
AUST'RAtIA AND NEW ZEALAND 
Year Aust . N. Z. Year Aust. 
1953-54 14.7 21.6 1956- 60 13 . 2 
1954- 55 16 .9 25 .9 1960-61 14. 1 
1955-56 15 . 2 24.6 1961- 62 11. 5 
1956-57 12 . 1 23 .6 1962- 63 12 .8 
1957- 58 13 . 2 24 .6 1963-64 12 .6 
1958- 59 12 . 5 19 . 1 1964- 65 14. 1 
Source : As for Table I 
2 
70 
23 
3 
98 
2 
100 
N. Z . 
18 .6 
22.2 
18 .6 
17.9 
19.9 
18 .9 
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TABLE III 
IMPORTS OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND 
ACCORDING TO INDUSTRIAL USE (1964- 65) 
% total imports 
Australia N i:>w Zealand 
Producers materials for use in 
manufacturing 51 
Capital equipment 27 
Fuel and lubricants 2 
Other 5 
Consumer goods 15 
Sources: As for Table I 
TABLE IV 
INTENSITY OF TRADE FOR 
1960- 62 (AVERAGE) AND FOR 1965++ 
Exports to Japan Australia 
Exports from 
Japan 
170 
(185) 
Australia 418 (347) 
New Zealand 97 223 (109) (238) 
++ 1965 figures in parenthesis 
Source : United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 
49 
25 
7 
5 
12 
New Zealand 
95 
(124) 
1053 
(1108) 
1966. 
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TABLE VI 
EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF AUSTRALIA, JAPAN 
AND NEW ZEALAND AS% TOTAL EXPORTS AND IlvPORT S 
Exports 
to 
Aust- N z Imports 
ralia Japan · · from 
Aust-
ralia Japan N . Z . 
Exports 
of 
Australia 16. 6 
Japan 3.8 
New Zealand 4.7 5 . 1 
Source: As for Table I 
Exports 
of 
6 . 3 Australia - 9.7 1.5 
0 . 7 J a-pan 6 . 8 0 . 8 
New Zealand 18 . 8 6 . 3 
TABLE VII 
PRINCIPAL I:NrPORTS OF NEW ZEALAND 
(JUNE .YEAR, 1965) 
N . Z .. $(ODO) Value of imports from 
Fertilizers 
Motor spirit, etc . 
Organic and inorganic 
chemicals 
Pharmaceuticals 
Plastics 
Textiles 
Iron and steel 
Aluminium and copper 
Motor vehicles 
Electrical machinery and 
equipment 
Total 
(principal imports) 
Others 
Total 
Total Australia Japan 
12,682 
19,334 
17,075 
12,772 
15,487 
50,428 
50,118 
16,290 ' 
71, 409 
40, 114 
306,339 
356,328 
662,667 
6,420 
3 , 274 
3,735 
2,797 
3,494 
23,535 
3,726 
15,744 
2 , 697 
65,422 
62,546 
127 , 968 
784 
8,901 
10,966 
341 
295 
21,287 
15,397 
36 , 684 
Source: New Zealand Yearbook, 1967. 
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TABLE VIII 
PRINCIPAL EXPORTS OF NEW ZEALAND 
(JUNE YEAR, 1965) 
N. Z . $(000) Value of exports to 
Total Australia Ia.12an 
Wool 208 ,640 1,896 13,923 
Beef and veal 57,409 345 
Mutton and lamb 134,972 5,981 
Other meats 20,394 636 47 
Butter 119,647 
Cheese 40,681 168 557 
Milk (dried) 18,890 598 
Other animal p r oducts 65 ,947 387 3,858 
Wood pulp and newsprint 16 ,711 16', 322 184 
Total (principal exports) 683 , 291 19' 409 25, 493 
Others 58 ,881 15 , 159 7, 807 
Total 742 , 172 . 34,568 33 ,300 
Source : New Zealand Yearbook, 1967 , 
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TABLE IX 
PRINCIPAL IMPORTS OF AUSTRALIA 
(1964-65) 
Commodity A$(000) f. o. b. Value of im_eorts 
from Ja_ean . 
Aircraft and parts 85,993 
Apparel 25,367 3,024 
Chemicals, drugs, fertilizers 184,720 7,744 
Electrical machinery and 
appliances 139,277 
Iron and steel 102' 802) 
) 110,212 
Machines and machinery 506, 769) 
Motor vehicles 252,896 
Oils 210,159 1,684 
Paper 103,314 6,626 
Piece goods 135,135 72,310 
Plastic materials 62,407 
Rubber 59,983 
Total (principal imports) 1,869,522 201,600 
All other 1,035,181 56,974 
Total 2,904, 703 258,574 
Source : Australian Year book, 1966. 
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TABLE X 
PRINCIPAL EXPORTS OF AUSTRALIA 
(1964-65) 
Commodity A$(000) f. o . b . Value of exports 
to Japan 
Butter 
Cheese 
Chemicals 
Coal 
Fruit 
(fresh, canned and dried) 
Grains and cereals 
Hides and skins 
Iron and steel 
Lead (pig and bullson) 
Machines and machinery 
Meats 
Ores and concentrates 
Sugar 
Wool 
Total 
62,165 
14,197 
30,497 
51,120 
82,227 
391, 859 
79,534 
61, 687 
60,432 
42,373 
276,443 
80,954 
112,685 
805,850 
2,581,913 
Source: Australian Yearbook, 1966 . 
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48,082 
36,672 
18,298 
10,272 
16,942 
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242,658 
440,740 
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COMlvIBNT ON L.V. CASTLE'S PAPER 
By Gustav Ranis 
In addition to the usual disclaimer, that is, that I am 
not knowledgeable on the New Zealand economy, I have to 
admit to not being a trade expert. It is for the reason that 
I especially welcomed, from a purely selfish point of view, the 
unusual clarity and comprehensiveness of Professor Castle's 
paper; but I would venture to guess that others also benefitted 
from it. 
The scene conveyed by the author depicts the U. K. and 
New Zealand in a devoted mother-child relationship, with the 
mother beginning to show signs of straying, and the child beginn-
ing to worry and exhibit withdrawal symptoms--but not as yet 
willing to leave home and face the world. 
Nevertheless, as Professor Castle himself indicates, 
the real world has forced a change on New Zealand which was, 
in fact, quite dramatic, · especially when contrasted with changes 
over the previous 50 years . Exports to the Pacific area, 
for example, are now 33% of the total as compared to 15% in 
1956. Professor Castle takes the New Zealand government· 
to task for not having adopted specific policies to this end; but 
if the economy, in fact, was able to respond to changes in 
market forces the government must, at a minimum, have been ac-
commodating, and, in fact, we know that it was at least that. 
It responded to changing income growth patterns in Japan and 
Asia vis-a-vis the U. K. in terms of the trade agreements 
entered . Perhaps Professor Castle's objection is more to 
New Zealand's mentality rather than her actions. 
With respect to the key commodities of lamb, butter and 
cheese, which comprise more than 40% of New Zealand's 
exports, Castle especially deplores the continued almost total 
dependence on the U . K. But is it not too simple to say that 
New Zealand refused to turn to the Pacific just because she 
· · feared the possible hurt to her industries from having to grant 
reciprocal access? One would need to know more about the 
lamb market, for instance to know whether New Zealand is a 
price maker or price taker; what her competitive situation is, 
142 
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etc , , before one could weigh the benefit of access against the 
costs of reciprocity plus the costs and benefits of the special 
bulk purchase type of arrangement while it lasted, One can 
agree on the dangers of indefinite preference~ in drugging a 
system into inaction but the validity of the case can only be es -
tablished if the options or opportuniti es foregone can be cited 
clearly. 
I have one other related caveat to put forward- -and that 
is that I would warn Professor Cas tle against undue reli-
ance on the F AO forecasts of demand and production on a global 
basis, forecasts which seem to have influenced the tentative 
conclusion that the dairy industry may well go by the wayside 
while meat continues strong. These conclusions may well be 
right but I would not like to base them on projections which are 
devoid of any price assumptions. 
I cannot resist commenti ng on one other point- - though it 
is not central to Professor Castle ' s argument, and that is that 
on p . 104 the paper states that "food aid is not directly connec;t-
ed with economic development and may indeed damage the p r os -
pects of increasing domesti c agricultural productivity". With 
respect to the first part of that statement, I can agree that fr e e 
and unfettered aid may be better from the r e cipient ' s point of 
view but that is not usually the relevant choice. Aid tied to 
a particular donor may only be worth 90 i of the dollar (due to 
non- competitive prices and incomplete "fle xibility" of foreign 
exchange resources); aid tied to both particular commodity and 
a particular donor may only be worth 80 i of the dollar; but in 
either case these represent additional resources per miting the 
recipient to do additional things , in cludi ng grow fast e r . With 
respect to the "disincentive" issue raised in the second part of 
the quoted statement, the re cert ainly can be a problem here if 
agricultural resources are dump ed indiscriminately i n a marke t 
which is trying to increase the contribution of domestic produc-
tion . However, as the experience of Pakistan since 1961 . 
well illustrates , P , L , 480 assistance infused carefully into 
the system in the form of a buffer stock to moder ate agricultu-
ral price fluctuations and permit the free price trend to decline 
slowly with time is perfectly consistent with inc r easing agri-
cultural producti vity as the effort is made domestic ally to help 
close the gap . The whole emphasi s agricultur al productivi ty 
increases, where obtainable on efficient t e rms , in the most 
recent United States P. L . 480 legislati on is based on the as sump-
tion that such careful infusion of agricultural commodities into the 
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less developed world is possible as we buy time to get much of 
the problem solved domestically. 
Finally, I cannot resist commenting on how much I was 
struck by the likeness of New Zealand's behavior to the typi -
cal less developed economy syndrome; import licensing, import 
substitution, strong (one might say somewhat premature) wel-
fare programme, budget deficits, inflation and low growth 
rates. I realize that currently there is some stirring around 
in terms of potentially profound changes in this picture; but 
in the meanwhile I wonder how New Zealand can reasonably 
consider the relatively big step involved in a Pacific Free 
Trade Area where so little has been done and dared in con-
nection with the Australia- New Zealand free trade zone. 
As long as activation, of that relatively small step is subject 
to the constraint that "no New Zealand industry be damaged" 
we seem to be a long way from realizing any of the bigger steps 
being discussed ; that is, unless it is politically more palatable 
to be "hurt" more by some one further afield than Australia . 
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Prof. McDougall's paper examines the impact of a free 
trade area between Australia, New Zealand and Japan, 
(JANFT A) on the pattern and possible volume of intra area 
trade, giving consideration to the major objectives of economic 
policy in Australia and New Zealand. 
The first section of his paper i s devoted to a survey of 
major policy objectives (full employment of a growing workforce, 
raising per capita income, an equal distribution of inc omes, · 
and stability of incomes brought about by each country regulat -
ing the market mechanism internally and endeavouring to become 
less dependent upon international trade). It may be common 
for nearly all countries to point out the first three policy ob-
jectives, but the last objectives should be examined more close-
ly, I think·. Why s.hould reduced dependence upon i n ternati on-
al trade be one of major policy objectives? Why could not the 
expansion of gains from international trade be regarded as one 
of the main policy objectives for achieving economic growth? 
It seems to me curious at first sight, because Prof. McDougall 
has in his paper(pp .111 and 113) clearly mentioned that "neither 
country has proved markedly successful in reducing its depend-
ence upon international trade". 
Besides the high dependence of Australia and New Zea-
land upon a narrow range of primary product exports, the pre-
valent tendency towards agricultural protectionism in industrial 
nations makes structural change difficult for both countries. 
One solution may be a policy of import substitution which 
brings about a favourable effect on terms of trade. But ac- . 
cording to the interpretation of Prof. McDougall, import 
ratios have failed to fall significantly (p. 111). Major ca uses 
have been the spill- over of unsatisfied import demand of a num-
ber of import-competing industries which has generated infla- · 
tionary pressures and made expansion difficult for efficient 
import- competing industries. At the same time, "consumers 
have reacted to rising domestic price levels by switching their 
demand back to relatively cheaper imports . " 
This process and Table III of Prof. McDougall's paper 
teach us clearly that the objective to reduce dependence on 
international trade was not only unsuccessful, but also incom-
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patible with the policy objective of full employment both from a 
short-run and long-run standpoint. Thus, I agree with Prof . 
McDougall's alternative policies in the first section (p. 113-114) 
which "would allow manufacturing industry to develop in accord-
ance with each country's comparative advantage." This policy 
guarantees that manufacturing development in Australia and 
New Zealand will be competitive and increase its efficiency and, 
lastly, would lead to the establishment of export industries 
through technological improvement. 
Section II investigates some characteristics of J ANFT A 
from the viewpoint of market size, trade relations, and levels 
of protection in the member countries. 
Section III provides a qualitative analysis with respect 
to the possible benefits and costs of integration through the a-
chievement of economics of scale and the effects of increased com-
petition. According to Prof. McDougall's tentative conclu-
sion, one would expect terms of trade effects for the area as 
a whole to be negligible. As far as the trade creation effect 
is concerned, domestic demand in Australia for imports from 
Japan can be assumed highly elastic and this would tend to in-
crease trade creation effects. Finally trade diversion effects 
are unlikely to be large, given high supply elasticities of J apa-
nese goods and relatively stable supply prices. 
On the other side, gains from increased competition 
through the establishment of a free trade area are difficult to 
assess. But to summarize the issues: a) The establishment 
of a free trade area would enable non-price competition and 
price competition to become more effective. b) If larger 
markets were established, new firms would prove less tolerant 
of traditional practices and would intensify competitive condi-
tions. c) The important long-run effect of integration would 
be its influence upon the volume, pattern and value of invest-
ment . d) Integration would give rise to many economies of 
scale which should be important to partner countries. 
It seems to me that quantitative analysis which provides 
a detailed estimation of the gains or losses likely to arise from 
economic integration and the direction of possible changes in 
trade relationship should be systematically attempted besides 
the above mentioned qualitative analysis. But it is even very 
difficult to estimate net gains from trade creation, trade diver-
sion and changes in the terms of trade for each country. As 
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Prof . McDougall has also correctly observed, this quantita-
tive estimation requires a comprehensive knowledge of effective 
rates of protection, price data and of demand and supply condi-
tions in not. only the member countries of the area, but also 
their trading partners throughout the world . 
As far as the terms of trade effect is concerned, I run 
tempted to propose here an empirical method with a simple theo-
retical background : (See T . Shimano, O·n the Measurement 
of the Im ort- and Ex ort- biased Productivit Chan e in a a -
nese Economy mimeographed , 19 7 . Not only the composi-
tion· of changes in exports but also the expansion in volume terms 
for one country are due to external and internal factors. With 
respect to external factors, it is of importance to notice the 
rapid expansion effect of the intra- areal trade in manufactures 
in highly advance countries, while with respect to internal 
factors technical change, through increasing investment in 
rationalisation and modernisation, contributed to enhance the 
adaptability of exportables to changing demand conditions in 
other countries . In other words, structural changes on the 
supply side play quite a significant role in the growth perform-
ance of exports. It is here perhaps worth noting in passing, 
that the export performance of industrial sectors depends both 
on private initiatives and the impact of policy. My empirical 
method for calculating terms of trade effect derives from the 
theory of Hicks and Johnson . Their theoretical interpreta-
tion i n eludes two problems which are also of interest in empiri-
cal research; 1) Technological or productivity change that 
does not take place uniformly in all industries and has a diffe -
rential effect on the balance of trade . 2) Their model hints 
at the direction of structural changes in world economy through 
transition of trade centres in the process of productivity changes. 
I shall limit myself to three comments on Prof. McDou-
gall's paper. Firstly, if one takes Prof. 'McDougall's investi-
gation of trade effects as being approximately correct and if 
liberalization had no further consequences for the economy , 
one might well conclude that all of the efforts .required to br ing 
about a free trade area within three countries are desirable and 
acceptable for each country . However , because of the exten-
sive practi cal difficulties , Prof . McDougall concludes that " it 
is most unlikely that anyone of the proposed members would ac-
cept a proposal for integration on other than a sectoral basi s" . 
I can understand that there are many inherent diffi culties of 
establishi ng a free trade area and the another obstacles which 
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are already built in institutional regulations in planning JANFT A . 
But it is not convincing and it seems to me that it is logically 
inconsistent to point out the impossibility or ineffectiveness of 
an integration directly after referring to the difficulties of 
quantitative investigation and the implausibility of Prof . 
Kojima' s empirical research. I w&s puzzled by this suddenly 
changed conclusion . 
Secondly, Prof . McDougall has given his attention to the 
effects of protection upon the organization and behavior of 
Australian industrie s and the effects of her protection in inter-
national specialisation. Since Australia and New Zealand 
have primary- product biased economies , removal of protection 
might bring complete specialisation in certain lines of activity 
with substantial relative shifts between expanding and contract-
ing industries . His analysis depends on a chain of reasoning 
which can briefly be summarized as follows: The existence 
of tariffs in Australia and New Zealand permits high domestic 
prices which in turn allow inefficiency to be maintained; this 
inefficiency results primarily from the small scale of both do-
mestic markets and, therefore, a lowering of tariffs would be 
desirable because of the possibility of reducing inefficiency 
and domestic prices. The link in his line of reasoning is the 
attributing of high prices or inflationary pressures in both 
countries to the degree of inefficiency present in industrial 
sectors. As Prof . McDougall pointed out, high prices are 
found in both efficient and inefficient industries, the only dif-
ferenc~ being that in the form~r either excess profits or high 
selling costs are also present. Therefore, it seems to me 
that price setting in both countries requires more explanation 
and probably would turn on the question of the number of the 
competitors and the quality of competition within industries . 
Let me now turn to the issue of tariffs . Tariffs are 
recognized as a permissive condition for inefficiency and they 
are said to constitute the main barrier to integration in this 
area . But I think that tariffs are not a sufficient condition 
for integration . I would like to ask whether tariffs are even 
a necessary condition for it. 
Finally, much more important is Prof. McDougall's 
proposal for sectoral integration. The study of the work-
ability of sectoral integration is of considerable importance . 
Sectoral integration may make it feasible to realize much great-
er integration through limited governmental decisions , and act 
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as stimulus for integration to be pressed on a larger scale. 
This proposal is a very practical and constructive means 
for promoting JANFTA in near future . It has much merit and 
deserves close attention . 
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DISCUSSION CN CASTLE'S AND McDUGALL'S PAPER 
In reply Prof. Castle agreed that no detailed cost bene-
fit study had been undertaken of the effect of British preferen-
tial arrangements on New Zealand's principal agricultural ex-
ports or of the gains through switching to Pacific country mar-
kets . But he maintained that the facts and prospects he had 
adduced seemed to support his general conclusions. With 
respect to the nature of the market for New Zealand's princi-
pal exports, he suggested that she was a price-taker in the 
case of butter and lamb, and a price-maker in the case of 
cheese. 
Prof. Castle emphasized the difficulty of making quanti-
tative estimates of the effect of liberalization on New Zealand's 
exports to Japanese, United States, and Canadian markets 
because of the prevalence of quota restrictions. This also 
applied in the Australian case. He agreed that, for this and 
other reasons stressed by Prof. Ranis, it would be unwise to 
base agricultural policy on F AO-type projections. 
As to the prospects for the adoption of more ambitious 
policies to diversify the market and commodity structure of 
New Zealand' s trade in view of her timidity about the Austra-
lia - New Zealand Free Trade Agreement, Prof. Castle sug-
gested that there has been a significant change in official atti-
tudes since New Zealand was forced to follow British devalua-
tion. These changes have taken place in the last few months 
and they may permit a more adventurous approach to internation-
al economic policy. 
Prof. McDougall took up two points which Prof . Shimano 
raised. He reiterated his skepticism about the value of 
quantitative estimates of trade liberalization which were based 
upon very simple assumptions. He stressed that the result 
of tariff protection in New Zealand was to encourage the estab-
lishment of numerous extremely high-cost inefficient industries . 
The discussion which followed ranged over many issues, 
the most important of which were : the relative merits of the 
sect oral versus the wider free trade area approach to trade 
liberalization ; the practical meaning of the sectoral approach 
to freer trade i the nature and significance of the industrializa-
tion objective in New Zealand's economic policy; and the fea-
sibility of a JANFT A arrangement. 
Some cautioned against the possibility that the sectoral 
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approach might lead to greater degrees of protection rather than 
fre e r trade. First, the effect on effectiv e rates of protec-
tion must be taken into account. Second, th e s cope fo r 
tr ade div ersion within sectoral free trade arr angements might 
be very great. Both points were illustrated by reference to 
the New Zealand- Australia Free Trade Agreement whi ch 
inc orporates an element of the sectoral approach to "freer" 
trade, although these illustrations were qualified to the extent 
that this arrangement is still in an early s t age of developmenL 
Seve r al participants s ought a more precis e definition of 
th e t e rm "s ector". Do r-s it me an s ome bro ad e conomic s ector, 
such a s agriculture or en gin eering, or d oe s it refer t o a much 
narrow e r rang e of commoditie s ? The se questions assume d im-
portance i n a discussion of the political feas i bility of the sector-
al approach-. For exampl e , it w as suggested that i t w oul d be 
i mpossi ble for Australian negoti ators to give concessi ons on 
i mports of manufactured goods without the promise of recipro-
cal conc essions on agricultural expor ts , despite the economic 
usefulness of unilateral tariff concessions . Others sought an 
explanation of the economic rationale of sectoral integrati on , 
more narrowly defined . 
The different positions of the New Zealand and Australi-
an economies were also brought out in discussion. Size , 
the degree of industrializati on, rates of growth in industri al 
productivity, and the degree of industrial competitiveness 
clearly distingui shed the two economies . The iron and steel 
industry and motor vehicle industries were cited as two of many 
Australian 'infant industries ' which had unsuccessfully matured . 
One participant suggested that the case for continued inf ant 
industry protection was much stronger in the case of New Zea-
land. Some felt that it would be difficult for New Zealand to 
contemplate a substantial freeing of trade, even among Aust-
ralia, Japan, and New Zealand , without taking account of the 
damaging effects on industrialisation objective . It was sug-
gested that market forces alone might not lead to industrial 
rationalisation to New Zealand's advantage . 
There wer e some differences of opinion about the econo-
mic justification for the industrialisation ob jective . One par-
ticipant suggested that its justificati on might be found in the 
lack of fact or substitutability in the p rimar y expor t sector and 
the need to maintain full employment through industri ali sati on, 
rather than through conventi onal commercial and other policy 
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adjustments . Others stressed the impor tance of the terms 
of trade argument for protection in a New Zealand-type economy 
and others the importance of the population variable in relation 
to protection of the industrial sector in New Zealand, Austra-
lia, and Canada. 
Finally, many comments related specifically to the 
JANFT A proposal. Participants drew attention to the lopsided 
nature of the proposed free trade area . Only a very small 
proportion of potential partner- country trade is presently 
intra- areal. The main benefits of closer economic co-opera-
tion among the three countries appeared to derive from increas-
ed bargaining strength and stature vis - a - vis the United States 
and Europe, the prospects for co- operation in ai d - gi ving to 
Asian countries, and its potential as a basis for more general 
moves towards freer trade . 
Chapter 5 JAPAN'S INTEREST 
IN THE PACIFIC TRADE EXP AN SION1 
By Kiyoshi Kojima 
Professor, Hitotsubashi University 
I Introduction 
International trade policies are volatile and searching 
for fresh directions in the Post- Kennedy Round situation . A 
restructuring of Atlantic trade can be anticipated . In the 
Pacific region, there i s need to develop measures for expand-
ing trade among advanced countries (the United States of 
America , Canada , Japan, Australia and New Zealand) and 
trade and aid with the developing countries of Asia arid Latin 
America, in the hope of promoting closer economic coopera-
tion and, perhaps, the establishment of a Pacific Free Trade 
Area . 2 
This paper examines, first, recent trends in the Paci-
fic trade, based upon a trade matrix by country as well as by 
commodity group, and the intensity of trade among the five 
Pacific countri es and their trade with Asian and Latin Ameri-
can developing countries . The analysis suggests that trade 
among the five Pacific countries has tended to become more 
inter- dependent, that there has been increased economic co- l 
operation between those countri es and , at the same time , 
that there are some weaker links which should be strengthened . 
for further trade expansion . ' 
Secondly , the possible static effects of eliminating tari ffs 
among five Pacific countri es are estimated on the basis of 1965 
1This: paper is intended to revise and amplify the auother ' s 
former paper "A Pacific Economic Community and Asian Develop-
ing Countries," Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Vo. 7, No . 1, 
June 1966, pp . 17- 37 
2(See footnote on following page) 
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trad e figure s . The anticipated trade expansion would be ex-
tensive and larger than the effec t of the Kennedy Round tariff 
\ reductions . This suggests that the formation of a Pacific 
F r ee Trade Area, if the fiv e countries should so, would be 
effective in expanding trade, especially when the likelihood 
that another round of global tariff reductions may not be feas i-
ble i n the coming ten to twenty years is taken into account. 
It is also shown how the gains from the elimination of tariffs 
would be distributed among the five count ries and in what com-
modity gr oup s th e expansion of trade would be significant. 
T hirdly , a p r oposal for a P acific Free T rad e Area 
seems quite p r emature for v arious reasons . M ore p rac tic al 
alte r nati ves are proposed for in tensifying closer trade partn er-
s hip among the fi ve P acific count r i es and for incr easi ng aid 
to and trade with developi ng countries i n Asia and Latin Ameri-
ca. 
2The devaluation of the pound sterling on November 18 , 
1967, and the uncertainty about the dollar which followed 
sterling devaluation, were a severe shock for P acifc countri es . 
They warned of the precariousness of international economic 
and financial co- operation within the framework of the IMF 
and GATT and the need for tighter internati onal economic 
integration . Ten days before sterling devaluation, an im-
portant report was published by Maxwell Stamp Associates , 
(The Free Trade 0 tion, 0 ortunit for Britain, The At-
lantic Trade Study, London, 19 7 , strong y a vacating the 
formation of a North Atlantic Free Trade Area among the 
United States, Canada, and Britain. The lessons of sterl-
ing devaluati on suggest that the establishment of NAFT A will 
become an urgent task. Then, what course should Japan , 
Australia , New Zealand follow in the Pacific? The NAFT A 
plan treats them lightly: they may be permitted to participate 
as associate membe r s . From our point of vi ew , thi s hardly 
seems satisfactory . Why should the five Pacific countr ies , 
the United States , Canada , Japan, Australia, and New Zea-
land , not prepare for the formation of a Pacific Free Trade 
Area and welcome B riti sh participation? M i ght not P AFT A 
and NAFTA be linked together through common United State s -
Canadian parti c i pation? 
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II Recent Trends in the Pacific Trade 
(1) Two centres in world trade 
The Pacific is one of the two major centres of world 
trade and ranks alongside Western Europe. Trade among 
the five advanced Pacific countreis, the United States, 
Canada, Japan , Australia, and New Zealand, increased by 
97 percent between 1958 and 1965, from $9. 16 billion to 
$18.02 billion, and their share in world trade rose from 7 . 99 
percent to 10. 38 percent (Table 1). 
The intra- areal trade of the EEC was $6 . 86 billion in 
1958, which was smaller than P AFT A trade, and has tripled 
to $20. 84 billion in 1965. The share of intra- areal trade of 
the EEC in world trade has increased from 5. 98 percent in 
1958 to 12. 00 percent in 1965, more rapidly than in the PAFTA 
trade. 
Taking the total trade among EEC, UK and other West-
ern Europe as "European Trade," which has increased by 
2.3 times from $22.23 billion in 1958 to $51.16 billion in 1965, 
or from 19. 38 percent to 29. 45 percent in the share of world 
trade, it is one of the most important and rapidly growing cent-
res in world trade (see Table 2). 
Within this, we can compare the "extended Pacific 
trade", which is the sum of the trade among countries in 
PAFTA, other Asia (excluding Mainland China) and Latin 
America. Extended Pacific area trade was $23. 36 billion 
or 20. 36 percent of world trade in 1958, which was somewhat 
larger than European trade, and has increased to $37. 71 bil-
lion or 21. 71 percent of world trade in 1965. Extended Paci-
fic area trade is another centre of world trade, but it has not 
grown so fast as lias European trade, mainly due to the stag-
nation in exports of primary produce from developing countries 
1 
in Asia and Latin America. 
The extended Pacific area could be the largest centre 
of world trade if there were closer cooperation in expanding 
\ 
trade and development within the area, since it has greater 
potential in the endowment of its population, natural resources, 
and capital awaiting development than already- well-developed 
Europe. 
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Furthermore, intra- areal trade amongst the five Paci-
fic countries has increased more rapidly than their trade with 
outside countries . The ratio of intra- areal trade for the 
five Pacific countries taken together has increased from 32 . 5 
percent in 1958 to 37 . 3 percent in 1965 . . In contrast, similar 
ratios for EEC were 30.1 percent in 1958 and 43 . 5 percent 
in 1965. 
The five Pacific countries taken together have increased 
the share of their total exports going to Asia and Latin 
America from 19 . 3 percent in 1958 to 20 . 3 percent in 1965, 
and that to Europe as well from 26. 7 percent to 27 . 9 percent 
resp 0 ctively (Table 2) . Thus, they have spread their expan-
sion of trade to other areas . While the share of intra- areal 
trade in total European trade has increased from 53 . 3 percent 
in 1958 to 64 . 3 percent in 1965, the share of European trade 
both with the five Pacific countri es and with Asia and Latin 
America has decreased from 13 . 6 percent to 12 . 4 percent and 
from 11. 5 percent to 7. 0 percent respectively . This seems 
to reflect the inward- looking trend of European trade, which 
has required Australia and New Zealand to turn their eyes 
back towards the Pacific area . 
These trern;ls may be shown more exactly by the intensity 
of trade indices . 1 As shown in Table 2 (C), the intensity 
of intra- area trade among the five Pacific countries is fairly 
high, 132 in 1958 and 133 in 1965, while that of intra- European 
trade is much lower, 106 in 1958 and 96 in 1965 (although that 
I ~ of intra- EEC trade is v. ery high, 184 and 224 respectively-
vi Table 3). The intensity of exports from P AFT A to ALA 
(Asia and Latin America) is high and increasing from 116 in 
1958 to 147 in 1965, while that from Europe to ALA is low 
and decreasing from 63 to 45. 
In short, extended Pacific trade is one of the most im-
portant and rapidly growing centres in the world trade and 
maintains a close trade relationship between the five Pacific 
countries and affiliated developing countries in Asia and Latin 
America . 
1CSee footnote on following page) 
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(2) P AFT A trade for each member country 
The ratio of intra- area trade for the five Pacific coun-
tries taken together, as mentioned already, has increased from 
32 . 5 percent in 1958 to 37 . 3 percent in 1965 . The similar 
ratio for four countries has increased; from 25 . 2 percent to 
31.0 percent for the USA, from 29 . 2 percent to 36 . 8 percent 
for Japan, from 27. 5 percent to 33 . 3 percent for Australia , 
and from 22 . 8 percent to 23 . 5 percent for New Zealand; while 
it has decreased only for Canada from 63 .0 percent to 60 . 1 
percent (Table 4) . The exceptional decrease in the Canadian 
ratio was due to her heavy increase of cereal exports to 
Socialist countries . 
The importance of exports to Europe has increased for 
the USA from 25 percent in 1958 to 33 percent in 1965 and for 
Japan from 11 percent to 13 percent, while it has decreased 
for Australia from 50 percent to 35 percent , for Canada from 
27 percent to 22 percent , and for New Zealand from 70 per- I 
cent to 65 percent. Thus , we clearly see a growing import-
ance of the Pacifi c trade for the five countries which has pro-
vided a new outlet for the three B r iti sh Commonwealth coun-
tries . 
1The intensity of, say , Japan ' s export trade wi th another 
country i s measur ed by the ratio of that country' s share in 
Japanese expor ts to it s tot al share i n world imports . In sym-
bols, X .. I M. · 
--1!... 1 x 100' X . W - M. 
J J 
where Xji stands for Japanese exports to country i ; Xj for 
total Japanese exports (= ~ Xji ) ; Mi for total imports by coun-
try i; Mj for total imports by Japan ; and W for total world i m-
ports. It might be argued that the denominator of Mi/(W- Mj) 
should be W, instead of W - M j. However , this does not 
seem valid since Japanese import s do not constitute a demand 
for Japanese exports meaningfully . In the case of such an 
aggregated t r ade as the P AFT A and EEC, the formula should 
be X . I M. 
Xp1 W- (Mi_ M ) x ,100 , 
P P . PP 
where Xp and Mp stand for the total expor ts and i mports of the 
P AFT A count r i es and Mpp for the intra- a r ea imports (=exports) 
in the P AFT A : consequently Mp - Mpp represents the import s 
of the P AFT A countries from the outside areas . 
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Taking the total exports (equals imports) of PAFTA 
trade as 100, the composition of intra- area trade as well as 
the importance of the trade with outside countries are shown 
in Table 5 and summarized in Figure 1. The share of Japan ' s 
exports i n P AFT A trade has shown the most rapid rate of 
/1 increase, rising from 9 . 2 percent in 1958 to 17 . 3 percent in 
;~ 1965 , and that of Australia has also increased from 5 . 0 p e r -
cent to 5. 8 percent, while the similar share has decre ased 
for the US A from 49 . 2 percent to 47 . 1 perc 12nt , for Canada 
from 34 . 9 percent to 28 . 5 percent , and for New Zealand from 
1 . 7 percent to 1 . 3 percent . The decre ase in the Ame rican 
share was mainly due to the relative decrease of exports to 
Canada . The share of American exports to other thr ee coun-
1 
tries have increased . It is clear that Japan, Australia and 
, the US have been the growth centres i n the expansion of PAFTA 
i trade while Canada and New Zealand have been weaker links . 
These trends are shown further in Figure l. 1 The 
share in the total P AFT A trade of Japanese i mports and export s 
to each of the P AFT A countries has without exception increas-
ed. A similar trend can be seen in American and Australi an 
trade with P AFT A countries other than Canada and New Zea-
land . 
(3) Leading sectors in P AFT A trade 
In order to carry out a commodity analysis of the PAFTA 
trade, trade matrices of eight commodity groups are calculated 
from UN, Commodity Trade Statistics for 1958 and 1965~ 
The commodity groups are : 2 
1Similar trends can be depicted by comparing over- time 
changes in the intensity of trade indices shown in Table 3 . 
2 According to the revised classification of SITC, the 
coverage of commodity groups is as follows. 
Ni - goods : Division 04 
N2 - goods : Sections 0 (less 04) and 1, and 941. 
NJ - goods : Sections 2 (less 251, 266, 267, 27 , 28) and 4 . 
N4 - goods : Divisions 27 and 28 , and Secti on 3 (less 351) . 
Li - goods; Sections 6 (less 66, 67, 68 , 69) and 8 (less 
812 , 821 , 86), and 267, 665 , 666 , 667 . 
L2 - goods : 541, 69 , 733 , 812 , 821 , 86, 951, 96 1. 
C1 - goods : Secti on 5 Cless 541) and 251 , 266 , 351 , 66 (le s s 
665, 666, 667), 67 , 68 . 
C2 - goods : Section 7 (less 733) . 
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Ni - goods : staph' foods (ri ce, wheat, and other grains) . 
N2 - goods: other foodstuffs, including processed goods . 
NJ - goods: agricultural raw materials. 
N4 - goods: minerals, metals, and fuels. 
Li - goods : labor- intensive goods of light industry, both 
intermediate and final products. 
L2 - goods: labor-intensive final goods of heavy and chemical 
industry origin (cameras, sewing machines, 
bicycles, precision typE' equipment, medicine, 
etc.) 
Ci - goods: capital-intensive intE'rmediate goods of heavy and 
chemical industry origin (pig-iron, steel, chemi-
cal fibres, fertilizer, etc.). 
C2 - goods : capital intensive heavy machines and E"quipment. 
Further, Ni - and N2 - goods are aggregated as Food, 
NJ - and N4 - goods as Raw Materials, Li - and L2 -goods as 
Light Manufactures, and Ci - and C2- goods as . Heavy Manu-
factures and Chemicals, for the convenience of analysis . 
The composition of PA FT A trade for each country ex- I; 
hibits different characteristics . In Japanese trade with 
PAFTA countries in i965, 94 . 8 percent of exports were manu-; 
factures while 7i. i percent of imports were primary products . 
Japan's trade is mainly verti cal type, specializing in exports 
ofmanufacturE'<l goods . Australia and NPw Zealand main-
tain another type of vertical trade, specializing in exports of 
primary products : 80 . 0 percent of exports were consisted of 
primary products in the case of Australia and 82. 4 percent in 
the case of New Zealand, while imports were 88 . 2 percent 
and 84. 6 percent in manufactured goods respectively. The 
United States and Canada maintain a balance in the trade of 
manufactures as well as pri mary products between exports and 
imports : manufactured goods occupy 70 . 0 percent both in ex-
ports and imports for the US and 60 . 5 percent and 79. 6 per ... 
cent in exports and imports respectively for Canada . It is 
to be expected , therefore , that the two countries should con-
duct horizontal type trade with the P AFT A countr ies. 
Relative to the growth of total P AFTA trade from ioo 
in i958 to i97 in i965, trad P in heavy manufactures and chemi-
cals CC - goods) has grown fastest (264) and followed by the 
trade in light manufactures (200) in which , however , the more 
sophi sticate d ones CL 2 - good s) have grown al most as fast as 
C- goods (252) , while the trade in food and raw materials has 
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grown at a slower rate than total trade (181 and 173 re spec-
tively) (see Table 6). Heavy manufactures and chemicals as 
well as sophisticatPd labor intensive goods have been the lead-
in.g sector Ln P AFT A trade, with food, raw materials and 
traditional light manufactures (L 1- goods) the lagging sector . 
Figures 2 clE'arly shows that the imDortance of bilateral 
trade in C - goods (the total share in P AFTA trade was as 
large as 46 . 5 oercE>nt in 1965) has rapidly increased in almost 
all nirections except in three unimportant cases, i . e . , Aust -
ralia-+ the U . S . , New Zealand-+Australia, and New Zealand 
-+Canada . The U.S . and Japan are in export surplus while 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand are in import surplus . 
In L - goods (the total shar"' was 20 . 6 percent), except in only 
one case (Canada-+ the U . S . ) , the importance of bilateral 
trade has also increased in all directions (Figure 3) . Only 
Japan is in heavy export surplus while the other four countries 
are in import surplus . 
Raw materials are as important as L - goods in PAFTA 
trade, the total share being 20 . 5 percent (Figure 4) . The 
U.S . and japan are net importing countries while Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand net exporting countries. The 
most significant change during the period of 1958 - 1965 was 
the increase of importance in Australian exports to Japan, the 
U.S. , and Canada and the decrease in bilateral trade between 
the U.S. , and Canada. 
Food is the least important commodity category (11. 3 
percent) in P AFT A trade, and only Japan is a net importer 
(Figure 5). The most significant change was the decrease 
in importance of trade between America and Canada. 
\ 
The expansion of horizontal trade in manufactured goods 
can be regarded as the primary acceleror of rapid growth and 
-prosperity of the EEC's intra-bloc tradel (Table 7) . In 
order to ascertain whether or not similar progress i n horizont-
i al trade between the P AFT A countries has been taken place , 
the degree of horizontal trade2 is calculated (Table 8). 
1
Ki yoshi Ko jima, " The Pattern of Internat ional Trade 
Among Adv-ancPd Countri es, " Hitotsu bashi Journal of Econ o -
mi cs , June 1964 , pp. 24- 26 . 
2CSee f ootnot e on followi ng page ) 
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i) The aggregate degr~e of horizontal trade within 
P AFT A for all commodities, Dr , in 1965, was high in the 
case of the U . S. and Canada, 54 . 8 and 50. 3 respectively, 
while that of Japan (24.1), Australia (20. 4) and New Zealand 
(13. 8) was low. In bilateral trade, Dr was high only in the 
American-Canadian trade (47. 2) and low in all other bilateral 
trading; spreading from 30 . 2 to 5 . 2. The higher figures com-
pare well with intra- areal trade in the EEC which, however, 
has no lower degree evE'n in bilateral trade. 
2The degree of horizontal trade between two countries 
for a certain commodity category (denoted by D) is calculated 
as follows : where country A's imports .of commodity h from 
country B is Ah and country B's imports of the same commodity 
h from country A is Bh : 
D 
Bh 
x 100, Ah 
or 
D = 
Bh 
x 100, Ah 
The degree of aggregate horizontal trade (denoted by 
D) can also be calculated as the weighted adverage of D of 
several commodities by using as weights the percentage ratio 
of the total of Ah and Bil in the total trade of the two countri-
es, or it is shown as follows : 
D 
Bh Ah+ Bh 
(if Ah > Bh) = z --x--
MA+ MB h 
Ah Ah+ Bh 
(if Ah < Bh), +Z--
Bh BA+ MB 
where MA represents country A's total imports from country 
B and MB, country B's total imports from country A. 
The degree of horizontal trade is always less than 100 
and the closer it is to 100, the further the horizontal trade is 
carried out and balanced within the same commodity category or 
aggregate categories. 
i 
I 
! 
' 
I 
I 
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ii) In the EEC, the degree of horizontal trade has rapi d-
ly increased in general from 1956-58 and 1965 CT able 7) . In 
PAFTA trade, the degree has increased from 1958 to 1965 in 
bilateral trade among the U . S . , Canada and Japan, while it 
has decreased in Australia- PAFTA, Australia-America, New 
Zealand-PAFTA, New Zealand- Canada, and New Zealand-
} apan trade. 
iii) In the degree of horizontal trade by commmodity (D) , 
the higher figures and/ or those which show the most significant · 
increase are to be found in heavy manufactures and chemicals 
(C1 and C2) among the trade of the U . S , , Canada and Japan ; 
for example, in C- goods .it has increased from 22 in 1958 to 
43 in 1965 in American"'. Canadian trade, from 22 to 54 in 
American- Japanese trade, and from 43 to 69 in Canadian- J apa-
nese trade. These higher degrees of horizontal trade in 
heavy manufactures and chemicals are equivalent to those in 
EEC . The trade of Australia and New Zealand in this com-
modity category is low and decreasing in the degree of horizont-
al trade with other P AFT A countries . 
iv) Higher degrees of horizontal trade in raw materials 
CR - goods) are shown in the trade of America-Canada, Ameri ca• 
Australia, Canada-Australia, Canada- New Zealand, and 
Australia-New Zealand . The promotion of horizontal trade 
in raw materials between the PAFTA countries, except Japan , 
would be fruitful. In food (F -goods), hori zontal trade has 
not progressed except in the trade of America-Canada and 
Australia-New Zealand . 
In short, horizontal trade between P AFT A countri es , 
with the exception of American-Canadian tracle, is not well 
developed r~lative to that of the EEC. This would suggest 
us that there is a plenty of room to expand P AFT A trade 
through the promotion of horizontal trade, particularly in 
heavy manufactures and chemi cals, and raw materials as w ell . 
(4) Summary 
The analysi s of recent trends in the Pacifi c trade sug-
ge sts to us, first , that trade between the five Pacific count-
ries (USA, Canada, Japan , Australia , and New Zealand) 
has been growi ng r apidly, and interdependence has intensified. 
T his provides a found ati on for moving toward s clos e r economic 
co- operation and , perhaps , integration . 
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Secondly, although extended Pacific trade had the sar~e 
scale as European trade in 1958, the latter has gone ahead of 
the former since then . This suggests a need of closer econo-
mic co- operation in the extended Pacific region which possess-
es hugh potenti al for economic development. 
Thirdly , the growth centres of the P AFTA trade have 
been Japan, Australia and U . S . A . , while Canada and New 
Zealand have been l agging behind . Heavy manufactures and 
chemicals, as well as sophisticated light manufactures, have 
been leading sectors in trade expansion , while trade in pri mary 
produce and traditional light manufactures has been relatively 
stagnant . Differences by commodity in the growth of trade 
has a close ri:>lation to the growth rate of each country's trade . 
These trends suggest the main policy targets for further 
expansion of the Pacific trade . · 
III Static Effects of P AFT A 
The formation of a Pacifi c Free Trade Area would , in 
fact, bring about more comprehensive trade liberalization 
amongst participating countries , with the elimination of tari ffs 
on a substantial propor tion of their commodity trade , and would 
result in a larger trade expansion than is possible through 
tari ff reducti ons of the Kennedy Round type . Complete regi on-
al trade liberalization would appear to have consider able ad-
vantages over partial trade liberalization in world markets . 
This is especi ally true if, as is most probable , another major 
round of global tariff reductions i s not feasible wi thin the next 
ten or twenty years. In that event, the formation of P AFT A 
would seem an effective alternative for mutual trade expansion 
among the five advanced Pacific countries . 
(1) Effects of Tari ff Eliminati on in PAFTA 
Here an attempt is made to estimate the impact of the 
elimination of tari ff upon the five Paci fic countries whi ch might 
constitute a Pacific F r ee Trade Area , on the basi s of 1965 
trade figures . The method of the estimati on is the same as 
that used in the author ' s former paperl based on the 1963 trade 
figures . 
1csee footnote in the following page) 
164 KIYOS HI KOJIMA 
\
. The impact effect of Pacific tariff elimination would be 
to increase trade by $5,000 million . This represents an 
expansion of 28 percent on intra- areal trade, or 10. 3 percent 
; on Pacific country exports to, and 11 . 9 percent on imports 
from the whole world. In other words, there would be sig-
nificant trade expansion. (Table 9)2 
.The gains from tariff elimination would not be equally 
distributed amongst the five Pacific countries i nvolved . 
Japan's exports would increase by $1 , 740 million , or 56 per-
cent on her total exports to P AFT A countries , and her impor ts 
would increase by $430 million , or 14. 7 percent on her total 
i mports from PAFTA countries . Japan ' s trade balance with 
the Pacific , which was roughly in equilibri um i n 1965 , would 
consequently i mprove by $1, 310 milli on . United States ' ex-
ports would increase by $2, 300 million , or 27. 9 percent , and 
imports by $2, 280 million , or 30 . 1 percent , and the favour -
able balance in United States ' trade with the Pacific, of 
about $850 million in 1965 , would be pre served. On the oth e r 
hand, imports would rise more rapidly than exports for the 
remaining three countries . Canada' s exports would increase 
by $855 million but her imports would rise by $1 , 480 million ; 
Australia' s exports would increase by $65 million, whereas 
her imports would rise by $650 million ; and New Zealand' s 
exports would grow by $22 million , whilst her imports woul d 
rise by $140 million . 
The differential pattern of gains depends principally 
upon whether the country' s exports are more or less heavily 
concentrated in manufactures, and suggests a need for foster -
ing further industrialization in Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand . Indeed, the pursui t of this objective would be 
facilitated through the dynamic effects of establishing a larger 
and completely free regional market, and through the freer 
movement of capital , technical know- how , and managerial 
1 
Kiyoshi Kojima , "A Pacific Economi c Community and 
Asian Developing Countries," Hitotsubashi Journal of Econo-
mics , June 1966 , pp . 23- 26 . 
21t was estimated that the increase would be $3 , 183 mil-
lion or 23 percent of the total intra- area trade in 1963 (Kiyoshi 
Kojima , i bid . , pp . 23- 24) . A greater increase in 1965 than in 
1963 is due to the faster expansion i n manufactured trade than 
in trade of primary products during that peri od . 
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skills among member countries. The most important fact to 
be noted, however, is that the expansion of intra- areal trade 
would be large if the five countries could effect tariff elimina-
tion.1 
As shown in Table 10, in terms of intra- areal trade in 
1965, the increase of trade in food and raw materials would be 
limited (4. 5 percent and 2. 0 percent respectively) while that 
of light manufactures as well as heavy manufactures and chemi-
cals would be considerable (40. 8 percent and 39. 5 percent res-
pectively). This is also true for each country. These re-
sults are as might be expected since existing tariffs and elas-
ticities of demand are low for primary products and high for 
manufactures. Thus, the elimination of tariffs would promote 
trade in manufactures of the area as a whole and bilateral 
horizontal trade, but it would not stimulate to the same degree 
trade in primary products. These differences result from 
a variety of effects in each country along the lines mentioned 
above. 
How the trade balance between each pair of countries 
would change is also shown in Table 9. Japan would improve 
her trade balance with all four countries in the area; the 
United States would do the same with three countries, except 
Japan; Canada's trade balance would deteriorate with the 
United Sta1~es and Japan, while improving with Australia and 
New Zealand; Australia's would deteriorate with three coun-
tries, except New Zealand; and New Zealand's would deterio-
rate with all four countries. These results, as mentioned 
already, depend upon the degree of concentration of exports in 
manufactures or in primary products respectively. 
In view of close trade ties and greater possibilities for 
increasing trade through the reduction or elimination of tariffs, 
a Pacific Free Trade Area among the United States, Canada, 
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand offers a target worth 
studying, although it presents a number of problems which need 
to be solved before its establishment. 
1Trade diversion effects are not estimated here. If 
these are included, the expansion of P AFTA trade would be 
much larger than our estimates show. 
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The esti mation of the effects of trade liberalization make s 
some of these problems clear: 
(i) Although the establishment of P AFT A would result 
in a sizeable expansion of intra- areal trade as a whole, the 
I 
distribution of gains between the exporting and the importing . 
countries of manufactured goods would be so unequal that no 
consensus towards the establishment of the P AFT A would be 
obtainable . Before its establishment , concerted actions of 
the P AFT A countries to promote export-oriented industrializa-
tion of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand would be needed . 
(ii) As shown in Table 10, heavy manufactures and 
chemicals would expand remarkably due to the elimination of 
tariffs both in exports and imports in all the five Pacific coun-
tries. The promotion of horizontal trade within the area in 
these commodities should be the primary goal sought by the 
five countries whether through the establishment of P AFT A or 
through alternative measures. These industries can realize 
the largest dynamic effects through the enlargement of markets 
and through the freer movement of capital, technical and mana-
gerial know - how beyond national frOntiers . These dynamic 
effects would work more favorably for the relatively small coun-
tries which have abundant natural resources. It should be 
noted that the freer movement of capital in this area is much 
needed in order to promote horizontal trade in heavy manufac-
tures and chemicals . 
(iii) It is· estimated that trade in raw material s will ex-
pand by a very small percentage (2 . 0 percent in the P AFT A as 
a whole), but greater potential for expansion of this trade can 
be expected, particularly in the exports of mineral products from 
Australia and Canada. Further expansion of heavy and chemi-
cal industries in the Pacific region would require a rapi d deve -
lopment of trade in raw materials and intermediate goods within 
the area. The import surplus of Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand in heavy manufactures and chemicals would be 
covered by the export surplus from them in raw materials . 
In agricultural raw materials, however, room for exporti ng 
should be provided to developing countries as far as they can 
produce them competi tively . 
(iv) In the trade of light manufactures, the rate of in-
crease due to liberalization would also be large(40 . 8 percent 
in the P AFTA as a whol e , but only Japan would en joy a net in-
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crease in exports. Requests for protection of these light 
manufacturing industries in the U , S . , Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand, mainly for the purpose of maintaining full en1ploy-
ment, are so strong at this stage that to abolish trade barriers 
in this sector would encounter a number of difficulties. 
Moreover, all P AFT A countries ought to provide free access 
for developing countries' products of this type . How to fost -
er structural adjustment in this sector for the five Pacific coun-
tries as a whole by taking into consideration the expansion of 
trade with developing countries in Asia and Latin America 
would be an important but difficult problem. 
(v) The elimination of tariffs in itself would not change 
greatly trade in foodstuffs (expected increase being limited to 
4. 5 percent), since a number of non-tariff restrictions exist 
either openly or covertly . Protectionism for agriculture is 
unreasonably strong, especially in Japan and the United States . 
Should these protectionist attitudes be rationalized, however, 
P AFT A trade in food offers much scope for expansion through 
mutual readjustment . Here, too, attention should be paid to 
the interests of developing countries . 
Thus, the five Pacific countries should take measures 
to expand production and trade of heavy manufactures and chemi-
cals as well as raw materials, on the one hand, and, on the 
other, measures to readjust production and trade of light manu-
factures and food . Also they have to take into consideration 
readjustments for increasing trade with developing countries in 
Asia and Latin America . It might be best to concentrate on 
the expansion of production and trade in heavy manufactures , 
chemicals, and raw materials and refrain from pushing the abo-
lition of protectionism in light manufacturing and agriculture, 
as a first step towards wider Pacific integration . If the ex-
pansion of growing sectors is sufficiently large and rapid , 
readjustments in the lagging sectors will follow smoothly with-
out so much trouble . For this reason, the sectoral free 
trade approach has much to recommend it as a first step. 
In order to expand harmonious production and horizontal 
trade in these growth sectors within the Pacific area , the eli-
mination of tariffs should work effectively but it alone will not 
be enough, and a supplementary measures will be required . 
The free movement of capital and provision of larger markets 
or ' in other words ' the dynamic effects of economic integration 
s houl be promoted specifically . 
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(2) Effects of Global Tariff Reductions 
It is beyond our capacity for the time being, although 
admittedly very important, to estimate rigorously the effects 
of the Kennedy Round negotiations concluded in June 1967. 
Here a very rough estimation is attempted in order to show 
that even the largest global tariff reduction of the Kennedy 
Round scale would bring about a much smaller expansion of 
trade for the five Pacific countries than the establishment of 
the PAFTA. 
In making this estimate, it is assumed, first, that the 
elasticity of imports (and exports) with regard to the reduc-
tion of tariff is the same as what adopted for each country's 
trade with the P AFT A. Secondly, the rate of tariff reduc-
tions was 100 percent in the case of P AFT A, while it is as -
sumed here to be 25 percent for food, 30 percent for light 
manufactures, and 35 percent both for raw materials and for 
heavy manufactures and chemicals, for the Kennedy Round 
negotiations. Thirdly, it is assumed that all the countries 
in Europe, i.e. , the United Kingdom, EEC and other West-
ern Europe, reduce tariffs. 
Because of these assumptions, the estimation would re-
sult in an over-valuation of the actual effects of the Kennedy 
Round tariff reductions. Our estimates indicate the maximum 
effect of the global tariff reductions which are likely to be ' 
realized. Results of the estimation are shown in Table 11. 
Firstly, it should be noted that the rate of increase in 
trade due to tariff reductions is far larger in the case of the 
formation of P AFT A than in the case of the Kennedy Round. 
In the former case, the total intra- areal trade of the five 
Pacific countries in 1965 would increase by 10 . 3 percent and 
11. 9 percent respectively for total exports to and imports from 
the world, while in the latter case by 5. 5 percentl and 7 . 7 
percent respectively . This suggests to us that a complete 
regional trade liberalization would be better than partial free 
trade in respect of the world market for the five Pacific coun-
tries as a whole and for each of them. 
Secondly, balance of payments effects too would be more 
advantageous in the case of P AFT A than in the case of global 
1
CSee the footnote in the following page) 
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tariff reductions . In the former case, the balance of incre-
ments between exports and imports would be zero for the five 
Pacific countries taken together, while it would be in deficit 
by $600 million in the latter case. For each country, it 
may be better to compare in both cases the ratio of imbalance 
to the sum of incremental exports and imports . The ratio 
would be 60. 4 percent in .the case of P AFT A and 45. 4 percent 
in the. case of global tariff reductions for Japan , 0 . 4 percent 
and - 7 . 2 percent for the U . S. , - 26 . 8 percent and - 27. 6 per-
cent for Canada, - 82 . 0 percent and -85 . 4 percent for Aust-
ralia, and - 72 . 7 percent and -73.9 percent for New Zealand . 
These disadvantageous trade balance effects in the case of 
global tariff reducti ons are due to the fact that a group of coun-
tries (i" e. , developing countries and socialist countries) does 
not reduce tariffs but is allowed a "free ride" on the Pacific 
countries' tariff reductions . The more favorable effects of 
establishing P AFT A as compared with global tariff reductions 
should be closely noted by the five Pacific countries , particu-
larly in view of the prospect that another global negotiation of 
tariff reductions as large as the Kennedy Round scale would 
not take place in the coming ten to twenty years. 
(3) The Choice for Japan 
The best choice for Japan is to expand and free mutual 
trade with every trading region . The present stage of her 
industrialization, her dual pattern of trade with developed and 
1
The rate of increase in a country's exports is proportion-
al to (a) the rate of tari ff reductions and (b) the coverage of 
area which reduces tariffs for the country's exports . Let r F 
and r G stand for the rate of tariff reductions in the case of free 
trade area and of global negotiation respectively , and X F and 
X G for the share in a country' s total exports to the free trade 
area and to the countries which reduce tariffs outside the free 
trade area in global negotiati on respectively. Then , according 
as x F /Cx F + x G) is greater than , or equal to , or smalle r th an 
r cir F , the increase of a country' s exports in the case of free 
trade area is greater than , or equal to , or smaller than that in 
the case of global tari ff reductions . For the five Pacific coun-
tri es taken together , in 1965, X F = 0 . 37 , X G = 0 . 28 and X F / 
(xF + xG)=0 . 57 . Thi s i s greater than rGlrF =0 . 3/1 , and 
therefore , the establishment of P AFT A would b ring about a 
gr eater gain of exports than in the gl obal t ariff r educti ons of the 
Kennedy Round scale . 
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developing countri es, and her geographical location dictate 
such a choice . 1 However, if a further global tariff reduc -
tion is not expected to be feasible in the near future and if , 
moreover, the compartmentalization of world trade is promoted 
further, it would be a serious concern for Japan to devise 
measures for expanding trade on an assured basis through es -
tablishing the Pacific Free Trade Area or some other alter-
native. 
The establishment of P AFT A would· bring the largest 
gain to Japan among the five Pacific countries . Japan's ex-
ports would increase by $1, 740 million or 20 . 0 percent of 
her total exports and her balance of trade with the area would 
improve by $1,310 million . These gains would be far great-
er than in the case of global tariff reductions of the Kennedy 
Round scale which would increse Japan's exports by 8 . 8 per-
cent. 
The big gains for Japan from the establishment of PAFTA 
derive, firstly , from the fact that Japan's exports depend as 
much as 37 percent upon the P AFT A markets . European mar-
kets are not important (13 percent) for Japan . 
Secondly , about 95 percent of Japan's exports to other 
Paci fic countries are manufactures which would enjoy a great-
er expansion from trade liberalization , while about 71 percent 
of Japan ' s imports are primary products , which would not in-
crease very much in consequence of reductions . 
When the time comes fo r Japan to consider economic i n -
tegrati on, it should be a Pacific Free Trade Area . Japan 
is destined by geography to participate in political arrangements 
in the Pacific rather than in Europe . Moreover , economic 
integr ation wi thout the United States , whose importance for 
Japan ' s market is as large as 30 percent , offers lesser incen-
t ive for Japan to joi n . 
1
Kiyoshi Kojima, "Trade Arrangements among Industri-
al Countries : Effects on Japan, " in Bela B alas s a , Studie s in 
Trade Liberalization , The Johns Hopkins P r ess , Baltimore, 
1967 , p . 211. 
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Thus, Japan would benefit from the establishment of 
P AFT A, or from some other alternative, through the cheaper 
import of raw materials and other primary products, the ex-
pansion of her exports of light manufactures, and the promotion 
of horizontal trade in heavy manufactures and chemicals. 
The formation of P AFT A or some other alternative for 
economic co-operation among the five Pacific countries is 
desired by Japan for another reason . Collective measures by 
the group are especially desirable for assisting economic deve -
lopment and trade growth in Southeast Asian countries . 
Asian markets are very important for Japan relative to 
other Pacific advanced countries. The share of Asia (ex-
cluding Mainland China) in Japan ' s total exports is as large as 
26 percent, though it has been decreasing . Japan cannot dis-
regard the interests of developing countries, especially in 
South and Southeast Asia, and the same applies to the United 
States vis - a-vis Latin America. The question is often rais-
ed: should Japan rely on the rapidly increasing .but competitive 
markets in developed countries, or on the complementary but 
more slowly expanding markets in developing countries? She 
has, in fact, to expand trade· in both directions . 
If the five Pacific countries were to establish P AFT A, 
they should welcome as associated members those developing 
countries in Asia and Latin America who wish to join. Or, 
they might provide general preferential tariff sl in favor of the 
developing countries. Moreover, the five Pacific countries 
should provide assistance more efficiently and on a larger scale 
to foster structural adjustment in their own industries in order 
to open wider markets for developing countries products . Con-
certed policy measures among the five Pacific countries are 
urgently required. 
In this context, Japan's attitude towards Mainland China 
present a problem. Political, military, and ideological 
troubles aside, however, it is obvious that main supply sources 
of natural resources and profitable markets for Japan are not 
the Asian mainland but the extended Pacific region. 
1see, Kiyoshi Kojima, "General Preferences to Develop-
ing Countries : A Japanese Assessment," The Malaysian Insti-
tute of Management Journal (forthcoming). 
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Although it seems to be quite beneficial for Japan to es-
tablish the Pacific Free Trade Area, there is hesitation and/ 
or caution in Japan about stepping out in that direction . One 
of the reasons for hesitation is heavy protectionism for agri-
culture which needs time to be rationalized. The other is 
fear about the penetration and domination of American capital. 
These difficulties and worries should be remedied from a wider 
view point of economic co-operation within the extended Pacific 
region. 
IV Closer Pacific Trade Partnership 
At this stage, the P AFT A proposal seems premature, 
unless there is some further unforpseen disturbance in the free 
world economy . It is as yet neither economically nor politi-
cally feasible. Firstly, American interests are presently 
worldwide and the United States could not participate readily 
either in a Pacific or an European regional grouping. For 
the moment, the United States appears committed to a global 
non-discriminatory approach to freer trade, 1 
Secondly, the five Pacific countries still lack the soli-
darity and degree of integration that would be necessary for 
dispensing with protective measures for the main sectors of 
their economies involved in regional trade - the labour- inten-
sive industries in some countries, the agricultural and pastoral 
industries in other countries . 2 
1 . Cf. John W. Evans, U.S. Trade Policy, New Legis-
lation for the N ext
11 
Round, . Council on Foreign Relations, 1967. 
Alfred C. Neal, Economic Necessities and Atlantic Communi-
ties," Foreign Affairs, July 1967. William Diebold Jr 
"D b b A l · ' . ' ou ts a out t antic Free Trade," The Round Table October 
196? ·. ~illiam J?iebold, Jr, :, "Future Negotiating Issu~s and 
Pohc.ies m Foreigi:- Trade., Issues and Objectives of U .S. 
Foreign Trade Policy, Joint Economic Committee Congress of 
the United States, September, 1967. ' 
2 . . A comment agamst P AFT A is presented by H W Arndt 
"P AFT A : An Australian A~ses sment," lntereconomi~s, ·Ham- ' 
~urg, ?~tober 1967, to which there is a reply by Kiyoshi Kojima, 
A Pacific Fre<:> TradP Area: Reconsidered," ibid. 
(forthcoming). --
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Thirdly , the static gains from complete trade liberaliza-
tion would differ widely from one _country to another because of 
the disparity in stages of industrialization within the region. 
However, the realization of P AFT A might be precipitat-
ed by a shock which came from outside the area . Greater 
European integration between EEC and EFT A could produce an 
"inwg_rd looking" Europe whereupon the United States might 
well find closer integration in the Pacific desirable and neces -
sary . Should the United Kingdom fail again to join the EEC, 
she might probe, the establishment of a North Atlantic Free 
Trade Area with the United States and Canada.1 In the case , 
Japan, Australia and New Zealand might have to consider seri-
ously their own integration. Moreover, PAFTA and NAFTA 
might be linked together through the U.S. and Canada which 
would belong to the two free trade areas. 2 
Economic integration in the Pacific, should be a free 
trade area instead of a customs union or political union. A 
free trade area arrangement would have advantages over the 
alternatives from several points of view: it is consistent with 
the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; 
it preserves the autonomy of members with respect to their 
tariff policies vis- a-vis non-participants; and it is a purely 
commercial arrangement, carrying no obligation for eventual 
1Maxwell Stamp Associates, The Free Trade Area Qp_-
/ tion, Opportunity for Britain, the Atlantic Trade Study, London, 
1967. Theodore Geiger and Sperry Lea, "The Free Trade Area 
Concept as Applied to the United States," Looking Ahead, Na-
tional Planning Association, Washington, October 1967 . 
2If N AFT A is instituted among the U . S . , Canada and 
Britain while P AFT A is not, Japan should join the former since 
otherwise she would suffer from large- scale trade diversi on. I t 
is estimated that "the UK would capture about 10 percent of 
Japanese trade (say about $225 milli on) in North American mar-
kets , if Japan were not in N AFT A . " (Maxwell Stamp Associates, 
The Free Trade Area Option, ibid ., p. 44) . Since the NAFTA 
proposal aims at freeing of non- agricultural trade , Australia and 
New Zealand would be less interested in joini ng (Ibid ., p . 38) . 
Both for NAFTA and PAFTA , a crucial questi on is : "Would the 
Americans accept the free trade area concept of a new Grand 
Design?" (Ibid . , p . 78) . 
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political federation or union.1 
Whether or not a free trade area can ultimately be es -
tablished, the five advanced Pacific countries should now set 
about establishing closer and more profitable trade partner-
ships with each other. To date, the United States has tend-
ed to look toward the possibility of ultimately 'going in with 
Europe 1 , and has tended to neglect the Pacific region. T~e 
flow of financial resources and direct investment from America 
to Pacific basin countries, including Asian and Latin Ameri-
can countries, has lagged behind that going to Europe . 2 
The Pacific, Asian, and Latin American region has a huge 
potential for trade '~rowth and development compared with 
Europe, and it should be looked at more closely. 
Studies and proposals about Pacific trade expansion 
have been quite limited . However , recently a movement in 
this direction has been initiated. The Canada- United States 
Automotive Agreement has taken effeet from January, 1965. 
This should be given much attention as a pioneer of selective 
1see, Harry G . Johnson, "Proposals for a North At-
lantic Free Trade Area, " an address to the European- Atlantic 
Group, 6 March 1967, pp . 4 - 5,Canadian-American Committee , 
A Canada- U . S . Free Trade Arrangement, Survey of Possible 
Characteristics , October 1963 . Ditto. , A Possible Plan for 
Canada- U. S . Free Trade Area , AStaff Report, February 1955 . 
Ditto, A New Trade Strate.gy for Canada and the United States , 
May 19 
2The financial resources flows from developed to develop-
ing countries in 1964 were $8. 51 per capita for Africa, while 
they were $3 . 92 for Latin America , $2 . 85 for South As i a, 
and $3.88 for Far East . The last one was, however, very 
small if aid to South Vietnum is excluded . (OECD, Geo.graphi-
cal Distribution of F inancial Flows to Less Developed Countries , 
1966.) 
The U . S . Dire ct foreign investments , amounting to 
$49, 328 milli on at the end of 1965 , have directed mainly to Ca-
nada (30 . 9 percent), EEC (12. 8 per cent) and other Europe 
05 . 6 percent), while Oceani a (3. 7 percent) and Japan (1.4 per-
c ent) have benefited not only very limited amount but also in 
slower increase relative to Europe . (US Department of Com-
me rce , Survey of Current Business, September 1967) . 
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industrial integration.1 The Australia-New Zealand Free 
Trade Agreement began in January 1966. 2 The Pacific Basin: 
Economic Co-operation Committee was established among busi-
ness circles of the five Pacific countries in April 1967; and a 
number of bilateral co - operative activities have been promoted 
in business circles . It should be noted also that Mr. T akeo 
Miki , Japan ' s Foreign Minister, is keenly interested in pro-
moting economic cooperati on in the Pacific and Asi an regi on . 
Before the establishment of P AFT A, several steps to-
wards closer Pacific economic co-operation might be practic-
able immediately. Five main objectives suggest themselves: 
1. To increase the flow of financial resources from the 
United States to other ·Pacific countries, as well as to Asian 
and Latin American developing countries. 
2. To stimulate horizontal trade among the five advanced 
Pacific countries in heavy manufactures and chemicals and to 
expand production and trade of raw materials and intermediate 
goods more efficiently for the region as a whole. 
3. To readjust production and trade in agricultural com-
modities among the five Pacific countries, taking into considera-
tion their relationship with Asian and Latin American develop-
ing countries. 
4. To readjust production and trade of light manufac-
tures, which are labour intensive, with the aim of providing 
greater access for Asian and Latin American countries in ad-
vanced country markets. 
5. To co-ordinate the aid policy of the five advanced 
Pacific countries towards Asian and Latin American developing 
countries. 
1 See, Sperry Lea, "Free Trade by Sectors," NP A, 
Looking Ahead, September 1966. 
2 F. W. Holmes, "Australia and New Zealand in the 
World Economy", The Economic Record, March 1967. 
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~·· Practical steps towards closer Pacific economic co-
operation can be taken by strengthening functional , rather than 
institutional integration, and thus attempting to attain the favour -
able benefits of a free trade area whilst avoiding the unfavour-
able impact effects. To realize these objectives , I suggest 
the initiation of three codes of international behaviour and the 
formation of two new regional institutions. 
1. A code of good conduct in the field of trade policy, 
under which countries would relinquish the right to raise tariffs 
or impose other forms of trade restriction, 1 and would gradual-
ly reduce those trade barriers particularly on the import of 
agricultural products and labour intensive light manufactures , 
, should be promulgated . 
2 . A code of overseas investment to promote mutual 
investment among the five advanced Pacific countries, most 
effectively from the United States , and to foster the activity 
of joint ventures is much needed to promote trade expansion , 
especially horizontal trade expansion in heavy manufactures , 2 
and for the development of the vast mineral resources of the 
/ 
Pacific region. A code which minimises the fear of American 
capital domination and maximises protection for America's 
balance of payments would greatly facilitate overseas invest-
ment and the better allocation of regional resources. 
1
The assurance against the reimposition of duties in a 
free trade area would induce enterprises to expand trade and 
investment abroad. The code of good conduct would reduce 
uncertainty in international trade and be a partial substitute 
for the formation of free trade area. See, Bela Balassa, 
Trade L i beralization Among Industrial Countries, Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1967, pp . 160-161 . 
2
N . P . G . Elkan suggests an interesting scheme for pro-
moting horizontal trade in his article, "How to Beat Backwash : 
The Case for Customs-Drawback Unions," Economic Journal , 
March 1965. His plan may be applicable to trade between small 
economies like Australia and New Zealand but would be too 
cumbersome to work in wider markets . It seems to me that 
horizo~tal tr~d~ would be fostered most efficiently through the 
expansion of Joint ventures and other private capital's activiti -
es. 
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3. A code of aid and trade policies towards associated 
developing countries is also required, so that Asian and Latin 
American countri es might enjoy the benefits of larger markets 
for their agricultural products and light manufactures. The 
flow of developmental aid must be increased, appropriate aid 
projects selected, and domestic industrial structures adjusted 
to meet the legitimate trade needs of affiliated less developed 
countries .1 
I An organization for Pacific Trade and Development 
(OPT AD) should be established in order to give effect to these 
codes of international behaviour . Its main features would be 
similar to those of the OECD, and it could be structured in 
the same way, with three committee on trade, investment, and 
aid.2 
Further, a Pacific Bank for Investment and Settlement 
r ould be established with the aim of facilitating investment and 
settlement within the Pacific, Asian , and Latin American re-
gion, and equipped with a mechanism for preventing the drai n -
age of gold from the United States . 3 
1 See. Kiyoshi Kojima, "A Proposal for International 
Aid," The Developing Economies, December 1964. Ditto, 
"Japan's Role in Asian Agricultural Development," The Japan 
Quarterly, April-June, 1967. 
2 Aid Committee could be set up first because of urgency 
for increasing aid and trade with developing countries . 
3This topic will be further developed by Ashiya' s paper 
presented to the conference. My own thought was shown in 
Kiyoshi Kojima, "A Proposal for Increasing International 
Liquidity, " The Oriental Economist, Aug. , 1964, which was 
reviewed in "How Aid Could be United," The Economist (Lon-
don), July 25, 1964, pp . 401-402. 
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Chapter 6 PACIFIC ECONOMIC INTEGR.A TION : 
AN AUSTR.A.LIAN VIEW 
by Peter Drysdale 
Lecturer, Australian National University 
I Introduction 
Last yPar must rank among the most significant in the 
history of Australia's international commerce. Japan became 
.Australia's largest export market - the first occasion that any 
country surpassed the United Kingdom in its annual purchases 
of Australian produce . Less noticed, but no less significant-
ly, the United States replaced Britain as Australia's major 
supplier of imports - again the first occasion that any country's 
annual sales to Australia have been larger than the United 
Kingdom's . 
These developments underline Australia's already pro-
found and growing interest in Pacific area trade . But has 
the conjuncture of both major shifts in the geographic structure 
of Australian trade any wider significance? ·And how might 
it shape the future evolution of Australia's commercial policy? 
Answers to these quf'stions first require brief considera-
tion of the factors which have caused largescale transformation 
in Australia's economic structure an0 tra<le specialisation over 
the last df>cade and a half . Second, an assessment is made 
of the criteria for eff Pctive integration amongst advanced Paci-
fic countries. Third, ~stimates of the impact of mutual tariff 
elimination amongst Pacific countries upon Australian trade , 
international payments, industrial production, and employment 
are presented. Fourth, the dynamic effects upon the Aust-
ralian economy are stressed. F inally, an atte1npt is made to 
guage the acce-ptability to Australia of various policies design .. 
ed to promote Pacific E'conomic integration. 
II Transformation in Australia's Trade Specialisation 
The essential features of Australia's commodity speciali-
sation in world trade are well known . But the pattern of 
export specialisation in raw materials and foodstuffs and 
impc:'r.t sp.ecialisation in ~anufactures has been substantially 
mod1f1ed in recent years . The growth of Australia's export 
specialisation in minerals and metals has been accompanied by 
194 . 
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the strengthening of export specialisation in manufactures, 
whilst producer materials and equipment increasingly dominate 
import specialisation. Australia's postwar economic growth 
was characterised by the large scale immigration of labour and 
capital from the United Kingdom, Europe,- and North America, 
and factor migration was stimulated by trade restraints which 
encouraged the "'Xpansion of the import- competing manuf actur-
ing sector. HPnCP, thP eff Pct of factor migration and forced 
industrialisation superimposE'cl itsP lf upon the effect of basic 
resource endowments in the development of Australia's present 
structurf' of proCluction and tr,ade. 
Although made-to-measure protectionism encouraged 
the expansion of some highly inefficient industrial activity, it 
also resulted in the establishment of a relatively efficient 
(
industrial base centred on steel, metals, motor vehicles, and 
1 
engineering. Throughout the interwar period and most of 
II the postwar period, the employment- creating and inf ant- econo-
. ~ my arguments seemed powerful justifications for Australian 
protectionism. With thP transformation of Australia's trade 
and economic structure there has recently been widespread 
questioning of the extPnt and structure of tariff protection, not 
least by the Australian Tariff Board itself. 
The most remarkable developments in the geographic 
str'Jcture of trade have undoubtedly been in Japanese - Aust-
ralian trade relations. Between 1950 and 1967, Japan's share 
in Australian exports rose from 4 percent to 19 percent, whilst 
the United Kingdom's share fell from 39 to 13 percent. 
Throughout the same period, Japan's share in .Australian im-
ports rose from 1 percent to 10 percent whilst the United King-
dom's share fell from 52 percent to 24 percent. 
( 
These shifts in the g;eographic structure of Australian 
trade resulte~ from two broad si=>ts of factors: _the underl~ng 
complementarity between Japanese and Australian E'conom1c 
rPsource endowments, and factors affecting the geographical, 
political' and historical closeness of the two economies. 
In the first place, the increased importance of the J apa-
nese market to .Australia c1erivE'0 from Japan's very high rates 
of economic growth, and her vastly increased share in world 
trade. The high degree of compli:>mentarity between the 
Japanese and Australian E>conomies ensurPd that Japan's over-
all trade growth stimulated proportionati?ly larger purchases 
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from and sales to Australia. In the earlier phases of post-
1 
war Japanese growth, increased import demand was heavily 
1 
concentrated on textile raw materials and provided new outlets 
I for exports of Australian wool. In later phases, accelerat-
ed hea'Vy industrialisation and new patterns of consumer demand 
l associated with higher income levels strengthened Japanese im-
port demand for fuel and minerals, such as coal, iron ore, 
I
/ copper, bauxite , and alumina, and foodstuffs such as wheat.' . 
' meat, and dairy products. On thP other hand, Japan speciah-
) 
sed in thP exp.ort of manufactured goods for which Australia's 
import demand has always been relati vely strong . In the 
past, the degree of complementarity between the structure of 
Japanese exports and Australian imports within these broad com-
modity categories was not so strong as the degree of comple -
mentarity between the structure of Australian exports and 
Japanese imports - one factor which helps account for persist-
ent bilateral imbalances in Japanese - Australian trade. But 
the growing share of capital equipment and machinery in J apa-
nese exports, and their predominance in Australian imports, 
is likely to strengthen complementarity in that trade flow . 
( 
In the second place, geographical proximity always 
favoured Japanese - Australian trade. Of course, some 
commodities, especially manufactured goods, can be delivered 
to distant markets at relatively small cost so that the location 
of foreign markets does not much affect the geographic distri-
bution of their export - another factor which accounts for 
bilateral imbalances in Japanese - Australian trade. On the 
/Other hand, low value to weight bulk commodities, like fuels 
I 
and mineral ores, are generally expensive to transport and 
nearby sources of supply offer distinct cost advantages to 
inte; national buyers. These considerations prompted Japan's 
) large scale. partic~pation i.n the developn:ent of Australia's 
huge deposits of high quality and accessible coal, iron ore, 
bauxite, and copper . Australia promises, for Japan, to be 
the most adequate and stable source of supply of these materi als 
for many years, especially because of increased political un-
certainties in mainland China . Japan has already contracted 
to buy large quantities of iron ore, coal, bauxite, and alumina 
in the next two decades. By the early 'seventies Australia 
will be supplying almost 40 percent of Japan ' s imported iron 
ore, compared with the 10 percent she is currently supplying, 
and well over 40 percent of Japan ' s imported coal, compared 
with the 27 percent she is already supplying . Indeed , J apa-
nese demands have played a major role in the recent develop-
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ment of Australia's strong advantage in the export of mineral 
products. By the middle 'seventies they will have effected a 
complete transformation in Australia's whole specialisation 
in the world economy and far-reaching changes in the whole 
fabric of Australia's political economy when minerals and as-
sociated manufactures replace wool as Australia's chief export 
earner. 
Institutional factors and trade policy have not always l 
favoured a large trade between Japan and Australia. As is j' 
well known, they positively inhibited it. Significantly, it I 
was the breakdown of special institutional and policy biases 
against trade between the two countries that permitted its re-
markable expansion in recent years. Australia's earlier 
reluctance to foster freer trading relations with Japan stemmed 
from strong economic, cultural, and political ties with the 
United Kingdom, fears of 'cheap labour' competition, and the \ 
hangover of war, and her trade policy discriminated severely 
against imports from Japan until 1957. The conclusion of a 
trade agreement between the two countries in that year was the 
major watershed in Japanese - .Australian trading relations J\ 
after the war . Under the agreement, Australia accorded 
Japan most-f avoure<l-nation treatment, which involved substan-
tial reductions in tariffs on textiles and other consumer goods 
and nondiscriminatory treatment under import licensing arrange-
ments. Japan allowed freer access to her markets for Aust-
ralian agricultural exports and she undertook not to impose a 
duty on the import of wool. In 1963, the agreement was re-
newed and extended. Australia relinquished her right under 
Article 35 of GATT to discriminate . specifically against J apa-
nese imports. In return, Japan made new concessions in 
her import policy towards Australian wool, foodstuffs, and 
motor vehicles. 
It is impossible to over- stress the role these trade agree-
ments played in establishing freer and fuller economic relations 
between Japan and Australia. A complete transformation of 
each country's interest in the other has been effected under 
their aegis. Their direct impact on trade growth was rein~ 
forced by a combination indirect dynamic effects on trade and 
investment flows. 
One obstacle to the development of Japanese - Australian 
trading relations was the quite general difficulty encountered in 
all trading with foreign countries where business rapport must 
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be established carefully and slowly. Perhaps in some ways 
this factor posed a greater problem for Australians who were 
not used in the past to dealing with nations very different in 
language and customs from their own. But in other ways it 
posed afar greater problem for the Japanese. The nature 
of the merchandise which Japanese exporters were newly try-
ing to sell in Australian markets demanded more direct contact 
with Australian businessmen and knowledge of Australian in-
dustrial conditions . In this connection, the establishment 
of the Japan - Australian Business Co- operation Committee 
in 1963 proved valuable , not only to Japanese businessmen in 
their understanding of the character and potential of the Aust-
ralian economy, but also to Australian businessmen in their 
understanding of the mutual beni:>fits to be drived from trade 
with Japan, and their vision of the international economy, 
both of which have been considerably enhanced by the dialogue 
with their Japanese counterparts. To those who remember 
the chilly reception which Australian manufacturing interests 
gave the first trade agreement in 1957, this development must 
rank among the most satisfying in the history of postwar Japa-
nese - Australian relations. 
The changes in the relative magnitude of Japanese -
Australian trade, and their explanation, only begin to tell the 
/! full story. For growth in trade between Japan and Australia 
J has had significance beyond anything its mere proportions 
. suggest. It was one factor in the complete re-orientation of 
Australia's economic and political relations away from Britain 
and Europe towards Asia and the Pacific - a realignment of 
consequence not only to Australia's economy but also to her 
whole international outlook. It contributed to fundamental 
changes in Australian attitudes to international and commercial 
affairs. 
The developments in United States - Australian trade 
l 
hardly seem less noteworthy than those in Japanese - Australian 
trade. Between 1950 and 1967, the United States' share in 
Australian exports rose from 8 percent to 12 percent. 
Throughout the same period, the share in Australian imports 
rose from 10 to 26 percent. But these developments have not 
had the same impact on the public mind as their Japanese count-
erparts. Other political and strategic questions have domi-
nated United States - Australian relations. 
'Jn the oth0r hand, American investment in the Australi-
an ~onomy has been the subject of considerable public discus-
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sion. And the role of American investment in Australia's 
postwar industrial transformation is intimately bound up with 
these changes in the geographic structure of Australian trade . 
There has been relatively largescale American investment in 
new Australian activity throughout the whole postwar period . 
Firms in new industries have a very high propensity to import 
equipment and supl)lies which are commonly not available domes -
tically . American private investors, through their firms, 
subsidiaries and associates, tended to buy equipment and pro-
ducer materials from their home country (if not their home 
firm), thus boosting the proportion of imports originating in 
the United States, over two-thirds of which consist of machi -
nery, equipment, and producer materials. 
Growth in the share of Australian exports destined for 
the United States has been far less impressive. Signifi-
cantly, this results from the persistence and effectiveness of 
protectionist pressures in the United States against Australia's 
principal exports, wool, minerals, and foodstuffs, all of which 
are subject to high tariff duties or import quota restrictions. 
For obvious reasons, Australia herself has not been capable of 
negotiating any significant trade concessions from the United 
States. 
These shifts in the geographic structure of Australia's 
1 trade alone evidence her huge stake in Pacific area trade. 
Her trade with New Zealand re-inforces this evidence. Al-
ready about 40 percent of Australia's exports are taken by 
Japan, the United States, New Zealand, and Canada, whilst 
1 
a similar proportion of imports originates in these four countri-
es. Australia would appear to have a particularly strong 
interest in closer Pacific economic co-operation . 
Apart from thE'se developments in trade with the Pacific 
r area, the most significant change in the geographic structure 
of Australia's trade was growth in export trade with Asia . 
)
Between 1950 and 1967, Australian exports destined for Asia 
rose from 11 to 18 percent, partly because of large wheat sales 
to China, and partly because of increased exports of manufac-
tured goods to the region . ThP propinquity of Asian markets 
and certain similarities in the structure of Australian and 
Asian demand for industrial goods have facilitated this new 
trade. Since the early sixties, trade policy has been direct-
ed towards promoting exports of manufactures. Trade in 
1 manufactures with Asia and New Zealand assumed s-pe cial im-
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portance in policies designed to strengthen Australia's indus -
trial base through the expansion of export markets. 
Between 1950 and 1967, imports from Asia fell from 13 
to 8 percent of total Australian imports. This largely result-
ed from reduced demand for raw materials. However, Asian 
countries are increasingly competitive suppliers of textiles and 
light manufactures and their share in Australian markets for 
these products has tended to grow at the expense of the United 
Kingdom and Japan. 
Australia's preference scheme for imports from less 
developed countries should, at least partly, be viewed in the 
context of trade policies designed to extend trade interests in 
less developed country markets, especially in Asia and the 
Middle East. 
Ill Criteria for Pacific Economic Integration 
I Intensity of trade indexes have been used by Kojima as 
I 
criteria for assessing the desirability of economic integration . 
This would seem a useful approach . Two countries trade 
' more or less intensively with each other than they do with the 
rest of the world because of the particular commodity composi-
tion of their trade in relation to that of world trade, or because 
of their geographical proximity and special institutional and 
historical ties. These two factors, the first of which may be 
called the degree of complementarity in bilateral trade, and the 
second of which may be called the degree of special country 
bias in bilateral trade, jointly determine the intensity of trade 
l?etween two tra. ~ing partners. 
In the literature, a distinction is made between what may 
be called observed and potential complementarity among trade 
partners . Consequently, it might be argued that observed 
complementarity is an inadequate criterion for assessing the 
desirability of economic integration. However, such an argu-
ment seems of doubtful empirical relevance. Trade policies 
rarely distort the whole structure of .a country's trade speciali-
sation so much that generalisations about complementarity bet-
ween pairs of countries cannot be made on the basis of observed 
trade specialisation . 
r The concept of I complementarity' is often used loosely 
in economic literature to describe the extent to which countries 
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have dissimilar resource endowments and structures of produc-
tion and are therefore likely to trade intgsively with each other. 
But the term is rarely defined precisely. Here the concept 
is defined in a very precise way. It is defined in a relative ' 
sense and measures the extent to which one country's export 
pattern matches another country's import pattern more closely 
than it matches the pattern of world imports. An index of the 
degree of complementarity in bilateral trade CCja) can be deriv-
ed to measure exactly the extent to which country J's exports 
to country A are relatively large because the commodity com-
position of J's exports matches that of . A's imports more close-
ly than it matches the commodity composition of world trade. 
It follows that for each pair of countries, in a many-country, 
many-commodity world, there are two measures of the degree 
of complementarity in bilateral trade - one is derived from the 
flow of J's exports to A, and the other from the flow of A's 
exports to J. This index and associated indexes are defined 
algebraically in Appendix I. 
The concept of special country bias in bilateral trade 
(Bja) is defin·2d to measure the extent to which J's exports have 
more or less favourable access to A's import markets than 
might be expected from both countries' shares of world trade in 
each commodity. 
Trade policy also distorts the pattern of special country 
bias in trade. Country bias in Australian, Canadian, and 
New Zealand trade policy in the form of British preferential 
arrangements tends to mitigate against more intensive trade 
with Japan and the United States. Thus, high degrees of 
special country bias in these countries' trade with Japan and 
the United States would suggest that other natural geographi-
cal, political, and institutional barriers to trade were rela-
tively low and that there was a strong case for closer economic 
integration amongst these Pacific countries. 
The results of a detailed study of complementarity, spe-
cial country bias, and intensity in Pacific region trade flows 
are presented in Table 1. The methods by which these in-
dexes were calculated, and a brief description of the data upon 
which the calculations were based, is presented in Appendix 
I. Row c records the degree of complementarity, row b re-
cords the degree of special country bias, and row i records 
the intensity of trade index for each bilateral trade flow. 
Take Australia's export trade with Canada . The result of 
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TABLE 1 
Complementarity, Special Country Bias, and 
a 
Intensity in Pacific Asia Trade , 1965 
Exports to 
Australia Canada Japan 
New United 
Exports from 
Zealand States 
c . 52 176 59 81 
Australia b . - 67 228 2029 126 
i. 35 401 1197 102 
c. 86 115 83 123 
Canada b. 112 - 74 99 415 
i. 96 85 82 510 
c. 118 109 142 99 
Japan b . 182 55 - 91 264 
i. 215 60 129 261 
c. 18 29 122 70 
New Zealand b . 1406 96 98 - 161 
i. 253 · 28 115 112 
c . 125 127 99 112 
United States b . 110 350 158 68 -
i. 137 446 156 76 
a. Row i measures the intensity of trade. An index 
of 100 indicates that one country exports (exports) 
exactly that share of her total exports to (from) 
another country as that country's share in world 
trade . 
b . Row i equals row c multiplied by row b , divided 
by 100 . 
Source: Calculations based on data described in Appendix I. 
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this study reveal that, simply because of the character of 
Australian export specialisation and Canadian import speciali-
sation in world trade, Canada's share in Australia's export 
trade should be 52 percent as large as her share in world im-
ports; further, that Canada's share in Australian exports is 
only 67 percent as large as might be expected from both coun-
tries' shares in world trade of each commodity; and that, 
therefore, Canada's share in Australia's export trade is only 
35 percent as large as might be expected from her share in 
world imports. That is, the degree of complementarity in 
Australia's export trade with Canada is 52, the degree of 
special country bias is 67, and the intensity of trade is 35. 
( 
The general picture which emerges from Table 1 islthat trade 
among advanced Pacific countries is highly intensive . There is 
a high degree of coi:nplementarityin trade between Japan and Aust-
ralia, Japan and Canada, Japan and New Zealand, the United 
States and Australia, the United States and Canada and the 
/
'United States and New Zealand, and a fairly high degree of 
complementarity in trade between Japan and the United States. 
The degree of special country bias is high in all trade flows 
except Australia's export trade with Canada, and Canadian -
Japanese tr ad", so that even where the· degree of complement-
arity is relatively low, intensity in trade remains high. 
Canadian trade is heavily oriented towards the East Coast 
and the United States and natural barriers to trade with Japan 
and Australia appear larger than might otherwise be expected. 
On the other hand, the index of country bias for Canada's 
export trade with Australia is reasonably high in consequence 
of both preferred treatrJ.i.ent in Australian markets and the as-
~ 
sociation between trade and capital flows. All trade partners 
have a high intensity of trade with the Pacific region as a 
whole, the highest being in Canada's export trade (354) and 
the lowest being in New Zealand's export trade (109). The 
relative size of the complementary and competitive trade flows 
~ suggests a strong case for closer Pacific economic integration. 
Here the focus of attention is Australian trade. The in-
tensity of Australia's export trade with the Pacific region 
(181) is very high. The intensity of her import trade (126) is 
also high . 
Australia's export trade with Japan and the United States 
reveal the highest degree of complementarity whilst complemen-
tarity in export trade with New Zealand and Canada is rela-
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tively low. Observed complementarity in her export trade 
with the United States probably understates potential comple-
mentarity significantly. Complementarity in export trade 
with New Zealand and Canada is perhaps larger than might 
have been expected from a superficial consideration of the 
broad structures of the three economies. These indexes 
evidence Australia's stronger export specialisation in manu-
factures as, too, does a comparison of complementarity index-
es for Australia's export trade with those for Canada and New 
Zealand. Australia lies squarely between Canada and New 
Zealand as an industrial exporter. 
Special country bias in Australia's export trade with New 
Zealand is extremely high; it is large in export trade with 
Japan; and it is also relatively large in export trade with the 
United States. The extremely high degree of special country 
bias in export trade with New Zealand results from geographi-
cal nearness, preferred tariff arrangements, and market 
familiarity. Australia's new manufactured exports are heavi-
ly concentrated in the New Zealand market. Much of the 
special country bias in Australia's export trade with Japan is 
accounted for by the influence of transport costs and the special 
nature of Australia's trade with Japan in raw wool. Trans-
port costs were ranked alongside indexes of special country 
bias for Australia's major exports to Japan. The degree of 
correspondence proved remarkably high. The coefficient of 
rank correlation was + 0. 65, which is significant at the 99 
percent level. Similar tests, in which relative transport 
costs were ranked alongside indexes of special country bias 
for major suppliers of various bulk commodities to Japan 
yielded similar results. Assymetry in economic distance ap-
peared to account for much of the unexplained variance. 
The degree of complementarity in Australia's import trade 
with Japan and the United States is high, and it is also rela-
tively high in import trade with Canada. However, it is 
extremely low in import trade with New Zealand. Special 
country bias in import trade with Japan is now remarkably high, 
and reflects factors already discussed above . Sp0cial coun-
try bias in import trade with Japan had been as low as 46 in 
1956. As might be expected, there is extremely high special 
country bias in import trade with New Zealand and relatively 
high special country bias in import trade with the United States, 
the latter being largely explained by the association between 
the capital and trade flows . 
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It is pertinent to compare these indexes of complementarity, 
special country bias and intensity in Australia's trade with the 
Pacific and similar indexes calculated for Austcalia' s trade 
with the United Kingdom, Australia's major trading partner 
outside the Pacific region. The degree of complementarity 
(157) and special country bias (140) were relatively high for 
Australia's export trade with the United Kingdom , yielding a 
very high index of trade intensity (220). The degree of 
complementarity (136) was high for Australia's import trade 
with the United Kingdom, and the degree of special country 
bias (243) and trade intensity (330) were very high . Though 
a large part of special country bias in United Kingdom - Aust-
ralian trade can be attributed to preferential tariff treatment 
and long established trade relations, it emerges that a large 
-proportion of this trade is based upon high degrees of comple -
mentarity in trade specialisation and, therefore' that the costs 
pf trade diversion on this trade flow could be large if Australia 
ijoined a Pacific Economic Community. This is also true to 
la lesser extent of Australia's relatively intensive trade with 
Asia. 
However, there seems a fairly strong presumption in 
favour of Australian participation in Pacific economic integra-
tion . The Pacific constitutes a major part of Australia's 
ec0nomic world. There is a high degree of complementarity 
in Australian trade with principal Pacific basin countries . 
And there is a high degree of special country bias in trade with 
almost all potential Pacific partners despite the fact that 
British Preferential arrangements work against it in the case 
of the two largest Pacific economies . 
IV The Impact Effect of P AFT A on Australia 
The precise· effects of Pacific economic integration upon 
the Australian economy are impossible to predict precisely. 
But the general effects can probably be forecast clearly enough . 
First, an estimate of the impact effect of Pacific tariff elimi-
nation upon trade expansion is presented. This enables rough 
specification of both the important direct gains from integration 
as well as the important costs of adjustment associated with 
integration . Later , the significant dynamic effects on the 
Australian ~conomy are considered. 
A detailed study, using national tariff data and three or 
four digit SITC commodity trade data for 1965, was made to 
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estimate Australian import and export expansion in consequence 
of the elimination of Pacific area tariffs. 
The impact effect of tariff reductions on trade depend upon 
the height of the original tariff, changes in tariff rates, and the 
relevant price elasticities of demand ap.d supply. Assuming infinite 
elasticities of supply, the change in imports (and exports) can be 
measured using the formula: 
t / 
!::::. M = a 100+ t rt, M 
wherel::::.M is the change in imports du to tariff reduction, a is the 
rate of tariff reduction, t is the original tariff level, /\,is the price 
elasticity of import demand, and Mis the original value of imports . 
The price elasticities of import demand us ~ in this study are 
basically those adopted by Kojima in an earlier study. However, 
they have been modified to incorporate superior estimates of price 
elasticities for agricultural commodities of importance in Aust-
ralian exports . 
Estimates of the effect of Pacific area tariff elimination are pre-
sented in Table 2 . As Kojima discovered in his earlier study, the 
height and structure of Australian tariffs and relatively high price 
elasticities of demand for Australian imports would lead to a substan-
tial increase in imports . On the other hand, lower tariffs and lowe r 
price elasticities of import demandfor Australian exports to Pacific 
countries restrains export expansion that would follow Pacific are a 
tariff elimination . Nonetheless, both import and export expansion 
would be considerable, even if it tended to worsen Australia's balance 
of payments . Elimination of the increased deficit in international pay-
ments would require a 6- 7 percent devaluation of the exchange rate or, 
more appropriately, compensatory measures which had an equivalent 
effect. 
These estimates suggest an even larger expansion of trade and 
benefits from integration than Kojima's most recent estimates. The 
differences in estimation result from the use of slightly different pri-
ce elasticities, the use of more detailed Australian tariff data, the 
use of weighed and selected tariff rates rather than ave r age nominal 
rate, and allowance for the effect 0f quantitative restrictions on agri-
cultural and mineral imports into Japan and the United States . In fact, 
the estimates ofimport expansion are probably still conservative 
since effective rates of protection are very high for some import com-
peting industries in Australia and use of nominal rates understates the 
implied decrease in import prices in the most sensitive areas of produc· 
tion . 
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The Effect of Pacific Area Tariff Reductions 
on Australian Trade, 1965 ($USm) 
Merchandise Merchandise 
Imports Exports 
Trade with World 3350 2970 
Trade with Pacific 1268 1075 
Increase in Trade with Pacific 751 187 
Percentage Increase on Trade 
17 .4% 6.3% with World 
Source : Calculations are based on methods 
and data described in th,.: text. 
A rough attempt was also made to -~e the effect ofimport ex-
pansion on production and employment in import-competing manufac- ' 
turing activity. The largest declines in production would be locat-
ed in textiles (12- 13 percent), metals and machinery(8-9 percent), 
miscellaneous manufactures (8-9 percent), and chemicals (6- 7 per-
cent). Motor vehicle production accounts for 21 percent of the de-
cline in metals and machinery, electronics and electrical apparatus 
account for 10 percent, and light machinery and appliances account 
for 5 percent. The fall in chemical production is probably grossly 
underes-:=imated since the prevalence of special protective measures 
for that industry makes it difficult to estimate the height of the tariff 
satisfactorily . Hence, the total decline in manufacturing production, 
if estimated import expansion were the only effect of tariff elimination 1 
would be of the order of 6 or 7 percent. The structure and size of 
these change imply the necessity to re-deploy about 100,000 to 
110, 000 industrial employees or about 8 to 9 percent of the manufac-
turing work forc e in 1965. 
These estimates are simply designed to illustrate the gen eral 
magnitude of the adjustment problem in static circumstances, and to 
draw attention to the need for me asu;res to minimize these costs. In 
fact, there is likely to be compensating export expansion in some 
manufacturing sectors, and the dynamic effect, for better or for 
worse, have yet to be considered. 
V The Dynamic Effects of PAFT A on Australia 
The dynamic effects of a move towards Pacific economic integ-
ration are likely to be by far the most important effects for relatively · 
small economies such as Australia and New Zealand . Though it is 
impossible to quantify these effects, even as approximately as the 
static effects have been quantified, something can be said about the 
direction they may take. 
Knowledge of trading partner economies is a precondi-
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tion for trade. Although hitherto largely unanalysed, incre as -
ed knowledge is a most important source of gains from more 
intensive regional trade. What structural changes are likely 
to be wrought because of the knowledge effect through Pacific 
economic integration? 
The economic consequences of imperfect knowledge are 
manifested internationally as factor immobility (lack of aware-
ness of employment possibilities in other countries), domestic 
orientation in consumption (lack of'jw areness of t~e commodities 
and uses of commodities produced in other countries) and domes -
tic orientation in production (failure to produce for potential 
overseas markets, lack of knowledge of production processes, 
organisational forms and the products of firms operating in other 
countries, lack of awareness of foreign sources of raw materi -
als and semi-processed industrial inputs). 
Pacific economic integration is likely to promote economi c 
welfare through the extension of knowledge in three ways . 
First, the establishment of an institution such as an Organisa-
tion for Pacific Trade ,Aid and Development would facilitate 
contact between businessmen and public servants in Pacific coun-
tries . Existing vehicles of communication, like the Pacific 
Basin Business Co-operation Committee, would be strengthen-
ed and given new purpose . Second, the establishment of 
P AFT A would direct the interest of individuals in each country 
to the economies of partners . Third, increases in the volume 
of international transactions in themselves are associated with 
gains in knowledge . 
Greater knowledge will raise economic efficiency by pro-
moting both commodity and capital movements. Greater know-
ledge of the uses of foreign goods will allow consumers to adapt 
their purchases to their tastes more rationally. Producers 
will be more willing to tap foreign technology and sources of 
raw materials. These benefits are likely to be of special 
importance of Australia. 
Other structural changes will also be important . Integ-
ration would change the degree and nature of competition in 
each partner and modify attitudes to economic efficiency . For 
Australia, these benefits might be counted as of a high order . 
Australians, proudly, are the Norwegians of the Pacific. 
The~e can be little doubt that the diminished pressure is bought 
at high cost in terms of output of commodities . 
PACIFIC ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 209 
' Stronger competition among Pacific country producers 
would force more rapid dissemination of the most efficient tech-
niques of production and methods of or ganisation employed in 
Pacific basin countri es . These effects are also likely to be 
of considerable importance to the smaller economies . 
It is likely that there will be some tendency towards es -
tablishing uniformity in other institutions . Labour markets 
are quite differently organised in Japan and the other four 
prospective members , with major differences , as well, bet-
ween Canadian and American and New Zealand and Australi-
an labour markets , Strong upward pressures on wages and 
labour conditions in the southern partners could well prove 
incompatible with the maintenance of free trade unless there 
were continual (and undesirable) exchange rate adjustments . 
Some Australians may fear that only stronger labour organi sa-
tions in Japan would diminish this danger . 
Important structural change is more likely to occur and 
will be of greater importance in industries which are subject 
to economies of scale. The effective P AFT A market for a 
commodity is a function of national income and tastes in member 
countries . Although consumer preferences differ in member 
coun~Ties , Pacific economic integration would vastly increase 
the size of markets for mass - produced commodities . There 
are numr:rous cases of industries subject to economies of scale 
1operatin at sub- optimal capacityin ~Pacific countri es . The u..r-
)potential ain for such industries (!]) clearly greater in small-
er countrie . However, the introduction of intra- area free 
trade would induce a strong tendency for all production to mig-
rate to countri es with the largest internal markets - usually the 
United States and Japan , The destructi on of nati onal indust-
ries in smaller economies could result in capital outflow , un-
employment, aand balance of payments diffi culties . Provisi ons 
would have to be made through OPT AD to minimi se these effect s 
by promoting and directing capital movement into less indus -
trialised partners . In industries in which national location 
is unimportant, there is room for the negotiation of locati on. 
In some, OPT AD intervention could cause more efficient loca-
tion. 
I The question of capital movements is inseparable from the question of freer trade , and of enormous importance to 
Australia . P AFT A would affect capital movements in three 
ways . First, the establishment of a Paci fic Bank for Invest-
' 
\ 
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ment and Settlement would facilitate the directing of capital 
move ments for balance of payments, income growth, or em-
ployment reasons. This would be made feasible by the likeli-
hood of a net i mprovement in the balance of payments positi on 
of the r egi on as a whole . The balance of payments of the 
United States and Japan is likely to be strengthened , and a 
major constraint on capital outflow from PAFTA's potential 
capital exporters removed . 
Second, capital movements will be affected by changes 
in the relative profitability of investment in various countries . 
The incidence of specific capital increases the importance of 
this factor . Already a major share of Australian capital 
inflow i s being directed towards low cost export - oriented 
mineral industries . The removal of regional tariffs would 
increase the attractiveness of investment and capital inflow in 
metal based industries . 
Third, P AFT A i s likely to promote capital movements 
by increasing knowledge of investment opportunities in othe r 
countries and reducing the risks ~ foreign investment. The 
strengthening of regional balance of payments and reduction of 
the risk of devaluation could also contri bute to this effect. 
This consideration of dynamic effects of relevance to 
Australia has been far from comprehensive . But it seems 
clear enough that the gains from Pacific economic integration 
would be far larger than analysis of the static trade expansion 
effects alone would suggest. There would have to be safe -
guards against the centralisation of production in the more 
highly industrialised economies, or P AFT A is unlikely to 
be attractive to the smaller economies . But these safeguard s 
need not be inconsistent with longer run economic efficiency , 
especially if they take the form of promoting capital movement s 
to facilitate production in less highly industrialised countries 
which possess significant natural advantages in sorrie manu-
facturing industri es . 
VI The Feasibility of the P AFT A Alternative for 
Australia 
A full treatment of the.feasi bility of Pacific economic 
integration would demand an assessment of the acceptability 
·of each prospective partner ' s demands to the others . As a 
·contributi on towards a full e r treatment, some of the Australi -
~
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\ an political and economic attitudes that are relevant to whether 
or not a political decision could be taken in favour of Pacific 
/ economic integration . 
I Two broad types of attitude against Pacific economic 
integration can be identified . The first encompasses various 
aspects of the protectionist attitude . The second includes 
opposition to closer economic integration with Pacific countries 
at the expense of contacts with other countries and regions . 
Australian prote ctionism has had as its prime objects 
f 
the full employment of a workforce growing rapidly through 
migration, and long term income growth through the develop -
ment of an infant economy or infant industries. 
Both objects have been served more than adquately by 
the existence of a manufacturing industry has been ample justi-
fication for its continued protection. Though there has been 
a radical change in thinking about tariff policy, the sudden 
euthanasia of large sectors of existing inefficient manuf actur-
ing activity would be quite impracticable. Any move towards 
freer trade would have to be gradual, with care being taken 
to prevent too great an impact on existing import competing 
capacity . 
~ 
· The employment principle is associated with the indus-
trialisation principle in Australian protectionism. Full em-
ployment is the first article of economic faith of all Australian 
political groups . Even given the expansion likely to result 
/ from freer Pacific trade , neither the rapidly growing capital-in-
/ 
~ tensive mining sector nor the agricultural and pastoral sectors are 
) 
capable of absorbing Australia's rapidly growing workforce . More-
ove r ,despite some pride in their rural history, Australians probab-
ly share the wide spread pre' jur1ice that in some non-economic sense 
urban activities are "superior" to rural activities . Hence , to re -
ceive strong support in Australia, PAFT A must give rise to shifts 
between industries wi thin the manufacturing sector rather than shifts 
between manufacturing and other sectors , Some manufacturing in-
dustries would rapidly with free trade across the Pacific . 
Others could expand if the capital and t e chnology became avail-
able . But provisions would have to be made for the artificial 
stimulation of manufacturing if it appeared that the free work-
ings of the e conomy were not maintaining the size of the manu-
facturing sector . And it must be made obvi ous in advance 
that immediate action .would be taken to r emove large unemploy-
/ 
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mcnt or industrial decline. 
The inf ant economy principle in protectionism has been 
of pre-eminent importance in postwar Australia. There is 
no doubt that prote ction did promote rapid growth in the indus -
trial s ector. Now that a broad industrial base has been es-
tablished, selection of industries with long term prospects of 
efficient production is becoming a more important criterion in 
tariff policy. These developments serve to reduce the op-
position to wholesale dismantling of the Australian tariff 
against Pacific countries. But true infant industries do 
remain. It would be both uneconomic and politically unaccept-
able to adopt a policy that led to the decline of industries with 
long t erm prospects of efficient operation. P AFT A agree-
ments would have to include provisions for the continued pro-
tection of infant industries. The re are dangers of abuse in 
a free trade agreement that exempts particular commodities -
the Australian - New Zealand Free Trade Agreement is a 
classic case of vested interests securing a tariff structure that 
produces a maximum of trade diversion and a minimum of trade 
creation. Great care must be taken to establish the creden -
tials of an applicant for continue d protection. 
The second source of resistence - the weakening of 
Australia's association with countries outside P AFT A - is -
hardly l e ss important. Relations between Australia and the 
United Kingdom, Australia and the Territory of Papua and 
New Guine a and Australia and the developing countries of 
Asia and South- East Asia require comment. 
The spe cial relationship with the United Kingdom has 
loosened conside rably over the past decade . The weakening 
of e conomic ties with Britain would no longer appear as an 
important constraint on policie s towards Pacific economic 
integration. However, should Britain's bid to enter Europe 
fail, moves towards Australian and British association in a 
larger P AFTA - NAFTA union would be regarded sympathe-
tically. 
Special provisions would have to be made for the Terri-
tory of Papua and New Guinea. Australia grants the Terri-
tory preferential treatment on some of its exports and this 
tre atment i s not reciprocated. In addition, over two-thirds 
of Australia's overseas grants in aid are directed into New 
Guinea. Australia's interests in this regard could be satis-
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fied if the Territory was granted status in P AFT A equivalent 
to that it now enjoys in relation to Australia. Such provi-
sions could be made at negligible cost to other P AFT A coun-
tries. 
More subtle, and more difficult to acco'in.odate, is Aust.:. 
ralia' s relationship with the countries of South- East Asia. 
Australia's strategic and economic interests in the economic 
development of South- East Asia are, with those of Japan, 
greater than those of other P AFT A countries. Australia's 
trade with most countries of the region has been growing rapid-
ly in recent years. The idea of trade between the rich 
countries of the Pacific burgeoning at the expense of the 
economic interests of other Asian and South-East Asian coun-
tries is antipathetic to a strong and growing part of Australian 
sentiment and policy. The eclipse of the current vision of 
Australia developing as a part of Asia, to the mutual advant-
age of all members of the region, would be retrograde . 
Associate membership status might prove the most ac-
ceptable solution to this problem, coupled with programmes 
for aid and development. Australia's interests in this regard 
would be amply satisfied if Asian and South-East Asian coun-
tries were granted preferential access to P AFT A markets, 
but remained free to impose their own tariffs . The extremely 
limited scope of current Australian preferences for less deve.:. 
loped countries, suggests that this solution could only be adopt-
ed gradually because of the protectionist constraint. 
VII Conclusion 
Australian participation in Pacific economic integration 
would have the benefits associated with a significant move to-
wards freer trade. Incomes would rise as a result of the 
direct effects on trade volumes. There are also likely to be 
important dynamic benefits, through improved access to inter-
national capital and technology . 
The main costs of Australian involvement in Pacific 
economic integration would be the costs of adjustment result-
ing from the need to re- allocate labour capital and other re -
sources out of less effici ent import-competing industries into 
more efficient domestic production, the costs of trade diver-
sion, the costs of perverse capital movements, and the politi-
cal costs of any shift of emphasis in international relations too 
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I. 
/ much towards the Pacific and away from Asia . 
These costs can be exaggerated. In a growing economy 
the costs of re- allocation need not be so great. Moreover, 
the great merit of the regional approach over the multilateral 
· approach to freer trade is that close co-operation between part-
ner countries can help minimise the costs of adjustment. 
Because the Pacific is such a large part of Australia's trading 
world, the costs of trade diversion are likely to be minimal. 
Furthermore, insofar as the trade needs of nearby less develop-
ed countries can be accommodated by the extension of trade 
preferences under an associate membership scheme and the 
provision of increased developmental assistance, the costs 
of trade diversion and the political costs would be minimised. 
The costs of adjustment could be greatly reduced if a 
Pacific Industries' Council were established in each partner 
country to adjudicate cases of "undue harm or injury" to import 
competing sectors affected by tariff elimination. These Coun-
cils would serve a similar function to the Advisory Authority 
instituted under the Japanese - Australian Trade Agreement 
of 1957. 
An Organisation for Pacific Trade, Aid and Develop-
ment could co-ordinate the work of the five Pacific Industries' 
Councils, assess claims for continued infant industry protec-
tion, and assist with the rationalisation of regional industrial 
location so as to minimise agglomerating forces. Significant-
ly, it could co-ordinate aid-giving by the five partner countries 
and provide assistance to private investors interested in invest-
ment in developing countries. It could also administer a sys -
tem of associate membership for Asian (and no doubt Latin 
· American) countries. 
Finally, a Pacific Bank for Investment and Settlement 
could be established with the aim of facilitating investment and 
settlement within the region. This would ease the short term 
balance of payment problems and contribute to longer-run objec;.. 
tives by facilitating movements of long term capital, especially 
to countries like Australia, 
Contacts in the Pacific area are already strong, not 
\
only i n trade and commerce, but also in political and strategic 
matters . Already 38 percent of advanc e d Pacific country 
trade is intra-areal : that compares favourably with the 41 per-
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,1~' cent of intra- areal trade achieved within the European Econo-
mic Community. Pacific trade would undoubtedly continue to 
prosper without more formal regional arrangements but if we 
I 
J 
work gradually towards more formal arrangements, the poten-
tial for regional growth could be greatly enhanced, as too, 
' could the potential for mobilising regional resources for more 
effective assistance to less developed countries in Asia and 
· Latin America. Indeed, there seems a strong presumption 
! 
that, at this turning point in her commercial history, Australia 
could do well by directing her international economic policy 
toward achieving closer Pacific economic integration. 
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APPENDIX I 
This appendix defines briefly the new concepts introduc-
ed in the paper to analyse factors which affect the intensity of 
trade between trading partners . They are defined in (1) (4) 
(5) (7) and (8). Other concepts defined in (2) (3) and (6) 
are useful in understanding the logic and character of the main 
formulae and for more detailed analysis of trade intensity. 
For a fuller discussion see (9). 
Ija is an index of the intensity of country J's export 
trade· with country A: 
where 
Xja 
I. = -x I 
Ja j 
M a 
M -M. w J 
X. are J's exports to A, 
Ja 
xj are J's total exports' 
Ma are A's total imports, 
Mw are total world imports, and 
Mj are J's total imports. 
(1) 
The intensity of trade index provides a measure of the extent 
to which country J's exports to country A are larger or small- . 
er in relation to her exports to the whole world than country 
A's imports are in relation to world trade. 
R ~ is an index of J's specialisation in the export 
of commodity t': 
M i 1'.1[i - !Vi. w J 
M - M. w J 
(2) 
. . . 
where 
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X~ are J's exports of commodity -~, 
J 
X. are J's total exports, 
J 
Mi are world imports of commodity i, w 
M ~ are J's imports of commodity i, 
J 
M are total world imports, and w 
Mj are J's total imports. 
217 
The index of export specialisation provides a measure 
of the extent to which country J exports relatively more or 
less of commodity i than all other exporters on average . 
Di is an index of A's specialisation in imports of 
d
. . a 
commo ity i: 
where 
Mi - M~ 
I w J 
M - M. w J 
Mi are A's imports of commodity i a 
Ma are A's total imports, 
and all other terms are as defined above , 
(3) 
The index of import specialisation provides a measure of the 
extent to which country A imports relatively more or less of 
commodity i than all other importers on average . 
C. a is an index of the degree of complementarity in J's 
export ti1ade Cwith~ := (Ri • Di . ~~ ~j ) (
4
) 
Ja ;; J a w - j 
or 
c. = n (xx~ 
Ja ;; j 
M w - M. J 
i 
- M. 
J 
(5) 
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where all terms are as defined above. 
The index of the degree of complementarity in trade provides a 
measure of the extent to which country J's export trade with A 
is relatively large or small because of the character of J's 
export specialisation and A's import specialisation in trade . 
exports 
K~ is an index of special country bias in 
of cocllhodi ty i to A: 
X~ Mi 
)a / a 
X~ Mi - M~ 
J w J 
J's 
(6) 
where X~ are J's exports of commodity i to A, and all 
other terh'ts are as defined above. 
The index of special country bias for commodity i provides a 
measure of the extent to which J's exports of i have more or 
less favourable access to A's markets than other exporters 
of i. 
J's 
B;, is an index of overall special country bias in 
expor~ trade with A: 
B. 
Ja 
= X ;n 
ja I 
Mi ) __,...___,_a . 
Mi i - M. w J 
where all terms are as defined above. 
(7) 
The index of special country bias in J's export trade with A 
measures the extent to which J's total exports have more or 
less favourable access to A's import markets than might be 
expected from the two countries' shares of world trade in 
each commodity. 
Thus, the intensity of trade is a product of the degree 
of complementarity and special country bias in trade: 
I. = C. 
Ja Ja 
B. 
Ja 
(8) 
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The Calculation of the Intensity, Degree of Complementarity 
and Special Country Bias in Pacific Trade . . ' 
The results of calculations of the intensity , the degree 
of complementarity , and the degree of special country bias in 
trade amongst Pacific countries in 1965 are presented in 
Table 1. These calculations are based on three digit SITC 
commodity trade data assembled from United Nations, Com-
modity Trade Statistics, O.E.C .D., Commodity Trade: Im-
ports, United Nations, Yearbook of Internati onal Trade Sta-
tistics, and national trade statistics. Estimates of the com-
position of world trade by the 178 commodity groups identified 
in the study were derived from data available in United Nations , 
Commodity Trade Statistics which recorded about 7 4 percent 
of world imports by SITC three digit classification in 1965. 
The limitations of these measures are set out elsewhere 
The effect of commodity classification on the proportion 
of trade intensity attributable to complementarity or special 
country bias deserves explicit note. In particular, complete-
ly reliable results can only be obtained if commodity groups are 
perfectly homogeneous. 
Results in the text are quoted in index form . For exam-
ple, when J exports to A exactly the same share of her total 
exports as A holds in world trade, the intensity of J's export 
trade with A equals 100 rather than unity. 
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Session III 
Comment on K. Kojima' s Paper by I . A. McDougall 
Professor Kojima' s paper provides us with an excellent 
and detailed analysis of trade flows within the five countries 
which he suggests should form a free trade area . We are all 
I am sure indebted to him for this statistical breakdown and 
for the stimulus which his earlier and present thoughts on this 
proposed free trade area have provided for the participants i n 
this Conference . His paper raises a large number of issues 
many of which have already been discussed and I shall endeav-
our in. my comment to avoid repeating comment upon these points . 
Part I of Prof . Kojima' s paper shows clearly that 
trade among the five Pacific area countries has been growing 
rapidly, although less rapidly than has intra- European trade . 
The growth centres of Pacific trade have been the U.S. A,, 
Australia and Japan and trade has increased most in heavy 
manufactures and chemicals as well as in sophisticated light 
manufactured goods. 
I do not believe, however, that these facts support all 
of the conclusions and policy suggestions which Prof . Kojima 
derives from them. The m~e fact that trade has been expand-
ing in a particular geographic area does not in itself provide an 
argument for integration. Even if it did one must pay atten-
tion to the way in which a region. is constructed . For inst-
ance, in the time period selected U . S . A . trade with Europe 
was not only absolutely larger than with the Pacific area but 
also showed a greater percentage increase . This would sug-
gest, according to Prof. Kojima' s reasoning, that the U . S , A , 
and perhaps Canada would do better to seek some European 
or North Atlantic trade grouping if any at all. 
The fact that extended Pacific trade has not expanded 
as rapidly as intra- European trade is according fo Prof . 
Kojima another reason for proceeding with integration in the 
Pacific. This ignores, however, the fact that intra- Europe-
an trade might well have expanded for reasons other than 
the promotion of the EEC. Furthermore, it may well be 
that the development of the latent resources of the Pacific 
area may more urgently require policies other than an expansion 
of trading opportunities. 
My final comment on Part I of this paper concerns 
Prof . Kojima' s conclusion that because intra- area trade in 
224 
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the Pacific has expanded most in the field of heavy manufactures 
and chemicals "stimulation of horizontal trace in these goods 
sPems to be the most promising route for trade expansion" . I 
hope that he does not forget that trade expansion as far as Aust -
ralia and New Zealand are concerneo has been concentrated 
upon commodities other than heavy manufactures and chemicals 
and that the conu'pt of horizontal trade applies also to these 
other commodity categories . 
In Part II, Prof . Kojima measures thP static effects of 
tariff elimination in P AFT A , compares thPse static effects with 
the gains to be had by P AFT A countries from the Kennedy 
Round and, finally , comments upon policy alternatives confront-
ing Japan. 
As far as the computation of the static effects of tariff 
elimination in the P AFT A countries is concl"rned, Professor 
Kojima makes use of a technique explained more fully in another 
paper. I have already indicated that the assumptions on which 
these conclusions are basE'd givP me cause for concern . First, 
although Prof . Kojima is in good company when using the elas -
ticities of import demand develo-ped with respect to the U.S . A . 
by Bull and Marwah, it seems to me that these elasticities which . 
relate to broadly aggregated commodity groups cannot with any 
confidence be uniformly applied to such different economies as 
Japan, Australia and New Zealand. Secondly, even although 
only static effects are being calculated, one needs to know some -
thing about effective rather than nominal rates of protection if 
the effects of trade creation are to be accurately assessf'd . 
Thirdly, Prof. Kojima has assumed away thi? eff Pcts of 
trade divi?rsion and these could significantly alter not only his 
implil"n estimate of gains but also the nistribution of bPnefits and 
losses among the in<Jividual members . Finally, Prof. Kojima' s 
method of calculation requires the further assumption that terms 
of trade effect would be negligible (despite large structural 
charges in the volume and commodity composition of trade) and 
that thE' complication arising from non- tariff barriers can be 
assumed small . In my opinion these are very strong assump-
tions and while they suffice to give some conclusion of the ap-
proximate increase in the volume of intra- area trade I do not 
believe as Prof . Kojima suggests that they lend themselves to 
an assessment of the direct balance of payments effects of the 
establishment of a free trade area. 
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On the basis of the balance of payments effects detailed 
on p .164 of his paper, Prof . Kojima concludes that the indus -
trialization of New Zealand, Australia and Canada would 
need to be promoted so that they can share in the benefits of 
expanding trade in heavy manufactures and chemicals. . This 
conclusion , however, depends upon the sets of assumption 
underlying his calculations of static effects and upon the dyna-
mic effects of increased investment flows, economies of scale , 
and increased competition not working so as to eliminate thes? 
deficits . Moreover, in my opinion, it places economic 
development in Canada, Australia and New Zealand into a 
straight jackPt not necessarily indicated by comparative ad-
vantage considerations. 
I shall not comment upon Prof. Kojima assessment of 
Kennedy Round effects which depends upon similar assumptions 
to those mentioned earlier. 
Prof. Kojima' s first policy choice for Japan would be to 
expand free multilateral trade, but given that global tariff reduc-
tions are unlikely, his second policy choice is for the establish-
ment of a Pacific Free Trade Area. A comment on p. 170, 
however, suggests that a free trade area which did not include 
the U.S.A. would prove unacceptable to Japan. Per haps 
Prof . Kojima would like to comment on this. 
Apart from economic benefits, Prof. Kojima cites the 
interests of the developing countries as a further reason for 
seeking the formation of P AFT A.. This objective has already 
been commented upon by others. 
Finally, in Part III Prof. Kojima makes several pro-
positions for promoting closer Pacific trade relations. In 
view of what has been said one can agree with him that the 
moment is premature for the formation of a free trade area 
which would incorporate the U.S.A. (and therefore Canada). 
I am disturbed, however, by his suggestion that in the 
meantime measures should bf' adopted to expand trade horizont-
ally in heavy manufactures and chemicals but that levels of 
protection accor~~d light. manufacturing and agriculture are at 
pres~nt too sensitive an issue for negotiation. As pointed out 
by Sir John Crawford this morning, levels of protection in 
these areas would need prove negotiable, if Australia and New 
Zealand were to participate in a free trade area involving them-
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selves and Japan; 
Finally, I need comment upon Prof. Kojima' s three 
codes for better behavior in international trade and upon the 
international institutions he would recommend establishing. 
A code of good conduct which could perhaps obtain agree-
ment on the dumping of subsidized exports on commercial mar- · 
kets but I believe it unlikely that countries would relinquish the 
right to raise tariffs or impose quantitative restrictions in the 
event of balance of payments difficulties. 
As far as the code of overseas investment is concerned, 
I am not clear how this would regulate the flow of foreign invest-
ment. Would it, for instance, prevent it from seeking its 
highest rate of return (perhaps in ventures not involving the 
production of heavy manufactures or chemical goods). Fur-
ther, I do not understand the precise connection between a 
code of overseas investment and the probably irrational Japanese 
fear of the domination of U.S. capital. Perhaps Prof. 
Kojima might explain this point in greater detail. Further 
comment is also required by him on his suggestion for a code 
of aid and trade policy towards developing countries . 
Of the two international organi zations proposed by Prof . 
Kojima, one - -The Pacific Bank for Investment and Settlement 
--has already been discussed in detail. T he other--an Orga-
nization for Pacific Trade and Devel opment - - would have much 
merit even if a free trade area were not to be proceeded with in 
the near future, because it would facilitate a greater understand-
ing of trade problems and in this way could assist in obtaining 
closer collaboration on trade, investment and aid in the Pacific 
Area. 
Finally, Mr. Chairman, lest it be thought that I am do-
ing no more than disagree with Prof. Kojima, let me add that 
I take it for granted that the many merits in his paper are ap-
parent to all and do not require my elaboration: let me also 
again say how grateful I am personally to him for his provocative 
thoughts on this subject of a Pacific Free Trade Area. 
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Comment on P . Drysdale' s P a'Jer by Hisao K anomori 
Dr. DrysdalP' s paper is particularly interesting to me 
in two respects: the first is its discussion of the dynal'lic ef-
fects of intf'gration and the second is its discussion of the cri-
teria for effective integration . Some of thf'se points have 
alri:>ady bepn ciscussPd but I should like to have thf'm explain-
ed morp fully. 
As Dr . Drysdale' s paper makes clE'ar, there is an un-
usually close compl<:>mentarity between Australia and Japan. 
Japan imports raw materials such as wool and iron ore, fuel 
such as coal, and foodstuffs such as wheat and meat and ex-
-ports industrial goods . Thanks to this complementarity, the 
trade between the two countries has expanded rapidly. Com-
plementarity will probably increase through growing imports of 
coal and iron ore. What is the effect of this complementarity 
on Australia's industrialisation? If, in future, the demand 
of industrial nations for foodstuffs and raw materials increases, 
as indicated by Dr. Oki ta yesterday, the terms of trade could 
be favourable to Australia and agricultural and mining produc-
tion should be more profitable. Will that not check Austra-
lia's industrialization? Will the ratio of manufacturing in-
dustry in Australian economy increase or decrease when tariffs 
are lower!"d? 
Is it necessary to prevent the centralization of produc-
tion in the more highly industrializf'd countries? If the centra-
lization results from economies of scale, an attempt to prevent 
it may be against the interPst of international division of labour . 
Of course, the nPcessity for having some manufacturing indus-
try is undeniable, but if thP production of wool and iron ore 
are centralized in Australia, why doE's she consider it un-
desirable that industrial production become centralized in other . 
nations? As the demand for raw materials will probably in-
crease, and their supply become more scarce, the advantage 
of industrial countries ovi:>r agricultural and mining nations may 
prove to be an illusion and not long- lasting. Can not agricul-
tural countries exploit industrial countries in future? This is 
not my opinion but merely a question. 
Suppose there is a rush of demand for Australia's raw 
materials from all over the world, and she can import industri-
al goods from any nation. On the import side, what kind of 
industrial goods will Australia import in future? Probably 
SESSION III 229 
labour - intE>nsive goods, judging from her factor endowment . 
However, Japan will probably export less labor- intf"nsive 
goods, and more capital-intensive goods. In that case, the 
complementarity between Australia and Japan may weaken, 
and Australia may come to have a closer complementarity with 
the countri es of Southeast As i a . Wi ll she feel l e ss attract-
ed by the Pacific economic inte gration due to these factors ? 
As criteria for assessi ng the desirability of economi c 
integration , the ind ex of the degree of complement arity is an 
excellent device . From this index , we can calculate how 
closely the export structure of country A matche s the import 
structure of country B . The intensity of trade between A 
and B is the product of the degree of complementarity and 
special country bias in trade . Using these indices , Dr . 
Drysdale has undertaken a brilliant analysis of the characteris -
tics of the Pacific Area countries in Table 1 (p . 202) . 
A surprising foature of this table is that the degree of intensity 
of Australia's export trade with Japan is as high as 401 . 
This is almost as close as the relation between the Unite d 
States and Canada. On the other hand, the degree of inten-
sity of Japan's export to Australia is not so high, only 215. 
In particular, complementarity is surprisingly low ; it is low -
er than that between Australia . and the United Kingdom, 136 . 
Does this asymmetry of complementarity between export and 
import trade not mean that it might be advantageous for Aust-
ralia to extend her trade to a wide area than P AFT A, especial-
ly in the f'\vent of a seller's market in foodstuffs and raw materi-
als? 
I should like to know how the index of complementarity 
between Australia and Japan has been changing . It would also 
be intf'rf'sting to assume probable futurf" changes in Australia's 
industrial structure and E'stimatF> the indices for such cases . 
They may provide useful insight into the future of P AFT A . 
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Discussion on Kojima's and Drysdale's Paper 
In reply Prof. Kojima agreed that his estimates of the 
static effects of Pacific tariff elimination were rough but he 
maintained that they were useful in specifying the general magni-
tude of these effects . Moreover, the estimates have been 
improved by Prof. Wilkinson and Dr . Drysdale and they could 
be further improved by taking dynamic effects into account . 
Prof . Kojima also agreed that his proposal for three 
codes of international economic behavior and two institutions 
to facilitate Pacific economic co-operation had not yet been 
studied fully . He hoped that colleagues in New Zealand and 
Australia would assist with this task . However, he felt that 
Prof. McDougall's objection to constraints on tariff-raising on 
the grounds that they would hinder balance-of-payments opera-
tions was wrongly based. An appropriate financial institu-
tion would more effectively serve to remedy balance-of payments 
problems. 
Prof . Kojima also admitted the difficulty of estimating 
the dynamic effects which would follow the formation of a free 
trade area . He explained his emphasis on the role of hori-
zontal trade by reference to European experience of growth in 
trade of manufactured goods . Whilst he appreciated concern 
in Australia and New Zealand about increased trade oppor-
tunities for primary commodities, such as butter, meat, cere-
als and other primary products, he felt sure that both count-
ries could enjoy an expansion of exports from specialized manu-
facturing industries . 
With respect to Japanese attitudes towards trade liberali-
zation and Pacific i:>conomic integration, h~ agreed that there 
were strong protectionist attitudes amongst businessmen again-
st the liberalization of capital movemf'nts and amongst farmers 
against liberalization of agricultural imports. His own opi-
nion was a minority opinion but moves towards liberalization 
could and should be encouraged . 
In reply to Mr. Kanamori's comments, Dr. Drysdale 
made three main points. 
First, he stressed that whilst his estimates suggested 
that there would be a significant re- arrangement in the pattern 
of Australian manufacturing activity in consequence of moves 
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towards freer trade, it seemed very unlikely that the ratio of 
manufacturing to primary activity would decline. The most 
important sectors of industry, such as iron and steel, metal 
based industries, and motor vehicles, are already quite com- . 
petitive and they would probably become more competitive with 
freer trade. 
If the effect on capital flows was not perverse, and Dr . 
Drysdale was optimistic in · this respect, this conclusion would 
be reinforced. In general , he felt that Mr . Kanamori was 
too optimistic about likely trends in the terms of trade for 
primary commodity exporters . 
Second, Dr. Drysdale was skeptical about the possibili-
ty that Australia would become a major exporter of minerals 
to the whole world in the very near future . He emphasised 
that his study indicated that Australia's mineral exports would 
continue to be heavily concentrated on near markets, such as 
Japan, although there had already been some small shipments of 
iron ore to Europe. The economics of tran sportation for 
these bulk commodities still dictate heavy geographic concent-
ration in exports. 
Finally, Dr . Drysdale agreed that it would be useful to 
develop indexe s of complementarity and country bias for predict-
ing trade flows and said that he was keen to do that. He also 
agreed that it was interesting to look at changes in these index-
es over time, and especially changes in the index of complement-
arity for Japan's export trade with Australia. He said that , 
in fact, the index of complementarity in this trade had tended 
to decline recently but that this trend requires careful inter-
pretation. He argued that the decline was transitional and 
resulted from the change in Japan's export specialisation from 
light to heavy industrial goods. He stressed that , contrary 
to Mr. Kanamori' s belief, Australia was a major importer of 
capital-intensive goods, and that she would continue t o specia-
lise in the import of these goods . Since Japan was becoming 
an increasingly significant exporter of these products relative 
to other industrial traders, the index of complementarity in 
Japan's export trade with Australia can be expected to rise 
markedly. Dr. Drysdale therefore suggested that Australia's 
interest_ in Pacific: economic co - operation will remain strong . 
Australia could not be an efficient industrial producer and ex-
porter to Asia without close Pacific trade conne ctions . 
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Discussion centred on two related themes which had been 
developed in both papers. The first was the possibility that, 
without policy safeguards, factors of production might tend to 
migrate towards larger economies and have perverse effects on 
the industrialisation of smaller economies, following moves 
towards freer trade. The second was the basis for increased 
horizontal trade among advanced Pacific countries. 
It was asked whether there was any evidence of the mig-
ration of factors between New Zealand and Australia conse-
quent upon the Ni:>w Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agreement. 
It was explained that this was a major fear of New Zealand 
policy-makers and industrialists and a major reason for the 
limited nature of the agreement. However, there was little 
empirical evidence one way or the other yet because of the 
limited operation of the agreement. 
A New Zealand participant suggested that it was possible 
that New Zealand manufacturing activity would expand within 
the framework of the New Zealand-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement, and cited the growth of manufacturing activity in 
smaller centres in Australia as further evidence that "agglo-
merating" forces may not be strong if there were a move to-
wards freer trade. It was pointed out that there may be ex-
ternal diseconomies associated with "agglomeration" and this 
illustrated with reference to New Zealand and Japan. 
On the other hand, others from Canada and Australia, 
drew attention to the importance of policy influences in this 
regard and stressed the importance of external economies in 
fostering concentration on initially large markets. A J apa-
nese participant suggested that technological efficiency might 
be an important determinant of location, even for resource-
intensive manufacturing industries, and cited the competitive-
ness of the Japanese and Italian iron and steel industries as 
evidence of this. 
Three significant influences on the location of manufac-
turing activity were noted. First, it was argued that for 
primary manufacturing and processing location would be dictat-
ed largely by resource availability. Second, for secondary 
manufacturing, Research and Development were important 
determinants of efficiency, and it was felt that the concentra-
tion of Research and Development activity was likely to lead to 
concentration in production and location. Finally, for mature 
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secondary manufacturing industry, in which Research and 
Development had become relatively unimportant, it was argued 
that location would again be determinated more by the availa-
bility of cheaper resources including labour. These obser-
vations were discussed with reference to North American ex-
perience. 
Some saw the main basis for improved industrial special-
isation and increased horizontal trade in these factors, es-
pecially in the first and third factor. It was argued, how-
ever, that free market forces might not always lead automatic-
ally to this improved specialisation and that this would be a 
legitimate concern for smaller economies . Prof. Kojima 
suggested, for example, that the problem of market franchise 
restrictions would have to be controlled within the framework 
of his Code for Overseas Investment. 
Chapter 7 A NEW WORLD TRADE POLICY 
IN THE POST-KENNEDY ROUND ERA: 
A SURVEY OF ALTERNATIVES, WITH SPECIAL 
REFERENCE TO THE POSITION OF THE PACIFIC 
AND ASIAN REGIONS 
by Harry G. Johnson 
Professor, London School of Economics 
University of Chicago 
I Introductory Observations 
The intention of the Administration of the United States , 
in preparing the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 as the basis for 
the Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations, was to contain the 
regionalizing and discriminatory effects of the formation of the 
European Economic Community within a broader movement 
towards free world trade on a non- discriminatory multilateral 
basis. Much of that objective had to be written off when 
Britain was denied admission to the Common Market, with the 
result that the scope of the "dominant supplier authority" of 
the Trade Expansion Act, which authorized elimination of 
tariffs on industrial products on which the U . S . A. and the 
E. E. C . together conducted eighty percent or more of free 
world trade, shrank to insignificance. Reliance then had 
to be placed on the authority- to negotiate linear tariff cuts of 
up to 50 percent on industrial products, which it was hoped 
would still provide scope and incentive for a substantial free-
ing of trade . As the negotiations slowly dragged along, how -
ever' many proponents of freer trade began to fear that the 
Kennedy Round would be a failure, and consequently to believe 
that some other method of approaching free trade than negotia-
tions for tariff reductions in GA TT would have to be re sorted 
to. At the same time, many came to the conclusion that, 
particularly for the smaller and less mature industrial countri-
es, the mere lowering of tariff barriers was insufficient to 
enable a full harvesting of the major benefits that free trade 
might afford - the opportunity to exploit the economics of fine 
specialization of activities and associated economies of large 
scale production on the basis of assured access on equal terms 
to a really large and competitive market. Consequently, the 
attention of many policy experts in various countries turned to 
the possibilities of an alernative route to free trade, the es -
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tablishment of complete free trade on a regional basis - and 
specifically, for reasons which are discussed below, the es-
tablishment of free trade areas rather than customs unions. 
For some, regional free trade was regarded as the natural 
response of the policy of countries situated elsewhere to the 
regional discrimination implicit in the formation of a European 
Economic Community that appeared unwilling to n.egotiate reduc -
tions of its external tariffs on a basis of reciprocity. For 
others, probably the majority, however, the free trade area 
approach was visualized as a method of by- passing European 
protectionism and continuing the momentum of the postwar trend 
towards freer trade, while at the same time building additional 
bargaining power to overcome European resistance to the multi-
lateral freeing of trade. 
The eventual successful conclusion of the Kennedy 
Round necessarily altered the situational assumptions of this 
position in several important respects . Most notably, it 
demonstrated that the European Economic Community was not 
obstinately and incurably protectionalist, as contrasted with 
the other major industrial nations, but rather that protectionist 
interests were prevalent in all the negotiating countries, but 
could be subordinated to more general national interests in the 
freeing of international trade . It thus became possible to 
contemplate openly the concept of world free trade as an ulti -
mate objective, and to consider alternative trade policy ar-
rangements for the future, as different strategies for securing 
that same end, rather than as political instruments for retalia-
tion and coercion . 
At the same time, the painful protraction of the Kennedy 
Round negotiations and the exhaustion of the negotiators that 
they produced, give good reason to doubt both that the major 
industrial nations would be willing to undertake a similar exer-
cise in the near future, and that if undertaken it would produce 
significant, let alone comparable results. In addition, the 
Kennedy Round failed to make significant progress with respect 
to two problems that are of great concern to important categori-
es of countries, and with which it was intended to deal, the 
reduction of barriers to trade in agricultural products, and the 
opening of markets in the developed countries for exports of 
both primary products and manufactured and semi - manufactured 
goods from the developing countries on a non- reciprocated 
basis. These features of the outcome both underline the 
desirability of considering approaches towards free trade by 
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methods alternative to that of multilateral negotiation of reduc -
tion of trade barriers through G. A. T . T ., and suggest that 
some of these approaches may be better able to cope with the 
problems of barriers to trade in agricultural products and 
developing country exports than multilateral negotiations may 
be expected to do. 
In addition to recognizing these implications of the con-
clusion of the Kennedy Round, an evaluation of trade policy 
alternatives for the future must pay at least some attention to 
the implications of recent developments in international mone-
tary affairs, and of France's veto on consideration by the 
European Economic Community of Britain's application to join 
the Common Market. 
The recent sequence of international monetary disturb-
ances, involving the devaluation of sterling, the rush of specu-
lation on gold against the dollar, and the necessity of the imposi-
· tion by the United States of new restraints on private invest-
ment overseas by industrial and financial corporations and re -
ductions in overseas defense and development assistance ex-
penditures by th0 United States government, has two major 
implications for possible alternative new trade policy arrange-
ments. One is that the upsurge of protectionism in the Unit-
ed States in 1967, that folowed so closely on the completion of 
the Kennedy Round and caused so much concern among the 
other Contracting Parties to GATT, is likely to be strongly 
reinforced by arguments drawn from the state of the balance-
of-payments. The United States Administration, therefore , 
far more so than in 1962, will be able to contemplate only thos e 
new initiatives towards free trade that either promise on net 
to improve the balance of payments, or promise to serve some 
overriding national interest in world politics., or preferably 
(as in 1962) both interests simultaneously; and it may in fact 
be unwilling for balance - of-payments reasons to contemplate 
any immediate move towards free trade, which could mean that 
any such initiative would have to be taken on a smaller , and in 
all likelihood, more narrowly regional, basis . At the pre-
sent time, the constellation of circumstances that would most 
probably evoke a new U.S. initiative would be the opportunity 
to strike back at the countries of the European Economic Com-
munity, from which the external pressure for the new re straint 
policies has come , through the formation of a free trade area 
with E. F. T. A, and Canada that would discriminate strongly 
against E . E. C , exports of manufactures. But the develop-
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ment of the war in Vietnam might lead the 
0
United States to 
contemplate a Pacific Free Trade Area as a means of streng-
thening its political position in Asia vis- a - vis Communist 
China . In relation to either of such regional arrangements, 
the U . S. concern with the position of the dollar would be like-
ly to make it anxious to trade off the relatively greater gains 
to its partners than to itself from the freeing of trade, against 
monetary arrangements committing its partners to support of 
the dollar. 
The other important implication of recent monetary 
developments concerns the developing countries. The first 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development origi-
nated in the realization that prospective supplies of develop -
ment aid would fall far short of the prospective needs of the 
developing countries, and the consequent demands of these 
countries that aid should be supplemented by new trade p'iicies 
on the part of the developed countries designed to increase the 
market opportunities and export earnings of the developing 
countries. The force of this appeal has been recognized 
both in the intention of the Kennedy Round to make special ef-
forts on behalf of developing countries on a non-reciprocal 
basis, and in the acknowledgement by the proponents of vari-
ous plans for establishing free trade areas among advanced 
industrial countries that such plans must include special provi-
sions for preferred market access to the free trade area for 
all developing countries or for those in the relevant region. 
The balance-of-payments difficulties of the United States and 
the United Kingdom in recent years have had as one consequence 
the effect of causing these countries to reduce the amount of 
development aid they have been willing to supply, with inhibitory 
efforts on increases in the aid supplied by the countries that 
have been in surplus . The deflation required to underpin the 
devaluation of sterling, and the new U.S. balance-of-payments 
programme, will involve both substantial further reductions of 
the aid supplied by these two countries, and an inability on 
their part to offer the developing countries any really substan-
tial trade policy concessions at the second United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development . This in turn implies an 
addi tional moral obligation on the participants in any new 
regional free t rade arrangements to prevent such arrangements 
from reducing the export opportunities of the developi ng countri -
es and if possible , t o provi de exp anded export oppor tunitie s 
fo r these coun trie s . 
The implications of the French refusal to allow consider-
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ation at present of B r i t ain ' s application to join the . Common 
Market depend on what steps Britain now decides to take . 
V, as is present policy , Britain is willing to wait on the 
doorstep until allowed in on Europe's terms, this would im-
ply a commitment to European regionalism which woul d pre -
clude a further multilateral approach toward free trade and 
would strengthen the arguments either for both a Canadian-
American and a Japanese - Australian- New Zealand free trade 
arrangement or for a Pacific Free Trade Area . The same 
conclusion would follow if Britain and the other members de -
c i ded to strengthen the European Free Trade Area, possibly 
by turning it into a Customs Union, in order to discriminate 
more intensely against the E. E. C . and build up bargaining 
power for forcing their way into the European Economic Com-
munity . If, on the other hand, Britain decided to abandon 
the effort to get into Europe as either hopeless, or not in her 
national interest given the present character of the Community , 
and to look elsewhere for the free competition in a large mar-
ket she believes the health and growth of her economy require, 
the stage would be set for serious considerati on of a North 
Atlantic Free Trade Area, which would most probably be more 
attractive to the United States and Canada than a Pacific Free 
Trade area - though of course membership in one would not be 
inconsistent wi th membership in the other and the two proposals 
could be combined in an enlarged free trade area scheme . 
These preliminary observations are intended to establish 
a contemporary context for the consideration of alternati ve 
trade policy strategies for moving towards free trade in the 
post- Kennedy Round era . Unfortunately, given the rapidity 
of developments during the past year, one can have little con-
fidence that further developments will not alter the politic-
economic situation and hence the balance of considerations 
concerning the various alternatives. But it is nevertheless 
necessary to do the best one can. 
For purposes of analysis, the alternative strategies 
available can be divided into four types , of which the first 
two entail multilateral negotiations on a non-discriminatory 
basis (non- discriminatory, that is, on GATT definitions , 
though not necessarily in economic effect) and the latter two 
entail negotiations among a restricted group of countries on a 
discriminatory basis, one type being in contravention of and 
the other acceptable under the rules of G. A . T . T . These 
strategies compri se another Kennedy- Round- type GATT negoti-
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ation of free trade on a sector- by sector basis; negotiation of 
tariff reductions on a conditional most-favoured- nation basis; 
and the formation of free trade areas. 
II Multilateral Non- Discriminatory Approaches 
(a) A Second Kennedy Round 
The success of the Kennedy Round in reducing tariffs 
on industrial products by an avPrage proportion somewhere in 
the neighbourhood of one third (as compared with the target of 
50 percent) suggests that one possible way of achieving a 
further freeing of trade would be through a second "Kennedy 
Round" conducted according to the same ground rules of a 
targeted percentage linear reducing of tariff rates . The ex-
perience of the Kennedy Round itself, however, tends to 
argue that a second Kennedy Round would be difficult to orga-
nize, and unlikely to prove very effective in achieving substan-
tial tariff reductions, at least in the next five years or so . 
In the first place, as already mentioned, the Kennedy 
Round negotiations proved unexpectedly protracted and arduous, 
and it is unlikely that the major industrial nations would be will~ 
ing to undertake a similar exercise in the near future - especial-
ly as tL~ next time around they would know what to expect, 
whereas at the outset of the Kennedy Round there was excessive 
optimism about the speed and efficiency with which negotiations 
could be completed. 
In the second place , while the Kennedy Round was intend-
ed to replace the former technique of item- by-item negotiation 
by negotiation for tariff reductions on a linear basis, in prac-
tice the Kennedy Round negotiati ons relapsed in very short or.-
der into something very like the old style of item- by- item nego ::-
tiation, albeit subject to the overall target reduction, to a 
deadline for the negotiating proce ss, and to the principle of 
subsequent tariff reduction according to a fixed time-table . 
It is probable that in a repeat p e rformance the vested interests . 
in protection in the various countries would be even more sue- · 
cessful in asserting themselves so as to corrupt the s i mplicity 
of the linear bargaining principle and to make the ave rage tariff 
reduction actually achieved fall signific antly short of the targe t -
ed percentage . The history of GATT n e gotiations , i n fact, 
suggests that a new technique of bargaini ng for tariff reduction 
is most successful the first time it is employed--- the first 
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(Torquay, 1947) GATT negotiations, which intr?duced multi-
lateral negotiati ons for the first time on the pre.viousl! employ-
ed item- by- item basis, produ~ed more. substan~ial tariff ~e~uc­
tions than the subsequent multi lateral item- by-item negotiation!> 
under GATT ---- before it has become familiar enough to be 
exploited by the negotiators to preserve domestic protectionist 
interests, by offering concessions that do not vitally threaten 
such interests while withholding concessi ons that do . If a 
second Kennedy Round were proposed, the first reactions 
would probably be an even more acrimonious attack on the 
linear principle itself than occurred in the early stages of the 
Kennedy Round , and an attempt to complicate the principle 
with qualifications for tariff disparities, industri es in which 
there was deemed to be a national interest in domestic produc-
tion , and so forth ; and if it were proceeded with, protection-
i st interests would be forearmed with knowledge of how to work 
the bargaining process to defend their interests. 
In the third place, and largely in consequence of the 
preceding two observations, a second Kennedy Round would 
only be likely to command the interest of the major industrial 
countries if it could set at least as bold a target as the 
Kennedy Round itself . The obvious target, and the only one 
probably capable of generating the necessary enthusiasm and · 
sense of commitment , would be elimination of the tariff barri-
ers on industrial products remaining after the Kennedy Round -
"the other fifty percent" . (This would of course be only a 
tar get, and it would not be expected to reach free trade , only 
to reduce tariffs as close as possible to the minimum considered 
essential to overriding national interests or i mmovable due to 
the power of vested interests.) The establishment of such a 
target for a second Kennedy Round would not be feasible until 
after the tariff reductions of the first Kennedy Round had been 
absorbed , _ and public opinion convinced that free trade was 
mutually beneficial and its disturbing consequences for pre -
viously protected domestic industri es readily tolerable . 
This stage might conceivably be reached after the first two or 
three steps in the time - table 0f Kennedy Round tariff reduc -
tions, but would more likely not be reached until after the full 
cuts had come into effect five years from now . A further 
consideration pointing in this di rection i s the unlikelihood that 
the United States will be in a position to take the initiative in 
a major move towards world- wide free trade until its balance-
of- payments deficit has been corrected, which event obviously 
lies several years at least in the future. 
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For all these reasons, it appears that a continuation of 
progress towards free trade along the heretofore - established 
lines of multilateral bargaining in GATT is not a practical pos-
sibility; the Kennedy Round seems to represent "the end of 
the road" for traditional GATT baf'.gaining , at least for a 
period of years . If further progress towards trade liberali-
zation is to be made in, say, the next five years, it will prob-
ably have to be made through the adoption of some new alter-
native approach . 
(b) The Sector- By- Sector Approachl 
One alternative approach to a second Kennedy Round, 
which would lend itself to negotiation through the machinery of 
GA TT, is the reduction of tariffs on , or complete freeing of 
trade in, particular industrial products or product groups, on 
a non- discril natory multilateral basis . (This type of sect-
or-by-sector approach has to be distinguished from the sector-
al reduction or elimination of tariffs among a group of countries 
only, such as was involved in the formation of the European 
Coal and Steel Community, which is discriminatory in GATT 
terms and requires a GATT waiver . ) 
The sector- by- sector approach was implicit in the domi-
nant supplier authority of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 , 
though then the sectors eligible for free trade were to be speci-
fied by an automatic rule based on the proportion of free world 
trade conducted by the major parties to the negotiation, r ather 
than selected by mutual consent of the countries principally 
concerned in the trade, as under the proposal considered here . 
The approach was applied, or essayed, in the Kennedy Round 
itself, in the case of particular difficult industrial sectors; 
most notably, the liberalization of trade in chemicals was 
handled by a special agreement embodied in a separate protocol , 
It has been recommended as a possible basis for future negoti -
ations in the GATT framework by Mr. Eric Wyndham White , 
Director-General of GATT . 
1The discussion of this section draws heavily on G . and 
V . Curzon, After the Kennedy Round : What Trade Rhcies Now? 
(London: The Atlantic Trade Study, 1968) . 
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The industries or industry groups to which the sector-
by- sector approach might be effectively applied could be select-
ed according to a variety of criteria. First, an effort might 
be made to eliminate "nuisance tariffs" - that is,, to estab-
lish free trade in products where the existing tariffs of the 
major countries or a substantial proportion of them, are 
already low, sa~ 5 percent or less. Second, the "dominant 
supplier" concept of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (and 
of previous item- by-item bargaining in GATT) might be reviv-
ed in a suitably amended form. Third, the effort might be 
made to specify industries or industry groups in which the 
freeing of trade on a sectoral basis would be likely to be mutu-
ally beneficial without imposing serious adjustment problems 
for the countries involved. Specifically, trade might be 
freed on a sectoral basis in high-technology research- inten-
sive products, in which tariff protection is relatively ineffec-
tive in giving a competitive advantage in the market as compared 
with technological leader ship and innovative capacity . Or it 
might be freed on a sectoral basis in products which the major 
countries both export and import on a fairly large scale, so 
that the adjustment to free trade would mainly involve changes 
in national product mixes rather than overall changes in 
national industry sizes. Or trade might be freed in semi-
manuf actured materials that serve mainly as inputs into other 
industries. 
The sector- by- sector approach would have the advant-
age of consistency with the GATT principle of non- discrimina-
tion, and of considerable flexibility. On the other hand, 
it would have most of the disadvantages of GATT negotiations 
prior to the Kennedy Round; that is, there would be urgency 
about negotiating tariff reductions, and the advance towards 
free trade could be blocked by the unwillingness of a major 
industrial country to participate in the negotiations. 
Most important, given the urgency of expanding export 
markets for the manufacturers of the developing countries, 
even more than the item- byeitem approach of GATT bargain-
ing prior to the Kennedy Round the sector- by- sector approach 
would tend to reduce tariff barriers in a manner that would 
de facto discriminate against the inanuf acturing export interests 
of the developing countries. This would be especially so for 
the freeing of trade in technologically advanced products, which 
could benefit the developed countries considerably but would be 
of little or no help to the developing countries - and could even 
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damage them to the extent that technologically- advanced pro-
ducts such as computers serve as inputs into the efficient pro-
duction in developed countries of more conventional and stand-
ardized products with which the developing countries must com-
pete on the basis of cheaper labour employing a less sophi sti-
cated technology. Free trade in products that the developed 
countries both export and import on a large scale would probab-
ly be relatively neutral in its short- run effects on developing 
country exports, almost by definition, though in the longer 
run it might well expand the opportunities for developing coun-
tries to become themselves exporters of the products in ques -
tion . The freeing of trade in semi - manufactured inputs might 
benefit the developing countries considerably, in the sense 
that such inputs may be characterized by routine production 
methods suitable for transplantation to developing countries , 
and may sell on a s t raight basis of the pri ce charged for a 
standard product without involving the need to appeal to buyer's 
tastes or preferences; on the other hand, the availability of 
cheaper inputs to the developed country producers of the final 
product outputs would increase the effective rate of protection 
enjoyed by these producers in their domestic markets against 
competition from developing country exporters of rival final 
products. 
III Discriminatory Approaches to Trade Liberalization 
Given the political fact that the liberalization of trade 
in the modern world has to be undertaken through international 
bargaining for reciprocal tariff reduction, the GATT system 
of regulating barriers to international trade through multilate -
ral agreement and reducing such barrie rs by multilateral bar-
gaining is a great improvement overthe bilateral methods em-
ployeed previously , since it marshalls the superior force of 
multilateral sanctions to the policing of agreements once arriv-
ed at, and permits a sort of "multilateral clearing" as cont-
rasted with "bilateral balancing" of the tariff concessions the 
separate nations are willing to offer . On the other hand , 
the multilateral character of GATT tariff bargaining , in con-
junction with the principle of non- di scrimination between 
national suppliers of particular i mported goods, ensures that 
progress towards free trade can only be made at the pace which 
the most timid or reluctant of the major countries participating 
in the bargaining is prepared to tolerate . 
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In view of this disadvantage of the GATT machinery, 
which appeared particularly serious to proponents of freer 
trade during the long glacial period of the Kennedy Round 
negotiations before agreement was finally ·reached, alternative 
approaches to freer trade have been proposed which would en-
able those countries most interested in further liberalization of 
trade to go ahead on their own, on the discriminatory basis of 
liberalizing trade among themselves without extending the bene-
fits to other countries. These alternatives have been propos-
ed with various motives in mind: sometimes simply to enable 
the most ardent free-trade countries to set their own pace; 
sometimes with the objective of forcing the hands of the laggards 
by establishing superior bargaining power in the form of collec-
tive rather than individual national discrimination against them; 
and sometimes with the hope that the laggards will be, not 
corrected by discrimination, but won over by the demonstra-
tion of the benefits of freer trade to be provided by the new 
discriminatory trading arrangement. 
(a) The Conditional Most-Favoured Nation Approach 
As already mentioned, it is a basic principle of GATT 
that negotiated tariff reductions should be non- discriminatory, 
that is, that they should be extended to all members of GATT 
whether or not they have reciprocated those reductions by 
reductions of their own tariffs; and it is this principle that 
confines the pace of trade liberalization to the pace tolerable 
to the participating countries least enthusiastic about trade 
liberalization. To circumvent this drawback of the GATT 
apparatus for trade liberalization, it has been suggested that 
the countries most anxious to liberalize trade - and specifical-
ly the United States - should in their international bargaining 
revert to a technique employed in the past, that of conditional 
most-favoured nations treatment, under which tariff reductions 
arrived at by bilateral or multilateral bargaining would be avail-
able to other nations not party to the original bargaining only 
on condition that they offered equivalent reductions of their own 
tariffs. 
This proposal was made by various experts and politici- · 
ans prior to and in the middle stages of the Kennedy Round, 
when it was thought that the Common 1vI arket countries would 
refuse to bargain for tariff reductions within GATT; and it was 
also considered by various Kennedy Round negotiators as a 
means of countering the propensity of Australia, Canada, Japan 
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and New Zealand to attempt to enjoy a "free ride" on the tariff 
reductions being negotiated among the U.S . , U. K. , and E.E.C. 
without offering tariff reductions of their own in reciprocation.1 
It obviously has certain attractions as a technique by which a 
group of like - minded countries bent on trade liberalization could 
press ahead, especially if their long-range aim were to build 
up their bargaining power against the group of laggard countri-
es in the hope of coercing the latter into being willing to negoti-
ate free trade on a multilateral basis. 
The conditional most - favoured-nation principle was the 
basis of United States tariff policy until 1923; and it is rele-
vant that it was abandoned because of the serious difficulties 
encountered in operating a tariff policy on that principle. 
Strongly against reversion to it is the consideration that, 
since unconditional most-favoured nation treatment is the basic 
principle of GATT, a GATT waiver requiring a unanimous 
vote would be necessary if reversion were to be made consist-
ent with the preservation of the GATT machinery and the 
GATT structure of tariff agreements and code of good commer-
cial policy behaviour. Apart from that problem, which could 
presumably be overcome if the countries involved were import-
ant enough in world trade and could make out a plausi ble enough 
case 6.at what they proposed to do was consistent with the free-
trade spirit of GATT, there is the more general question whe-
ther it is worth bringing the principle of non-discrimination into 
jeopardy, whatever the provocation offered at particular points 
of time by the obstinate refusal of important countries to co-
operate in the liberalization of trade. The principle of non-
discrimination, embodied in the unconditional most-favoured-
nation provision, does establish a rule of law in international 
commercial diplomacy, whereas, as both past history and 
general reasoning show, the conditional most-£ avoured-nation 
approach can only too easily degenerate into the law of the 
jungle. The principle of non-discrimination as implemented 
and applied through GATT has on the whole and in the long 
haul worked well, and there is every reason not to subvert it 
for the sake of a temporary acceleration of the pace of trade 
liberalization. This conclusion is especially cogent as there 
exists within the framework _of GATT, and quite consistently 
with its principles , an alternative means by which countries 
desirous of forcing the pace of trade liberalization can do so 
by establishing freer trading arrangements among themselves 
discriminatory against third parties - the exemption from the 
general GATT ban on new preferential arrangements of custom 
(1) See Curzon and Curzon, op . ut. pp . 32- 34 
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unions and free trade areas covering "substantially all trade" 
among the participating countries and scheduled to come into 
full effect within a definite period of time. 
(b) The Free Trade Area Approach 
The exemption of customs unions and free trade areas 
from the general enjoinment on new preferential arrangements, 
provided that they cover "substantially all trade" among the 
members, rests on the assumption that such trading arrange-
ments represent on balance a movement towards freer world 
trade. That assumption is extremely questionable as a gene-
ral presumption, from the theoretical point of view, but the 
central point is that such arrangements are sanctioned by 
international agreement as a legitimate means of moving towards 
free trade. Moreover, while the phrasing requires the inclusion of 
"substantially all trade", recognition of the special position and pro-
blems of agriculture has meant that in practice what is required to 
qualify for approval is free trade in in substantially all industrial · 
products. 
The two alternative forms of discriminatory trading 
arrangement deemed consistent with the general principle of 
non-discrimination are, however, sharply divergent in their 
implications. The customs union requires unification of ex-
ternal tariffs, which in turn presumes a common political will 
and implies the creation of at least a "pseudo-nation" out of 
the member nations for the purpose of commercial policy with 
respect to the outside world, whereas the free trade area 
provides only for free trade with other members, and allows 
members to retain their national sovereignty with respect to 
commercial relations with the outside world . Thus the rela-
tive emphasis of a customs union is on joint discrimination by 
members against trade with non-members, whereas the rela-
tive emphasis of a free trade area is on the freeing of trade 
between members; and the customs union makes it relatively 
difficult, whereas the free trade area makes it relative easy, 
to admit new members from the outside world. The customs 
union, in other words, is primarily a means of extending the 
scope of national tariff protection, whereas the free trade 
area is primarily a means of extending free domestic competi-
tion beyond national boundaries . (This .distinction is of 
course too black- and-white, because both types of arrange -
ment have both types of effect; but it seems valid as a broad 
generalization) . It follows that the free trade area is the 
natural arrangement for a group of countries that wish to ac-
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celerate progress towards world free trade in the face of re -
luctance on the part of others to adopt. This is the motiva-
tion of most of the proponents of a North Atlar.tic Free Trade 
Area, and presumably the motivation of the proponents - or at 
least of many of them - of a Pacific Free Trade Area . How-
ever, a free trade area is also an attractive arrangement for 
a group of countries in a region that would like to exploit the 
development potentialities of the region on the basis of region-
al protection, but by reason of political, economic, and cul-
tural diversity could not contemplate formation of a customs 
union. This has been the motivation of some proponents of 
free trade between Canada and the United States, and is 
presumably the motivation of some proponents of free trade 
among Australia, New Zealand and Japan. 
Apart from the fact that a free trade area constitutes 
a legitimate method, within the framework of GATT, of accele-
rating progress towards free trade by by-passing countries 
reluctant to co-operate in making such progress, the free 
trade method has the substantive advantage over bargaining 
for tariff reductions multilaterally in GATT that it promises 
to arrive at complete free trade, albeit only with other member 
countries, within a finite and predictable period of time . 
This is :i matter of considerable importance to the smaller and • 
less mature industrial countries that might participate in such 
an arrangement, since the main gains that such countries may 
expect to obtain from trade liberalization lie in the opportuni-
ties for specialization, and the associated economies of scale 
and profitability of research and development expenditure, that 
free trade and the guarantee of assured acc e ss to a large 
market, but not low tariffs and changeable foreign commercial 
policies, can provide . 
By contrast to the multilateral non- discriminatory ap-
proach to trade liberalization discussed in the preceding sec-
tion, also, the free trade area alternative (and for that mat-
ter the formation of customs unions) provides the institutional 
opportunity to make special arrangements to expand export 
opportunities for the developing countries, either for the col-
lectivity of them or for those in the region on which the free 
trade area is formed. As mentioned in the introductory sec-
tion, the effort to improve the export opportunities of the 
developing countries through the machinery of GATT has had 
rather dis appointing results, the multilateral context of negoti -
ation apparently providing insufficient stimulus for the exercise 
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of generosity by the developed towards the developing countries . 
On the other hand, action by individual developed nations is 
inhibited both by the general aversion to showing more genero-
sity than others, and by the concrete fear that such excessive 
generosity would lead to undue disruption of domestic markets. 
The free trade area offers in this connection a convenient 
half-way house : as an association of like - minded nations it is 
more likely than the aggregate of the Contracting Parties to 
GATT to be able to form a concensus on appropriate trade 
policies for assisting the developing countries - especially if 
it assumes specific responsibility for developing countries in 
its own region - while at the same time being able to arrange 
for the burden of adjustment to expanded imports from the 
developing nations to be fairly shared among its members. 
IV The Position of the Pacific and Asian Regions 
The evolution of international commercial policy since 
the Second World War has been dominated by relations with-
in the North Atlantic Region between the United States on 
the one side and the European countries on the other, rela-
tions strongly conditioned in the immediate postwar period by 
the "cold war" between the United States and Russia . In 
the course of the postwar period, U . S . foreign economic 
policy has turned from the pursuit of the pre- war objective of 
1 multilateral non-discriminatory reduction of tariff barriers to 
the promotion of European economic integration, and then 
back to the non- discriminatory liberalizati on of world trade as 
a means of containing the regionalizing and discriminatory 
forces it had turned loose in Europe. The conclusion of the 
Kennedy Round marks the achievement of only partial success 
in this last endeavour . This paper has surveyed the alter-
native strategies available for pursuing the ultimate objective 
of free world trade in the post- Kennedy Round era. In so 
doing, it has maintained the conventional focus of trade policy 
discussion. on the Atlantic Region, on the traditional assump-
tion that world trade policy is appropriately discussed in that 
context. 
The configuration of world trade has been changing, 
however, with the rise of the Pacific Region, which overlaps 
the North Atlantic region through the inclusion in both of the 
United States and Canada . The political environment of 
international commercial diplomacy has also been changing , 
with the achievement of a detente between the United States 
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and the Soviet Union and the emergence of Communist China 
as a rival super-power. It is necessary, therefore, to 
consider briefly the position of the Pacific and Asian Regions, 
and particularly the part that the advanced industrial countries 
of the Pacific might play in the evolution of a new world trade 
policy in the post- Kennedy Round era. 
While the relative importance of the Pacific Region in \ 
world trade has been increasing, and while one can forecast 
a growing role of Asia in international commerce, the Atlan-
tic Region will remain for a long time ahead the focus of world 
trade strategy. This implies that the proposal for a Pacific 
Free Trade Area (to include the U.S.A. and Canada as well 
as Australia, Japan and New Zealand) cannot be a proposal 
for near-term action, but must be at best a long-range project. 
As such, its relevance and feasibility will depend on three 
factors: the evolution of the importance in world trade and the 
patterns of trading interests of the prospective partners, the 
development of Communist China as a political and economic 
power in the world, and the development of trading relation-
ships in the Atlantic Region. As suggested in earlier sec- _ 
tions, the proposal would be most likely to become practically . 
relevant if on. the one hand Britain and the other EFT A coun-
tries gained admission to a European Common Market that 
remained protectionist and inward- looking, and attempted to 
build itself up as a super-power rival to the United States and 
the Soviet Union, while on the other hand the United States 
became concerned to strengthen the economies of the non-Com-
munist countries of the Pacific against the threat of aggression 
from Communist China, as earlier she was concerned to 
strengthen the economies of Europe against the threat of Com-
munist agression from Russia. If, to the contrary, the 
EFT A countries succeeded in entering a Europe which there-
after became outward-looking and interested in further trade 
liberalization, free trade in the Pacific would be subordinated 
to free trade for the world as a whole as an objective; and if 
Britain decided to write off her bid to join the Common Market 
as a failure, and turn westward across the Atlantic in her 
trade policy, Pacific free trade would be a sequel and exten-
sion or adjunct of Atlantic free trade. 
Since the likely course of future events is unpredictable, 
the proposal for a Pacific Free Trade Area is nevertheless 
well worth exploring, especially as a Pacific Free Trade 
Area would not be inconsistent with an Atlantic Free Trade 
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area; rather, the two would be complementary instrumentali-
ties of advance towards the ultimate objective of world free 
trade . Moreover, publicity for the benefits of free trade, 
whatever the form proposed for it, will be salutary in a post-
Kennedy Round era in which the forces of protectionism 
threaten to gather strength; and the results of research on the 
probable effects of a Pacific Free Trade Area will be useful 
for the determination of future trade policy, whether or not 
the actual outcome is a Pacific free trade arrangement . 
Finally, exploration in the context of the Pacific Free Trade 
Area proposal of measures that might be taken to expand the 
export markets of the developing countries will be independent-
ly useful in helping to solve one of the most important outstand-
ing problems of world trade policy in the post-Kennedy Round 
era. 
For the nearer term, it would seem more realistic to 
concentrate attention on the probable benefits, drawbacks, 
and constitutional problems of a narrower Pacific free trade 
arrangement among Australia, New Zealand, and Japan . 
There is no reason why the exploration, and the formation, 
of regional arrangements for freer trade should wait on the 
determination of a global world trade strategy; and, as out-
lined above, there are various reasons why a regional free 
trade arrangement may be more attractive to relatively small , 
not yet fully mature industrial economies than the gradual 
negotiation of successive reductions of existing tariffs that 
has been pursued by the larger and more mature industrial 
nations through the agency of GATT. A free trade area 
among these three countries could in addition - like EFT A in 
the European context --- serve as a pilot model of free trade 
for the rest of the world, and possibly in the course of time 
be one of the building blocks out of which a world- wide system 
of free trade could be constructed. 
Chapter 8 THE AGRICULTURAL GAP IN THE PACIFrcl 
by Kenzo Hemmi 
Associate Professor, The University of Tokyo 
I Background 
The European Economic Community, which is the most 
important trading area of agricultural commodities in the world, 
launched a Common Agricultural production and trade in the 
community are effectively integrated by this policy, which is, 
the author thinks, quite protective. The second biggest trad-
ing area of agricultural commodities in the world is the Pacific 
Basin. The four biggest exporters of agricultural commodi-
ties in the world, i.e., Australia, Canada, New Zealand and 
the United States, and Japan, one of the world's biggest im-
porters of agricultural commodities, all face to the Pacific 
Basin. Asia and the Far East, which is also a big importer 
of agricultural commodities, gi:~ts a large part of its agricultur-
al import requirements via the Pacific routf's. Therefore, ,, 
the Pacific Basin is the most important unintegrated trading 
area of agricultural commodities in the world and is extremely 
important in promoting the stability and orderly expansion of 
world trade in agricultural commodities. 
No,vadays almost all developed countries are protecting 
their domestic agriculture, and the world trade in agricultural 
commodities is far from free. However, it is without ques-
tion that a country whose agricultural economy depends heavily 
on exports can not pursue its agricultural progress independent-
ly of the world market. Agricultural resources in the four 
exporting countries of the Pacific Bas in are too abundant to 
permit them to pursui:=- thPir agricultural program independently 
of the world market . Moreover, they are all temperate zone 
producers, and producing and exporting the same kinds of 
commodities. On the other hand, Japan, which is protecting 
its domestic agriculture very strictly, depends heavily on 
these-·major exporters for food and agricultural raw materials 
fThe author is extremely grateful for the comments offer-
ed at the conference, especially for the one by Professor Sir 
John G. Crawford, the Australian National University. 
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since its agricultural resources are too poor to supply its 
population with sufficient food and fibre. Joint action of the 
five developed Pacific countries in the field of agricultural 
trade could be very effective not only in promoting the stability 
·and orderly expansion of Pacific trade in agricultural commodi -
ties, but also in setting up successful domestic agricultural 
programs . The first step in this direction will be taken at 
the end of January 1968, when five Pacific members of the 
International Federation of Agricultural Producers meet in 
Honolulu to discuss various aspects of the Pacific trade in 
agricultural commodities, including food problems in develop-
ing countries . We hope that the Honolulu conference is 
successful and is followed by more powerful action . 
On the we stern side of the Pacific Bas in there are the 
developing countries of Asia and the Far East. As noted 
earlier, these countries are, as a group, big importers of 
agricultural commodities, although their main export items 
are also agricultural commodities . The average per capita 
calorie intake of this area in 1962 was 2,080 calories, which 
was only 93 percent of the calorie requirement of the area. 1 
This was the lowest figure in the world. The countries in 
the area are mainly agricultural. Agricultural productivity 
in these countries is very low and will be a bottleneck to their 
economic development. Therefore , transforming the tradi -
tional agricultural methods into modern ones is of vital import-
ance to attain not only a high nutritional level, but also rapid 
economic development in these countries. As will be noted 
later, there is a big gap in agricultural productivity between 
these developing countri es and the developed Pacific countries . 
The agricultural resources and scientific knowlP<lge accumulat-
ed in the latter can be used in transforming agriculture in the 
former. Joint action of the five Pacific countries in this 
field will be very helpful too . 
The purpose of this paper is to explain the necessity and 
efficacy of joint action in these two fields of agriculture among 
the five Pacific countries and to show a feasible way to co -
ordinate it . 
1F ood and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, Agricultural Commodities - - Projections for 1975 
and 1985, 1967, Vol. 1, pp . 36- 37. 
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II The Outlook for Trade in Agricultural Commodity 
in the Area in 1975. 
In this section basic data for explaining the need and 
feasibility of Pacific agricultural integration is presented . 
It is a survey of the demand for and supply of various agricul-
tural commodities at present and in 1975 . The survey is 
quite selective>, and only important trading items in the area 
are included. 
Another kind of basic data for the same purpose may be 
the estimated effect of the reduction of tariff and non- tariff 
barriers on trade of the commodities in the area . However, 
lessons from the Kennedy Round discussions show that any 
further significant lowering of levels of agricultural protec-
tion in either the United States or Japan is not immediately 
practicable 1 . The binding of montante de soutien (fixing 
levels of protection), arrangements for ratios of self- suffici-
ency, 2 and other measures will be more practical. The au-
thor does not estimate any effect of reduction of tariff and non-
tariff barriers on t~ ade of the commodities in the area. 
Fortunately an extremely comprehensive study of agri-
cultural commodity projections for 1975 and 1985 by the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations was pub-
lished recently . 3 The summary of results is included with 
the author's own estimates in the appendix tables at the end of 
this paper. Highlights in the summary are as follows . 
1 After receiving the comments by Professor Crawford the 
author feels that the latter part of this sentence should be re -
placed by the following one. " . . . any further significant lower-
ing of levels of agricultural protection in either the United States 
or Japan is not immediately practicable." 
2The ideas of montante de soutien and of arranging ratios 
of self- succiency were proposed by the European Economic Com-
munity in the Kennedy Round negotiations as parts of an idea for 
market organizing world trade in agricultural commodities . 
For details of this idea, see Yves Malgrain, L 'Inte.gration 
Agricole de L'Europe des Six, 1965, esp . Part Three and 
J. H . Richter , Agricultural Protection and Trade : Proposals 
for International Policy, 1964, Chap . II . 
3F ood and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations , 
A.gricultural Commodities - Projections for 1975 and 1985, 1967 , 
2 vols. the author owes heavily to Mr . Yonosuke Hara for h i s 
statistical work in checking the F AO figures . 
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Wheat Exportable surpluses of wheat will increase 
significantly in the United States and Canada, and also in-
crease in Australia . Japanese import requirements will in-
crease considerably, while those of New Zeal and will de-
crease . The net exportable surplus of the developed Pacific 
countries will increase significantly . The import require-
ments of Southern and Western Europe will decrease drastic -
ally, and, the Pacific wheat exporters will find it very diffi -
cult to find an export market for their wheat. The exportable 
surplus of these countries will be far bigger than the total im-
port requirements of the developing countries, including the 
countries of Asia and the Far East. Therefore, an arrange-
ment for production control among the developed Pacific coun-
tries will be worthy of consideration, and there will be a pos -
sibility of including a food aid program in the arrangement. 
Coarse grains Among the Pacific exporters only the 
United States will increase its exportable surplus of coarse 
grain considerably. However, the amount of the projected 
increase is almost equal to the projected amount of increase in 
Japanese import requirements . Thailand will also increase 
its exportable surplus. However, other Asian countries, 
such as India, will increase their import requirements too . 
Moreover, the projected world production is almost in balance 
with the projected world consumption . There will be no seri-
ous problem in coarse grain trade in 1975 . 
Rice Rice is, and will be far more important in agri -
cultural production and food consumption in Asia and the Far 
East. During 1961-1963 Asia and the Far East exported 
rice in small amounts to the outside world . However, under 
a low GDP assumption, there is a possibility of a rice defici -
ency in the area, though the projected deficient amount will 
not be large and can be met by the projected exportable surplus 
of the developed Pacific countries . Therefore, there will 
be no serious shortage in the rice trade in 1975 except for the 
problem of foreign e xchange needed for the developing Asian 
importers to buy rice . Under a high GDP assumption, pro-
jected world production will exceed the projected world con-
sumption by about 6 million tons . When this situation is real-
ized, Asian rice exporters will face serious difficulty in find -
ing export markets . Moreover, the projected wheat surplus 
of the world is far bigger under a high GDP assumption than 
under a low GDF assumption . 
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Although there are many publications and speeches whi c h 
warn the world of a serious food shortage in the not very dis -
tant future, the fact is that, as far as the grain economy i s 
concerned, there will be no serious shortage , but a possibility 
of having a serious surplus in the world , particularly in the 
Pacific- Asia area , by around 1975 . The other fact to be 
noted is that the approximate self- sufficiency in rice of Indi a , 
Pakistan and some other countries is dependent upon large 
amounts of wheat imported partly as a substitute for rice . A 
considerable part of these wheat imports has been on conces-
sional terms. Therefore, in any consideration of arrange-
ment of wheat trade among the developed Pacific countries men-
tioned above , not only coarse grains , but also r i ce should be 
included . 
Milk and milk products These products are produced 
and consumed mainly in developed and centrally planned coun-
tries , and not in developing countries . There will be th r ee 
noteworthy tendencies in production and trade among the develop -
ed countries . First, the European Economic Community wi ll 
experience a tremendous increase in its exportable surplus , and 
will export the equivalent of 8 million tons of milk in milk pro-
ducts in 1975 , which will be slightly less than the projected com-
bined exportable surplus of Australia and New Zealand . Of 
course , both Australia and New Zealand will increase their 
exportable surpluses considerably . Second , Japan will in-
crease its import requirement significantly . Third , both the 
United States and Canada will not increase thei r exportable 
surpluses . 1 The developi ng countries , especially developi ng 
Asian countri es , will become influential figures in the world 
trade in milk products . The se countries will increase thei r 
import requirement tremendously . The output of milk in these 
countries scarcely kept pace during the past decade with the in-
crease in consumption due to increases in both population and 
per capita consumption , and this tendency will conti nue in the 
future . 
In summary, there will be two big problems in this group of 
commodities . First, both Australia and New Zealand will 
1Recent developments in the dairy industry in the Uni ted 
States shows that there is a possibility of the United States 
becoming a net importer in the near future . 
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face a grave difficulty in finding cash markets for their products 
in the developed countries.1 Second, how to supply the popu-
lation of Asia and the Far East with sufficient and cheap milk 
and milk products will be a serious problem not only in these 
developing countries, but also in the developed Pacific countri-
es. We have to be prepared to face these problems. 
Meat A table for meat is not included in the appendix , 
because tendencies in the world meat market resemble the tend-
encies in the world milk and milk products market except for the 
following facts. First, the European Economic Community 
will continue to be a big importer of meat. Second, the deve-
loped countries as a whole will continue to be big importers of 
meat. These two tendencies are especially true in the case 
of beef and veal. There will be no serious problem for Aust-
ralia and New Zealand in finding a cash market for meat. 
The only problem foreseen in the future is how to supply the 
Asian population with sufficient and cheap meat. The output 
of poultry and pork can be expanded rapidly, and the feed con-
version ratio which can be obtained is relatively high. The 
problem of supplying the Asian population with meat will not be 
as serious as that of milk and milk products. 
Sugar The future of the world sugar market is quite 
uncertain, since the futures of both centrally planned countries 
and Latin American countries, mainly Cuba, are quite uncer-
tain. However, the developing Asian countries will continue 
to be exporters of sugar, and so will be Australia, although 
Australian exports of sugar will increase more rapidly than 
those of the other Pacific-Asia exporters. The United 
States imports will not increase significantly. Japan and 
Canada will increase their import requirements considerably , 
and the combined volume of increase in imports projected is 
about equal to the combined volume of projected increase in the 
exportable surplus of Oceania. Therefore, it can be con-
cluded that, if the developed Pacific and developing Asian 
countries agree about arranging the sugar trade in the Pacific-
Asia area, the arrangement will be quite helpful in stablizing 
and expanding the sugar trade in the area. 2 
1u the United Kingdom succeed in joining in the Europe-
an Economic Community, the difficulty of Australia and New 
Zealand will be extremely serious. 
2It is to be noted that the International Sugar Agreement 
has not been working recently. 
THE AGRICULTURAL GAP IN THE PACIFIC 257 
Fats and oils Fats and oils consist of five groups of 
commodities; i) by- products such as cottonseed oil, fish oil , 
etc.; ii) tree crops such as palm oil, olive oil, etc. ; iii) 
annual crops such as groundnut oil, rapeseed oil, etc.; iv) 
butter and v) whale oil. The production and consumption of 
fats and oils is extremely complex, and the supply of and demand 
for some items of fats and oils are fairly elastic with respect to 
price changes in these commodities. Production can easily 
balance consumption, especially in developed countries. The 
biggest problem of the Pacific exporters will be to find markets 
for their products in the centrally planned economies. Only 
in some Asian countries, India and Pakistan, will the shortage 
in fats and oils worsen . The fat and oil problem in Asian and 
the Far East as a whole is the projected decrease in exportable 
surpluses in the area. The future of fats and oils will be 
similar to that of milk and milk products. 
Tea The main producers in the world are India and 
Ceylon . They will increase their exports of tea tremendously. 
The problem of tea is exclusively one of assuring a market for 
them. 
Cotton There are two problems in cotton. The first 
is the problem of shifting cotton manufacturing from the develop-
ed to the developing countries . Considerable expansion can 
be anticipated in the textile export capacities of India, P akis -
tan, Hong Kong and a number of smaller developing countries . . 
Net imports of cotton manufactures into other developing coun-
tries may be reduced . On the other hand, imports into deve -
loped countries of cotton goods will increase, and Japanes e ex-
ports may decline. The future of the developing cottom manu-
facturing countries will depend on their capacity to reduce the 
cost of manufacturing and to improve the quality of the goods. 
The second problem is that cotton i.s keenly competing with 
man- made fibers . The future of cotton producers will conti-
nue to depend upon their capacity to reduce the costs of produc-
tion and to improve quality . 
The survey above of the demand for and supply of various 
agricultural commodities in the area shows that there will be 
no serious food shortage in the area. In the cases of some 
quality foods, such as milk and milk products , how to overcome 
the projected shortage will be a real problem, and in some coun-
tries , sucl;i. as India and Pakistan, there will be a continuous 
necessity of increasing food production, since these countries 
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will continue to have a shortage of foreign exchange. Gene-
rally speaking, a mere increase in production of a commodity 
in some importing countries will have an adverse effect on ex-
porters of the same commodity. Measures for stabilizing 
and expanding trade in agricultural commodities in such a situ-
ation will be discussed in the next section . 
Before discussing measures, we have to make clear a 
deep rooted problem in Asian agriculture. As noted earlier , 
imports of rice into Asian rice eating countries have been kept 
at low level by high level imports of wheat in postwar days. 
For example, rice imports of the rice ea ting Asian countries 
(Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Hong Kong, Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan) totalled about 5 million tons annually dur-
ing 1934- 38, and it was 3.4milliontons annually during 1957-
59. Wheat imports in the same are a totalled 0. 3 million tons 
annually during 1934-38 and 7. 4 million tons annually during 
1957-59. The percentage of the total wheat imports of wheat 
that was bou'i_ht on special terms during the latter period were 
only 51-62%. It is clear that Asian rice exporters are los -
ing their competitive position in world grain trade. 
Long-run price movements for rice show the same fact. 
Table 1 shows that the rice price did not show any tendency of 
decline while the wheat price did. (The rice price during 1950-
52 was exceptionally high because of the Korean War.) The 
same tendency could be seen in the British market since 
1867- 77 . The price of Burmf'se rice at British ports of 
import declined only 7 percent during the period from 1867- 77 
(average) to 1931-39 (average), while the American wheat 
price in the same places declined about 42 percent during the 
same period . 2 There has been a widening productivity gap 
between the developed Pacific wheat production and the deve-
loping Asian rice production. 
1see Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, The World Rice Economy, Vol. II: Trends and Forces, 
1963, p. 95. 
2v. D. Wickizer and M. K. Bennett, The Rice Economy 
of Monsoon Asia, 1941, p. 137 
THE AGRICULTURAL GAP IN THE PACIFIC 259 
Table 1. Changes in World Market Price of Rice and Wheat 
(1934- 38 = 100) 
1924- 28 1950-52 1959-61 
Rice 321 490 359 
Wheat 270 239 200 
Source : Uni t e d Nations, Commodity Survey 1962, 
1963, p . 19 . 
Rice represents Asian agriculture while wheat represents 
western agriculture . Agriculture is the most important economi c 
sector amoung the developing Asian countries. Moreover, 
rice was, and i s abasicwagegoodin Asia and the Far East , 
while grain and animals fed on grain were , and are, basic 
wage goods in western countries . Therefore , it can be said 
that the Ricardian case of a falling rate of profit and vanishing 
investment opportunities is working in the developing Asian 
countries . Cheap food is much important than self- sufficiency 
in food among the developing Asian countries . As Thorkil 
Kristensen, Secretary- General of OECD , stated, some of 
them w~mld do better to continue to be large net importers of 
food for a long period to come, and to become rather large ex-
porters of manufactured goods . 1 
III Possi ble Arran.gements for Stabilizing and Expanding 
Pacific Trade in A.gricultural Commodities . 
We have three kinds of experiences in controlling trade 
in agricultural commoditi e s in postwar days . These are ex-
periences in international commodity agreements , in the dis -
posal of surplus agricultural products or food aid, and in the 
Kennedy Round negotiation . · 
1Thorkil Kristensen, "The Economist and Farm People 
in a Rapidly Changing World", in Inte rnational Journal of 
Agrarian Affairs , May 1967 , pp . 151- 55 . 
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Postwar experiences of internatio_nal co:n~odit1 agree-
ments have, generally speaking, been d1sappo1ntmg. The 
reasons for this disappointment are as follows. First, the 
agreements have had nothing to do directly with the long-run 
tendencies of the commodity exports from developing countries . 
Second, a far smaller number of agreements were concluded 
than was expected in the immediate postwar period . Third , 
these agreements have been too timid in asking modifications in 
the domestic commodity policies of participating countries . 
These reasons have to be taken into consideration in formulat -
ing possible arrangements. 
Experiences in surplus disposal or food aid have been 
fairly successful, partly due to the excellent principles of 
surplus disposal recommended by F AO and agreed upon by 
almost all developed countries . 2 But the main reasons for 
success c;ire the persistent food and foreign exchange shortage 
of a number of developing countries, and the ability of the 
United States to export the commodities on concessional terms . 
It is, of course, true that food aid is a special kind of tied aid , 
and has some of the common drawbacks of tied aid. More -
over, surplus stocks of grains have diminished in recent years, 
and after the large sales to India in 1965-6, they no longer 
exist. As was stated in the last section, to meet the needs 
of the recipient developing countries, milk and milk products 
and some other non- cereal foods will have to be included as 
food aid commodities in the future . Therefore, food aid 
has to come out of current production in the future, and it will 
be a heavier burden to donor countries than when it was taken 
out of stocks already accumulated in order to support domestic 
agriculture. These facts have to be taken into consideration 
in the formulation, too. 
Before discussing the Kennedy Round negotiations, 
1see Kenzo Hemmi, "International Commodity Problems," 
in Measures for Trade Expansion of Developing Countries : 
Re ort of a a an Economic Research Center Internati onal 
Conference, 19 , pp. 223-24 . 
2See, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, Functions of A World Food Reserve: Scope and 
Limitations, 1956, pp. 75-77. 
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some facts in the history of the General Agree ment on Tari ffs 
and Trade need to be noted . 1 First , as early as 1954- 55 , 
the United States expressed the intention of continuing import 
restrictions on milk products on whi ch there were no domesti c 
restri ctions. S inc e then milk products have continued to be 
the subject of the most heated debates i n GATT di scussions . 
New Zealand i s among the claimants, and the United State s 
is among the defenders . A Special Group on Dairy Product s 
which was formed as a part of the Dillon Round settlement h a s 
not worked at all . Second, mainly as a result of the Habe r -
ler Report , it has been increasingly realized that the tariff is 
only one of many devices for agricultural protection . It was 
estimated that, of the production in the thirty- four countri es 
investigated, non- tariff measures covered the trade of 
84% of all butter production , 2 
59% of all cheese production , 
52% of all sugar production, 
87% of all wheat production . 
These non-tariff measures include not only quantitative restri c -
tions, but also import levies , state trading measures , bilate-
ral agreements, etc . Finally, overlapping with thi s fact , 
it has been increasingly realized that different principles have 
to be applied to trade in agricultural commodities than those 
applied to trade in manufactured commodities. The Groups 
on Cereals , Meats and Dai ry Products , all of whi ch were 
formed at the same time , were a response to this realizati on . 
The Baumgartne r Proposals for organizing world trade in 
agricultural commodities also arose from such a realization . 
The experiences of the Kennedy Round negotiations 
generally resemble those above listed . First, the resulting 
tariff cuts in agricultural commodities are less remarkable 
than those in manufactured commodities, and it is generally 
1see Gerard Cur son , Multilateral Commercial Diplo-
macy ; The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and its 
Im act on National Commercial Policies and Techni ues , 
19 5, chapter VII . 
· 2 
Op . cit. , p . 192 . 
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believed that there will be no significant tariff cuts in agricul-
tural commodities in the near future. Second, among the 
concessions in the GATT negotiations, a proposal for having 
agreements to keep the self- sufficiency ratio below a declared 
percentage was outstanding. Since the difficulty of remov-
ing agricultural protection in developed countries is already 
generally recognized, and since the fact that protection, in 
turn, stimulates technical progress is also generally recogniz-
ed, assurances not to increase the self- sufficiency ratio may 
be a practical type of concession. Third, a proposal to 
bind the montante de soutien as an element of concession was 
proposed, though it did not receive so much attention as the 
notion of the assurance. These three experiences show that 
any further significant reduction in levels of agricultural pro-
tection is not immediately practicable . However, in develop-
ed countries, the volume of import, or export of some agricul-
tural commodities, such as milk and milk products, is small in 
relation to domestic consumption or domestic production. 
Therefore, the net imports of developed countries could be very 
sensitive to moderately small changes in domestic agricultural 
and food policies . 1 In the case of Japan, even the fixing of 
the level of protection' will be effective in expanding imports of 
agricultural commodities . Fourth, an International Grain 
Agreement arrived at during the Kennedy Round negotiations 
reflected the opinion that food aid has to come out of current 
production in the future, and provisions for sharing the burden 
of food aid were included in the agreement. As was noted in 
the previous section , future needs for food aid will be not 
only grains (including rice), but also for such commodities 
as milk and milk products. Both Australia and New Zealand, 
which are the main exporters of milk products, can not bear 
the whole burden of such kinds of food aid as milk products. 
It will be necessary to provide for sharing the costs of food aid 
in the Pacific Basin. The author expects that, except for 
India, the future demand for food aid in Asia and the Far East 
will not be unbearably large . 
One additional fact can be mentioned. Australia and 
Canada have exported a huge amount of wheat to the centrally 
planned countries since 1963. Wheat exports to these count-
ries of two Pacific wheat exporters have been a real headache 
1 
See appendix tables . This fact is noticed in the Haberler 
Report. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Trends 
in International Trade : A Report by a Panel of Experts, 1958, 
p. 89. 
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to American wheat growers. However, the future import 
requirements for wheat of the centrally planned economies will · 
not be large; they may have a exportable surplus in the future. 1 
All three grain growers in the Pacific Basin will face a wheat 
surplus problem . 
Arrangements for stabilizing and expanding Pacific 
trade in agricultural commodities should be based on the above 
experiences . 
There will be four types of arrangements; arrangements 
for trade liberalization, arrangements concerning market ac-
cess for exporters, arrangements for sharing the costs of 
food aid, and arrangements for assisting agricultural develop-
ment in developing Asian countries. The first two types are 
commodity arrangements, and remaining two are non-commodity 
arrangements. 
The trade liberalization arrangements will be modest. 
Any significant tariff cut or any significant reduction of the 
level of agricultural protection is not practical. 2 Moderate 
changes in agricultural and food policies, or fixing of produc-
ers' real prices of agricultural commodities both in exporting 
and importing countries, are much more practical. The mar-
ket acce::; s arrangements are of two kinds; arrangements of 
self- sufficiency ratios and the coordination of individual long-
term bilateral contracts . There will be no arrangements for 
international commodity price stabilization, since stabilization 
is a main objective of traditional international commodity agree-
ments . 
1The author has no information about Communist China' s 
future import requirements. About Soviet Russia, see Bureau 
of Agricultural Economics (Canberra, Australia), The Econo-
mics of the Soviet Wheat Industry, December 1966. 
2 After receiving the comments by Professor Crawford the 
author feels that these two sentences should be replaced by the 
following three sentences. "The commodity arrangements which 
are proposed here should be taken as the first step in a serie s of 
trade liberalization movements in the Pacific basin . The trade 
liberalization arrangements will be modest. Any significant 
tariff cut or any significant reduction of the level of agricultural 
protection is not practical in the immediate future ." 
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Arrang e ments fo r sharing food ai d costs a r e of two 
types ; thos e fo r indivi dual countri es such as Indi a, Pakist an , 
e tc .; and those fo r an emergent food shortage such as in the 
case of a ver y bad crop . As was alr eady noted , incre a s ing 
s e lf- sufficiency in food i s not always practi cal and economical , 
and sometimes it is v ery harmful to food exporters . There -
fore, the arrangements for sharing food ai d cost s are ver y 
helpful in p r eventing countries from launching uneconomic 
programs to incre.ase food production. 
The agricultural development assistance arrangements 
are quite different. Since the developing Asian countries 
are generally agricultural, and since Asi an agriculture is 
generally quite traditional, transformation of the traditional 
agriculture should be one of the first steps in their economic 
development. Supplying capital and dispensing technical 
knowledge in the developed Pacific countries will be the mai n 
parts of the assistance. However, the modernization of tra-
ditional agricultural supply and processing industries in the 
developing Asian countries is very effective in helping to trans -
form the traditional agriculture. The promotion of direct 
joint investment in these fields in these countries is also a part 
of the assistance arrangement. I 
The author will not go into the details of these arrange-
ments, s ince they are quite technical . Only several points 
are explained . First , the trade liberalization arrangements 
are made only by the developed Pacific countries . Second , 
the market access arrangements are made by the developed 
Pacific and developing Asian countries . The arrangements 
concerning the self- sufficiency rati o are made mainly by the 
developed Pacific countries and will take the form of allocating 
import quotas to the Pacific exporters . Third , balancing 
the costs and benefits incurred by these four arrangements 
among the developed Pacific countries, i s the most crucial fac -
tor in carrying out Pacific agricultural integration. The au-
1The role that the modernization of agri cultural supply 
and processing industri es plays in transforming the traditional 
agriculture has been unbelievably neglected until recently . 
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thor is not very pessimistic about solving this crucial proble1n , 
since i mbalance in the trade arrangements can be balanced by 
cost sharing in the ai d arrangements . Moreover , Japan , 
which will be the loser in the trade arrangement, will a bi g 
beneficiary of the anticipate d liber alization of trade in manu-
facturing commodities. 1 The author proposes the establish-
ment of a Special Committee on Agricultural Development in 
the Organization for Pacific Trade and Development which is 
proposed in Prof. Kojima' s paper . 
For the main features of the individual commodity arrange-
ments see Appendix. 
1see K. Kojima , "Japan's Interests in the Pacific Trade 
Expansion", in this volume . 
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APPENDIX : MAIN FEATURES OF THE INDIVIDUAL COM-
MODITY ARRANGEMENTS 
Grain Arrangement - Wheat, Coarse Grains and Rice 
i) Acreage allocation among the developed Pacific 
countries, and fixation of levels of protection 
among the developed Pacific countries . 
ii) Offering of the amounts of grain required by the · 
food aid arrangement . 
iii) Joint operation of a grain bufferstock by the Pacific -
Asian countries. 
Milk Products Arrangement 
i) Modest reduction or fixation of levels of protection 
among the developed Pacific countries. 
ii) Offering of the amounts of milk products required 
by the food aid arrangement. 
Meat Arrangement and Cotton Arranement 
i) Coordination of long- term contracts . 
Sugar Arrangement and Tea Arrangement 
i) Allocation of import and export quotas among the 
Pacific- Asian countries . 
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SESSION IV 
Comment on H. G. Johnson's Paper by Bruce W . Wilkinson 
Prof. Johnson has provided us with a succinct comment-
ary on the current issues and alternatives for international 
commercial policy. Coming as it does in the middle of this 
conference, his statement provides a very useful frame of 
refenrece of the assessment and integration of the previous 
papers with those still to come . 
My remarks will be brief because many of the issues 
that he has raised have also been examined in other papers. 
But a few comments on his assessment of the four alternative 
strategies for future trade liberalization are in order. 
Few would disagree that it would be a retrograde step 
to return to using a conditional most-favoured- nation approach 
to trade negotiation, at least in its historical form . The sec-
toral approach, however, must be given a further hearing. 
Professor Johnson might have considered another variant of 
this idea--a limited participation sectoral approach, which, 
like a free trade area, may be open- ended to permit other 
nations to join subsequently . It could also be open- ended in 
a second sense : more sectors could be added. 
Conceived of in this form, with only a few interested 
countries participating initially, the sectoral reduction of 
trade restrictions need not be blocked by the willingness of 
some major industrial country to participate . Nor is there 
any reason why the member countries could not make suitable 
provisions for assisting the developing countries, just as they 
could do in a free trade area. These matters could be entire-
ly within the power of the member countries to determine. 
A problem that might have been mentioned, however, i s 
where to draw the line in attempting to establish free trade in 
a sector. Trade liberalization in component parts, capital 
equipment, construction materials, and repairs and maintenance 
supplies may also be necessary if the basic sector involved is 
not to suffer competitive disadvantages with foreign firms en-
joying lower costs of production for these items . Such prob-
lems already have arisen with respect to the Canada- United 
States automobile agreement. But even this di fficulty should 
not cause us to dismiss entirely the possibility that as a prac-
tical first step towards gaining public acceptance of a broader 
approach to trade liberalization, negotiations on a sectoral 
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basis may prove useful . 
As for more multilateral negotiations of the Kennedy 
Round variety, I would agree with Professor Johnson that a 
mere continuation of the same approach is likely to lead to 
l e ss satisfactory results a second time around . But perhaps 
if the removal of agricultural protection and all the non- tariff 
barr iers associated there with were made the major goal of new 
multilateral trade negotiations, s i gnificant result might b e 
achieved . Surely at some point the strength of the agricul-
tural interests in the industrialized, agricultural- importing 
nations must be overcome. A multilateral, non- discrimina-
tory approach may be the answer . 
Turning to the fourth alternative, free trade areas , 
I believe one additional advantage deserves emphasis . It 
offers a useful framework not only for the consideration of all 
sectors at once, including agriculture, but also for the con-
sideration. of all non- tariff hindrances to trade such as buy 
domestic policies and subsidies . 
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Comment on K. Hemmi' s P api:>r by Sir John Crawford 
The text of my commentl is to be found in two statements 
by Prof .. Hemmi. The first on page 253 states: "However , 
lessons from the Kennedy Round discussions 5how that any 
further significant lowering of levels of agricultural protec-
tion in either the United States or Japan is not foreseeable . " 
Again on page 263 we are told "Any significant tariff cut or any 
significant reduction of the level of agricultural protection is 
not practical." 
If these statements are to be accepted without qualifica-
tion they represent the bluntest warning that Australia can 
forget any worth-while negotiations on agricultural markets 
with either the United States or Japan. Prof. Hemmi offers 
the cold comfort of E. E. C. -type approaches to fixing levels 
of protection, ratios of self- sufficiency, and all the other 
devices for attempting to contain the excesses of the Common 
Agricultural Policy without impairing its highly protectionist 
character. There is no basis in this approach for any seri-
ous discussion of a Free Trade Area embracing Australia 
and New Zealand. 
Prof. Hemmi and I agree in our judgment that a free 
trade association is not an early prospect if it calls for dis-
mantling the apparatus of agricultural protectionism in Japan. 
The same comment applies to any expectation that industrial 
tariff protection in Australia will be quickly dismantled. 
However, I do not believe this disposes of the subject since 
moves towards, but short of complete free trade do offer a sig-
nificant basis for further expansion in trade between Japan and 
Australia. I may be wrong, but, fortunately for my optimistic 
nature, I also believe that Prof. Hemmi has underestimated the 
powerful force within Japan working to moderate agricultural 
protectionism. For example, although it seemed intractable dur-
ing Australian-Japan negotiations in 1963, the barriers to trade 
in meat have been usefully reduced. This is merely a pointer 
to the future. 
1 I have decided not to comment on the general review of 
commodities offered by Prof. Hemmi. He used F. A.O. data 
in the main. Much of these are open to question and lead, 
too, to some inaccuracies about the position of Australian 
agriculture. These, however, are minor matters . 
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As in Europe, Britain, and the United States, J apa-
nese agricultural protectionism reflects the strong political 
weight of rural interests . Nevertheless, in Japan, the ob-
jective of policies for economic growth include raising the 
standards of the urban masses . Japanese consumers are 
pressing for the welfare benefits of economic growth and these 
include more varied and better quality foodstuffs. It is 
beyond the capacity of Japan's limited physical resources 1 even 
granted potential for increasing farm efficiency, to keep pace 
from its own farms with demands for meat and dairy produce not 
to mention dried and canned fruits. 
Nor i s my view based solely on this observation of 
Japan's limited capacity for agricultural and pastoral produc-
tion . Japan's leaders know that growth policies call for 
rapidly expanding world markets and that not all the expansion 
can be provided by horizontal trade with advanced industrial 
countries . It must have entry to the industrial markets of 
Australia, among others, who will requi re access not only 
for industri al products, such as automobiles, but also for 
agricultural, pastoral, and. mineral products . As Dr . Oki ta 
has shown Japanese dependence on Australia and other suppli-
ers for minerals is already considerable. I believe that 
dependence on external suppliers for foodstuffs and feed- grains 
will also become highly significant, within the space of a r ela-
tively short time . 
All this adds up, in policy terms, to two points : 
(a) Talk of complete free - trade between Australia and 
Japan is quite premature, but 
(b) It is not premature to expect continuous bilateral or 
multilateral negotiation which will call for both 
Japan and Australia to lessen their existing barriers 
to mutual trade. Both have much to gain from this 
course . 
Since Australia undertakes even its bilateral negoti a-
tions within a GATT framework it is important to stress that 
Australia claims with a.t least legal validity that the original 
GATT rules did not di fferentiate between trade in agricultural 
products and trade in manufactured goods . It makes no apolo-
gy , therefore, for contending , under the general " eye- for - eye " 
system of negotiation encouraged by GATT, that tariff conces-
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sions by it call for recognition of Australia's comparative ad-
vantage in the export of primary products. 
As a technical footnote to the general discussion as well 
as to these comments on Prof . Hemmi ' s paper, I think it right 
to mention another di fficulty in the free trade area concept. 
Australia's own experience with the E. E. C. suggests that a 
Pacific Free Trade Area would be wise to take considerable 
notice of the interests of other countries- - the developing coun-
tries especially. Argentina might well take a jaundiced view 
of discrimination against its meat exports even though I doubt 
it will ever prove a serious supplier to the Pacific. Nor 
could Japan ignore potential suppliers of feed-grains and sugar 
from outside the free-trade area. And yet is an open- ended 
free trade area to be only open in respect of agricultural 
trade? 
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Discussion on Johnson's and Hemmi's Papers 
Prof . Johnson explained, in response to the discussant' s 
comments, that he had not gone into the sectoral approach for 
freer trade among a few countries because it was diffi cult tc· 
encompass within the GATT framework; but if such an approach 
were possible, he would grant Prof. Wilkinson ' s points . 
As regards non- tariff barriers to trade, Prof. Johnson pointed 
out that the record of the Kennedy Round suggested that non-
tariff barriers to trade in industrial products are neither uni-
versal nor significant. A study by Gerard Curzon, now in 
proof, also suggests that non-tariff barriers to trade, whilst 
numerous, are insignificant. However, the emphasis in dis-
cussion at this conference has suggested otherwise . This 
difference in emphasis may be explained by two observations . 
First, non-tariff barriers are of special importance to trade 
in agri cultural commodities. Second, non- tariff barriers 
may be more important in the trade of smaller, less fully-in -
dustrialized nations, than they are in trade among the world's 
larger industrial producers. In other words, the problem 
of non-tariff barriers may be more serious in such cases than 
one judges from the Kennedy- Round experience and Curzon' s 
study. 
Prof . Hemmi in turn responded to Sir John Crawford's 
comments by observing that there was actually little disagree -
ment between them concerning the future prospect of trade 
liberalizati on in Japanese agri culture; Prof . Hemmi too, 
believed that there was a long-run tendency towards freer 
trade . He was also concerned to ensure that there should be 
orderly access to Japanese markets for agri cultural commodi-
ties, and that dumping by E. E . C . countries should not be 
allowed to disturb the interests of Japan ' s major potential 
suppliers, Australia and New Zealand. 
A remark from the floor suggested that Prof . Hemmi 
had been too optimistic about the future prospect of the world 
food supplies and that there still was a long way for the pendu-
lum to swing towards excessive agricultural producti on . 
The discussion then centered on the choice between the 
global and regional approaches to free - trade . The role of 
the U · S · policy was felt to be crucial. It was pointed out 
tha~ ~ ~ove toward a free trade area approach mi ght lead to 
a d1v1s1on of the world into three or four trading blocks , 
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because it would be intole rable , from the U . S . viewpoint , 
to l eave any of her allies outside a regional trading area . 
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The formati on of such blocs could entail high political costs for 
the United States - such as the alienation of the E . E . C . , as 
well as some economic damage . Furthermore , the United 
States currently has heavy commitments to less developed coun-
tries . In short , there appears little incentive for the United 
States to pursue the free trade area approach , unless , say , 
some catastr ophe took place in Europe , or the U . S . balance 
of payments situation continued to deteriorate . 
On the other hand, it was also observed that neither 
NAFT A nor P AFT A was to be regarded as an exclusivist 
device, but could be considered as a step towards world- wi de 
free - trade . The curr ent issue is how far the United States 
can carry her present responsibilities under the mounting 
balance- of- payments pressure . In fact, there are indications 
that she mi ght adopt a highly protectionist path . In that · 
eventuality , the questi on is what should the rest of the world, 
including Asian-Pacific countries, do? 
Judgment about relative merits of the alternatives was 
seen importantly to depend upon assessment of the feasibility 
of further multilateral moves towards freer trade i n the near 
future . Some grounds for optimism were enumerated . For 
one thing, the Kennedy Round took place under most unfavour-
able circumstances i n so far as the E. E . C . had very little 
operational experi ence before bargaining began . . For another , 
a great deal was learned during Kennedy- Round negotiati ons , 
and this should facilitate future multilateral negotiations . 
Moreover, there may have been a tendency to exaggerate the 
general signi ficance of non- tariff barriers. All in all , the 
difficulties of a global appr oach may not necessarily be formid-
able . 
Finally, several participants urged the reorientation of 
the U . S . policy away from the traditional, European- centered 
to a more Asian- directed approach . It was stated more than 
once that the Pacifi c nations were l ooking toward the United 
States for major leadership in this respect. Needless to say, 
the question is how to strike a balance between the two direc-
tions . Some stressed the importance of providing motivation 
for United States efforts in the regi on and of counter- acting 
excessively Atlantic- centered or inward- looking policies . 
In contrast , others saw the P AFT A proposals as a vast over-
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correction of U . S . policy orientation in present circumstances, 
Others were of the opinion that Australia , Japan, and New 
Zealand could not afford to wait for United States initi atives 
in Asian- Pacific e conomic cooperation but should be prepared 
to take independent steps in that direction at the earliest pos-
sible opportunity . 
Chapter 9 FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC 
COOPERATION AROUND THE PACIFIC 
by Richard N , Cooper 
Professor, Yale University 
I Introduction 
This paper discusses some of the financial aspects of 
economic cooperation among the industrial countries bordering 
the Pacific Ocean , It is not confined to a free trade area , 
although that is perhaps the most discussed form of coopera-
tion. 
I would like to begin by identifying three quite different 
reasons, apart from strictly political ones, for economic co• 
operation based on regional groupings of countries . The 
first concerns allocative efficiency of national resources in a 
trading world in which total free trade or unilateral free trade 
cannot be achieved. Under these circumstances, several 
countries may find it mutually advantageous to eliminate barri-
ers to trade among themselves, and this union will improve the 
world's allocation of resources if, in the technical jargon , 
trade creation exceeds trade diversion (using these terms to 
include consumption as well as production effects) . 
}_ variant of this rationale ari ses when free trade would 
damage unacceptably national objectives with respect to the 
composition of output, for example a desire to "industrialize," 
but where a go-it- alone policy would be very costly because of 
the limited size of the national market. Several countries 
with similar objectives therefore might find i t advantageous to 
pursue their industrialization jointly, provided that the result-
ing distribution of manufacturing output within the free trade 
area were satisfactory to all members . Again the world al-
location of resources would be improved, not with respect to 
free trade, but with respect to the leading alternative set of 
arrangements, i.e. countries industrializing individually and 
separately . 1 
1This rationale for customs unions has been emphasized 
by B . F . Mas sell and C. A . Cooper in their "Toward a General 
Theory of Customs Unions for Developing Countries , " Journal 
of Political Economy, 73 (October 1965), 461- 476. 
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Similarly, several countries may improve the allocation 
of their resources by permitting free movement of factors of 
production- -labor and capital- -within the area; arguments 
similar to those for a trade area hold . The case of foreign 
investment will be discussed at some length below . 
A second rationale for regional economic cooperation 
ari ses from the prevai ling time pattern of inter national pay-
ments . Under certain circumstances , discussed more fully 
below , several countries may gain by pooling their reserves 
and investing the reserves thereby conserved in higher yield-
ing assets. Reserve pooling can take place quite independent -
ly of trading arrangements , and may be attracti ve to a group 
of countries even if they have no interest in forming a free 
trade area . Also, unlike a free trade or investment area , 
reserve pooling does not involve discrimination against non-
members. 
A third rationale for regional economic cooperation 
arises when the members of the region all have over-valued 
currencies, relative to the rest of the world, and are unable · 
or unwilling to devalue their currencies. Actions taken in 
lieu of devaluation, if non- discriminatory , may do unnecessar y 
harm to other countries also with over-valued currencies . 
The countries may gain (with a resulting gain for the world) 
by retaining full freedom of international trasactions within 
the region but restricting payments to non- members, i . e . by 
forming a discriminatory bloc. 
It should be noted at the outset that the first and third 
reasons for regional trading groups advanced here are strict-
ly second- best soluti ons to the problems at hand in the sense 
that some other solution is super ior on economic grounds . 
Thus to be justifiable it must also be argued that superior 
solutions to the problems posed are not available . The 
second rati onale for regional g r oupings , reser ve pooling, is 
also second- best i n a slightly different sense . It accepts 
as given any existing imperfections in private capital marke ts , 
where (it i s assumed) borrowing costs are substanti ally high-
er than deposit yie lds and the ability to borrow in t i mes of 
need is uncertain . It may also be justifi ed if a government-
sponsored clearing me chanism i s more efficient than using the 
deposit and check- writi ng system of commercial banks . 
With this prelude , three questi ons must be asked about 
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a regional grouping of the industrial countries around the Paci-
fic Ocean: Australia, Canada , Japan , New Zealand, and 
the United States. First, do any of the above conditions 
obtain, i . e. , is there any economic basis for a regional ar-
rangement? Second, if so, do the five ad7anced countries 
bordering on the Pacific make up the best group to take ad-
vantage of the conditions for gain? Third, would all pros-
pective participants find it in their long- run political interest s 
to join such a grouping , even in the presence of affirmative 
answers to the fi r st two questi ons? This last question is im-
portant because , to cast the point in economic terms , " recon-
tracting " is even more difficult among countries than i t is 
among business firms , and the inducement to rival reaction to 
a Pacific economic bloc may be high . A ceteris paribus as -
sumption.is not appropriate when considering arrangements of 
these kinds; it is necessary to ask how other countries will 
react. The last question applies to all the prospective mem-
bers, but it applies with particular force to the United States . 
Analytically, the second of these questions is perhaps 
the most diffi cult: it gets into the relatively unexplored domain 
of "optimum areas." Fortunately, the conference title impli-
es a list of prospective participants in a Pacific economic area , 
so that question need not be answered here. I will , however , 
say something about the first question --the degree to which one 
or another of the various economic grounds for regionalism 
obtain in the Pacific Area - - and I will conclude with some 
brief and largely speculative remarks on the third question - -
the political wisdom of such an area. 
II Free Trade 
The gains from free trade among the industrial countries 
bordering the Pacific arise , statically, from the reallocation 
of resources wi thin the region to lower cost sources of supply 
and, dynamically , from the stimulus to cost- reducing invest-
ment and innovation that would result from exposing existing 
producers to greater competition . Against the static gains 
must be set the losses that would arise from diverting purchases 
from low cost sources of supply outside the region to higher 
cost but duty- free sources of supply within the region . 
Broad criteria for determining whether the trade-creating ef-
fects of a free trade area are likely to outweigh the trade - di-
verting effects have been laid down by James Maede and 
subsequently refined by others; basically they come down to 
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how much the prospective members of the area have been pro-
tecting their domestic suppliers from competing producers 
within the prospective region, as opposed to those in the rest 
of the world. 
An assessment of trade relations in the Pacific area has 
been made in the other papers, and it would be redundant to 
review that grouno here. Suffice it to say that on superficial 
inspection a Pacific Free Trade Area would seem to score 
very high in trade creation, since Australia, Canada, and 
Japan all tend to protect industries in which the United States 
seems to have important cost or quality advantages, while the 
United States, Australia, and Canada all protect their indus-
tries from imports of goods that Japan produces competitively.! 
But the locus of production of labor-intensive manufactures 
seems to be shifting rapidly away from Japan to many less 
developed countries, so the very forces which would make a 
free trade area involving the United States and Japan more 
tolerable politically in both countries will also reduce the eco-
nomic gains from such an arrangement. 
Moreover, as noted earlier a free trade area is strict-
ly second best, in terms of the gains from trade, to non-discri-
minatory free trade. 2 The countries in question are all ex-
tensively engaged in world trade, although the trade of both 
1This assessment leaves agriculture out of account; 
apart from a few commodities such as wool and dairy products, 
the gains in rationalization of agricultural production within the 
Pacific Area would not seem to be nearly so high, relative to 
manufactures, than would be true of some other country groups, 
In any case agriculture is not likely to be opened to free com-
petition without a far greater degree of integration of economic 
policy than has been contemplated so far for the countries in 
question. 
2 A technical qualification is necessary here to allow for 
the possibility of a terms of trade effect, potentially resulting 
in a gain from systematic discrimination against the rest of the 
world. In my view this possibility has received far more at-
tention from trade theorists than it warrants in practice. 
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Canada and New Zealand is heavily concentrated with a single 
trading partner, Canada with the United States and New Zea-
land with Britain. All would benefit from continued MFN 
tariff reductions, and a regional free trade area has no obvi-
ous advantage over MFN tariff reduction. Eecause of the 
structure of protection conjectured earlier, roughly the same 
kinds of reallocation would be required in either case .1 
However, the possibility must be allowed that MFN tariff re• 
ductions would actually take place more rapidly if a rival group-
ing to the European Economic Community were formed first, 
essentially for bargaining purposes. 
III Free Capital Movements 
A "free investment area" could be established in con-
junction with a free trade area, or even in the absence of the 
latter . The practical importance of this notion arises from 
the strong interest of a number of American businesses , sup-
ported by the United States government, in investment abroad. 
Would mutual benefit proceed from a complete liberalization of 
capital movements within the Pacific area? And would the 
results be acceptable to all parties? 
Creation. of a free investment area would have effects on 
investment flows analogous to those of a free trade area on 
trade . There would be "investment creation" as a result of 
removing existing barriers to investment; and "investment 
diversion" as a result of removing those barriers in a discrimi-
natory way, so that investment flows --both inflows and out-
flows--within the area might substi tute for those that would 
have taken place with respect to the rest of the world . These 
effects should be distinguished from the effects on investment 
flows arising from the reduction or removal of tariffs within 
the area. 
1Again the changing structure of Japan's exports should 
be noted. Conceivably a free trade area among the five count-
ries could protect an · against large incursions of goods from 
less developed countries. The extension of generalized tariff 
preferences to less developed countries moves in the opposite 
direction , and would weaken the protective effect of a Pacific 
Free Trade Area. 
288 RICH.P,RD N. COOPER 
Investment here must be thou~ht of not only or e V<"n pri -
marily in tPrms of pure capital flows, i . ~ . , a shift of real 
resources (saving) from one country to another, but also in 
terms of transfers of managPmPnt skill and technical know - how . 
Direct investment flows arP analogous to trade flows insofar 
as the advantages of inflows from alternative sources can bP 
ranked, c e teris paribus (espe cially with respect to the ex-
change rate), along some scale of bew=>fits. Of course, the. 
traditional supply price of "capital" is also relevant, but it 
becomes only one element among many. The standard assump -
tion in trade th ory that "factors" of production do not move 
at all across national boundari e s ·but that "knowledgP" with 
respect to organization and production technique moves instan-
taneously is artificial, to say the least. This is particular-
ly so when much technical knowledge is appropriable through 
patent rights and the like . International inve stmi:'nt should 
also be thought of in terms of financial intermediation leading 
to an improvemi:>nt in the allocation of capital . 
With some important exceptions, the restrictions on 
forpign investmPnt havi:> probably been less severe than restri c -
tions on trade . By "restrictions" I mean here deliberate 
policy aimPd at foreign investment rather than the numerous 
other impediments to investment abroad which often arise from 
ignorance and from uncPrtainties with respect to other polici -
es, for example the exchange rate or degree of exchange con-
trol. These are not designed deliberately to restri ct invest-
ment, and such impediments are in any case small for the 
countries under consideration. 
In many respPcts the industrial countries of the Pacific 
already enjoy the benPfits of a free investment area, which in 
practice means largely the flow of the American capital to thi:> 
other four countries (Table 1), although recently there has 
been growing Canadian interest in Japan , Japanese i nt Pre st 
in both Australia and Canada , and Australian interest in 
New Zealand . Since 1963, however , portfolio capital move-
ments have been restrainPd by the U.S . balance of payments 
program, about which morp will be said below . Din='ct invf's t-
ment outflows havP bP en, until January 1968, under lPss s ev e re 
restraint . 
Most countries do limit inward flows of direct invest-
ment capital in certain r espe cts . Canada, for instance , 
strongly discourage s foreign investment in Canadian banking 
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and insurance; several European countries limit foreign in-
vestment in r e al estate or in natural resources . Of all in-
dustrial countries, howeve r, Japan undoubtedly has the most 
severe restrictions on foreign direct investment. 1 Although 
Japan is relatively short of capital and has imported capital 
very heavily in the past d ecade , only a small fraction of this 
has been in the form of direct investment. 
National positions on foreign dire ct investment are some-
what baffling . While no other industrial country r e stricts 
inflows so severely as Japan , many Western European coun-
tries would like to restrict capital inflows and the Common 
Market countries would probably do so if they could agree 
among themselves on a common policy . Canada complains 
about the American investment therP and occasionally takes 
moves which suggest an attempt to discourage it. The United 
States, on the other hand , has for many years officially sup-
ported the outflow of capital, particularly direct investment, 
and still does so in principle, although that support is now 
tempered by concern with the balance of payments. Moreover , 
Britain too has encourage d direct investment abroad except 
when such investment was strongly inconsistent with current 
balance of payments requirements. 
In many respects these positions are just the r everse of 
what one might expect them to b e . On national economic 
grounds, the United States should be very skeptical of direct 
investment overseas, especially in other industrial countries . 
Capital importing countriPs, on the other hand, should wel-
come it. The United States should be skeptical for three 
reasons. First, dirPct inve stment ov<:>rseas entails a sub-
stantial loss in taxe s as compared either with investment or 
dividend distribution at home. U . S . corporations in 1963 
receive d cre dits against their U . S . tax liabilities for for eign 
taxes paid amounting to $1 . 6 billion . 2 Corporations conti nue 
1 A lucid account of the imp ediments to foreign direct in-
vestment in Japan, despite offici al commitments to libe ralize 
such investment, is given in Leon Hollerman , Japan's Depend-
ence on the World Economy , Princeton University Press , 1967, 
chapter 15 . 
2This understates the tax loss to the United States be -
caus e foreign incomE' gene rally b e comes taxable only when it is 
remitte d to the United States . 
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TABLE 1 
U . S . Financial Assets in Pacific Area Countries , 1966 
($ million, year-end) 
Australia Canada Japan New Zealand 
Direct Investment 1,918 16,840 756 
In Manufacturing 999 7,674 333 
Long- term Claims 522b 9,554 s41b 
Bonds 2oob 6,251 34ob 
Stocks lOb 2,474 sob 
Other 312 829 421 
Short-term Claims 110 1,125 2,736 
a Includes "other Oceania" 
b Estimated from data on transactions 
c Less than $18 million 
Source : U.S . Department of Commerce, 
Survey of Current Business; 
Treasury Bulletin . 
n . a . 
n . a . 
n. a . 
n.a . 
c . 
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to invest abroad because they do not bear this tax loss; they 
are interested in rates of return after all taxes, foreign and 
domestic, whereas the capital-exporting country as a whole 
· should be concerned with rates of return after foreign but 
before domestic taxes. This ia a grant from The U.S. Trea-
sury to other govf'rnments comparative in size to The U.S. 
economic assistance program. Second, there is growing 
evidence that direct investment in othPr developed countries 
displace exports. Business firms support foreign investment 
on the grounds that such investment stimulates American ex-
ports; and it is true that American-owned firms abroad import 
heavily from their parent firms. But these transactions must 
be compared with what U.S. exports would have been in the 
absence of overseas investment, a notoriously difficult com-
parison to make. A large sample of British firms, however, 
noted that their exports to other developed countries would 
generally have been larger in the absence of their direct invest-
ments there, even on the pessimistic assumption that without 
British investment someone else would have made the invest-
ment. 1 And those who have studied American investment 
abroad have found if any difference is to be noted between the 
behavior of American-owned firms and locally-owned firms 
with respect to foreign trade, it is that the American.- owned 
firws export 111ore with no tendency to import 1nore, suggesting 
that export sales from U.S. subsidiaries displace exports 
from the United States. In addition, American firms intro-
duce technology and production skills which might otherwise 
have to be imported in the form of goods from the United 
States. 2 It is, moreover, interesting to note that during the 
period 1957-1965 U.S. exports of manufactures increased by 
$3. 8 billion, U.S. direct investment in manufacturing abroad 
(including reinvested earnings) increased by $11. 3 billion, 
and production of manufactures by foreign subsidiaries of 
American firms increased by $24. 0 billion, over six times the 
increase in exports. 
1w-. B. Redd away, Effects of U. K. Direct Investment 
Overseas, An Interim Report, Cambridge University Press, 
1967, Chapter 12 and Appendix E, esp. p. 108. 
2 see A. E. Safarian, Foreign Ownership of Canadian 
Industry, Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1967, chapters 4-6; and 
John H. Dunning, American Investment in British M anuf actur-
ing Industry, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1958. 
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Export displacement is more likely in a world with declin-
ing tariffs, since firms already established overseas may be 
reluctant to jeopardize their overseas investments by exporting 
from the parent, even when the parent has enough control over 
the technology to export competitively. 
Third, direct investment abroad involves the capital-
exporting country in some loss of control over its firms with 
respect to such matters as anti - trust policy, trade with certain 
countries that is proscribed for foreign policy reasons, and 
the like. Some of this loss of control arises simply from the 
greater difficulty of policing firms outside the home country , 
while some arises because of the jurisdictional conflicts that 
foreign investment produces . For example, the United 
States proscribes trade with China and Cuba, but Canada en-
courages it. American firms in Canada are caught between 
conflicting jurisdictions . To the extent Canadian policy 
dominates (as it formally has in this case), a "leakage" in 
U.S. control is created . 
Capital-importing countries might be expected to welcome 
direct investment inflows, on the other hand, because they 
capture the tax gains on the investment inflow (in effect, there 
is a transfer from the U.S . Treasury to the capital-importing 
country), because direct investment brings with it new tech-
nology and management skills as well as capital, and because 
as a result of both of the foregoing effects national income in 
the capital-importing country is increased even if its resources 
were already fully employed. Direct investment inflows may · 
admittedly create some friction between the capital-importi ng 
country and the United States, however, over American at-
tempts to recapture some of its lost control by extending its 
jurisdiction to U.S. - owned firms abroad . 
The actual positions taken by countries seem to reflect 
a misunderstanding of the issues involved, or else they reflect 
or narrower conception of the national interest than the fore-
going arguments would suggest. Some Americans argue that 
a redistribution of the world's savings from the rich to poorer 
countries would be desirable for the world, and hence in the 
long run for the United States; and while redistribution from 
the United States to Brazil or India might be better still , re-
distribution to Canada or Europe or Japan is at least a move-
ment in the right direction. But the national positions more 
likely reflect a desire to favor certain groups within each 
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country. American business obviously benefits from having 
its options for investrn.ent enlarged and, on occasion, from 
being able to escape U . S . regulation or taxation . At the 
same time, increasing competition from foreign (e.g. American) 
firms will generally be detrimental to particular business in-
terests in the capital- importing countries. They in turn can 
play on vague but potent nationalistic feelings in carrying thei r 
case for restrictions on capital inflow to the country at large . 1 
To return to the 1r,ain point : a free investment area among 
the Pacific industrial nations is likely to have little effect on 
investment flows except for direct investment into Japan; and 
in that case the effect is likely to be "investment- creating" 
rather than investment- diverting, although there might be a 
few instances in which American or Canadian firms displaced 
European firms that would have been permitted to invest in 
Japan under non-discrirninatory arrangeu1ents. Balance sheet 
figures for overseas direct investment are not available for 
all these countries but Table 2 shows the flow of direct invest-
ment earnings to and from the five industrial countries of the 
Pacific, a rough proxy for foreign investments . It indicates 
that relative to its size Japan has very low foreign investments 
abroad . Both Canada and the United States are high inves -
tors abroad, relative to total national output, with Australia 
and New Zealand falling in between . This pattern can be 
explained partially by the degree of capital scarcity in each 
country; but Japan , as noted above , is also a notoriously low 
importer of direct investment capital. These figures refer 
only to direct investment ; both Canada and Japan are heavy net 
importers of portfolio capital. 
The effects of a free investment area on international 
capital flows must be distinguished from the effects of a free 
trade area on capital flows when capital is relatively free to 
move . Impediments to trade also influence international 
capital movements , and the removal of tariffs and other barriers 
to trade among several major countries can be expected to re-
sult in a realignment of production not only within countries but 
1see Harry G . Johnson , " A Theoretical Model of 
Economic Nati onalism in New and Developing States, "The 
Political Science Quarterly , 80 (June 1965), 169- 185; also 
his The Canadian Quandary, Toronto : McGraw- Hill, 1963 , 
especially Chapter 2 . 
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also between countries. There is little doubt, for instance , 
that the heavy American investment in Canadian manufacturing 
has been induced by the tariff protection which the Canadian 
government has accorded to local manufacturing production; in 
the absence of this protection much of the Canadian market fo r 
manufactures would be served directly from the United States . 
This view is supported by survey evidence on the likely 
impact of an "Atlantic" Free Trade Area (including Japan , 
but not Australia and New Zealand) on the foreign investment 
plans of Ameri can firms , 1 Of the 169 firms that replied , 82 
indicated that an AFT A would not affect their overall foreign 
investment plans, 46 indicated that they would contract their 
overseas operations (or cut back expansion plans) , relying t o 
a greater extent on exports from the United States, and 4 1 
indicated that they would expand their overseas operations ev en 
more, partly to export to the United States . Only one firm, 
however, indicated that it would expand its Canadian opera-
tions , and many of those who reported that their total overseas 
investment would be unchanged indicated a switch from Canadi an 
production to Japan or Europe . 2 
This partial view of the problem does not offer a complete 
answer to the effect of tariff changes on capital movements . 
In general, there will be a movement of capital and other fac t ors 
of production out of tariff- protected industries and into the ex-
port industri es on the reciprocal removal of tariffs among 
1
M . E . Kreinin, "Freedom of Trade and Capital Mov e-
ment-- Some Empirical Evidence , "Economic Journal , 75 
(December 1965) , 748- 758 . 
2This view of Canadian prospects under free trade with 
the United States is implicitly disputed by the Wonnacotts , 
who feel that Canada's lower labor costs would give Canada a 
great cost advantage in many manufacturing lines if they wer e 
given a chance to serve the entire North American market. 
They make the implausible assumption, however, that under 
free trade Canadian labor productivity would rise to the level 
in the United States , while Canadian wages would remain 
lower . See R . J . Wonnacott and Paul Wonnacott, Free 
Trade Between the United States and Canada: the Potential 
Economic Effects , Cambridge: Harvard University Press , 
1967. 
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TABLE 2 
Total Direct Investment Earningsa and GDP, 1965 
Gross 
Receipts Payments Domestic Product 
(US $ million) ($ million) 
Australia 57 264 22.1 
Canada 135b 537b 48.9 
Japan 14 36 84.8 
New Zealand 8 77 5.3 
United States 5486 749 676.9 
aincluding reinvested earnings 
bEncluding reinvested earnings; reinvested earnings 
of foreign enterprises in Canada were $272 million 
in 1961. 
Note: Data on direct investment outflows and earnings 
are notoriously shaky and non-comparable. 
For instance, U.S. data show Japanese direct 
investment earnings in the United States alone 
to be $22 million in 1965, and V. S. earnings 
in Japan to be $91 million. 
Sources: IMF, Balance of Payments Yearbo~k, vol. 
18, 1961-65. International FinaTICial 
Statistics 
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several trading partners- - or, more correctly, out of some 
lines and into others in each "industry," since trade in manu-
factures increasingly takes the form of specialization within 
broaJ industries rather than between them . The net effect 
on the demand for capital in any one country depends on how 
capital-intensive the export industries are, on average, re-
lative to the import-competing industries; and on the increase 
in exports relative to the increase in imports. The initial 
effects of trade liberalization would probably be a sharp in-
crease in Canada's net imports (probably true for Australia 
too) and a sharp increase in Japan's net exports. But these 
changes would create imbalances requiring monetary adjustment 
to reduce the disparities in effect on imports and exports . 
Thus the categories "export industry" and "import-competing 
industries" may themselves shift. For example, some manu-
facturing industries in Canada~ requiring protection would 
become competitive at a lower exchange rate. 
The onJy quantitative information we currently have on 
the factor intensity of imports and exports arises from a series 
of empirical studies based on input-output analysis, beginning 
with Leontief' s celebrated study of the factor intensity of U , S. 
foreign trade .1 Unfortunately the results of these studies 
are counter-intuitive . Leontief' s study suggests that a paral-
lel increase in U . S. exports and imports of goods in competition 
with domestic production would lead to a net release of capital, 2 
while the studies by Wahl and by T atemoto and lchimura suggest 
1w. W . Leontief, "Factor Proportions and the Structure 
of American Trade: Further Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis, "Review of Economics and Statistics, 38 (Novemb~r 
1956), 386-407; Masahiro Tatemoto and Shinichi lchimura , 
"Factor Proportions and Foreign Trade: The Case of Japan," 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 41 (November 1959), 
442-446; Donald F. Wahl, "Capital and Labour Requirements 
for Canada's Foreign Trade," Canadian Journal of Economic 
and Political Science, 27 (August 1961), 349-358. 
2 
Actually, Leontief' s results on this point were quite 
sensitive to the definition of "import-competing" and to the 
particular year chosen; perhaps a more cautious conclusion to 
be drawn from his study is that a parallel increase in exports 
and imports would not much affect the net demand for capital. 
Op . cit. , pp . 397 - 398 . 
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that a parallel increase in exports and imports competing with 
home production in Canada and Japan would lead to a net in-
crease in demand for capital in each of those two countries , 
i.e . reducing protection would raise the rate of return on 
capital. With international capital mobility , these change s 
would lead to an increase in the flow of capital from the United 
States to Canada and to Japan. 1 
The calculations cited above apply to total trade, not 
merely to trade within the Pacific area . Wahl's estimates 
for the capital content of Canada's trade with the United 
States, however, reveal for a parallel increase in trade an 
even larger increase in the demand for capital than would be 
true for total trade; some evidence offered by Tatemoto and 
lchimura for Japanese trade with the United States , in con-
trast, suggests that a parallel increase in such trade would 
reduce the demand for capital in Japan and would increase the 
demand for labor, a result that conforms more closely with 
expectations based on neo - classical trade theory . 
The methodology underlying these calculations has been 
criticized on a number of grounds that are not necessary to 
recount here . They do not off er a firm enough foundation for 
indicating clearly what the long-term effects of tariff reduction 
on international capital movements will be . We are therefore 
left with the view that in the short run elimination of tariffs 
among the Pacifi c countries would probably result in a reduc-
tion in capital movements to Australia and Canada and (if it 
were permitted) an increase in capital movements into Japan, 
but that in the long run , after monetary adjustment to corre ct 
imbalances in payments ha.d taken place, it is less clear what 
the effects on capital movement would be . 
IV Reserve Poolin_g in the Pacific 
A second form of regional economic cooperation, very 
different from a free trade area or a free investment area , in-
volves the pooling of foreign exchange reserves. Countrie s 
can benefit by taking advantage of misalignments in their net 
payments positions, whethe r these arise from seasonal fact-
1This assumes the domestic supply of capital is unchange d 
by the shift in composition of output. 
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ors or from other relationships, to conserve on the need for 
international reserves. I assume that countries hold inter-
national reserves primarily to settle occasional deficits in 
their international payments, and that the amount of reserves 
that they need to meet these contingencies is directly related 
to the expected size of the contingencies, e . g . to the expect-
ed standard deviation of disturbances to the balance of payment s. 
To the extent that these contingent payments deficits are less 
than perfectly correlated with those of other countries, some 
of the reserves held as a precaution against the deficits can 
be "saved" by pooling reserves in such a way that each of 
the participating countries can draw on the pool when in pay-
ments deficit. 
The data in Table 3 indicate the extent to which the 
reserve changes of the five industrial countries around the 
Pacific were in fact correlated during the period 1955-1966 . 
The standard deviation of year- to-year reserve changes (in 
billions of U.S. Dollars) for each country is shown on the 
main diagonal. The entries above the diagonal record the 
correlation coefficients for reserve changesl of the indicated 
pairs of countries, and the entries below the diagonal show 
the covariances, that is, the product of each correlation co-
efficient with the two relevant standard deviations . 
Gains from reserve pooling arise for any degree of cor-
relation less than unity, but the gains increase the correla-
tion falls . 2 The highest positive correlation between reser-
l A crude proxy for payments imbalances. For the United 
States, net reserve changes have been used, i.e . , reserve 
changes less changes in liabilities to foreign monetary authori-
ties. The year- to- year reserve changz:s of Canada were reduc-
ed during 1955-61 by use of flexible exchange rates and more 
recently by an agreement with the United States on its reserve 
level. 2 . ... . 
Algebraically, the standard deviation (Sn) of combined 
reserve changes for n countries is given by the expression: 
1 
Sn= c.ss? + 2.S.Sr· ·5i_S·)"2 
j>ii lJ J 
The expression in brackets will be smaller the smalleT are the 
correlation coefficients qj, i, j = 1, 2, . .. n. S will equal the 
sum of the individual standard deviation si only if qj = 1 for all 
i,j,. The assumption in the text is that at least some part of 
desired reserves for each country i is proportional to Si . 
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Bilateral Relationships Between Changes in Reservesa, 
Australia 
Canada 
Japan 
New Zealand 
United States 
1955- 1966 New Uni ted 
Australia Canada Japan Zealand States 
. 287 .09 -.63 . 05 . 35 
.005 . 174 . 06 . 15 -. 48 
-. 046 .002 . 256 . 42 -. 74 
.006 .001 .004 .038 -. 33 
. 131 -. 107 - .246 -.016 1. 297 
aincluding reserve position at the IMF. For the United States , 
changes in reserves less changes in liabilities to foreign mone -
tary authorities . 
Note: Entries above diagonal are correlation coefficients (rip, 
entries along the diagonal are stangard deviations (Si m 
billions of U . S . dollars), and entries below the diagonal 
are covariances (qjSi Sj) . 
Source of original data: International Financial Statistics . 
ve changes of these countries during the period in question CJ apan 
and New Zealand) was • 42 , while there were several hi gh n ega-
tive correlations. It is clear from inspection of the covari ance 
terms tl1at large absolute gains from reserve pooling the period 
in question would have arisen by pooling reserves between the 
United States and Canada, between the United States and Japan , 
and between Japan and Australia . 
For the five countries taken togethe r , the standard devi a -
tion of year- to- year rese r ve change s would have been $1 , 145 
million, compared with $ 1, 297 million for the United States alone 
and a sum of standar d de viations for the countries taken s epar ate-
ly amounting to $2 ,052 million . T hus pooling of r e s e rves would 
have reduced the n e ed to hold reserves against contingent paymen ts 
deficits by 44 percent. This could r epresent a substantial sav-
ings , 1 and if the experience of the past decade is any guide t o t he 
future, it suggests that r e serve pooling might be mutu ally b enefi --. 
cial. While the correlation coefficients for the peri od 1955- 1966 
1 . 
The actual amount of the saving would depend on the r e la-
tionship of precautionary reserve holdings to the expected var ia-
tion (si) in reserves , and this in turn would depend on the degre e 
to whi ch payments deficits were serially corre lated and on the 
degree of " risk aversion" the authoritie s of each country had to 
the exhaustion of precautionary r e serve holdings , 
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undoubtedly do include some accidental elements, they also re-
flect the ties of trade and capital movements among these coun .. 
tries. The United States is the largest trading partner of both 
Canada and Japan, and Canada and Japan are the largest single 
trading partners of the United States. Portfolio capital move-
ments are also very large between the United States and each 
of these countries, the two countries together taking about half 
of total U.S. portfolio outflows before 1965. It is surprising, 
therefore, that when the payments position of the United States 
deteriorates, that of the other two tends to improve, and vice 
versa. Mutually strong trading ties also exist between Aust-
ralia and Japan, so the payments positions of these two countri-
es tend to move in opposite directions for the same reason. 
To say that these countries could benefit by reserve pool-
ing assumes, however, that they have not already been doing so. 
Yet the Sterling Area, of which both Australia and New Zealand 
are members, can be viewed precisely as a reserve-pooling 
arrangement whereby all members agree to turn in their "reser •. 
ves" (gold and dollars) to Britain, receiving in exchange claims 
in sterling; and the gains from this reserve pooling are distri-
buted to members not only through interest earnings on their 
sterling claims, but also through access to the London capital 
market. In effect, some of what would otherise have to be held 
in the form of gold and dollar reserves has been converted into 
real capital by importing more from the non-Sterling Area. 
Similarly, both Japan and Canada have engager~ in parti al 
reserve pooling with the United States. Both countries hold a 
large portion of their reserves in dollars, having partially fore-
gone the purchase of gold for the sake of holding interest- bear-
ing assets. The pooling of gold in the United States has per-
mitted a larger volume of imports or larger purchases of assets 
in the rest of the world than might otherwise have taken place . 
The sale of gold by Canada to the United States in 1966 and 1967, 
while undoubtedly motivated by more immediate concerns, can 
be rationalized along the lines suggested here. 
It should be recalled that gains are to be had from reserve 
pooling only if private capital markets are imperfect. Other-
wise, private lending from surplus to deficit country could be 
relied on to cov~r reversible and mutually interacting payments 
deficits and surpluses. It is note worthy that both Canada and 
Japan hold reserve s that are considerably less in relation to 
trade than is typically true of industrial countries (the same is 
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not true of Australia , but New Zealand operates on a very 
narrow base of reserve s r e lati ve to trade) . Thi s sugge sts 
that they have r e lied in part on the New York financial marke t 
as a source of occasi onal balance- of- payments suppor t. 
Moreover , until the past f e w years both countries have had 
gains from further r e serve pooling would probably have been 
small, since it would have been difficult to improve on exi sting 
arrangements through this device . More recently, how e v er, 
"imperfections" in capital markets have been introduced by the 
U . S . balance of payments program, both the form of the inte-
rest equalization tax and through the voluntary credit restrai nt 
program . That brings us to the third possible economic ratio-
nale for regionalism . 
V Regionalism and Imbalances in Payments 
A third rationale for regional e conomic groups involves 
imbalances in i nte rnational payments. The basic problem is 
this : when a major country, or grouping of countries, runs 
into balance of payments difficulty and takes palliative acti on 
to reduce its payments to foreigners , its actions may incre as e 
the deficits of other countries or create deficits for countrie s 
that were initially in surplus . Those countries too will be 
induced or forc e d to r e duce their payments to foreigners . 
Now it could be argued that basic weakness in the payments 
position of those countries were concealed initially by the d efi -
cit of the large country . In a world of floating rates, the cur-
rencies of all these countrie s would d epreciate relative to ot h e r 
currencies, the e xtent of depreciation depending not only on the 
degree of initial overvaluation but also upon the sensitivity of 
each country's external transactions to changes in relative 
prices . 
We do not live in a world of flexible exchange rates , how -
ever, and it is well known that countries can continue for pro-
long periods with ex ante balance of payments deficits, partly 
financed by declines in reserve s or by borrowing, partly sup-
pressed through unwanted restrictions on international trans -
actions or on domestic demand . When balance- of- payments 
adjustments policies are non- optimal , their non- discriminatory 
application may r e sult in a larger loss of world output than would 
be true if they were appli e d in a discriminatory manner. This 
is especially true when the payments "feedbacks" between two 
or more countrie s are large , so that contraction of payments by 
one country compe ls the s Pcond al s o to r e duce its payments to 
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foreigners , and thi s in turn worsens the first country's payment 
position again . Put another way , payments restrictions or 
deflation under these circumstances have a very low leverage 
over the balance of payments, gross transactions having t o b e 
restricted by a large multiple of the final net improvement . 
It is this observation that provides the basis for a r e gi on-
al groupi ng based on balance of payments considerati ons . 
Several countries reasonably satisfied with thei r payments :>osi -
tions vi s - a - vis one another but running overall payments deficits 
with the world when pursuing desired economic objectives might 
find it mutually advantageous to restrict their payments to the 
rest of the world in concert, preserving freedom of internation-
al transactions within the region . 
The Sterling Area in its early days offers an example 
of such a r e gional grouping, when restrictions on both current 
and capital payments to the rest of the world were very severe 
but transactions with other members of the Sterling Area were 
largely unrestricted . Over the course of time, the distinc-
tion between members and non- members has become much less 
marked , with restrictions on payments outside the area d e clin-
ing , and with some me mbers increasingly restricting payment s 
even within the area. But in the late forties and early fiftie s 
the Sterling Are a preserved fr e edom of international transac-
tions in a large area during a period in which the world was 
b e set by acute currency difficulties and widespread restrictions 
on payments . 
More recently , discriminati on on a minor scale has been 
introduced into the relations between the United States, on 
the one hand, and Canada and Japan . For balance of pay-
ments r e asons the United States has adopted a variety of t e ch-
niques, ranging from a tax on U . S . purchases of foreign s ecu-
rities to a program of "voluntary restraint" by American busi-
n e sses investing abroad, to curb the outflow of capital . It 
has also restricted severely government purchases abroad 
(particularly relevant to foreign aid expenditures and to pro-
curement for U . S . militar y forces abroad), and there has 
been conside ration of restricting capital outflows furthe r 
and imposing a tax on international travel by Americans. 
These restrictions have had an undesirable impact on 
other countries . Impositi on of the Interest Equalization 
Tax (IET) on U . S . purchases of foreign securities induce d 
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what bPcame known as the "Kennedy Slump" in the Japanese 
stock exchange; Korean manufacturing industries growing 
handsomely on the strength of U.S. aid purchases and 
military servicing were given a sharp set- back; and Canada 
was so concerned about the threat of the IET to the new 
Canadian exchange rate that it made major protest to the 
United States and was given a partial exemption from the tax. 
Since that time Japan has also been accorded a partial exemp-
tion from the IET, less generous than that given to Canada , 
but still recognizing the special economic linkages between 
the United States and Japan. 1 But total U . S . lending to 
Japan dropped very sharply (Table 4), and attempts by Japan 
to find capital in Europe have been only partially success-
ful. Canada and Japan (along with the United Kingdom) 
have also been accorded special status under the "voluntary 
credit restraint program" applicable to foreign lending by 
American banks. 
The situation remains uneasy. The near term outlook 
for the U.S . balance of payments suggests the continuation of 
substantial deficits for several years, and the U . S . govern-
ment may feel obliged to impose further restrictions on inter-
national transactions. Non-discriminatory restricti ons will 
hurt the payments positions of countries with close economic 
linkes with the United States, and in some cases will perhaps 
even require those countries to take counter-measures, damag-
ing both to them and to the United States . 
The control point is that under such circumstances there 
may be mutual gains from forming a discriminatory bloc. In 
most cases it would be necessary for all members of the bloc 
to discriminate against the rest of the "W"Orld, to prevent "arbi-
trage" transactions through the members who did not dis- '· 
1Less developed countries, excluding petroleum export-
ers, were also exempt from the IET. This was partly a politi-
cal gesture (these countries do not borrow heavily on the U . S. 
market in any case), partly a recognition that lending to these 
countries does not, after allowing for the stimulus to exports, 
have the same deleterious effect on the balance of payments that 
lending to a European country would, partly an attempt to avoid 
blatant contradiction between balance of payments policies and 
the U.S. government's effort to encourage the flow of private 
capital to less developed countries. 
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criminate, such as the notorious "Kuwait Gap" in the Sterl-
ing Area in the mid-fifties. Canada has had to police its 
financial community informally to discourage leakages of 
American funds through Canada to Europe (a special prob-
lem is the unloading of American securities in favour of 
higher yield issues of American subsidiaries in Euope). 
Japan's exemption from the IET was until 1967 confined to 
government or government-guaranteed bond issues, presumably 
to inhibit leakage. In addition, agreements have been reach-
ed with both countries regarding total reserve levels. 
Thus the discriminatory bloc either has to be a limited, low 
pressure bloc, or it requires close coordination on framing 
and implementing the discriminatory policies. This is es-
pecially true for capital movements. 
TABLE 4 
U.S. Capital Flows to Australia, Canada, and Japan, 1961-66. 
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
($ million) 
Canada 
Direct Investmenta 302 314 365 253 912 1087 
Bank lending 131 98 70 -391 -81 
Other 632 396 455 1226 60 484 
Japan 
Direct lnvestmenta 29 54 68 78 19 31 
Bank lending 674 263 586 618 -44 - 385 
Other 125 210 185 1 12 - 11 
Australia 
Direct lnvestmenta 82 104 96 125 136 147 
Bank lending ,..5 35 24 37 86 103 
aExcluding reinvested earnings 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Survey of Current Business; 
Treasury Bulletin 
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Again the question can b e asked whether the five indust-
rial countries bordering the Pacific comprise the right group 
for a discriminatory bloc. The very heavy dependence of 
Canada and Japan on U.S. capital, and the rapidly growing 
dependence of Australia on U.S. capital, suggest that it may 
be . Although capital imports do not provide a large portion 
of domestic capital formation (never more than five percent of 
Japan ' s gross fixed capital formation in the past decade, 10-15 
percent of Canada's, or 10-20 percent of Australia's), their 
contribution is large enough to avoid being strictly marginal , 
and the possibility of borrowing abroad undoubtedly lowers 
interest rates and improves the allocation of capital by provid-
ing external financial intermediation. As noted above, trad-
ing ties between these countries are also high. Finally, the 
balance of payments positions of all of them could be charac-
terized as weak, given their various domestic and internation-
al objectives. · 
The difficulty with this rationale for a regional grouping 
is that it is very likely a transitory one; it does not provide 
the basis for a durable regional arrangement, since the balanc e 
of payments interests of these countries are not likely always 
to be inharmony. It does argue for a careful look at temporary 
arrangements, however, and possibly for putting discrimination 
on a more orderly and systematic basis than the ad hoc dis-
crimination that has taken place so far. 
VI The Political Element 
Sections II -V above suggest that the economic case for 
a regional grouping of the industrial countries bordering the 
Pacific, while not wholly absent, is not a compelling one - -
partly because some of those advantages are already being en-
joyed through existing arrangements. This is true especially 
of long-term capital movements (with the exception of direct 
investment into Japan) and reserve pooling. The evidence 
on trade has been considered by other papers. The balance-
of-payment rationale for regionalism may b e come much stronger 
if the United States imposes much heavier restrictions on its 
international payments than it has so far, the effects of those 
r e strictions on Canada and Japan having been mitigated in part 
by ad hoc discriminatory arrangements . But if the United 
States does take more severe restrictive action, there would · 
be an equally strong case for giving special treatment to other 
countriPs, such as Mexico, 
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As argur:: d above , the various economic arguments for 
regionalism are all second- best; advocacy of them implies 
that supe rior cours e s of action are closed off . It would not 
b e so despairing . While the Kennedy Round tariff r eductions 
fell short of initial expectations , the final r e sult was a substan-
tial move in the di r e ction of freer trade . It is too early to 
conclude that anothe r round of gen e ralized tariff r eductions , 
including also non- tariff barrie rs, will not be possible in the 
early s ev enties. The impediment s to inte rnational capital 
movements remain overwhelmingly thos e of ignorance and 
uncertainty regarding gene ral e conomic polici es rather than 
artificial barri i::rs to capital mov12mcnts as such, and until 
the past few y e ars the trend has been strongly toward greate r 
liberalization. Di scriminatory trading and investment arrange-
ments are justified only if these trends towards greater freedom 
are decisively reversed. 
If the economic arguments are not very compelling, is 
there a powerful political case for Pacific regionalism? F r om 
the viewpoint of the United States, the opposite is probably 
true, at least at the present ti me. For the United State s t o 
join a regional arrangement of any permanence would be like ly 
to generate a scrambl e by many smaller countries to associate 
with the larger Pacific or European groups, and it would b e 
difficult to resist their entry. Many Latin American countri-
es, for instance , would doubtlessly want to associate with a 
trade bloc including Canada and the United States . With the 
principle of non- discriminati on abandoned, what would be the 
grounds for thei r exclusion? 
Permitting privileged access to markets would reintro-
duce a sharply di visive element into international politics . 
Adherence to MFN has served to insul ate international trade 
at least partially from other dimensions of international politics. 
Further retreat from non- discriminatory trade would open up 
the possibility - - indeed the likelihood - - that trade favours 
will be exchanged for other favours. In the end economic ob-
jectives could be badly maimed . 
Chapter 10 A PACIFIC BANK FOR 
INVESTMENT AND SETTLEMENT -- ITS CONCEPTION 
by Einosuke Ashiya 
Professor, Seikei University 
I Introduction 
The conception of a Pacific Bank for Investment and 
Settlement (hereinafter referred to as "the Bank") is aimed 
at creating a regional financial institution that has investment 
and settlement functions in combination to serve the dual pur-
pose of facilitating investments and expanding trade among the 
five countries situated on the coast of the Pacific Ocean ---
the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zea-
land. 
If long- term investment and finance are to be facilitated, 
there should be a system under which the long-term capital 
invested or long- term loans extended could not leak out of the 
Pacific area through the purchase of capital goods and th~ like 
from outside the area . Such a leakage of capital would, in 
turn, put pressures on the balance of payments positi ons of 
the countries within the area . As the world economy is now 
heavily dependent on the United States dollar, any leakage of 
dollars to European countries would result ultimately in gold 
losses on the part of the United States, hindering the promo-
tion of U . S . long- term investment and finance in consequence . 
This is clearly testified by the curr ent dollar "crisi s." Ac-
tually, such a development has led to a further strengthening 
of U, S . dollar protection by means of reducing U . S . foreign 
aid and restraining private capital outflows. 
Next, with the expansion of trade within the Pacific 
area in view, there should be stable settlement system . 
Today , apprehensions about currencies persist in the world; 
the flurry of confidence in not only international currencies but 
other currencies impedes the expansion of world trade, as i s 
clear from the current state of trading, which must be avert-
ed in one way or another . 
Through the performance of these two functions , the 
Bank is expected to play the two major roles. 
The first role concerns the investment function of the 
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Bank . The Bank will accept from recipient countries as de-
posits. (1) the amount of capital estimated to leak out to outside 
the area on the basis of past records as regards governmental 
credits and donations, and private investments and loans 
abroad and (2) the amount of capital equivalent to that of invest-
ments and loans in cases where such investments and loans are 
made out of the Bank's owned capital. 
The capital funds thus accepted by the Bank will be 
transferred exclusively among the five countries within the 
area; hence, such funds are to be utilized for the procurement 
of goods from the five countries . 
The second role relates to the settlement function of the 
Bank. The Bank will institute a system under which the cur-
rencies of the five countries are used and then into a clearing 
system virtually with the Bank as its center . In order to 
make this system function smoothly the Bank will extend short-
term loans to the five countries within the area. 
11 The Investment and Loan System 
With the aim of facilitating long- term capital investment 
and finance, the Bank will have a department that functions to 
help circulate the capital invested or loans extended among the 
countries within the area without leaking out to outside the are a . 
This concept is based on the "Lent Currency" p r o-
posal advanced by P r of . Koji ma of the Hitotsubashi Uni versity . 
The proposal finds solution to the international liquidity p r ob-
lem in increasing the volume of liquidity , maintaining confidence 
and i mproving the process of international payments adjustment, 
all on an internati onal scale, with the Internati onal Monet ar y 
Fund taking the central part. 
Note : For details of Prof . Kojima ' s " Lent Currency" 
proposal, refer to the following literatures : 
"Japan ' s Foreign Trade and Tariff Cuts " by 
Kiyoshi K9jima, p . 192- 204 
"My Proposal for Increasing International 
Liquidity" (I), (11) by Kiyoshi Kojima , the 
Oriental Economist, August 1, 8, 1964. 
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"I Revise My Proposal for Increasing Inter-
national Liquidity" by Kiyoshi Kojima, 
the Oriental Economist, October 3, 1964. 
"A Proposal for Increasing International Liqui-
dity" the Oriental Economist, August 1964 
p . 549-551. 
"How Aid Could be United" the Economist, 
July 25, 1964, p. 401-402. 
"Letters" the Economist, August 15, 1964, 
p. 609. 
An investment and loan system of the Bank will merely 
have a limited function for the time being in facilitating invest-
ments and loans on a regional basis, and pave the way for 
development into an international scheme as proposed by Prof. 
Kojima. 
There are two major prerequisites to the establishment 
of the investment and loan system . The first prerequisite 
pertains to the character of long- term capital for investment 
and finance. Such capital funds are divided broadly into 
three: governmental credits and donations, private invest-
ments and loans abroaaf, and investments and loans by the Bank 
out of its owned capitaf: It should be noted that investments 
and loan grants among the five countries will have to depend al-
most entirely on p r ivate capital. As regards investments in 
and loans to developing countries, governmental capital carrie s 
much greater weight than private capital (s e e Table 1) . 
Hence the need of special consideration to the formation of a 
mechanism that will work to facilitate private capital invest-
ments and loans. The second involves the division of are as 
in which such long-term capital funds are invested or accommo-
dated . Cases of long-term capital investment and finance are 
divided by area into two : developed countries within the area 
and developing countries in Central and South America and 
Southeast Asia . 
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In consideration of these two prerequisites the Bank 
should adopt the investment and loan system that combines these 
prerequisites and meet each of them . 
In the first place, capital movements in the form of 
governmental credits and donations are made to developing coun-
tries in Central and South America and Southeast Asia rather 
than to developed countries within the Pacific area. 
Bilateral aid of this kind, as extended by the five coun-
tries other than the United States, is almost "tied" in charac-
ter, so no particular consideration is needed. In the case 
of the United States, the share of "tied" aid in the total has 
been rising sharply in recent years, as Table 2 indicates, 
though the "untied" proportion still remains . 
Table 2. Changes in the Proportion of "Tied" Aid 
from the Agency for International Development 
Source: 
1959 47% 
1960 41% 
1961 44% 
1962 66% 
1963 79% 
1964 87% 
1965 92% 
1966 90% 
1967 95% 
A.I.D . Quartery Report: "Trend of 
A. I. D . Commodity Expenditures of Pro-
curement by Resources" 
With an eye to preventing a decline in U.S . govern-
mental credits and donations the following operatons need be 
conducted . 
1. In cases where the United States has granted its 
governmental credits and donations to a certain 
country in the region of Central and South America 
and Southeast Asia, the country will deposit the 
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"untied" part of such credits and donations with 
the Bank in an account opened in the name of the 
central bank of that country. 
2. The Bank is required to hold the U . S . dollars it 
has accepted from the country as the reserve against 
the deposits made in the name of the country's central 
bank . The Bank is not allowed to claim conversion 
of the dollar deposits into gold. 
3, The country that has received U.S . governmental 
credits and donations is not permitted to convert its 
dollar deposits with the Bank into U . S. dollars in 
circulation but may add the dollars deposited with 
the Bank to the external reserves of the country. 
4. The country is authorized to use the dollars deposit-
ed with the · Bank exclusively for the payment of 
imports from the five countries within the Pacific 
area . 
5. Commercial banks of the countries within the area 
other than the United States that have received 
dollars from the Bank are authorized to use the 
dollars for settlements within the area. 
6 . In cases where the United States has received 
dollars from the Bank, the country may claim con-
version of the dollars into the dollars which the 
Bank has initially accepted and holds as the reserves. 
The second, as noted already, involves cases in which 
private long- term capital is invested in, and long-term loans 
are extended to , the developed countries within the area and 
the developing countries in Central and South America and 
Southeast Asia. A mechanism similar to that is to be appli-
ed to governmental credits and donations will be adopted in 
this case. By utilizing the Bank in this way it may be made 
possible to mobilize private capital indefinitely . 
For the most part, direct investments are usually placed 
in, and long-term loans extended to, the developed countries 
on a cash basis, so the amount of such investments and loans 
is to be deposited with the Bank . 
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Considering that private capital investments and long-
term loans by the five developed countries are generally made 
through commercial banks and that such resources are used 
by the banks in the form of foreign currency holdings, the Bank 
will be given freedom to use the currency deposited with the 
Bank in the name of the commercial bank concerned for settle-
ments among the five countries within the area . 
· In cases where private capital of the five countries is 
invested in or loaned out to the countries of Central and South 
America and Southeast Asia, they are required to deposit a 
portion of the capital prescribed as "local costs" with the 
Bank through the central banks. In the case of Japan, for 
instance, when a Japanese private enterprise advances into 
the underdeveloped area it offers in kind capital goods needed 
for the establishment of an enterprise and takes U . S, dollars 
into a developing country to use the funds after converting them 
into local currency for the payment of personnel expenses, 
electric power and other costs and outlays for the purchase of 
land, all needed for the construction of a plant, Incidentally, 
these expenses and costs are collectively termed "local costs." 
It is es timated that such local costs account for about 30 per-
cent of the total capital needed. Be that as it may , there is 
a possibility that the U . S. dollars exchanged for local cur-
r ency , after being added to the foreign currency holdings of 
the developing country, will be used for purposes not related 
to the venture concerned. 
Such a possibility could be avoided if the five countries 
deposit the amount equivalent to the local costs with the Bank, 
thereby preventing any leakage of their external reserves to c 
countries outside the area. 
As the U . S. dollars deposited with the Bank are used 
for settlements among the five countries, if Japan takes out 
the yen into the developing country instead of U.S. dollars, 
it will lead to the same result. For, the deposits with the 
Bank, whether they are made in U .S. dollars or Japanese yen, 
are treated in the same way as the Bank's currency . By 
so doing, the external reserves of the countries making invest-
ments or loans are saved. 
The third concerns cases in which the Bank uses its 
owned capital. The capital will consist of not only the cur-
rencies of the five countries but funds raised in the capital 
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markets in continental European countries. In this case, the 
capital will be used through transfer operations within the Bank . 
As the Bank conducts the operations mentioned above, 
the five developed countries are required to open deposit ac-
counts with the Bank in the name of commercial banks and simi-
larly the developing countries are asked to open deposit ac-
counts with the Bank in the name of respective central banks, 
and transfers are to be made among these deposit accounts. 
Ill The Settlement Mechanism 
The Bank will perform settlement and financing functions, 
·As its financing function the Bank will grant short-term loans 
under the overdraft facility. Primarily, the facility provided 
by the International Monetary Fund is to be utilized in financing 
activities, but payments gaps caused by settlements among the 
five countries have to be filled immediately and the period in 
which such finance is needed covers no more than several days. 
Herein lies the reason for equipping the Bank with the financing 
function. 
As a settlement mechanism three major systems may be 
applied for the operation of the Bank: utilization of the present 
key current system, creation of a common currency, and es-
tablishment of a clearing system. In this conception of the 
Bank, it is advisable to adopt a clearing system under which 
the currencies of the five countries are used. 
A system that uses the U.S. dollar alone is problemati-
cal as evidently illustrated by the present chaos in the inter-
national financial community. If only the U.S. dollar is 
used, settlements among the five countries are made in New 
York, implying the virtual adoption of a clearing system. Yet, 
if such a system is reinforced, it will face the general problems 
confronted by the international financial community and the New 
York market will have to play the role which the London market 
has once done in the past. Moreover, the United States 
must take it for granted wholesale assistance to the four coun-
tries within the area. In the present circumstances the 
United States can hardly be expected to play such a role . 
The creation of a common currency is ideal. But, this 
cannot be expected to realize for the time being in view of the 
fact that time is not yet ripe for the European Economic Com-
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munity for such an attempt. Notably, the creation of a com-
mon currency has to presuppose adjustment in fiscal and mone -
tary policies among the countries concerned. Considering, 
moreover, that the Pacific area is one that involves an inter-
national currency-- - the U.S. dollar---the creation of a re-
gional common currency on top of the dollar is not advisable . 
Restoration to the gold standard runs counter to progress 
in the international monetary system. A regional currency 
system, if adopted, implies strong ties among the countries 
within the area; here, it should be noted that the system is 
based on greater confidence in mutual ties and higher mutual 
credit compared with the gold standard. 
A. A Clearing System under which the. Five Currenci-
es are Used. 
Under the proposed clearing system the currencies of 
the five countries are used and settlements among these coun-
tries are virtually cleared to some extent. The system may 
be explained in more detail as follows: 
1. Trade and other payments among the five countries 
will be settled in U.S. dollars, the Japanese yen, 
Canadian dollars, Australian dollars and New Zea• 
land dollars. 
2. An exchange market will be formed for these cur-
rencies other than the U.S. dollar. These cur-
rencies have so far been not used in any significant 
amount because they are unstable compared with the 
U . S. dollar and no system obtains for the avoidance 
of risks incurred in their use. So, the Bank will 
open the way for covering exchange risks by acting 
to buy and sell these currencies. 
3. By buying and selling these currencies spot and for-
ward the Bank will meet requirements for the pur-
chase and sale of these currencies. This virtual-
ly implies transactions under the clearing system. 
4. Credits and debts accumulated with the Bank or 
holdings of the five countries' currencies will be 
cleared for every certain specified period of time, 
thereby restoring the capital formation of the Bank, 
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as composed of the five countries' currencies, to 
its initial state. 
As Table 3 suggests, U.S. dollars held by the Bank 
will decrease while other four currencies will be accumulated. 
As this hinders the smooth operation of the settlement mecha-
nism, the Bank will sell the four countries' currencies it holds 
in excess of the initial subscription to the respective central 
banks in exchange for U.S. dollars for every certain specified 
period. This enables the · Bank to restore its initial capital 
formation. 
Table 3. Balances of Trade among Five Countries in 1966 
(in millions of U.S. dollars) 
United New 
States Canada Japan Australia Zealand Total 
United States 745 -354 385 4 772 
Canada - 923 81 89 21 - 732 
Japan 153 - 141 - 233 0 - 227 
Australia - 458 94 167 138 - 247 
New Zealand 7 27 - 9 - 135 - 164 
Source: Direction of Trade, I. M. F. 
B. Formation of an Exchange Market for Four Cur-
rencies 
The currencies of the four countries---Canada, Japan, 
Australia, and New Zealand---cannot be used because they 
lack in marketability . Herein lies the need for forming an 
exchange market for these four currencies. So, the Bank 
will be accorded the following functions: 
1. The Bank will receive reports from the central banks 
of the five countries on exchange rates of their re.s-
pective countries' currencies for the U.S. dollar 
and on the amount of U.S. dollars they can buy from 
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and sell to the Bank on a certain specified date on 
the basis of the exchange rates to help the Bank 
adjust its exchange positions. Each of the cent-
ral banks is well aware of the supply-demand situa-
tion in the exchange market of the country to which 
it belongs, and intervene in the market, if need be. 
Hence, the Bank will act on the basis of the central 
banks' intention to intervene in their respective 
markets. When an exchange market has been form-
ed for the four currencies in the future and trans- · 
actions have expanded and become multilateral, the 
Bank will then be able to intervene in the exchange 
markets on its own judgment. At the outset, how-
ever, the Bank will have to depend on the central 
banks in the sense of re-insurance. 
2. On the basis of the central banks' intention to inter-
vene in their respective markets the Bank publishes 
buying and selling rates for the five currencies and 
acts to cover both spot and forward exchanges at 
the request of exchange banks. In this case, the 
Bank is required to set the spread between its buy-
ing and selling rates at minimum with the view to 
increasing transactions in the market. 
3. The Bank will be able to seek cover, when neces .. 
sity arises, to the central banks for the five cur-
rencies which the Bank has come to hold after meet-
ing cover requirements for the five currencies at 
the middle rates of the exchange rates published by 
the Bank for the currencies concerned. 
4. To make such operations possible for the Bank ex-
change banks are to report to the Bank about the 
holdings of the five currencies. 
5. After the formation of the exchange market for the 
four currencies the Bank will discontinue such ope-
rations, and at the time of discontinuation it will 
have its holdings of the five currencies bought back 
by the respective central banks. Exchange profits 
or losses likely to stem from exchange purchases 
and sales will be dealt with when such cases arise. 
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IV Meri ts of the Cle arin.g S yste m 
Merits likely to accrue from the accor ding of a vi rtual 
clearing function to the Bank through the use of the fiv e cur-
rencie s may be enumerate d as follows : 
1. The four countries--- Canada, Japan, Australia and 
New Z e aland--- make up for their shortages of e x-
ternal reserves under the clearing syst em. Table 
4 , in which the external rese rves of the countries 
within the ar ea are compared with those of the deve-
loped countri es outsi de the ar ea, shows that the 
reserve s of the former countries are much smaller 
than those of the latter countries . If the four 
countries are allowed to use their own currencie s 
for settlements within the are a, they may economi ze 
their reserves so much . 
Table 4 . . ( Reserves " Ratios of Reserves to Imports I t "J mpor s 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
United States 1.18 1.17 0 . 97 0.91 0 . 82 0 . 67 0 . 53 0 . 52 
Canada 0 . 32 0,37 0 . 40 0 . 39 0 . 38 0 , 37 0 . 27 0 .25 
Japan 0 . 43 0.29 0 . 36 0 . 31 0 . 25 0 . 26 0 . 22 0 .18 
Australia 0.33 0 . 55 0 . 53 0 . 66 0 . 58 0 . 41 0 . 43 0 .36 
New Zealand 0 . 24 0 . 15 0 . 23 0 . 16 0 . 17 0 . 09 0 . 09 0 ,12 
United Kingdom 0 . 29 0 . 26 0 . 26 O. 23 0 . 15 0 .19 0 . 19 0 .16 
F . R . Germany 0 . 70 0 . 65 0 . 57 0 . 59 0 . 54 0 . 42 0 . 45 0 .47 
France 0 . 36 0 . 50 0.54 0 . 56 0 . 57 0.61 0 . 57 0 .62 
It~y 0 . 69 0 . 73 0 . 67 0 . 48 0 . 53 0.65 0 . 57 0 .58 
Netherlands 0 . 41 0 . 38 0 . 36 0 . 35 0 . 33 0 . 32 0 . 31 0 .31 
Belgium 0 . 38 0 . 43 0 . 38 0 . 38 0 . 37 0 . 35 0 . 32 0 .41 
S witzerland 1.04 1. 02 0 . 95 0 . 94 0 . 86 0 . 88 0.84 0 . 78 
Source : · International Financial Statistics 7 IMF, 
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2. Exchange rates between the currencies of the four 
countries will become advantageous to the parties 
concerned. In explaining this advantage in more 
detail, an example shall be taken from the exchange 
rate between the Japanese yen and the Canadian 
dollar, as quoted on January 29, 1968, by which 
time the dollar crisis seeme<l to have lulled and the 
exchange market conditions returned to normal . 
.As the followin~ Chart indicates, the exchange rate 
between the Japanese yen and the Canadian dollar 
is arbitrated between the exchange rate of the Japa-
nese yen for the U.S . dollar and that of the Canadi-
an dollar for the U.S. dollar. On January 29, 
1968, T. T. selling rate for the U.S. dollar was 
quoted in Tokyo at ¥362. 50 and T. T. buying rate 
at ¥361.50. In New York, T . T. selling rate 
for the Canadian dollar was quoted at U.S . 
st92 .12 and T .T. buying rate at U.S. i91.20 . 
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In the case of Japan's imports from Canada, the 
importer first buys U.S. dollars at the T. T . sell-
ing rate of ¥262. 50 for the U .S. dollar and then 
buys Canadian dollars at the T. T. selling rate of 
U.S. </.:.92. 12. The importer is thus subjected to 
relatively high rates of exchange as the following 
formula indicates and has to pay so much more. 
¥362.50 x U.S.</.:.92.12 = ¥333.94 
In the case of Japan's exports to Canada, on the 
other hand, net receipts of the exporter prove smal-
ler than could otherwise be obtained. That is to 
say, the exporter first sells his Canadian dollars 
in exchange for U . S. dollars and then sells the 
U.S. dollars to obtain the Japanese yen. In this 
case, T . T . selling rates are applied to such sales 
to the disadvantage of the exporter. 
¥361.50 x U.S.</.:.92.10 = ¥332 . 94 
At the exchange rate between the Japanese yen and 
the Canadian dollar is not directly quoted, but ar-
bitrated through the medium of U.S . dollars, dif-
ferences between selling and buying rates are given 
at, 
0. 28 percent for Japanese yen- U.S. dollar 
rates 
0 . 02 percent for U . S. dollar-Canadian 
dollar rates 
0 . 3 percent for Canadian dollar - Japanese 
yen rates 
Thus the difference between buying and selling 
rates of the Japanese yen for the Canadian dollar 
is made of similar difference between the Japanese 
yen and the U.S . dollar and that between the U .S. 
dollar and the Canadian dollar. Should exchange 
rates between the Japanese yen and the Canadian 
dollar are quoted directly, the difference would be 
reduced with 0. 3 percent as its maximum. 
If there was no difference in time between Tokyo 
and New York, the Japanese importer could buy 
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Canadian dollars at a rate more advantageous to him. 
In actual practice, however, a time lag of one day 
due to time difference is necessarily causec , and 
risks likely to incur during the day are wooven into 
the exchange rate, so much working against the in-
terest of the importe r . 
3 . If exchange rates are to be quoted directly between 
the countries within the area, they will prove ones 
that reflect more ·the economic conditions in the 
countries concerned that those quoted through the 
medium of U . S . dollars or pounds sterling . 
For instance, substanti al fluctuations consequent 
upon instability in the strength of U . S . dollars 
and pounds sterling may be averted . It is only 
natural that so long as arbitration of exchange is 
conducted, exchange rates between certain two 
currencies should learn toward those quoted 
through the medium of U . S . dollars . 
But, when trade within the area expands, exchange 
rates reflecting the economic relations between the 
two counctries concerned will become more inducible 
and the lowest rates of exchange will be induced 
in that direction . 
4. An exchange market for two currencies, if formed, 
will make easy operations in forward exchange 
rates, there by serving to stabilize exchange rates 
at large . And if the spread between buying and 
selling rates is narrowed, exchange rates may be 
fluctuated for each of the two currencies within the 
limit of 2 percent above and below the parity regis- . 
tered at the International Monetary Fund. 
5 . If marketability is established for the currencies of 
the four countries within the area, the central banks 
will hold these currencies as the external reserves 
of the respective countries . Through the conclu-
sion of swap arrangements among the five countries 
within the area, the five countries may provide · 
against contingencies each other. In this way, as 
is the case with the European Economic Community, 
cooperation among the five countries is expected to 
proceed for the stabilization of their currencies. 
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6 . Exchange operations are ample if settlement curren-
cies are small in number, but conversely, those 
engaged in exchange operations will be favored with 
larger chances of getting advantages if such curren-
cies are large in number. The exchange systems 
of today retain traces of controlled prices prevalent 
during the last war. It is desirable that exchange 
markets should have fields in which freer operations 
could be conducted extensively. 
7. Finally, if the four currencies are used on top of 
the U.S. dollar, bear attacks likely to be launched 
on the dollar when it has run into a crisis, could 
be lessened. If the four countries hold U.S. 
dollars alone as their external reserves, any dec -
line in the strength of the dollar that may result 
from selling attacks from continental Europe, for 
instance, will lead the four countries to sell 
dollars they hold, further aggravating the dollar 
uncertainty in consequence. Hence, if the five 
currencies are used and held as external reserves 
of the respective countries, bear attacks on the 
dollar with the airri of averting risks would be weak-
ened. 
V Capital of the Bank 
Funds needed for operations of the Bank must be examin-
ed by dividing its activities into two sectors of investment ac-
counts and settlement accounts. 
In the investment account sector the Bank will not need 
any large amount of funds for its investments and loans out of 
the owned capital. For, as menti oned earlier, the major 
role of the Bank in the field of investments lies not in the use 
of its owned capital but in the facilitation of private capital in-
vestments of the five countries within the area. 
As regards the settlement account sector, the Bank will 
have to meet cover requirements for the currencies of the five 
countries and extend loans of a temporary nature. The size 
of funds needed for these purposes is dependent on the ratios 
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at which the five currencies are used respectively for settle -
ments among the five countries and on the extent to which pay-
ments gaps among the five countries is widened. Although 
it is hard to estimate the relevant figures, capital needed by 
the Bank is put at U . S . $200 million on the basis of the follow-
ing data. 
Imports of the four countries from each other totaled 
$10,890 million in 1966, and their trade balances with each 
other came to a deficit of $1. 73 million in the aggregate, which 
corresponded to 8 percent of the import total. On the assump-
tion that the currencies of these four countries were used to 
pay for the imports, the import total is estimated at $2 , 481 
million. Accordingly, an amount equivalent to 8 percent of 
this estimate, some $200 million, is considered the maximum 
one The Bank will have to hold as its reserves. 
Table 5. Imports of Five Countries from Each Other in 
1966 and Estimated Ratios at which their Res-
pective Currencies are Used. 
(in millions of U.S. dollars) 
Imports as 
multiplied 
by ratios 
United Aust- New (excluding 
States Canada Japan ralia Zealand u. s .) 
United States 4,857 2,414 313 130 
(70%) (90%) (90%) (90%) 
Canada 5,594 212 43 13 1,731 
(30%) (20%) (20%) (20%) 
Japan 2,364 335 552 61 344 
(10%) (20%) (20%) (50%) 
Australia 785 135 328 so 211 
(10%) (20%) (20%) (80%) 
New Zealand 117 40 60 181 195 
(10%) (20%) (50%) (80%) 
Total 2,481 
Source: Direction of Trade, I.M . F . 
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VI Future Role of the Bank 
It is expected that the Bank will play many roles on top 
of its functions that will help solve the current problems . Of 
particular importance is that with the Bank as the center co-
operation among the central banks and commercial banks of 
the five countries will be pushed forward. It is to be hoped 
that the Bank will assume features of the Bank for Internation-
al Settlements for the central banks and those of the Pacific 
Bankers Association for the commercial banks . 
With ties among the banks thus strengthened, long- term 
investments and loans will be facilitated more effectively and 
exchange uncertainty will be dissipated, and consequently 
operations of the settlement system for the countries within the 
area will be streamlined . 
Mutual guarantee of gold value for the currencies by the 
respective central banks and expansion of swap arrangements 
will then be made possible . International financial coopera-
tion will in turn be relieved from its current crisis and greatly 
bolstered through the promotion of regi onal financial coopera-
tion . 
SESSION V 
Comment on R. N. Cooper's Paper by Motoro K aji 
Prof. Cooper's paper is concerned with the main sub-
ject of this conference - - - it presents a most thorough study 
of the financial problems of closer Pacific economic co-opera-
tion. 
By way of introduction, Prof. Cooper suggested three 
justifications for closer economic co- operation; (1) that it 
should lead to improved allocative ameliorate efficiency, (2) 
that it should overcome difficulties in international payments, 
(3) that it should facilitate adjustments by over- valued cur-
rency countries. Then he asked three questions: (1) Is 
there any basis for regional arrangements among Pacific basin 
countries? (2) Do the five Pacific basin countries constitute 
the best group for integration? (3) Would all participants 
find it in their long run political interest to join such a regional 
group? In the remainder of his paper, Prof. Cooper sets · 
out his answers to these questions. 
In general, he believes that the establishment of a Free 
Investment Area would be beneficial. Though he is generally 
skeptical about the feasibility of a Free Trade Area, he does 
suggest that the trade creation-trade diversion criteria pro:.. 
bably support its establishment. I would rather emphasize 
the difference in industrial structures among the five countries. 
Prof. Cooper treats them all as industrialized countries. 
There is no doubt that they are all industrialized relative to 
less developed countries but the degree of industrialization in 
each is different. I am not sure whether this observation 
tends to qualify Prof. Cooper's conclusions. 
As to the balance of payments question, Prof. Cooper 
has provided a practical proposal. He suggests the establish-
ment of a reserve pooling arrangement among the five Pacific 
basin countries. His empirical study of the relation between 
reserve movements in Pacific countries provides support for 
these proposals. He found high negative correlation coeffici-
ents in four cases out of ten. And he concludes that the 
benefits of reserve pooling might be significant in those cases. 
Although I agree with his conclusions, I am not fully 
prepared to accept his proposal for reserve pooling. Prof. 
Cooper assumes that cou~tries_ hold in~ernatio~al_ resrrves. 
primarily to settle occasional international deficits. This 
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assumption is probably not reasonable for the United States 
whose currency is used as inte rnational liquidity . More ove r , 
her balance of payments has been in deficit for almost the en-
tire period which Prof. Cooper analysed . Taking these 
facts into conside r ation, it seems doubtful to me that any coun-
try would be willing to join in reserve pooling with the United 
States even if rese rves. move inversly with those of the United 
States . 
As to his final point about the fo r mation of discriminatory 
economic blocs , I would like to emphasize one thing - - - that i s , 
the importance of Japan ' s economic relations with South East 
Asia . Prof. Cooper pointed out that the United States could 
not exclude Latin American countries from any arrangement. 
Japan's position in Asia is somewhat similar to the United 
States' position in the Western Hemisphere . 
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Comment on E. Ashiya' s Paper by Harry G. Johnson 
Prof. Cooper has given us an extremely lucid survey of 
the various aspects that economic co-operation in the Pacific 
Region could take, and has dwelt particularly on the general 
possibilities of co-operation with respect to international mone-
tary arrangements and international capital movements; Prof. 
Ashiya' s paper complements Prof. Cooper's very well, by 
proposing the creation of a new international banking institu-
tion - - - A Pacific Bank for Investments and Settlements - --
through which these possibilities of co-operation could be 
realized, and by examining the characteristics that such a 
Bank should have and the problems that its creation would leave 
unsolved. 
I must confess, however, that I had some difficulty in 
understanding exactly what problem Ashiya' s Bank is intended 
to solve. The reason, so far as I can determine, is that 
Prof. Ashiya' s proposals build on a prior analysis by Prof. 
Kojima, which analysis is not made explicit in Prof. Ashiya' s 
paper. At two points in his paper (p .307 and p .321) it is 
stated that the function of the Bank as an investment mechanism 
is "based on the concept of"Lent Currency" worked out by Prof. 
Kojima and the idea of "Pacific Dollars" proposed in the consti-
tution of the Bank. Neither of these concepts is explained in 
the paper, and I cannot see that the proposed investment ac-
tivities of the Bank really imply them. On the contrary, 
these activities seem different from what one would propose if 
one were asked to suggest the activities that a government sup-
ported investment bank might undertake in the Asian region. 
However, the concept of the "Pacific Dollar", if I have right-
ly inferred its nature from its name, does appear implicitly 
and misleadingly in the advantages cited for the settlement ope-
rations of the bank. Advantages (6), (7) and (8), concern 
the use by outside developed countries of the currencies of the 
five Pacific countries and the consequent economization of 
foreign exchange reserves, could conceivably be realized if a 
single strong currency for the Pacific region were developed, 
supported by requisite commercial and financial institutions, 
and useful enough in world trade and payments to take over the 
commercial and financial role of sterling and possibly the dollar. 
But it seems very unlikely indeed that the Bank's operations in 
the five separate currencies, as outlined in the paper, would 
be sufficient to establish for the four other than the dollar, a 
role as an internationally us able currency. 
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It would probably be most helpful to the discussion if in 
my comment I attempted to restate what the main functions of 
the proposed Bank are intended to be, and comment on them. 
It is assumed that the main function of the international mone-
tary system will remain unchanged, and that the Bank will work 
within that framework. It will then have three major, and 
separable, functions. 
The first of these functions is to improve what Prof. 
Ashiya calls the marketability of the currencies and the stabili-
ty of their exchange rates. "Stability" is a rather puzzling 
term, since all the countries involved have fixed exchange rates 
in the IMF system. What Prof. Ashiya has in mind seems 
to be that the currencies of the area do not exchange directly 
against each other in the market, but are exchanged on the 
basi.s of cross-rates on the pound or the dollar; and that this 
involves both additional commission costs, and additional un-
certainty. The proposal is that the Bank should make a 
market for the commercial banks in each of the countries, for 
the exchange of the currencies directly for one another, and 
in so doing should reduce fluctuations of rates. This opera-
tion would be undertaken on the strength of commitments by the 
various central banks to supply their currencies for its opera-
tion. 
The proposal of this function raises three questions in 
my mind. The first is whether, the extra costs of conduct-
ing trade between Pacific countries by means of such currenci .. 
es are really important enough to inhibit such trade . I would 
judge from the other papers and the discussion that they are 
not, and that instead the main inhibitions on the development of 
intra-Pacific trade are traditionally political, cultural, and 
economic ties with countries outside the region - - - specifically 
with the United Kingdom. The second is whether the Bank 
would be able to achieve such improvement in the stability of 
rates and lowering of costs if it were to operate in the terms 
suggested . The third question is whether stabilization of 
rates and narrowing of dealer's margins are desirable: thes e 
phenomena provide the profit incentive for commercial banks 
and others, industry speculators, to make a private market 
in these currencies, so that the Bank might achieve the objec-
tives set only by itself becoming the market. 
The second function of the Bank would be to provide a 
settlement mechanism, both among the five developed countries 
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of the Pacific Region, and between them and the Asian develop-
ing countries and among the latter, thus permitting economies 
in the holding of gold and reserve currencies other than the 
dollar . As Prof. Cooper's interesting use of covariance 
analysis shows, substantial economies in reserve holdings 
could be achieved by pooling among the five countries, however , 
these gains are in fact already largely realized under existing 
arrangements. There might, moreover, be a problem, of 
which Prof. Ashiya is aware, in that one member --- probably 
under present circumstances the United States --- might ex-
ploit the settlement arrangement to finance a sustained balance 
of payments deficits. With respect to the developing countri-
es, it would, as Prof . Ashiya recognizes, be necessary to 
make provision to prevent such countries from financing their 
chronic balance of payments deficits through the accumulation 
of their currencies in the Bank . 
The third function of the Bank would be to provide short-
term and long- term financing for development, using funds at-
tracted from both public and private sources, This function 
raises two general problems. The first, which is not dis -
cussed in the paper, is how the Bank's operations would dove-
tail with the operation of the Asian Development Bank, not to 
speak of the other existing agencies for financing development. 
The second question is raised by all three of the propos-
ed functions of the Bank. Prof. Ashiya asserts at the outset 
of his proposal that the Bank should be a private institution but 
receive assistance from governments, and particularly central 
banks. It is not clear from the description whether the Bank 
is to be essentially a profit- making institution, or a public non-
profit corporation, receiving public subsidies to enable it to 
carry on its work. The description of its investment activi-
ties implies that it is intended to be profit-making; if so, then 
the question is whether the proposed investment operations can 
be carried on at a profit sufficient to attract the private funds 
expected. Both the function of improving the foreign exchange 
market for four of the five currencies, and the provision of a 
settlement mechanism, do not appear at first sight to promise a 
gratifying rate of profit. Hence it appears that a subsidized 
public corporation would be necessary for these . o/. o functions, 
and also for the i nvestment operations to the ext$!1't -that these 
are envisaged as subsidizing development in the developing 
countries . 
On balance, I am inclined to take the view that the pro-
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posed Bank is being charged with too many disparate functions , 
and that the foreign exchange market- making and the settlement 
functions would be better handled by agreement among the c entral 
banks to deal in and hold each others ' currencies , while the 
investment function should be performed by non- profit corpora-
tion if the intenti on is to use primarily public funds, or by a 
government- guaranteed private profit- making cor poration , if 
the intenti on is t o use primarily funds borrowed from private 
sources . 
In conclusion, there are some details of the paper that 
I do not understand. On p . 308, there is no description of the 
figures presented --- presumably they are ratios of reserves 
to some trade magnitude - - - and the interpretation of them shoul d 
recogni ze that the four countries for various reasons can manage 
with smaller reserves than European countries, either becaus e 
they have access to the US capital market or because they rely 
on the use of controls to an unusual extent. On p . 320, para 3, 
the requi rement of debtors to pay in currencies other than 
dollars does not make sense, the amendment from "required" 
to "allowed" leaves matters still in doubt, since in a conver t -
ible cur rency system debtors could always convert other curren-
cies into one of the five. On p . 321 , point (2) , the point 
about the interest burden and the lessening of it by greater 
speed in settlement needs elaboration; typically delay in settl e -
ment merely transfers interest earning from the lender to the 
borrower. Finally, on p . 322 , I cannot replicate the p r oces s 
by which the data on p . 323 yield an estimate of $200 
million for the capital required for the settlement account of 
the Bank . 
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Discussion on Cooper's and Ashiya' s Papers 
In reply Prof. Cooper took up three points raised by 
Prof. Kaji. 
He admitted that there was considerable heterogeneity 
in the industrial structures and economic performance of the 
five advanced Pacific countries, but he could not see why this 
would militate against effective integration. On the contrary, 
it could be argl).ed that heterogeneity would provide a basis for 
effective integration for number of reasons. For example, 
the free movement of diverse factors of production and know-
ledge have been stressed elsewhere. 
He explained that the correlation coefficients related to 
movements in reserves and not the absolute level of reserves 
and that conclusions about the desirability of reserve pooling 
could be made on this basis. For example, there were high-
ly negative correlations between movements in Japanese and 
Australian reserves, and United States and Japanese reserves, 
as might be excepted from the close trade relations between 
each pair of countries, and a positive correlation between 
movements in Australian and United States reserves. 
Though Prof. Kaji' s final comment implies criticism of 
regional arrangements on the ground of the different trading 
interests of partner countries, Prof. Cooper suggested that 
there might still be a basis for beneficial discrimination in 
capital transactions. So far the United States has resisted 
the temptation to implement trade restrictions, except in special 
procurements. Although the distinction between merchandize 
and capital transactions is increasingly difficult to draw, some 
regional arrangement might effectively maintain access to the 
United States capital market for Asian - Pacific countries. 
In reply to Prof. Johnson's comments, Prof. Ashiya 
made the following points. 
The virtues of a single currency system, the retention 
of which Prof . Johnson appears to advocate, are open to seri-
ous question. Such a system required sppropriate adjust-
ments of monetary and fiscal policy which, as is demonstrated 
in the case of EEC, are difficult to realize. 
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Cross-exchange transactions~ costly and risky. 
The object of the PBIS would be partly to provide a cover for 
exchange risks in dealing in the four lesser currencies. 
Under the present system, central banks have no par-
ticular incentive to lessen exchange instability, except within 
the IMF framework. Since they prefer to hold US dollars 
as their reserve currency, this is likely to remain so. 
The cost involved in cross-exchange operations to fi-
nance Pacific area trade might seem marginal. But profit 
margins on foreign trade are so narrow that even small econo-
mies in exchange costs could help to expand trade. More-
over, under the present system, trade, for example between 
Australia and Japan, has to be settled in pounds sterling, and 
instability in cross-rates among the four lesser currencies 
reduces rather than improves the effectiveness of the exchange 
market and provides the wrong profit signals. 
As pointed out in the original paper, the ex-
change rate between the US dollar and Japanese yen, for 
example, is disadvantageous in terms of market returns (See 
revised text, p. 319). 
The Asian Development Bank and similar organizations 
promote inter-governmental financing of development. The 
PBIS is designed to promote private capital flows. 
Whilst it is true that the operations of the PBIS would 
not to be so profitable as normal commercial banking opera-
tions, commercial banks would benefit from the increased 
marketability of member countries currencies and thus have 
an incentive to become involved in the operations of the Bank. 
Finally, only two main functions are suggested for the 
PBIS. i) an improved payments system, and ii) a more 
efficient investment institution. The system of payments 
suggested would become unnecessary when the currencies of 
the five countries achieved marketability and stability so that 
commercial banks could then handle payments in the currencies 
of the five countries. 
Discussion of Prof. Cooper's paper focussed on the 
United States attitude toward trade liberalization on a regional 
basis. Canadian and Australian participants stressed the 
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importance of k e eping the United States inte reste d in libe rali• 
zation . American participants argued that another Kennedy 
Round was still possible, although there must be some interval 
in which the results of the current round can be digested . 
They also stressed the impossibility of American participation 
in regional arrangements whi ch did not accommodate Latin 
American intere sts and, therefore, the superiority of general-
ized tariff preferences for less developed countries . 
Other participants, especially from Canada and Aust-
ralia , stressed the urgency of new approaches to trade libera-
lization from the viewpoint of smaller Pacific economies. 
They were anxious that opportunities for more effective indus -
trial specialisation be pressed . They saw little likelihood 
that future multilateral liberalization would produce significant 
benefits for these economies . 
Discussion of Prof. Ashiya' s paper centered on the 
three major functions of the Bank specified by Prof . Johnson. 
There was some doubt about the importance of additional 
costs because of ~xchange transactions among the four lesser 
currencies via London or New York . Prof. Ashiya and 
others suggested that these costs were significant . 
It was also argued that co-operation among Pacific coun-
try central banks serves the settlement function of the proposed 
Bank reasonably well . 
Moreover , it was pointed out that Japan, the United 
States, Australia and New Zealand were all committed to the 
Asian Development Bank which could serve the investment 
function of the prop osed Bank more effectively . Prof . Ashiya 
emphasized, however, that the PBIS would be a private insti-
tution designed to promote the flow of private investment funds • 
• 
Chapter 11 U.S. AID POLICIES IN ASIA 
by Gustav Ranis 
Professor, Yale University 
There can be little room for doubt, now less than ever 
before, that Asia as defined- -necessarily arbitrarily- - by 
ECAFE occupies a very important place in U.S. foreign 
policy--perhaps second only to Latin America in terms of any 
hierarchy of priority regions. Moreover, foreign assistance 
is well-recognized as one of the more important tools of foreign 
policy, in the U.S. as elsewhere. It should therefore not 
be surprising that the U.S. has spent more money on foreign 
assistance in Asia than in any other part of the less developed 
world since the end of World War II. Even on a per capita 
basis, the aid levels in this most densely populated of all aided 
regions exceeded those anywhere else until the Alliance for 
Progress came into being in the early 1960' s. Yet looking 
beyond this continuing affirmation of the importance of the 
Region to the U.S. national interest, what is really most 
striking is the diversity of major U.S. objectives in Asia and, 
consequently, of the aid effort itself over time. To help us 
demonstrate this central fact, we shall find it convenient to 
engage in some analysis of the nature of the past U.S. and 
presence in that part of the world before dealing with present-
day policies and likely future emphases which I take to be the 
main assignment of this paper . 
I It surely must be clear to even the most casual observer 
that the U.S. has a variety of major objectives in its aid pro-
grams in Asia- - as elsewhere--and that to treat the program 
as a monolithic whole would be extremely misleading. This 
is true both historically and in the contemporary context. 
While the number of all the relevant objectives that might be 
cited is large in number, the countries of the region can be 
divided reasonably into at least two major groups: a group in 
which objectives of security and stability are of over-riding 
importance, and a group in which objectives of economic and 
social development are paramount. 
* Gustav Ranis, Professor of Economics and Director, 
Economic Growth Center, Yale University. Although the 
author recently served as Assistant Administrator for Program 
and Policy in A.I.D., the views expressed in this paper are 
entirely personal and do not necessarily represent those of the 
U.S. Government. 
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Most of Asia lies at the periphery of the Communist 
bloc. As the U.S. redirected its global post- Korea aid ef-
fort towards the less developed countries, there can be little 
doubt that continuing competition with the Communist bloc play-
ed a major role in both size and orientation of the effort. It 
is, moreover, important to differentiate between those coun-
tries at the periphery of the Communist bloc in which the East-
West confrontation of the early fifties basically took on the 
form of an actual or threatened renew al of armed conflict- - and 
those in which it exhibited itself through competitive systems, 
aided by competitive donors, trying to achieve economic deve -
lopment. It should, in other words, be quite clear that 
U.S. aid programs in such countries as Korea, Taiwan and 
Vietnam, were heavily dominated by the military confrontation 
of the early post- Korean period, and that the assistance to 
such countries as India, Pakistan, Ceylon and the Philippines 
was premised differently, i.e. , on the more peaceful type of 
confrontation between competitive economic systems . 
In table I we present the total U.S. aid program in 
'53- '59, both on an overall basis and separately, for the major 
security/ stability and development objective countries. The 
table permits us to observe that while almost 79% of the total 
was made up of economic aid (A. I. D. predecessors p l us agri-
cultural commodities under P. L. 480), the proportion of mili-
tary assistance in the total is much higher in the case of the 
major security- stability objective countries (41. 4%) than for 
the major development objective countries (8.5%). We all 
recognize, of course, that resources are "fungible" and that 
the provision of military assistance to one country Ce. g. , 
Pakistan) and the provision of economic assistance to another, 
(e.g. , India), enabling the first to purchase economic and the 
second military equipment on the open market , may work out to 
have a similar impact on total resources available and their 
allocation. Nevertheless, we should be clear about the fact 
that, in the real world, fungibility is, in fact, not complete, 
especially when the foreign assistance is substantial in size 
relative to a country's total foreign exchange resources and/ or 
when the relations between r e cipient and donor are close and 
run the entire gamut of allocative decision-making in the host 
government. Decisions as to what type of assistance to pro-
vide and what type to refuse-- wi thin a given overall total for 
that country- - are, in such cases, likely to have a substantial 
impact not only on the recipient's allocation of total available 
foreign exchange resources but also- - and often more import-
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antly--the recipient's use of complementary domestic resources . 
In fact, the only way we could tell precisely what the impact 
of a given level and composition of any aid package has been is 
if we knew what the recipient would, in fact, have tried to do 
in the absence of foreign assistance. Only then could we be 
sure of how the additional capacity to allocate resources em-
bodied in the foreign assistance package was utilized. Such 
comparative analysis of the real impact of the U.S. aid pro-
grams in India and Pakistan, for example, would certainly 
be appropriate, if difficult to execute. 
In the countries of the first group, i.e. , those in which 
the U.S. was concerned primarily with assuring a minimum 
level of stability under the protective umbrella of a military 
establishment capable of repelling overt communist agression 
or covert infiltration, aid policies concentrated on the provi-
sion of a substantial volume of military equipment and technical 
assistance for the indigenous forces as well as on building 
the economic and social infrastructure capable of sustaining the 
host governments' own defense effort. While it is difficult 
to generalize either for all countries in this category or for 
the entire period of the 1950' s, the objective was one of assur-
ing the survival of society, first, and getting it back on the 
rails of social and economic growth, second. On the other 
hand, in the countries in which there was no clear and present 
military threat U.S. policy concentrated on generating, toge-
ther with the recipient, that volume of domestic and foreign 
resources and that agreement on policy actions intended to 
bring the economy out of stagnation and into a situation of self-
sustaining growth. To bring this down to an individual coun-
try context, this meant that while, in Korea and Taiwan, we 
were concerned mainly with an overt military threat, --and in 
vietnam and Laos with the threat of infiltration and insurgency 
-- support for the five year development plans of India and 
Pakistan, intended to put such economies in a position where 
they could stand-- and grow--on their own, went ahead with 
equal vigor. It is, in fact, clear that as the attention of the 
U . S . government shifted from Europe to the rest of the world 
the realization that development is the prime moving force which 
must be respond to became more and more wide spread . 
Moreover, it became clearer that substantial capital transfers 
--combined appropriately with the technical assistance of the 
early Point Four period-- were required if the re source require-
ments consistent with minimum growth targets were to be met. 
U.S. AID POLICIES IN ASIA 339 
Moving on to developments in the early 60' s, we may 
note a number of major events changing the structure of the 
U .S. aid program in Asia, as a direct result of changes in 
the situation facing a number of the recipient countries in that 
part of the world. Table II presents both the overall picture 
and the aid allocation in some of the important countries in the 
region. The overall rise in the relative importance of econo-
mic assistance, including P .L. 480, must be noted. With 
respect to individual countries, perhaps the most remarkable 
shift is the graduation of Taiwan from a stability/ security case 
to a developmental case. This transition began in the late 
50' s and had its full bloom in the early 60' s. We are all 
aware of the tremendous performance of the Taiwanese economy 
after 1960 when a substantial volume of economic assistance 
(see table II) was dove-tailed with a sustained domestic ef-
fort, including major economic policy changes within the Tai-
wanese economy. The policy package adopted included a sub-
stantial land reform, import liberalization via a loosening of 
the import control system, devaluation and fiscal and monetary 
reforms . This paper is not the appropriate place for a detail-
ed discussion of the famous Taiwanese "success story" ; suf-
fice it to say that the substantial bulge of U . S. foreign assist-
ance in the early 1960's enabled-- and emboldered-- the Taiwa-
nese to take those measures which, by 1965, had in turn put 
the economy in a position to move forward without any further 
substantial concessional assistance from the U . S . Table III 
provides us with an indication of the impact of these post-1961 
policy changes, as domestic saving and private foreign capital 
displaced foreign aid and permitted Taiwan to "graduate" from 
the roll of aid recipients by the mid 60' s. 
A second notable change in comparing country situations 
in the 60 ' s with the 50' s is the remarkable shift of Korea from a 
seemingly perennial security/ stability ward of the U .S. to one 
of the most promising developmental cas e s anywhere. It should 
be noted, for example, that Kore a's domestic savings rates 
which w 0r0 negative less than five years ago, are now exceed-
ing twelve percent, that exports, which were virtually stag-
nant, are now growing at astronomic rates, i.e. , in excess of 
30 percent a year . Transformation here again was in two 
steps, first a transition to development objectives, and, second, 
moving from short-run stabilization to a point where self- sus-
taining growth is in reach, as a consequence of sizeable aid in-
flows, coupled with major revisions in public policy. Kore a 
revised her exchange rate, dismantled many of her quantitative 
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controls, took a new, more forthcoming, posture towards her 
Japanese neighbor, reformed her industrial structure and mone-
tary policy in general and began to grow rapidly for the first 
time since World War II. 
What happened in both Taiwan and Korea was that once 
minimal security had been assured and markets activated as a 
result of a successful government stabilization and liberaliza-
tion effort, the interplay of individual profit maximizing deci -
sion-makers could move the system forward, with foreign aid 
providing the buffer for additional import requirements and 
assuaging the fears of policy makers as to the "drain of re-
sources" which might accompany such change. Once markets 
are activated and substantial new domestic . resources come into 
play as domestic entrepreneurs begin to spend their efforts 
on productive tasks rather than on trying to out-guess and out-
smart the control system, foreign capital is likely to follow. 
With respect to India and Pakistan, the U.S. has re-
cognized in the past that these two countries can be said to 
represent the free world's major developmental challenge in 
Asia. Consequently as tables I and II indicate, the U .S. 
has . mounted substantial aid efforts there over the years, with 
military assistance a somewhat larger proportion of the total 
in Pakistan and economic assistance more important in India . 
Moreover, acting through its aid missions and via multi-donor 
consortia of the world bank, the U.S. has tried to do more 
than simply allocate its resources in support of the Sub- conti-
nent' s development programs; it has tried- - and not always 
with complete success- -to maximize the catalytic value of the 
aid relationship. While a detailed analysis of this relation-
ship would take us too far afield, it is now generally accepted 
that the hammering out of agreement on a policy package compre-
mentary to the aid package enhances the opportunity to do more 
than simply provide additional resources via foreign assistance. 
Measures taken by the Government of Pakistan after 1961, for 
instance, including import liberalization, the restoration of 
market-determined prices of the major crops and a substantial 
devaluation of the currency through the institution of an export 
bonus system, were arrived at after years of mutual discussion 
and negotiation . It is now clear that these measures succeed-
ed in moving the economy in the direction of harnessing the 
medium-sized entrepreneur and landlord class to the develop-
mental effort. The usual performance indicators show that 
the Pakistan economy which was virtually standing still-without 
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TABLE 111 
Taiwan 
Private Foreign Capital Flows, Gross U.S. Aid Flows, 
and Domestic Savings Rates (Public and Private) 
343 
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 ----------
Private Foreign Capital 
% of GNP 
Gross U . S. Economic Aid 
% of GNP 
Domestic Saving 
% of GNP 
of which 
Private Domestic Savings 
0.9 3.7 2.2 3.1 3.0 1. 7 2.1 
10.4 8.5 7.3 7.3 7.2 4 . 5 3 . 9 
13.9 16.8 17.0 19 . 3 20.117.9 20.6 
% of GNP 4.6 7.3 8.4 9 . 9 11.412.2 14.4 
Public Domestia Savings 
% of GNP 9. 3 9. 5 8. 6 9. 4 8. 7 5. 7 6. 2 
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any substantial growth of output per head during the late 1950' s 
- -turned around dramatically in the 1960' s with per capita in-
comes rising at 2 - 3 percent a year, largely as a consequenc e 
of a substantial spurt in the agricultural sector which had been 
virtually stagnant in the earlier period. The increase in 
agricultural output at 5% or thereabouts in both wings of P akis-
tan in recent years- - an increase , incidentally, sustained even 
in t he aftermath of the Indo- Pakistan war and the more recent 
b ad monsoons -- represents as dramatic a turnabout in an e cono-
my' s basic economic landscape as has been witnessed in re cent 
years . Commodity aid to buffer import liberalizati on and 
P . L . 480 food to buff er fluctuations around the new - - and higher-~ 
level of crop prices illustrate the r ole foreign aid can play in 
inducing a government to taJce some. rat;her courageous steps , 
and in supporting those steps, once taken thereafter . 
India, on the other hand, traditionally more doctrinaire 
with respect to its view of the proper role of the market and 
government, has been slower to accept the notion that a more 
effective developmental program requires the participation of 
millions of the relatively, forgotten decision- makers in agri-
culture and in small industry- - and that furthermore , such par-
ticipation is very difficult to achieve through the best intention-
ed governmental programs acting alone . The most effecti ve 
coordinating and propelling device known to man-- aside from 
coercion which is rejected in most parts of Asia- -is the reac-
tion of individuals acting in their own self-interest to signals 
of the market place. Where these signals are imperfect and 
--as they often are in the less developed world blurred the 
government has a role to play in perfecting such markets. 
But an increasing number of aid recipients are coming to the 
realization each year that the most intelligent and enlightened 
civil service does not have enough administrative capacity to 
substitute for millions of market-oriented decision making units. 
About eighteen months ago the Indian Government also decided 
to embark on a thorough-going policy change including a major 
devaluation-cum-import liberalization package negotiated with 
the IMF, the IBRD and the ir1ternational community represent-
ed by the India Aid Consortium. The results of the adoption 
of this policy package are not as yet as dramatically evident as 
was the case in Pakistan some five years earlier, but there is 
general agreement among the experts that the unhappy timing of 
the recent bad monsoons has served to mask the underlying posi· 
tive structural changes which rendered the economy more flexi· 
ble, more receptive to competitive stimuli from inside and 
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abroad, and more capable of moving forward in a sustained 
fashion over time. It is certainly the expectation of the 
World Bank and the international community of experts that the 
Indian economy is now in a position to break out of its post-war 
stagnation. The removal of food zones in Indian agriculture 
and the attempt to continue the liberalization drive, especially 
in capital goods imports, should render growth rates of three 
to four percent annually feasible at response to levels of foreign 
assistance and would serve to provide a viable foil for the 
Chinese experiment on the other side of the bamboo curtain. 
It should be noted in passing that the early enthusiasm for that 
Chinese experiment, based on the Chino- India comparisons of 
the 50' s, has been waning in recent years and that the Sub-
continent has every chance to do substantially better than a 
system which must continue to harness the actions of millions 
of cultivators through a mixture of coercion and party discipline. 
While Korea and Taiwan are typical of countries able to 
switch from a security/ stability to a developmental emphasis, 
this is unfortunately not true for Southeast Asia. Thailand, 
for example, enjoying 6 percent annual growth rates spurred 
by its own agricultural sector and the help of foreign commer .. 
cial capital, which by virtually any set of economic criteria 
should have been ready for graduation from aid years ago , has 
more recently become the object of Communist infiltration a la 
early Vietnam. As a consequence, the U.S. aid effort in 
Thailand, instead of tapering off, has increased, with a grow-
ing emphasis on the northeast region, the area most vulnerable 
to infiltration. Moreover, it will surprise no one that the 
aid program in Vietnam itself has been increasingly directed 
to the economic support of the overall U.S. war effort there, 
specifically rural pacification and other counter-insurgency 
programs, and that the waging of the "other war" in Vietnam 
has been subject to considerable constraints as long as 8 major 
shooting war remains in progress. Thus the shadow over 
South- East Asia has certainly had the effect of postponing the 
hoped for shift in foreign aid objectives in that part of Asia. 
II Turning now to present U . S . aid policies and reason-
able expectations about the future, we cannot, once again-- and 
in all candor--ignore theimmediate importance of the Vietnam • 
conflict. Any single country program which provides aid 
levels in excess of $40 per head and takes up nearly one quart-
er of a declining world-wide foreign assistance availability 
cannot fail to have its impact, in the simple resources sense , 
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on other things the U.S. is trying to accomplish in that part of' 
the world. Moreover, the quality of our effort everywhere , 
the energies and attention span available for worrying about 
the tasks of development, are surely adversely affected , It 
would therefore be naive to argue that current U . S . foreign 
policy purposes, in general, as well as the catalytic uses of 
aid, in particular, are not profoundly affected by the confron-
tation now taking place in South- East Asia. The fate of the 
current aid bill, if nothing else, illustrates the existence of a 
constrained optimization problem in Asia- - and elsewhere--for 
the duration of the armed conflict. 
Nevertheless, it would also be a serious mistake to as .. 
sume that the U . S. has become so preoccupied with Vietnam 
and so squeezed in terms of the resources available for foreign 
assistance, that we have lost sight of the overriding long term 
objectives of our foreign policy in Asia. In spite of Vietnam, 
the Executive Branch, at least, proposed a total foreign as -
sistance effort (including AID, P . L. 480, support for regional 
banks, etc , ) for calendar year 1968 in excess of any previous 
level since the Marshall Plan days. Actual commitments for 
all foreign assistance was in the neighborhood of 6 billion last 
year. In spite of our present Vietnam and balance of payments 
-dictated difficulties and frustrations, I am convinced we 
will not withdraw but stay the course in the foreign assistance 
arena. Moreover, rather remarkable changes in the lands -
cape of development are presently being recorded which are 
bound to have substantial significance for the future. Our 
understanding of the growth process and of what needs to be 
done jointly with the recipient to further it has matured by leaps 
and bounds in recent years. We have, for example, a much 
better idea now, than ever before, of the importance of v i ew-
ing the typical less developed economy as a multi-sectoral 
org anism, with the focus on achieving a smooth mutually re-
enforcing inter- action among the sectors. Only as we are 
able to determine which sector, ideally, fuels development 
elsewhere and what the bottlenecks are preventing such an 
ideal functioning of the system, can we be sure that resource s 
and energies--including those included in the foreign assist-
ance package:.. - are being properly focused at the sectoral, as 
well as at the- aggregative level. It is this type of realiza-
tion which has led us increasingly to concentrate on ensuring 
the participation of millions of hitherto neglected decision-, 
makers in the development process by focusing on the agricul-
tural sector and on the "starved" medium- scale entrepreneurs 
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outside of agriculture- -while endeavoring to curb the number 
of new claimants to resources via voluntary population control 
programs. 
Even in the war zone itself, the President in his speech 
' at Johns Hopkins in 1965 made it abundantly clear that, while 
we look for opportunities to do what we can now, we shall be 
ready on a large scale to respond to the needs of development 
and nation- building in post-war Southeast Asia. Thus, as 
in Korea earlier, we are entitled to look beyond the present, 
to the day when the guns fall silent in South-East Asia. 
There are several major components of the U.S. policy frame-
work of particular applicability to this Region which should be 
cited here. 
First of all, we recognize the importance of the area by 
our awareness--even at a time of ever tighter appropriations--
of new and important foreign assistance opportunities in this 
part of the world. While budgetary cuts are forcing consider-
able retrenchment in Africa and making it difficult for us to 
maintain the critical minimum aid levels in India and Pakistan, 
we are, nevertheless, trying to take advantage of the changed 
situation which has recently presented itself in Indonesia and 
may yet fully present itself in the Philippines. Taking 
Indonesia as an example, here is a country with admittedly 
great potential wealth which has for decades been unable to 
harness its resources for successful breakout from stagnation--
in large part due to mistaken policies during the Sukarno peri-
od. The U. S. has declared itself willing, in concert with 
others, to support the current Indonesia stabilization effort 
and, more importantly, to assist the development effort which 
is concomitantly getting underway. Likewise, in the Philip-
pines, plagued for many years by an inadequate willingness to 
make some rather radical adjustments in the structure of 
economic and political decision making in the country. We 
are thus willing, in concert with others, to resume aid prog-
1".ams- - and thus make new investments in South-East Asia--
even as older investments, e.g. , in the Sub-continent, are 
threatened by budgetary tightness. 
In resuming such development-oriented aid programs, as 
well as in continuing others at critically reduced levels, it is 
clear that the U.S. wants to act in concert with other aid-giving 
countries, such as Japan. This is true not only in terms of 
sharing the burden of resources being contributed but also in 
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terms of the desirable multilateralization of the process of con-
sultation with recipients as to their domestic development poli-
cies and advise on the proper use of aid funds. 
The same insistence on working in concert with other aid 
giving countries of course applies to U.S . policy towards the 
older development- oriented foreign aid cases in Asia. In 
India and Pakistan, for instance, which clearly represent the 
mos t important non-military counterweight to Communist expan-
sion in Asia, both theory and experience argue for the possi-
bilities of effective efforts if carried out under a multilateral 
umbrella. It matters relatively little whether this umbrella 
takes the form of a tightly knit consortium , complete with aid 
pledges--or the more informal setting of a consultative group. 
The heart of the matter lies in the creation of a relatively 
political and technically-oriented setting in which information 
can be exchanged, advice given, and a sensible division of 
labor agreed upon. The U.S . would certainly support any 
further strengthening of aid cordination and multi - lateralization 
devices. 
A second major pillar of U . S. foreign assistance policy 
of considerable relevance to Asia is the emphasis on regional 
approaches to development where such are viable or can be ex-
pected to eventually become viable. The U.S. believes- -
and past experience has tended to bear it out--that the over-
whelming strength of the forces currently at play in the less-
developed world are centripetal in nature, i . e. , tending to 
pull countries apart, along tribal, ethnic or linguistic lines. 
While it is difficult- - and probably unwise- -to be doctrinaire on 
this issue, there can be little doubt that the utter disregard 
for economies of scale at home and for bargaining power abroad 
has led a number of countries down the slippery-- and costly--
road to attempted self- sufficiency and autarky. While some 
of these forces are indeed deeply imbedded in history and cul-
ture, the U.S. feels that its aid efforts, though clearly of 
marginal weight in the balance, ought to at least be registered 
on the side of those forces making for cohesion and the consoli-
dation of otherwise splintered members of a regional group. 
Not only is there a real question as to the simple viability of 
some of the smaller nation- states which have put in an appe ar-
ance of late, e.g. , in Africa, but also- - and more relevant 
to Asia- -the pace of overall progress in the less developed 
world can be substantially affected by the presence or absence 
of regional approaches to development. 
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The U.S. view of regionalism is not a doctrinaire, but 
a pragmatic one. For some purposes, e.g., river develop-
ment, one regional grouping may make sense i for another, 
e.g. , coordination of policy towards tourism, quite another. 
Pragmatic regionalism really has some of the aspects of a 
floating dice game, with changing partners for different 
purposes. Moreover, for any particular grouping, we 
are fully conscious of the wide gamut of choices, from occa-
sional multinational projects on one extreme, to complete policy 
harmonization within a common market context , on the othF::r. 
Moreover, any but the most starry- eyed assessment of the 
present objective economic situation in Asia is bound to impres s 
with the need for caution and the chance for little more than 
slow progress in the years immediately ahead. Nevertheless, 
this journey too has its initial small steps which must be regis-
tered when and if the opportunity presents itself. 
Most basic of all is our fundamental conviction that vir-
tually any aspect of what is loosely called regionalism must be 
conceived within the region itself before it has any real chance 
of survival. While, by now, it is a well-tried and tested 
truism to say that the entire foreign assistance effort, to be 
successful, must be understood--and fully supported by--the 
recipients, the force of the argument runs with particular st-
rength when more than the individual recipient nation state is 
involved. Any regional idea will ultimately be still- born 
unless it has deep roots in the region- - and no regional plan or 
multi-national project shelf worked out on the outside will suf-
fice even if the money is accepted and papers are signed. Ad-
mittedly, the need for results and achievements--partly self-
imposed and partly linked to pressure from donor country legi-
slatures--may at times tend to make us forget this basic fact of 
life, but it has increasingly become the cornerstone of our aid · 
policy in Asia. 
To come down to specifics, the U.S. would surely like 
nothing better than some--if tentative- - motion towards a region-
al approach to development in the Indian Sub-continent. 
There could hardly be a more effective way for the truly scant 
resources of that area to be applied to the monumental task at 
hand . Experts agree that there exist real possibilities--in 
the joint development of the Brahmaputra, in natural gas and 
fertilizer, and in jute, to start at the most modest (multi -
national project) level, as well as in the more ambitious areas 
of putting parts of the Partition- torn economy back together 
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again via joint transport and, eventually , common market ar-
rangements . But the time clearly has not yet come when our 
aid program in the Sub- continent can be based on any such 
immediate prospects . Meanwhile our strategy remains one 
of continuing to assi st with the most effective national-oriented 
development programs which can be devised- -while r eady t o 
respond to any sign of a further thaw in sub- continental politi -
cal and economic relations. 
With respect to Southeast Asia, the same caveat must 
of course be observed. Nevertheless, it should be clear th at 
in this Region, with its relatively numerous small export- o rient-
ed economies, the potential payoff from regional rather than 
strictly national efforts may be especially large . Therefore, 
any reasonable efforts to explore the possibilities deserve care -
ful consideration. While some rather modest steps have al-
ready been taken, we intend to briefly explore a number of 
possible limited further actions which remain open . 
As we have already noted, regionalism is viable only if 
it builds on some gener ally accepted aspect of economic (or 
political) interdependence . Usually the mildest version of 
interdependence comes from the recognition that some pro jects 
- -by virtue either of the physical character of the undertaking 
or the required economies of scale unattainable within any one 
country' s boundaries--must be viewed coope ratively if they are 
to be undertaken at all. The work of the Mekong Committee 
in the context of which 23 donor countries have committed near-
ly 70 million dollar s to river- basin- r e lated development i s the 
prime South- East Asian example of this most elementary "natu-
r al" form of regionalism . Somewhat , but only slight ly more, 
ambitious are the Malaysian proposals for a regional t r anspor -
tation and communications network whi ch would provi de e s s en -
tial overheads as a consequence of joint planning, in place of 
di sparate-- and possibly competit ive.:..,.. actions by the individual 
countries concerned . The very same fundamental principle 
applies to such "natural" regional activiti es as indigenou s 
disease and pest control, for example . 
A third and substantially more meaningful s tep would be 
agreement among the countries concerned on some ide al division 
of labor in the fi eld of applie d rese arch and human r esource s 
development . The Southeast Asi an Ministers of Education 
(S EAMES) have met several times in an effort to de cide where 
various regional centers of e ducati onal excellence might best 
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be located. Such centers will probably have a much better 
chance if they start life as national institutions and become 
regional, in fact, over time by virtuf' of their instrinsic high 
quality rathE'r than becaus e someone has put :.rp a sign designat-
ing them as such. This caveat would seem to apply inter alia 
to the proposed institutes of technology, of higher education, 
of science and mathematics, of educational radio and TV, all 
of which have been discussed in th12 recent past. With res -
pect to research on problems common to the region, e.g ., 
fisheries, tropical medicine, etc. , the highly successful exam-
ple of the markedly successful International Rice Research 
Institute should be kept in mind. 
Hopeful beginnings have thus been made in the exploration 
of priority projects ting<:>d with substantial externalities. 
These are admittedly positive steps, but we must be careful not 
to overstate their significance in terms of the real concessions 
made from positions of traditional nationalism and autarky. 
Perhaps the best way to gain a judgment on this matter is to 
ask a prior, more substantive question, i.e., what further 
steps in exploring the potential interdependencies currently 
existing in, say, Southeast Asia, an", in fact, one, desir-
able, two, feasible, and finally, how can U . S. foreign assis-
tance be of help. 
Measures oriP.nted to takin_g advantage of existing inter-
dependencies, potential or otherwise, and to build a more ra-
tional division of labor in the Region, quickly lead us to the 
consideration of sorne form or other of economic integration, 
with intra-rE'gional trade proinotion as a key objective. At 
present, as table IV indicatf's, the less developed countries of 
Southeast Asia trade mainly with the devi:>loped countries out-
side the Region . Intra-regional trade amounts to only 16-17 
percent of the total and is concentrated on food and other pri .. 
mary products. Under thPse circumstances there seems to 
be at least an a priori case for attempting to enlist intra-region-
al trade as a supplemental engine of growth . The growing 
importance of this engine is being increasingly recognized . 
Intra-ADC trade has been growing at 6. 5% annually during 
1960- 1965, compared to 2. 8% in 1955-60. Unctad H ~ in con-
trast to Unctad I, expects to pay much more attention to the 
potential for further substantial growth in such intra-LDC ex-
ports. There can be little doubt- -though we can only assert 
it here- -that the possibilities of expanding exports- -in non-
traditional commodities and to non-traditional partners--is the 
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less developed world's best hope. 
Steps toward integration, of course, come in many pack-
ages, from payments unions, to free trade areas, to common 
markets and complete harmonization. Few observers who 
have watched European progress and Latin American discus -
sions on this subject in recent years are very bullish about 
what is achievable in the short-term in Southeast Asia. 
Hard-headed skeptics are quick to point out that even if current 
problems are laid aside nationalism and autarky continue to run 
deep. Moreover, technical obstacles are frequently cited, 
including the lack of complementarity among the economies of 
the Region and the tendency of some to run continuous deficits 
within the Region.1 It certainly can be said with some confi-
dence that the area is not exactly ripe for any of the more far-
reaching possibilities cited; in fact, recent ECAFE experi-
ence with even modest attempts to achieve some harmonization 
of investment plans indicatf>s that neither the basic political 
trust nor the realization that major economic gains are there 
for the asking exist at this time. Nevertheless, it seems 
clear to us that while there can be arguments about the 
precise form and time-table of the movement towards regional 
integration, its ultimate inevitability should be recognized. 
Some room of regional grouping sePms to make sense as an 
interim ap-proach for the LDC' s in the area while the developed 
countries continue to discuss more global solutions. Some 
general observations on the pros and cons of various possibili- · 
ties are therefore in order. 
First of all, the present military conflict, there seems 
to exist no pervasive reason why a modest goal such as an 
Asian Payments Union must be ruled out, even for the near-
term future. The economies of South Asia are much more 
complementary than the long dreary history of ECAFE sessions 
gives them credit for. There arc~ the rice surplus and the 
rice deficit countries, there are the small trade-oriented econo-
mies and the larger domestically oriented e conomies. But, 
and much more important, the potential for future intra- South-
east Asian trade under the assumption of respectable growth 
rates in each of the individual countries of the region is very 
considerable. One can certainly already see a possible divi-
sion of labor, with the Philippines and Malaysia concentrating 
1 
ECAFE expert groups have consistently pointed to this 
obstacle as if it were a proven long term structural problem . 
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on the production of consumer goods, Thailand on rice, and 
Singapore on light capital goods. Given the labor surplus 
characteristics of most of the Region, trade in !abor intensive 
wood and wood products, leather goods, textiles, both within 
the Region and , , especially afte r some time, with major trading 
partners outside, has considerable Dotential. There certain-
ly exist as yet unexplored possibiliti,es for intra- regional manu-
factured exports, and import substitution on a regional basis 
is certain to be less costly. While I cannot claim to be a 
specialist in the comparative cost and production structure of 
the South- East Asian countries, I have no doubt whatsoever 
that a number of industries could now be identified in each coun-
try as candidates for economic expansion with integration . 
Such identification is, however, perhaps best left to market 
determination rather than to the cost estimates and log- rolling 
efforts of experts and officialdom. Present intra-regional 
trade levels are highest for Thailand, Taiwan and Malaysia 
(see table IV), i.e., among the fastest growing of the major 
countries in the Region. 1 Should Indonesia develop along 
the lines that we are now entitled to hope for she could e asily 
obtain the more flexible production structure required for pro-
ductive participation in any such regional grouping. The 
same is true for the Philippines, although here the gap between 
what is possible and what is likely to happen--under any reason-
able set of assumptions - - continues to be larger. 
Assuming that the above is a fairly accurate description 
of reality what first step is it feasible to t ake and who should 
be included in any such grouping? On the first question , the 
answer is relatively e asy . It normally does not pay to run 
before one can walk . A regional clearing house arrangement 
or payments union might well have t o precede any further move 
towards a free trade or common market area. It would have 
the clear advantage of permitting an incn'ase in the intra-region-
al trade currently carried on in inconvertible currencies, even 
when all other internal and external restrictions are unaffected . 
Secondly, and perhaps of greatest immediate benefit, it would 
save scarce foreign exchange for all its members by reducing 
the need to carry substantial idle key- currency working balance s. 
1Korea' s p e culiar geography and history have, until very 
recently , tied her more closely to Japan, which is outside of 
our "Intra- S. E. Asia". 
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TABLE IV 
S . E . Asian Trade Patterns, 1953-1966 
(in millions of dollars) 
% of % of Trade 
Imports Total Exports Total Balance 
Burma: 
Intra- S . E . Asia* 458 . 2 15 . 3 1,439.8 45,4 981.6 
Pacific Countries** 904 . 7 30 . 2 338.8 10 . 7 - 565.9 
Rest of World 1,636 . 4 54.5 1,392.7 43.9 - 243 .7 
Total 2,999.3 3,171.3 172 .0 
Cambodia : 
Intra- S . E. Asia 99.5 10 . 0 48 . 0 6.2 - 51 .5 
Pacific Countries 239.0 24.1 118.9 15 . 4 - 120.1 
Rest of World 653.6 65 . 8 605.0 78. 4 - 48.6 
Total 992 . 1 771.9 220 .2 
Hong Kong 
Intra- S . E . Asia 2 , 099 . 0 15 . 3 2,482 . 5 26 . 5 383 .5 
Pacific Countri f'.s 4,059 . 1 29 . 1 2,582.3 27.5 - 1 , 476 .8 
Rest of World 7,549 . 3 55 . 1 4,293 . 6 45.8 - 3,255 .7 
Total 13,707 . 4 9,358 . 4 - 4,349 .0 
Indonesia: 
Intra- S. E . Asia 967 . 2 11.6 624. 8 _6 .4 - 342.4 
Pacific Countries 3, 131. l 37 . 5 3,507.4 35 . 7 376 .3 
Rest of World 4, 231. 9 50 . 8 5,690.7 57 . 9 1,458.8 
Total 8,330 . 2 9,822 . 9 1, 492 . 7 
Korea: 
Intra- S . E. Asia 246.1 4.5 73 , 7 7.9 - 172 .4 
Pacific Countries 4,334 . 7 79.2 632 . 3 68.0 - 3,702 .4 
Rest of World 890.5 16.3 223.7 24 . 1 - 666 .8 
Total 5 , 471.3 929.7 - 4,541. 6 
Laos: 
-rritra- S. E. Asia 105.8 32 . 5 36 . 7 85 . 3 - 69 .1 
Pacific Countries 89 . 3 27.4 . 6 1. 4 - 88.7 
Rest of World 130.8 40 . 1 13.3 - 125 .1 
* Including all of Eastern ECAFE and excluding Japan. 
** Jap an, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the U . S . 
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Table IV (continued) 
Malaysia: 
Intra- S . E . Asia 
Pacific Countrie s 
Rest of World 
Total 
Philippine s : 
Intra- S . E . Asi a 
Pacific Countries 
Rest of World 
Tot al 
Taiwan : 
Intra- S . E . Asia 
Pacific Countri es 
Rest of World 
Total 
Thailand : 
Intra- S . E . Asia 
Pacific Country 
Rest of World 
Total 
Vietnam: 
Intra- S . E . Asia 
Pacific Countries 
Rest of World 
Total 
Total S . E . Asia: 
Intra- S . E . Asia 
Pacific Countries 
Rest of World 
Total 
% of % of T rade 
Imports Tot al Exports Total Balance 
7 , 186.6 36 . 6 2 , 599 . 3 13 . 8 -
3,643.2 18 . 5 6 , 120 . 2 32 . 6 
8 , 832 . 4 44 . 9 10,050 . 9 53 . 5 
4,587 .3 
2, 477 . 0 
1,218.5 
19,662 . 2 
628 . 4 7 . 0 
6 ,291. 4 70. 4 
2 '021. 3 22. 6 
8 '941. 1 
122 . 5 3 . 3 
2,819 . 3 76 . 1 
764 . 6 20 . 6 
3 , 706.4 
18 , 770 . 4 
167 . 8 2 . 2 -
5,783. 6 75 . 0 -
1 , 759 . 6 22 . 8 -
89 1.8 
460. 6 
507 .8 
261 . 7 
7,711.0 - 1 , 230 . 1 
517 . 8 19 . 2 395 , 3 
1 , 400 . 6 51 . 9 - 1 , 418. 7 
778.8 28 . 9 14. 2 
2,697 . 2 - 1 , 009 . 2 
559 . 3 7 . 9 853 .2 14. 1 293 .9 
3,481 . 0 49 . 0 1 , 847 . 1 30 . 5 - 1 , 633 . 9 
3,066 . 9 43.2 3 , 360.9 55 , 4 294 . 0 
7 , 107.2 
493.2 15 . 8 
1,506.8 48 . 3 
1,114. 7 35 . 7 
3, 114. 7 
6 ' 061. 2 - 1 , 046 . 0 
78 .5 11.2 - 414. 7 
90 . 4 12.9 - 1,416. 4 
532 . 0 75 . 9 - 582 . 7 
700.9 - 2,413 . 8 
12,965 . 8 17 . 4 8,922 . 1 14.9 - 4,043 . 7 
30,499.6 41 . 1 22 , 422 . 2 37,3 - 8 , 077 . 4 
30,892 . 4 41 . 5 28,693 . 6 47.8 - 2,198 . 8 
74,357 . 8 60,037 . 9 - 14,319 . 9 
Source : U . N . Direction_s of International Trade, 1951-May , 
1964. Published Jointly by U . N . , I. M. F . and IB RI>. 
June 1964 - Direction of Trade published jointly by 
I. M . F . and IBRD. 
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Finally, it would, as European and Central American experi-
ences has demonstrated, have substantial dynamic effects on 
the participating members' willingness to move towards more 
ambitious methods of exploiting the interdependencies within the 
Region. 
The question of the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of 
such a grouping represents, of course, a more delicate issue. 
As Professor Triffin in a recent related ECAFE paper has 
pointed out, it may well m·ake sense to think in terms of various 
natural intra-regional subgroups appearing possibly sequential-
ly even when only payments unions objectives are contemplated, I 
Whether or not the five major Pacific countries (including the 
three developed ECAFE countries) should be included is a more 
difficult matter. Reserve gains by some of the Southeast 
Asian countries during the last 10 years, for example, .far ex-
ceed losses in others and give one some comfort that there could 
be a sufficiently strong overall reserve position within the 
Region, e.g., with Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan as credit-
ors, to "go it alone". On the other hand, there are clearly 
substantial advantages if Japan, possibly also Australia and 
New Zealand, (but much less likely the U.S. and Canada) 
were to join. 
If we were at the same time to look ahead to a free trade 
or common market configuration, ideally co-terminous with the 
payments arrangement, the question of inclusion or exclusion 
of one or more of the major Pacific pow0rs becomes more dif-
ficult. From the logical point of view it may seem to make 
sense to have Japan, likely to be in a substantial creditor posi-
tion, join such a group and provide the transportation, heavy 
capital goods and technical skills required by the industrializa-
tion effort in the Region . This might be less attractive,--
at least in the near term future--however, for some of the other 
major Pacific powers which provide substantial amounts of foreign 
assistance to the area and,whose balance of payments might be 
adversely affected. From the point of view of maximizing the 
total flow of foreign capital to the Region and ensuring its most 
efficient allocation, along with that of the domestic resources 
which can be generated, there is no pressing need for any of 
the Pacific powers to be on the inside. If Japan were to re-
1
Robert Triffin, "Payments Arrangements within the 
ECAFE Region," August, 1967. Paper presented to the 
E CAFE Meeting of experts. 
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main outside, this might be more acceptable not only to the 
other Pacific powers but also to the less developed countries· 
in the Region; Japan would still be in a position to provide 
much of the capital goods and know-how and stand to be a prime 
beneficiary of the growth of demand accompanying sustained 
development. For even if Japan were to enter as a partner 
within a common market framework, she would undoubtedly be 
asked to provide special concessions to her less developed 
partners , since otherwise both the export promotion and import 
substitution obj·::ictives in most of these countries, taken as a 
whole, would be jeopardized. The experience in Europe of 
the less developed, Southern group of countries is certainly 
instructive here. 
The question that must still be faced is the manner in 
which foreign assistance can influence the situation and ease 
the burden of any· decisions that are made . Clearly, if 
there is one thing we have learned in the course of the last 20 
years, it is that foreign aid as a lever to effect desirable 
changes either within a country or in relations among countries 
is bound to be ineffective or even counterproductive unless two 
conditions are met. First, there is an honest and fundament-
al agreement among the experts and policy makers on both sides 
as to the inherent desirability of the step or steps to be taken; 
and second, that the foreign assistance funds made available 
tend to cushion any transitional pains, psychological or real, 
likely to be incurred in the course of adopting the particular 
policy changes . With four-fifths of the saving and an even 
higher percentage of the human capital provided by the less 
developed countries themselves, emphasis on the catalytic 
potential of the marginal foreign aid resources, rather than on 
the real resources transfer itself should lead one to an exami-
nation of how such funds can be used to assist the centrifugal 
forces in the area. For example, it might well be possible 
to establish an integration fund to ease both the temporary 
balance of payments pain (real or imagined) of countries join-
ing in a common market, as well as individual industry adjust-
ment pains . Such a scheme might be administered by ECAFE 
not normally an oper~ting institution, or by the Asian Develop-
ment Bank, which it is hoped, will , within a relatively short 
period of time, be in a position to do much more than act like 
a conventional bank making project loans to member countries . 
In fact, if the A , D, B, should be successful in organizing con-
sultative groups for the major countries in the Region, getting 
involved in their overall development policies as well as in 
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tackling such key sectoral problems as agricultural stagnation, 
it would become a natural for any related broader regional ini-
tiative to be headquartered there. The U.S. position on 
this general subject is quite clear. As recently as Septembe r 
27, in sending the Executive Branch's request for A. D. B . 
special funds to the Congress, the President reiterated his 
desire to see " our foreign assistance handled through multilate-
ral arrangements" . The firmest basis for successful inter-
regional as well as extraregional trade promotion is surely 
vigorous growth in each of the individual countries. If the 
Bank were to be in a position to have the various threads of 
aid and trade relations run together, through it, it would be in 
the enviable position of short- cutting by more than 15 years the 
learning processes of the World Bank in its own global arena. 
Future U.S. aid policy in Asia will continue to be aime d 
at moving as quickly as circumstances permit from security/ 
stability to developmental situations, and moving developmental 
situations, past, present and future, as quickly as possible to 
the point of graduation or self- sustaining growth. The means 
of achieving the former lie largely outside the realm of foreign 
assistance policy; the means of achieving the latter, we believe, 
lie largely in working towards a strategy which ensures the en-
listment of medium and small scale production units and their 
creative energies on an entirely different scale, within each 
aided country, and one which highlights the multilaterization 
of aid and trade as important facilitators of that process, as 
among the aided countries in the region. 
Chapter 12 
JAPAN'S ROLE IN ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
by S aburo Okita 
President, The Japan Economic Research Center, and 
Akira Ohnishi 
First Economic Affairs Officer, ECAFE 
I Introduction 
After the war, the Japanese economy has attained rapid· 
growth, and its international position has been greatly enhanc• 
ed. Consequently Japan now assumes greater responsibility 
for assisting the economic development of less-developed coun-
tries. In 1966, Japan's gross national product totalled near-
ly 100 billion U.S. dollars; and today the size of Japan's 
economy is as large as that of the economy of Britain, West 
Germany or France. Japan's GNP almost equals in size the 
aggregate GNP of all the less - developed countries in Asia 
(excluding mainland China) with a total population of about 900 
million. While in other parts of the world, North America 
is strengthening its ties with Latin America and Western · 
Europe with Africa, Japan's role in the economic development 
of Asia now assumes greater importance . 
Since Japan ranks among the major countries importing 
primary products from developing countries, Japan's policy on 
trade, import trade in. particular, as well as on foreign aid 
has important bearings upon the future of other Asian countries. 
As the Japanese economy has acquired greater importance for 
other Asian countries, business fluctuations in Japan, for 
instance, give direct impact upon their economies through the 
fluctuations in their exports to Japan. If the Japanese econo-
my continues its high growth tempo, it will create a better en-
vironment for the export trade and the economic development of 
these countries. Therefore, the stable and steady growth of 
the Japanese economy is required not only for Japan's domestic 
well being but also for the economic improvement of other coun-
tries in Asia . As the case stands, in formulating various 
policies, Japan should give adequate consideration to their 
possible influences on other nations, particularly on the econo-
mies of developing countries in Asia. 
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II Inter-dependency between the developing countries in 
Asia and Japan 
Those developing nations in Asia discussed here in this 
paper are practically the same as the ECAFE regional memb er 
nations which exclude China (mainland), North Korea and 
North Viet Nam . According to the United Nations "Econo-
my Survey of Asia and the Far East, 1966", the ratio of e x -
port to Japan fro m the developing ECAFE nations to their total 
export rose fro m 9 . 6 percent in 1960 to 13. 4 percent in 1965. 
Japan ' s share in the export from these countries exceeded that 
of Great Britain which constituted 10 . 4 percent in 1965, and 
came right after that of the United States which accounted for 
17 . 4 percent in 1965. While the total export from these coun-
tries gained only by 23 percent during the five year period from 
1960 to 1965, their export to Japan rose by 83 percent. 
The share of the developing countries in Asia in Japan' s 
import and export trade has been declining after World War 
II . Their share in Japan's export fell from 40 percent in 
1951 to 26 percent in 1965, and in Japan's import also decli n -
ed from 26 percent in 1951 to 17 percent in 1965 . Over the 
past few years, however, these shares seem to have ceased 
to show much decrease and is now stabilized at about 17 and 26 
percent respectively. 
As mentioned already, Japan ' s GNP almost equals the 
aggregate GNP of all the developing countries in Asia and i s 
annually growing by about 10 percent, Japan is now an impor t -
ant export market for the products of these Asian countrie s . 
In the first place, Japan must continue to import incre as -
ing quanti"ties of raw materials , fuels and foodstuffs to sust ain 
its expanding economy . In 1965, Japan imported two- thirds 
of its total consumption of energy- - mostly in the form of p etro ... 
leum . Thi s ratio is expected to rise to 80 percent in 1975 and 
furthe r to 90 percent in 1985 . Even if Japan is to generate 
in 1985, 30 mi llion kilowatts of nuclear power corresponding 
to one- thi rd of its total p ower generation capacity and assum-
ing nuclear powe r as domestic energy, the rati o of the imports 
of energy resour c e s wi ll change only from 90 to 80 percent . 
Japan will continue to i mport most of the iron ore and non-fer-
r ous metal ore s i t require s . Its import of raw cotton and 
raw wool may somewhat decline, but Japan must continue to 
import the total quantitie s of these textile r aw mate rials it 
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consun;es. In 1966, lumber was the second largest import 
of Japan, coming only after petroleum; and its import will fur-
ther rise in the years to come. Imports of animal feeds such 
as maize and kaoliang are sharply increasing. In 1966, 
Japan's feed imports amounted to 5. 7 million tons; and in the 
near future they will exceed the 10 million ton mark. Imports 
of oil seeds, sugar, bananas and marine products will also 
expand. If other nations in Asia can effectively produce the 
above-mentioned products, these countries will be able to 
greatly expand their exports to Japan. 
In the second place, the Japanese economy is now en-
countering the problems of intensifying labour shortage and 
high wages, and its favourable position in labour- intensive 
industries has been gradually weakened and so has been its 
competitive power in international trade in such areas. In 
the coming years, increasing quantities of manufactured and 
semi- manufactured products will be imported from the deve lop-
ing countries into Japan . Moreover, the share of imports of 
Japanese products, particularly of labour-intensive products, 
into the United States market has been substantially declining. 
During the period from 1955 to 1965, Japan's share in the i m-
ports of cotton textiles into the United States fell from 55 to 
29 percent, that of clothing from 40 to 25 percent, that of ply-
wood from 28 to 26 percent, that of toys from 72 to 53 percent 
and that of artificial flowers from 87 to 9 percent. On the 
other hand, Japan's imports of labour-intensive goods are 
on the steady increase. Japan's imports of such products 
gained by 6. 2 percent annually during 1956- 60, but they ros e 
by 33.5 percent annually during 1961- 65. Such a sharp in-
crease should be primarily attributable to a sharp gain in the 
exports of light industrial products to Japan from other coun-
tries in Asia such as Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea, If 
the developing countries in Asia hope to expand their exports 
of labour- intensive products, Japan will offer an excellent mar-
ket for their products. 
\Vhile Japan does and will offer a good and growing mar• 
ket for both primary and light industrial products of the deve .. 
loping countries in Asia, these countries are developing into 
important markets for the products of Japan ' s more sophisticat-
ed industrial products. During 1950-1965 the GNP of the 
developing countries in Asia attained an aven:i.ge annual growth 
of 4. 0 p e rcent. Ke eping pace with the p rogress in the modern -
ization of agriculture and the development of manufacturing in-
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dustries in these countries, their economic growth is expected 
to be accelerated in the future. According to the economic 
development plans for the latter half of the 1960s, the ECAFE 
member developing nations aim at attaining of about 6. 2 percent 
economic growth. Our projection shows that these countries 
will shortly attain the goal of 5. 0 percent annual economic 
growth set forth for the Development Decade 1960s by the 
United Nations, as shown in Table 4. 
Consequently, the economic development of these coun-
tries which will be achieved through their trade and economic 
and technical cooperation offered by advanced natibns now pre-
sents a highly important problem to Japan which fact points out 
to both parties the significance of inter-dependence. 
In order to analyze the inter-dependence between the 
developed nations--Japan, Australia and New Zealand--and 
the developing countries in the ECAFE region, we have prepar-
ed an inter-country relations table CT able 1.) This Table 
shows the type of inter-dependence through trade between the 
three advanced nations and the 18 developing countries in the 
region. This Table will enable us to make a quantitative 
analysis of the inter-dependence through ·trade between Japan 
and othPr Asian nations. Tables 2 and 3 show an outlook for 
the ECAFE region economy in 1970. While Table 2 shows 
an outlook based upon the past performance of the economy, 
Table 3 presents an outlook based upon the goals as set forth 
by each of the ECAFE member nations. Both of these tables 
were prepared in accordance with economic growth models for 
the countries enumerated in the Appendix. 
Per-capita GNP of Japan in 1965 amounted to nearly 
US $800 (in 1960 prices) as compared with an average of 
nearly US$100 in the developing countries in Asia. The 
difference in the per capita GNP between Japan and the deve-
loping countries in Asia is likely to further widen in the years 
to come, and the dem.and for Japan's increased aid and imports 
by the developing countries will become stronger in the future. 
The North- South problem in Asia will be the most serious 
among the similar problems in the world; and Japan's policy 
toward Asia, particularly those on trade and aid, will assume 
an important role in the economic development of these countri-
es. 
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III Economic development of Asia and Japan's policy 
In order to assist in the economic development of deve-
loping countries and also to expand foreign tt'ade, Japan must 
expand its imports, particularly from its neighbouring countri-
es in Asia. Since Japan's exports to these countries exceed 
its imports from these countries in most cases, Japan must do 
its utmost to increase such imports. However, these develop-
ing nations are not always able to meet Japan's requirements 
(as to quality, prices, quantity, etc.) this may partly be at-
tributable to Japan's inadequate trade and aid policy, but the 
development plans and policies followed by these newly-indepen-
dent nations in Asia are thought to be partly responsible. 
After the war, many newly-independent countries in 
Asia have not followed, in reaction to colonial domination, a 
policy of economic development through exports of primary and 
light industrial products but have concentrated their efforts on 
the production of import substitutes intended for their domestic 
markets depending upon heavily on financial aid from developed 
countries. As a result, these nations have been unable to 
meet increased import requirements for economic development 
with an increase in their export earnings; and their balance. 
of payments have been constantly in deficit and their borrow• 
ings from abroad have accumulated. 
From its own experience in the economic development , 
Japan has been advising other Asian nations that at the early 
stage of economic development the improvement of agriculture 
and the development of light industries for producing exportable 
commodities should receive high priorities. However, this 
advice has often aroused suspicion on the part of the developing 
nations in Asia that Japan wants these nations to remain agri-
cultural and light industrial nations. What Japan really me ans 
is that each developing nation must first improve agriculture in 
order to promote its industrialization effectively and that it must 
develop light industries capable of gaining export earnings to 
enable it to earn foreign exchange required for establishing its 
heavy industries. If the developing nations follow such a 
policy, it will be able to derive the benefit not only of the so-
called "economy of scale" by exploiting the large markets in 
the advanced industrial nations but also of international division 
of labour based upon comparative advantage. 
The history of Japan's economic development in the past 
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and the recent economic improvement of China (Taiwan) offe rs 
interesting examples in this respect. 
In the latter half of the 1960' s, however, many of the 
developing coun tri es in Asia came to re- exa~ine their ~evelop­
ment polic ie s and to follow a new policy placrng emphasis on the 
improvement of agriculture and the export of -primary products 
and finished or semi- finishe d products. It is expected that a 
new pattern of international division of l abour will thus b e form-
ed in the years to come to common benefit of Japan and the dev e -
loping countries in Asia. 
As is generally known, Japan imports most of the industr i-
al raw materials, fuels and foodstuffs it needs from abroad and 
exports manufactured goods . Therefore, Japan has no reason 
to oppose, in principle, to the elimination of various trade 
barriers against exports of primary products from developing 
countries as well as to the expansi on in the imports of such 
commodities through trade agreements . On the contrary , 
Japan will have to recognize the significance of interdependen c e 
between itself and the developing countries becaus e it must s e -
cure stable supply sources of ever- increasing industrial r aw 
materials, fuels and foodstuffs as well a s the export markets 
for its industri al products . If the granting of preferenti al 
tariffs for manufacture s and semi- manufactures exported from 
the developing countrie s could help speed up the industrializa-
tion of these countries, such preferenti al tariffs would for m 
a potential factor producing mutual benefits to Japan and the 
developing countries not only of "vertical division of labour" 
but also of "horizontal division of labour" in the long run. 
In other words, the industrialization of the developing coun-
tries would not mean a loss of Japan ' s export markets but it 
would mean an expansion in its exports . 
Of course, the above - mentioned statement does not me an 
that the elimination of trade barriers to the primary products 
and the offer of preferential tariff rates to the manufacture s 
and semi- manufactures exported from the developed countries 
cause no damage to certain commodities . However, Japan 
already has made a great progress in trade liberalization . 
Japan's demand for primary products is steadily increasing , 
and the abolishment of trade barriers to the imports of primar y 
products is not thought to inflict much damage to the economy of 
Japan as a whole. Imports of industrial raw materials have 
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been almost completely liberalized, and such commodities are 
either exempted from duties or subject to low duties. How-
ever, there are quite a few items of foodstuffs such as rice, 
wheat and edible oils which are not yet liberalized. Customs 
tariff rates on banana, black tea and a few other items are 
quite high. In order to stop general price hike and also to 
meet import liberalization and the elimination of trade barriers 
to the imports from the developing countries, efforts are now 
being made to free Japanese agriculture from excessive protec-
tionism and to modernize it. To stabilize commodity prices 
in Japan, it is urgent to strengthen the international competi-
tive power of agriculture through structural reform and reorga-
nization. 
The preferential tariffs to the exports of manufactures 
and semi-manufactures from the developing countries would 
affect the Japanese economy in a different way from the elimi-
nation of trade barriers to the imports of primary products 
from such countries. Increased imports of primary products 
would constitute competition simply with Japanese producers 
in the domestic market. But preferential tariffs on the manu-
factured and semi-manufactured products would intensify com-
petition not only in Japan's domestic market but also in over-
seas markets. In case all developed nations including Japan 
are to offer preferential tariffs to the products of developing 
countries, Japanese industries producing the same or similar 
commodities would inevitably be affected. Some of such 
Japanese industries might weaken their position in overseas 
markets under the pressure of expanding exports from the 
developing countries . However, taking such a possible deve-
lopments into account, Japan should form a judgment from a 
broader and long-range international policy viewpoints. 
In order to develop and industrialize the developing coun-
tries, their overseas markPts must be expanded. It may be 
desirable for Japan, in the long run, to allow developing coun-
tries to take over some of its overseas markets for commodities 
which can be produced under more favourable conditions in the 
developing countries . Such a shift in international trade 
would insure the more effective utilization of world resources 
and labour . To improve the existing economic structure of 
the developing countries and to accelerate their economic 
development, it is imperative that the advanced nations should 
also change their trade and industrial structure to better con-
tribute to the improvement of the international trade structure. 
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We have no reason to believe that such a change or adjustinent 
of industrial structure of the developed nations can be carried 
out smoothly and without any sacrifice. It naturally follows 
that the government of each of the advanced nations should not 
oppose to such industrial adjustment but should tackle the 
problem with a forward- looking attitude and strive to minimize 
the sacrifices demanded of certain producers and to increase 
the benefits of the nation as a whole to the utmost extent. 
Such efforts would contribute in the long run to the well being 
of the entire world inhabitants including those in the developing 
countries . 
The major obstacles are oppositions raised by the group s 
directly affected by such a policy and this will create political 
pressure on the government. In order to avoid political dif-
ficulties in the developed countries measures should be worked 
out to minimize such obstacles. 
IV Economic development of Asia and T apan 1 s aid policy 
In discussing the role of Japan's aid in the economic 
development of Asia, it is thought appropriate to examine 
Japan's basic policy on aid to these countries. Japan's post-
war bilateral aid to developing countries in Asia was started 
with its economic cooperation under the reparations programme s, 
the first case being the reparations agreement with Burma c on-
cluded in 1954. In the same year, Japan joined the Colombo 
Plan and started to offer technical cooperation to South and 
Southeast Asian countrie s. Since Japan became a member of 
the United Nations in 1956 , it has been participating in multi-
lateral aid efforts exerted by various international organiza-
tions. In 1960 Japan became a member nation of DAG (Deve-
lopment Assistance Group), which later became DAC of 
OECD, and the p osition of Japan as an aiding country was 
further consolidated. 
As already mentioned, Japan's position as an aid- offer-
ing nation has been steadily enhanced. However, soon after 
the war Japan was primarily concerned in its own economic 
recovery and development and did not and could not take a 
positive and consistent attitude toward aid to the developing 
countries. However, as Japan's economic power has steadily 
incre ased, Japan could no longer maintain such a passive at-
titude. During the latter half of the 1960' s, Japan took a new 
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turn in its aid policy. Japan possitively participated in the 
Asia Development Bank and took a leading part in calling the 
Ministerial Conference on the Development of Southeast 
Asia and the Southeast Asia Agriculture Development Confe-
rence. These actions indicate that there has been a change to 
a more positive attitude toward aid programmes. 
While Japan's share in the burden of economic aid is 
still comparatively small and the conditions of Japan's aid offers 
are not so liberal, Japan will have to follow a positive aid 
policy of its own in view of its increased international respon-
sibilities. Since there are but a limited number of 
nations capable of offering aids to developing countries in Asia, 
efforts should be made to carry out aid programmes most effec-
tively . Since the economic aids now being offered are not 
charity undertakings, Japan's national interest should natural-
ly be taken into account in furnishing aid . However, if 
Japan's aid is effective and effici~nt in accelerating economic 
development of other Asian countries, it will advance the mutu-
al interests of both the aid-giving and the aid-receiving coun-
tries. 
When we discuss the effective execution of aid programme s, 
we sometimes point out the fact that aids given to the developing 
countries by the advanced nations have not produced desired 
results. Often this fact is exaggerated, however . South 
Korea presents an interesting case, in this connection. When 
aids from the United States started to decline, the economy of 
South Korea miraculously started its high growth. Based upon 
this case, some economists contend that aids to developing coun-
tries do more harm than good. However, it cannot be said that 
the aids so far offered have been meaningless. Economic indi-
cators show that aids furnished to Taiwan, Thailand and Pakis-
tan have produced some encouraging results. It is unrealistic 
to expect that the same amount of aid will produce the same re-
sult in each aid-recipient country or that a large amount of aid 
will enable a developing country to accomplish "take-off". 
All the developing countries in Asia are not the same . They 
are widely different in the size of economy, stage of economic 
development, the endowment of natural resources, population, 
educational standards, political system, race and religion . 
It is only natural that aids given to these nations should be af-
fected by these factors. It is n ecessary to note that the result 
of aid is vitally affected not only by the forms of aid but also 
by the conditions and systems in the aid- receiving countries. 
368 OKIT A AND OHNISHI 
OECD is now studying the forms of aid to be given by 
the advanced nations. Japan also will have to study its own 
aid policy to be followed in cooperation with other advanced 
nations. We believe that Japan 's new aid efforts should be 
directed to the promotion of both bilateral aid and multilate ral 
aids through international agencies, 
To expedite the economic development of the developing 
countries, it is necessary to change and reorganize the exist-
ing inefficient economies into efficient ones on a world-wide 
basis; and for this purpose part of material and intellectual 
achievements so far reached by the advanced nations should be 
transferred to the developing countri es. While economic aid 
from advanced nations undoubtedly promotes the development of 
developing countries, it is true that the e conomic development 
of the developing countries should be accomplished primarily by 
self-help, Therefore, aid efforts should be so directed as 
to accelerate the attainment of a self- sustaining economy . In 
order to carry out aid programmes most effectively, it may be-
come necessary to create an machinery for mutual supervision 
to be jointly operated by the aid-giving and the aid-receiving 
nations. In this connection, Japan will have to establish 
standards for its economic aid and cooperation including priority, 
objectives and form of aid. 
In 1966, aid given by Japan totalled $539 million, an 
increase of 17 percent over 1965. However, since the Japa-
nese economy attained a high rate of growth during the year, 
the ratio of Japan's total aid to its national income fell from 
0 , 71 in 1965 to 0.69 percent in 1966. Compared with the 
advanced countries in Europe and America where per-capita 
national income is high and the rate of economic growth is rela-
tively slow, Japan's foreign aid is felt rather too heavy, as 
per - capita national income is low and growth rate of the economy 
is very high. This is the subject of further discussion by the 
OECD member nations . 
It should be noted, however , that if an aid programme is 
most effectively carried out, the aid equivalent to one percent 
of national income will not mean a complete "leakage" or loss 
to the aid-giving country but will mean a "real" reduction in its 
aid burden . An effective expansion i n Japan's foreign aid to 
the developing countries would increase its exports of industri-
al products and would push up the purchasing power of the 
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people of the aid-receiving countries. Thus in the long run, 
a reduction in the government's domestic expenditures caused 
by an increased outflow of capital in the form of aid would be 
partly off set by an increase in export earnings. On the other 
hand, if aid from Japan should be wasted away and should not 
lead to an expansion of foreign trade, then the "aid" would 
mean a "real" loss to Japan. 
Tables 5 and 6 show possible effects of Japan's financial 
aid to developing countries equivalent to one percent of its 
national income upon its economy based upon the "Dynamic 
Multi- Sector Model for the Japanese Economy" attached here-
to. Case No.1 presents a picture of a case where Japan's 
aid equivalent to one percent of its national income is effective-
ly utilized and increases Japan's export trade, while Case 
No. 2 shows what would happen if Japan's aid is simply wasted 
away and causes no increase in foreign trade. In the Case 
No. 1 the annual growth rate of the Japanese economy will 
stand at 8. 7 percent during 1963- 70, while in Case No . 2 it 
will be 7. 5 percent. In Case No. 2, the aid would not simply 
increase Japan's financial burden but also would adversely af-
fect the aid-receiving nations because of a possible decline in 
Japan's imports from these countries. The figures on these 
two tables explain that if Japan's aid is not increased within 
the limit of an amount acceptable to the Japanese economy and 
if the aid-receiving nations do not most effectively carry out 
their development programmes, the aid will produce no benefit 
either to the aided nations or to Japan. If Japan's aid is 
utilized effectively to develop the manufacturing industry to be 
es tablished on the foundation of improved agriculture, the 
economic development of the aided countries will be expedited, 
their economic structure improved and the levels of their econo-
mic activities raised. However, such development will inevi-
tably increase the imports into the aid-receiving countries. 
Therefore, if their exports do not increase, their balance of 
payments will show increased deficit and their ;'needs for aid" 
will increase. If Japan simply offers aid and does not expand 
its imports from the d eveloping countries, the economies of the 
aided nations would become all the more dependent upon aid 
from the developed nations. Such being the case , Japan 
should increase not only its aid to the developing countries but 
also its imports from them . 
The increased production and imports of primary products 
from the developing countries into Japan will benefit both Japan 
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and these developing countries. In order to attain self- sust ain-
ing economic growth of the developing countries by their s e lf-
help efforts, these countries should not only modernize agri cul-
ture but also should industrialize themselves. The preferent-
i al tariffs offere d to the imports of manufactured and semi-manu-
f actured products should be regarded as part of aid efforts. 
In order to be prepared for its increased aid efforts and 
the larger imports from developing countries as well as grant-
ing of preferential tariff rates to the imports from the d ev e l op-
ing countries , Japan will have to adjust its industrial str u c ture. 
Subsidies for the modernization of agriculture and for the ration-
alizati on of smaller enterprises or their shifting to other types 
of business will have to be considered as part of Japan ' s over-
all aid programme . By observing the present stage of Jap an ' s 
economic development from an international viewpoint, Japan 
should allow the developing nations to take ove r some of its 
overseas markets wherever possible and should strive to re al-
locate resource s and labour for better use . 
V Conclusion- - Re. ional cooperation in Asia 
and the position o apan . 
The so- called "regional economic cooperation" can be 
divided into three stages ; namely, cooperation, 
coordination and integration. EEC is an integration; but in 
Asia regional economic cooperation is still at the stage of co-
operation or coordinati on . There are some sub- groups of 
neighbouring countries closely related each other politically 
and economically; and in such a case there may be some pos-
sibility of their developing into common markets or economic 
integrations . But in Asia as a whole and at the present it i s 
still at the stage of strengthening step by step "cooperation" 
among countries . 
Regional cooperation among the developing countries i s 
neces s ary for two reasons . Firstly , even for the devel oping 
countries, it is necessary to secure the economies of scale in 
order to establish new indus t ries economically . It is some .. 
time s better for the se nati ons to cooperate in the building of a 
c ommon r e gi onal industry than to strive to e stablish i mport sub-
stituting industrie s individually . Secondly , from the view-
point of the effe cti v e utilization of aid, it i s not desirable that 
the aid- receiving nations compete with one anothe r in s e curing 
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aid and strive to develop industries producing same types of 
import substitutes . Thus regional cooperation among the 
developing countries would be a common concern of both the 
aiding and aided nations. For this r e ason it may be better 
for Japan to conside r to orient its financial and technical aid 
efforts to assist and encourage to promote such regional co-
operation . 
Since the Japanese economy is much different from the 
e conomies of the developing countries in Asia, there seems to 
be only a r e mote possibility of Japan's participating in such an 
economic inte gration. Japan should rather e xtend cooperation 
multi - laterally or bi- laterally, make its accumulated knowledge 
and expe rience available to the developing countries and advise 
the formulation of f e asible plans of cooperation. 
If Japan is to participate in a regional cooperation group , 
there is the possibility of its joining a group of the developed 
countries in the Pacific area. If such a group is to be orga-
nized, Japan's policy on the development of Asia through trad~ 
and aid will have to be properly adjusted to the policies of 
other member nations. If a joint aid -programme is to b e mapp -
ed out by a group of the developed nations in the Pacific are a 
for the develope d nations, such a programme could be more e f -
fe ctively carried out than the one formulated by Japan alone . 
Making a comparison between the e conomies of the developed 
nations and those of the developing nations, one finds that the 
GNP of North America is 15 times the aggregate GNP of all 
the countries in Latin America, and the GNP of Western 
Europe as a whole is 10 times that of Africa. However , 
Japan's GNP only equals to the aggregate GNP of the nations 
in South and Southeast Asia . Thus aid to the deve loping 
countries in Asia is too gigantic a proble m for Japan alone. 
It naturally follows that the joint and coordinated aid e fforts by 
the five developed countries in the Thcific area is highly desir-
able in the light of the proportion of the aggregate economic 
output of the developed nations to that of the developing nations 
in the Asian-Pacific region. 
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JAPAN'S ROLE 
TABLE S . Projections of key variables of the Japanese economy in 1970 
At 1960 prices 
(in thousand million yen) 
379 
Case 1. ~:;:nr:~~~ ~~fea~::. linancial aid to the developing countries amounted to 1 percent of its national income with trade 
3 4 5 6 
Sector Agri- Other Machi- Electricity 
culture, manufac- nery, Con- gas, water, Services Total Mining struc-fores- turing than metals, transporta-
try & Sector chemi- ti on tion & Variables fishing 4 cals communica. 
Gross industrial output 91610.8 5293.2 203.1 20456.1 32601.0 8854.2 6048.8 
Gross value added2 37916. 7 3644.5 512.0 5755.0 9689.0 2263.2 4260.1 
Compensation of employees 11017.5 178.8 1878.1 2415.4 1144.8 1645.2 
Gross business surplus 22461. 7 3042.3 215.3 3406.3 6145.1 944 . 2 1730.6 
d Depreciation allowance 4035.8 200.5 118.0 470 .6 1128. 8 174. 2 1064.4 
Labour employed (thousand employees) 51027 .3 10546. 8 44!.6 8525.6 7657 . 8 4473 . o 2921. 2 
Average wage rate (thousand ~il1ion 
yen/thousand employees) 0.40 0.22 0.32 0.26 0.50 
6. s: Gross fixed capital formation by sector 8995.4 194.9 356.8 1445 .2 2431. 7 259.0 
Gross fixed capital stock by sector 61034 .6 4066.5 2133. 2 8930 . 5 16722.6 1140.3 
c : Private final consumption expenditure 16680.9 986.9 54.4 7097 .2 1502. 0 
g : Government final consumption expenditure 4126.1 2.5 4 . 1 68 .9 201.4 16.1 
6 sf: Gross fixed capital expenditure for fin al 
use 8995. 4 29.3 43.3 3355.1 5162.1 
6 si: Increase in inventories 713 .6 251.4 17. 2 265.9 163.0 
Exports 5497 . 7 109 .0 1743 .7 2875. 8 1.1 
Imports 5027. 5 1261. 6 1146.0 665.3 1716 .6 
Px Export price indexes 0960=100) 100.0 100 .0 88. 7 93.6 
Pm: Import price indexes (1960-100) 100. 0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
b Trade balance 470.2 
Economic aid 292. 8 
Government current revenue 9050 .6 
Notes: (1) For the purpose of projection, the estimated parameters derived from time series data, 1951-1963 
are used without any modification except the ratio of aid to the national income. For the last 
decade Japan's export elasticities to the developing countries in relation to its financial aid are 
estimated to be around 0.2-0.3 depending on export sectors. 
(2) An estimated annual average growth rate .of GNP is approximately 8. 7 per cent for the period of 
1963-1970. 
2855.0 
18938.5 
1392.9 
146.1 
25.3 
5.4 
333. 7 
122.9 
and 
others 
17654.5 
11792. 7 
3935.3 
6978 .0 
879.3 
16461. 9 
0 .24 
1452.8 
9102.9 
5343. 7 
3687 .9 
317 .9 
10.6 
434.3 
115.1 
380 OKIT A AND OHNISHI 
TABLE 6. Projections of key variables of the Japanese economy in 1970 
At 1960 prices 
Thousand million yen 
Case 2. Assuming Japan's financ1fl aid to the developing countries amounted to 1 percent of its national income without 
trade expansion effects . 
3 4 6 
Sector Other Machi- Electricity Agri- Con-
Total culture, Mining manufac-
nery , struc- gas,water, Services 
fores- tu ring than metals, ti on transport a- and 
try & Sector chemi- tion & others 
Variables fishing 4 cals communica. 
Gross industrial output 80321. 3 4932.5 638.5 18344.2 27115 . 0 7687 .0 5401.3 16202 . 8 
Gross value added 33690.1 3386.4 459. 7 5137. 5 8031.9 2002.0 3787 .8 10884.8 
Compensation of employees 10145.5 171.6 1725.0 2156. 9 1000.1 1351. 5 3740.4 
Gross business surplus 19465 .9 2835 .6 178. 7 2968.8 4918.6 842.2 1430.6 6291. 4 
d Depreciation allowance 3727 .6 199. 7 109.3 l.43. 7 956.4 159. 7 1005. 7 853. l 
Labour employed (thousand employees) 49098. 7 10546 .8 441.6 8135. 9 7011. 5 4187.0 2835 . 1 15940.8 
Average wage rate (thousand million 
yen/thousand employees) 0.39 0.21 0.31 0.24 ff.48 0. 23 
/":, Gross fixed capital formation by sector 7575. 8 189.3 303. 7 1265.2 1791. 7 218 . 8 2475 . 5 1331. 7 
Gross fixed capital stock 56387 .6 4050.8 1977 .3 8419. l 14169. 2 1045. 2 17894. 8 8831. 3 
Private final consumption expenditure 15432.1 92L4 48.1 6548.5 1344. 7 1267 . 1 5032 . 8 
g : Government final consumption expenditure 3779.4 2.3 3.8 63.1 184.4 14. 7 133.8 3378 . 0 
b,. Sf: Gross fixed capital expenditure for final 
7534.5 24.1 37.9 2794.6 439~.4 21.3 264.1 
b,. Si : Increase in inventories 638.6 234.3 15.6 238.5 135.6 4 .9 9.7 
Exports 4055.8 94. 7 1463.3 1728. 7 1.1 333. 7 434.3 
Imports 4316.8 1127. 9 970. 7 588.4 1391. 9 122.9 115.1 
Px : Export price indexes 0960 .. 100) 100.0 100.0 89.6 93.8 
Pm : Import price indexes 0960=100) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
b Trade balance -261. 0 
Economic aid 260.2 
Government current reven'.le 7974. 7 
Notes: (1) For the particul ar purpose of projection, Japan's l!xport elasticities to the developing countries in relation to 
its financial aid are intendedly assumed to be zero for all export sectors , 
(2) An estimated annual average growth rate of GNP is approximately 7.5 percent for the period of 1963-1970. 
SESSION VI 
Comment on G. Ranis' Paper by Yoichi Itagaki 
I would like to make some comments on Prof. Ranis' 
paper which presented a comprehensive and clear picture of 
the United States' aid policies in Asia. In his paper, Prof. 
Ranis attempted to make clear the United States' major aid 
objectives, classifying them into two categories: first, secu-
rity and stability objectives which are considered to be of over-
riding importance to recipient countries on the periphery of 
the Communist bloc, and second, economic and social develop-
ment objectives, which are considered to be of paramount im-
portance to all other recipient countries . He then proceeded 
to show, analysing statistical evidenc0, that the United States 
aid programme shifted its emphasis from military assistance in 
the early 1950' s to economic assistance in the early 1960' s. 
Through these observations, Prof . Ranis confirmed 
that the first group of countries, such as Taiwan and Korea, 
have achieved great success in their economic development, 
after being assured security and stability, and "graduated" 
from the role of aid recipients by the mid 60' s. In this sense , 
United States' objectives have been successfully at tained . 
On the other hand, taking cases of India and Pakistan 
which belong to the second group of countries, Prof . Ranis 
tried to show that Pakistan in particular, has achieved remark-
able success in its economic development, while India suffered 
some difficulty in realising the targets of successive fivf' - year 
plans and lagged behind Pakistan economically. But all in 
all, Prof. Ranis is inclined to take the view that United States 
aid objectives for development proved on the whole successful 
in the case of these two countries . 
In this connection I would like to make two points. The 
first point concerns Prof. Ranis' understanding of the cause 
of successful development in Taiwan and Korea. Needless 
to say, the role played by the United States' .· aid in the estab-
lishment of security and stability for the countries concerned 
was extremely important. However, it does not always follow 
that a country, after being assured its security, will automati-
cally take off into self- sustained economic growth. Besides 
security and stability, there must be some other co-operating 
conditions which make economic development itself possible. 
In this regard, Prof. Ranis stressed the importance 
381 
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and the effectivene.ss of the "policy package" approach taken 
by the Unite d States and adopted by successive Taiwan govern-
ments . I admit the importance of this approach . But, in 
addition , I would stress that there were other social conditions 
of i mportance which contributed to Taiwan's economic perform-
ance . 
To my way of thinking, the comparatively high leve l of 
educational attainment of the Taiwanese people, in terms of 
literacy and so on , was one of the crucial factors in i nc r e as-
ingly successful economic activity. And the case of Kore a 
is more or less the same as that of Taiwan . 
The second point is related to Prof . Ranis' rather 
optimistic evaluation of the degree of economic development of, 
and future prospects for, Pakistan and India . With reg ard 
to Pakistan , I have almost no objections to the trend of Prof. 
Ranis' argument about the effects of United States' aid no r 
to his evaluation of Pakistan's economic performance . And 
I also accept that Pakistan' s achievements have been substanti -
ally superior to those of India, at least since the early 1960' s . 
In contrast, it seems to me that Indi a has been facing 
the t remendous di ffi culties not easily overcome for many years. 
Indian authorities ar-"' now going to attempt to change their 
policy orientation in view of their assessment of the causes of 
the economic cri sis which was brought about by too hasty an 
industrialization policy . The start of the 4th five - year p l an, 
which was to begin in the year of 1967 , will b e delayed until 
1969 . In many respects, such as food shortage, stagnation 
of industrial producti on and exports, chronic balance of payment 
deficits, huge accumulated foreign debts, and population pres-
sure, Indi a is involved in a lot of economic difficulties which 
cannot be overcome at present levels of foreign aid . She 
would need huge amounts of aid to sustain growth successfully. 
In this sense, I am rather pessimistic about India's economic 
prospects . And also, viewed from political point of view, 
there are hardly any grounds for optimism about national con-
solidation and political stability in post-Nehru India in view of 
the results of the general election early last year. In short, 
it was my general impression that Prof. Ranis' view of future 
outlook for India is too optimistic. 
There are several brief comments I would also like to 
make . The third point is related to the "policy package " 
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approach which is supported by Prof . Ranis . This approach 
should be carried out very carefully on the part of donor 
countries, for the reason that this sort of approach is a deli-
cate and difficult business as Prof. Ranis fully recognizes. 
Talks between donor and recipient countries will never 
be entirely free from the threat of intervention.in the internal 
affairs of recipient countries because of the differences in pow-
er position . Therefore, the "policy package" approach 
should b e undertaken best on the basis of multilateral arrange-
ments' so as not to inrluce feelings of reaction and nationalism 
on the part of recipient countries. 
Fourth, there is the question of food surplus assistance 
in a form of P .L. 480. There is little doubt that countries 
which received this type of aid derived much benefit from it. 
There are, however, some people who contend, paradoxically , 
that this kind of assistance disrupted and discouraged efforts 
to increase agricultural productivity in India. Unfortunately 
I cannot say 'yes or no' to this criticism since I have not yet 
studied the problem. But, could it be accepted merely as a 
necessary evil of granting P. L. 480 assistance? 
Fifthly, there is the problem of wider participation by 
millions of "little men or little people" in the development 
process through focussing on the agricultural sector and on 
the "starved" medium- scale entrepreneurs outside of agricul-
ture. I am of the samP opinion as Prof. Ranis, but it seems 
to me that he has neglected the crucial issue of how "little 
people" can be mobilized toward that direction. He only as-
serts that "little people" can be mobilized from below by means 
of appeal to their private profit motives in the market place. 
At this point, I must part company with Prof. Ranis, for the 
reason that it seems unlikely that private profit motives can b e 
relied upon in the early pre-take-off stages of development. 
Prob ably some sort of government intervention is necessary . 
In reality, mutual co-operation between gove rnment officials 
and local "little people" will be necessary . For this very 
reason I am uneasy about the possibility, for instance, of the 
Indian Administrative Service behaving just like rulers pattern-
ed on the former Indian Civil Service and not like humbl~ 
public servants . In this event, the desired co-operation 
would not result. The gap between government servants and 
"little people" may not be so e asily bridged. The proble m of 
the mobilisation of millions of "little people" from below as 
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well as from above seems a very difficult one . 
Finally, I must make a few comments on the big problem 
of regional co-operation in Southeast Asia taken up by Prof. 
Ranis. This problem is thought by him as a second major 
pillar of U .• S. assistance policy in Asia . In L .s opinion, 
regional approaches to development should not be doctrinaire, 
but pragmatic. I agree with Prof. Ranis' "concept of prag-
matic regionalism". He cited a number of co-operative pro-
jects in Southeast Asia which point the way. If efforts for 
regional co-operation involving planning for development, trade, 
and aid aspects succeeded, there are bright prospects for 
the economic development of Southeast Asian countries. 
At the moment, however, it must be frankly admitted that thl" 
case for regionalism is not strong enough to overcome the 
still powerful influence of nationalistic ideas. Even so, it 
certainly may be said that regional co-operation has already 
become a matter of common concern of developing countries in 
Southeast Asia . And it is worthy of note that with the 
voluntary co-operation of five countries (Indonesia, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines) the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded in August , 
1967 as an organizational setup for sub-regional economic and 
cultural co-opPration. It is a hopeful sign, but I am not well 
enough informed of the scope and direction of its activities. 
With regard to this point, I am happy to hear from Dr. Jones, 
the former U . S . Ambassador to Indonesia who was in the 
service there for seven years, that Indonesia took initiative 
in the establishment of AS EAN . I hope this important prob-
lem of regionalism in Asia will be discussed again in connec-
tion of Dr. Oki ta' s paper. 
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Comment on S. Okita and A . Ohnishi's Paper by Authur Paul 
Just before the adjournment of this morning's session, I 
intervened in the discussion to say that befor2 the conclusion of 
the conference, I wanted to address a few words to one particu-
lar aspect of the matters we have been discussing. These 
remarks, I said, would be made from thf' point of view of the 
developing countries of Asia . I explained that when Dr. 
Okita and Professor Kojima had talked with me last October 
about the possibility of my participating in this Conference, 
I had said that, if I did attend, I would like, to consider and 
to discuss the proposals and the papers that would be submitted 
to the Conference from the point of view of the developing na-
tions of Asia . I explained that my work for the last seven or 
eight years had been as an economic adviser to several of the 
smaller Asian countries. Therefore, I felt that my chief 
contribution to the meeting and my main field of competence might 
be to reflect the attitudes and to anticipate the reactions of 
those Asians who are struggling with the difficult tasks of plann-
ing and administering economic development programmes in the 
developing countries of Asia. 
I include this explanation of my present remarks because 
I want Dr. Okita to understand why my comments on his import-
ant paper are briefer and more general than would have been the 
case if there had been time for me to have made my other com-
ments during the morning session. 
More than any other paper submitted at this Conference, 
Dr . Oki ta' s deals with the question of joint or co-ordinated 
policies and programmes of assistance to the developing countri-
es by the five developed countries of the Pacific area. It is 
for that reason that I consider it to be one of the most signifi-
cant of the pap~rs that we have considered. Although two 
themes were proposed for this Conference, the discussion up 
until this final session has concentrated on the first theme which 
is consideration of the desirability and the feasibility of steps 
that might be taken toward the establishment of a free trade area 
in the Pacific. The second theme which is coordination of aid 
policies and the creation of aid programmes to be jointly sponsor-
ed by the developed nations of the Pacific, in my opinion, de-
serves equal, if not prior, treatment . Therefore it was grati-
fying to find this subject stressed in Dr. Okita' s paper and also 
to find certain aspects of it skillfully analysed in considerable 
detail in Mr. Onishi' s supplementary appendix to the paper . 
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In this connection I would like to suggest that in whatever pub-
lic announcement is made at the conclusion of this meeting the 
importance of the second theme of the Conference should be 
stressed. This will help to offset misconceptions regarding 
our discussions from arising in the minds of persons in the 
developing countries who are concerned with these subjects . 
This brings me to the question of the prevailing attitude 
held by many Asian officials and economists on these matters. 
Since my talks with Dr . Okita and Professor Kojima in Octo-
ber I have visited a number of the developing countries of Asia 
and I have had many conversations on this subject. Frankly 
I was very much concerned, but, on the whole not greatly sur-
prised, to find how strongly opposed many persons were to the 
proposals we have been discussing. In some cases the opposi-
tion was intense and, in my opinion, to some extent irrational. 
But whether rational or not these feelings exist and it behove s us 
to take them fully into consideration. Furthermore, some of 
the opposition was based on quite valid and fully rational grounds. 
There are a number of specific points that I could cite 
in order to give substance to the nature of the opposition to the 
proposals, but I shall concentrate my remarks on one of them. 
What I have in mind is ECAFE' s proposal to establish some 
form of payments arrangement among the member countries of 
that area. This proposal, which is an important part of 
ECAFE' s efforts to promote trade liberalization among the less 
developed countries of Asia, has gone ahead more rapidly than 
was originally expected. Detailed factual studies have been 
made of what would be the effect of pooling the trade balance 
of the ECAFE countries and of what the benefits of a clearing 
arrangement might be. At a meeting held in Bangkok last 
August, a plan prepared by Professor Robert Triffin was 
considered by a group of monetary experts from the region and 
plans for the next steps to be taken were formulated . These 
have now been submitted to the member countries. A second 
meeting on this proposal is planned for this summer at which 
the direct relationship of trade liberalization to the payments 
plan will be considered. At this meeting an effort will be 
made to devise a set of minimum standards for trade regulations 
and for control practices that would have to be adopted before 
a country could qualify as a member of the proposed clearing 
union . 
One of the by- products of the examination of the feasi-
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bility and the usefulness of creating some form of payments 
arrangement in Asia has been the way in which it has brought out 
into the open what must be faced up to by those countries who would 
be the persistent creditors of the prospective clearing union and 
whose balance of payments difficulties are greatest, These 
countries, none of whose currencies are convertible, are 
among those who are most anxious to take advantage of what-
ever benefits can be achieved by multilateral clearing of their 
trade balances with neighbouring countries who are in many 
cases their most natural trading partners. But the countries 
with more stable currencies are not themselves going to join in 
any clearing arrangement, especially one which might extend 
even modest credits, until those who are in persistent difficul-
ties are willing to impose restraints on their trade practices 
and to introduce sufficient internal financial discipline so that 
if assistance is given to their current problems there wi ll be 
some assurance of a future solution to them. Incidentally I 
might mention that this is the kind of pressure that bilateral 
aid donors have wanted for a long time to exert, but which has 
frequently led to difficult relationships with aid-receiving coun-
tries. It is far easier for a developing country of Asia to 
accept joint pressure from a neighboring group of Asian coun-
tries, especially if there would be immediate trade advantages 
in doing so. 
What is needed now for ECAFE' s proposals to move 
ahead more rapidly is Japanese and Australian participation in 
the plan, plus some gesture of endorsement or support by the 
United States. But what we have been discussing here has 
been a clearing arrangement between the developed nations of 
the Pacific area, all of whose currencies are fully convertible 
and for whose benefit highly efficient and low cost commercial 
clearing facilities already exist. This seems to me to be an 
inward looking step. Taken in combination with the lack of 
interest and of support given so far by the developed countries 
of the Pacific to the ECAFE proposals, this set of circums-
tances would appear to be a good and sufficient reason justify-
ing adverse reactions of the developing countries of Asia to the 
general nature of the propo s als we have been considering. 
Another matter of concern to the developing countries of 
Asia is the possible effect of an economic grouping of Pacific 
countries toward increasing their support and widening the 
scope of the functions of the Asia Development Bank. Dis-
cussion of the formation of a separate Development Bank on 
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the part of the developed countries of the area again is an in-
ward looking step which is bound to be disturbing to the develop-
ing countries of the area. 
For these reasons I feel that it is of great importance 
that the attitudes of the developing countries should be given 
serious consideration before further steps toward closer econo-
mic relationships are taken by the developed countries of the 
Pacific area. For the same reasons I also feel that the s e cond 
theme of the Conference, which is the creation of joint or co-
ordinated policies and programs of aid, should be given pri or ity 
over considerations pertaining to the Pacific Free Trade Are a . 
Aside from these questions of emphasis and priority , 
there are some general remarks I want to make at this t ime. 
My initial thoughts regarding the desirability of formalizing 
closer economic ties between the developed countries of the 
Pacific were mixed and were partly conditioned by my close 
association with the problems of the developing countri es of 
Asia. But the more deeply I considered the matter and the 
more closely I have studied the e arlie r papers as well as those 
submitte d to this gathering, the more important the potenti al 
benefits appear to be . 
. If the next steps that are taken are " outward" lookin g 
and if the organizational proposals are "open- ended" i n struc-
ture, then I believe it will be highly desirable to continue the 
explorations started at this Conference . In regard to the 
question of timing and the readiness of various countries for 
steps of this nature, I would like to say that I have been great-
ly impressed with the rapidity with which attitudes are changing 
in developed countries especially in regard to protectionism. 
This is partly due to the rate of technological change in indus-
trial equipment and in methods of agriculture . I have a feel-
ing that a few years from now our analytical work will be more 
devoted to calculations of how the impacts of technological change 
and synthetic products can be eased than to changes in tariff 
schedules. Dynamic factors present grave difficulties in 
judging projections of the kind we have been reviewing . 
In conclusion I want to apologize to Dr. Oki ta for having 
. used this time for a discussion of some matters only indirectly 
related to his paper. I concur with his general conclusions 
and I was particularly interested in the tables prepared by 
Mr. Ohnishi which throw new light on some of the subjects we 
have been discussing. 
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Discussion on Ranis' and Okita-Ohnishi' s Papers 
In reply Prof. Ranis took up the three mair.. points rais-
ed by Prof. Itagaki. First, he expressed optimism about 
the "policy package" adopted by India since devaluation of the 
rupee in 1966. Import liberalisation and normal monsoon con-
ditions give promise of improved Indian performances. Second , 
he suggested that PL 480 assistance could no longer be thought 
of as a "necessary evil", since United States' food surpluses 
had been used up. It now constituted genuine assistance to 
countries facing food crises . Third, Prof . Ranis agreed fully 
that the problem of mobilising "little peoples" to the develop-
ment objective was not easily solved and that governments must 
play an active part in the process. However, he was concern-
ed that governments intervene to create more perfect markets 
and utilize market incentives more effectively rather than try to 
substitute for market forces. 
Dr . Oki ta agreed completely with the remarks made by 
Mr . Paul, emphasizing that due regard must be paid to the opi-
nion expressed by people from developing nations . He went 
on to suggest that it would be better to invite econorn.ists from 
developing countries to any future mc·etings and discuss with 
them the possibilities for regional co- operation in the Pacific 
and Asian region . He also agreed that much weight should be 
placed on joint aid efforts by advanced Pacific countries . 
Further discussion was adjuourned until Session VII. 
SESSION Vil 
Summary of Discussion Sessions I--Vl by Harry G , Johnson 
The Conference set out to discuss the possibilities for 
freer trade in the Pacific Region, and the possibilities of com-
bining this, in the first instance, with assistance to the develop-
ing countries of Asia . In the forefront was the notion of the 
Pacific Free Trade Area, but this, I think, was regarded by 
all of us as an organizing theme rather than as a specific prac-
tical possibility which we would discuss in detail. 
At the end of discussion we have arrived at some general 
ideas of the positions and interests of the various countries in 
freer Pacific trade and in the possibilities of a Pacific Free 
Trade Area. To my mind, one of the most interesting things 
which has emerged from the discussion has been that the econo-
mists from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have arrived 
in their thinking about national trade policy at much the same 
point. That is, they have arrived at the conclusion that the 
protectionist policies followed up to now have resulted in the 
creation of high cost, inefficient, excessively diversified in-
dustries, and that their economies are sufficiently industriahz .. 
ed (perhaps with some reservations about New Zealand , but 
certainly not about Australia and Canada), sufficientcly effici-
ent, and sufficiently armed with capital, skilled labour , an l 
technology, that they can contemplate taking a major step for-
ward into the world economy . They have the capacity to be 
efficient industrial producers if they specialize, cut down the 
variety, and concentrate their industrial efforts, and they 
could do this most conveniently within the framework of free 
trade access to a largr-r "<arket. In the Canadian case it is 
obviously the US market that has to be considered, although 
Canadian economists have been looking in recent years increas-
ingly to Japan also as a possible market; in the case of Aust-
ralia and New Zealand the orientation is more toward Japan. 
That general -theme emerges with surprising similarity from 
the different papers we have had from Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand. 
At the same time, for Australia and New Zealand there 
is the major problem of markets for their agricultural exports, 
and here they look obviously to Japan. The Canadian position 
in agriculture is less serious in-as-much as agricultural prob-
lems are less important for Canada, but there still are problems 
there, and one of our major themes has been the question of 
possibilitiP.s of liberalizing agricultural trade. We devoted 
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one session to that. Here I think the opinions in the confe-
rence have been mixed, and a crucial element is the position 
of Japan. 
Japanese economists tends to take the present positi on 
as more or less immutable, whereas to the outside observers, 
as Sir Crawford in fact e ii,phasized, it looks very much as if 
the present policy will have to be transitional, that with the 
growth of Japanese income the policy of protecting domesti c 
agriculture heavily will have to go, that foodstuffs are avai l-
able far more cheaply from outside, particularly from Aust-
ralia and New Zealand, and that in the interest of the Jap ane s e 
consumer, liberalization of trade and the exploitation of comple -
mentarity in natural resources and skills would indicate a move 
toward the reduction of barriPrs to imports of agricultural pro-
ducts. This would be in Japan's inte rest both in terms of con-
sumer welfare and in terms of increased markets in Japan ' s in-
dustrial exports. The position of Japanese economists i s not 
as decided as the position of Canadian, Australian, and New 
Zealand on what their countries need, and this is one of the 
, themes we might explore further this morning. 
The idea of Pacific Free Trade Area raises the ques-
tion of world trade policy and how that might evolve. Here 
the position of the United States is crucial. The Amer ican 
economists took the view that there is a lot of time that the 
Kennedy Round has still to be digested, and that a second Ken-
nedy Round will prove possible. There is a division of opi-
nion on the evidence of whether the Kennedy Round really mark s 
the end of the phase of the world trade policy (the last step, 
so to speak, of multilateral non-disciminatory liberalization by 
negotiation) or whether it marks the first tentative step which 
could be consolidated much more feasibly once the Common 
market 1 s position is more settled. 
I think that the economists from the other four countrie s 
do not feel there is a lot of time and they are not particularly 
happy to have people in the United States take this view. It 
became clear that from the standpoint of Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, and Japan, there is a hope that the U.S. would 
provide some positive leadership. We look to the U .S. for 
leadership, and leadership which consists of saying "there is 
a lot of time", "delay" and "wait and see" is not satisfactory . . 
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There is also the feeling that given domestic obstacles 
which inhibit the adoption of progressive trade policies in 
smaller countries, some leadership from the U.S. would be a 
great help- - a challenge to which other governments would r e s-
pond. That certainly was the view put forward by Australian 
speakers, and it is true for Canada also. The United States 
could at least encourage progressive policies without having to 
declare itself in favour of trade liberalization in a Pacific Free 
Trade Area . This would be tremendous stimulus to move pub-
lic opinion in the direction which e conomic analysis of the situ-
ations in the various countries indicates would be intelligent 
national policy. 
While we talked about the Pacific Free Trade Area 
several speakers, acknowledging that P AFT A is a long way 
in the future, have raised the question of what could be done to 
move toward freer trade in a less comprehensive way, but 
still on the regional basis, and various ideas have been put 
forward here : the liberalization of trade in particular sectors 
among the countries of the region. We have not gone into 
that in great detail and that, too, is a subject that might be 
explored a little further. 
I think in our discussion, there appeared some difference s 
of opinion . Japanese speakers tended to feel that Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand did not have much industrial poten-
tial, whereas the analysis of both Australian and Canadian 
economists fairly convincingly established that industrial sect-
ors in those two countries are quite capable of surviving inter-
national competition if they have the opportunity to specialize, 
become less diversified, and do what they do well on a larger 
scale. 
We turned yesterday afternoon away from the question 
of free trade among the Jive countries toward the question of the 
promotion of development. Here, I think, there is again 
a difference in viewpoint between the Canadian, Australian, 
and New Zealand representatives, on the one hand, and Japa-
nese and American representatives, on the other, on the ques-
tion of what the connection between trade and aid is. The way 
policy is conducted in most countries, trade and aid come under 
quite separate departments of government and aid policy is 
thought of as one thing , based on generosity plus self-interest 
and so forth, and trade policy is thought of as something else. 
This comes out, among other things, in the fact that we have 
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no qualms about discrimination on regional and national grounds 
in the giving of aid, but when it comes to the question of trade 
policy to help developing countries, the principle of non-dis -
crimination stands there, like a powerful obstacle to clear-
thinking. In addition, while aid is thought of as involving 
charity, gift, transfers and so on, trade tends to be thought 
in highly commercial terms. 
The view of the relation between trade and aid that has 
been emerging in recent years, and here I may be exaggerating 
the influence on thinking of ide as which have come from Canadi -
an and Australian economists, is that trade and aid are really 
joint parts of a single operation. Pouring resources into the 
industrialization of developing countries is going to produce 
very unsatisfactory results unless, at the same time, changes 
are made which force the industrialization of these countrie s 
to conform to some extent with comparative advantage. That 
means essentially the combination of aid for development plus 
the provision of trade opportunities to encourage specialization 
in development along lines of comparative advantage . The 
latter has two elements to it at least. One is competition in 
less developed country markets from foreign suppliers--the 
discipline of the competition and also demonstration effects --
the exarnple of the way other nations do business. The other 
is that, given the fact of under-development, the national mar-
ket itself does not provide very much of what is really required 
for the industrial efficiency. 
This second factor really has two aspects to it again, 
although typically writings on the subject tend to concentrate 
on one. The first is the question of the large market. Pro-
tected national economies do not afford a large market within 
which competition can occur, and in which the economies of 
large- scale production and of specialization can be realized. 
A second, which I think is of great importance and which is 
being recognized gradually, is that modern industrial produc-
tion is a matter of extreme specialization within the industrial 
sector itself, specialization in production of components, parts 
and inputs of various kinds . To be efficient in the modern 
world, you need not only a large market in which to sell your 
products but you also have to have that kind of highly specializ-
ed industrial structure from which to obtain components and 
materials. 
What this implies is that the efficient promotion of deve-
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lo-pment in developing countries is not just a matter of giving 
them resources and letting them forge ahead on the basis of 
the domestic market. Development strategy based on that 
concept typically involves excess-diversification, extremely 
inefficient production of components, potentially efficient ope-
rations being handicapped by having to buy inefficiently produced 
components, and reliance on inefficient credit markets. To 
make the development effort succeed, you need to combine the 
contribution of the real resources, which these countries do 
not have, with the opening of markets, so that development 
funds can be used in efficient investment, investment which has 
some hope of leading to the take-off or the self-sustaining 
stage of the development. 
There is some division among us on this question. 
Looking at Canadian, and Australian experience, you see at 
a later stage of development the same kind of problem, These 
are rich countries, but they could be a lot richer particularly 
if they specialized more and could participate more fully in the 
world market. Looking back down the line to the developing 
countries, it seems to be of great importance that we should 
start at this stage to bring in both trade and aid as complement-
ary things. This, I think, comes out very clearly in the 
very interesting appendix to Dr. Oki ta' s paper which essential-
ly provides the calculations that that kind of thinking about trade 
and development suggests. That is, you have the question . 
whether the aid would be effective in developing countries, but 
also the question whether it will promote growing markets which 
will enable developed countries themselves to continue along 
the lines of specialization that they are presently engaged on. 
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Free Discussion 
Free discussion forcussed on two broad issues. First, 
emphasis was given to the conne ction between aid-giving and 
the creation of trading opportunities for less developed countri -
es, and polici es designed to integrate aid and trade policy . 
Second, some questions were raised about the transfer probl e m 
and its relation to aid- giving. 
It was suggested, parti cularly by American participants ~ 
that complete agreement with Prof. Johnson's view of the im-
portance of trading opportunities for less developed countries 
was quite consistent with skepticisr.n about the particular for in 
which putting this view into operation has taken in recent 
years. The appropriate mechanism for inducing less develop-
ed countries to specialize in world markets may still not be the 
provision of preferential access to advanced country markets. 
Prof. Johnson agreed that his view did not lead automatically 
to the preference proposal, some variants of which were espe-
cially undesirable. If preferential arrangements take the 
form of quota exemptions from duties, they might have a very 
bad effect in reinforcing protectionism by providing a protected 
market of a limited size, whereas what is really required are 
possibilities for growth by competition on level terms. 
Discussion turned to various mechanisms for integrating 
aid and trade policies . An American partici pant expressed 
sympathy with non-discriminatory aid policy and closer connec-
tions between trade and aid policy but doubted whether the gap 
between the two could be bridged both because of the character 
of international institutions for aid- giving, \and because of im-
portant and useful differences in the nature of aid policy proces -
ses. The former are more flexible, the latter virtually ir-
reversible in the short run. This point was qualified in so 
far as it seemed feasible for temporary preferences to be ex-
tended on a discriminatory basis. Others pointed out that 
these divisions in the aid and trade policy-making processes 
in the United States do not apply so clearly in Britain , France, 
and other countries represented at the conference. 
The difficulties associated with outside intervention in 
the directing of aid- use were also emphasiz~d. Australia 
was cited as a donor which provides virtually all of her aid in 
the form of grants dictated by the requests of recipient govern-
ments. Such an approach, when there is minimal donor inter-
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vention, has its own limitations and frustrations. But it see ;:y-1 _ 
ed clear that directing the use of aid in the way i mplied by pro-
posals for linking aid policy to the development of less developed 
country comparative advantage in world markets, would raise 
all the delicate problems of intervention and cooperation common 
to other forms of aid-giving. These need to be thought through 
very throughly. 
A Japanese participant suggested that Japan's aid policy 
had been oriented toward export promotion in the past. Al-
though the aid-element in Japanese aid-giving had been general-
ly thought to be small, at least there were strong incentives to 
extend aid-giving along these lines. Fallowing Dr. Okita' s 
paper in the previous session, it was suggested that the empha-
sis should turn towards export promotion from less developed 
countries. The concept of "infant export industries" is an 
accepted rationalization for preferences to less developed coun-
try manufactures and semi-processed goods. It might also be 
applied to primary product imports from less developed countri-
es. Another participant stressed that joint action by Pacific 
basin countries along these lines would be desirable. 
The value of discrimination in aid-giving was stressed 
particularly for small countries. So too was the value of 
cooperation .. in aid-giving among smaller donors, and regionali-
zation or multilateralization in aid-giving through the World 
Bank or Asian Development Bank. This was thought desir-
able from the point of view of directing aid into more effective 
development projects, such as with the Mekong Scheme or 
Indus River Scheme, and reducing national sensitivities about 
directing aid-giving . 
In additi on, others saw the P AFT A proposal as a means 
of breaking through the aid-trade problem in the Asian-Pacific 
region. It was argued that if advanced Pacific countries 
became committed to a substantial regional freer trade arrange-
ment, unilaterally offered free access to their markets for 
less developed country exports, and used their influence in a 
few other relevant directions, they would achieve a lot more 
than ours can be hoped for from UNCT AD discussions at Dehli 
and after. 
Some questions were also raised about the need for coun-
tries with balance of payments problems to tie aid . A New 
Zealand participant suggested that this might at least induce 
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large r aid efforts by more donors . On the other hand others 
cautioned against the conclusion that the transfer problem is 
acute in the case of aid but not in the case of trade "aid". 
The simultaneous and universal adoption of discriminatory pre-
ference schemes might lead to very serious transfer problems. 
* * * * * * * * 
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